Clock skew fixes.

Allow some slop (currently 3 minutes) when checking certificate validity.

Change certificate lifetime from 1 year to 2 days.  Since we
regenerate regularly (we regenerate regularly, right??), this
shouldn't be a problem.

Have directories reject descriptors published too far in the future
(currently 30 minutes).  If dirservs don't do this:
    0) Today is January 1, 2000.
    1) A very skewed server publishes descriptor X with a declared
       publication time of August 1, 2000.
    2) The directory includes X.
    3) Because of certificate lifetime issues, nobody can use the
       skewed server.
    4) The server fixes its skew, and goes to republish a new descriptor Y
       with publication time of January 1, 2000.
    5) But because the directory already has a "more recent" descriptor X,
       it rejects descriptor "Y" as superseded!

This patch should make step 2 go away.

svn:r658

diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index b9f3dbab3809432e9bc6f69168ab4d954a2427cd..b7f13aae0f04db4a3bcd8fa26e51f5aa7362b334 100644 (file)
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 
+/* How long do certificates live? (sec) */
+#define CERT_LIFETIME  (2*24*60*60)
+/* How much clock skew do we tolerate when checking certificates? (sec) */
+#define CERT_ALLOW_SKEW (3*60)
+
 struct tor_tls_context_st {
   SSL_CTX *ctx;
 };
@@ -166,7 +171,7 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
     goto error;
   if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
     goto error;
-  end_time = start_time + 24*60*60*365;
+  end_time = start_time + CERT_LIFETIME;
   if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
     goto error;
   if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
@@ -499,18 +504,20 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls)
   X509 *cert = NULL;
   EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
   RSA *rsa = NULL;
-  time_t now;
+  time_t now, t;
   crypto_pk_env_t *r = NULL;
   if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
     return NULL;
   
   now = time(NULL);
-  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(cert), &now) > 0) {
-    log_fn(LOG_WARN,"X509_get_notBefore(cert) is in the future");
+  t = now - CERT_ALLOW_SKEW;
+  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(cert), &t) > 0) {
+    log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Certificate becomes valid in the future: possible clock skew.");
     goto done;
   }
-  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(cert), &now) < 0) {
-    log_fn(LOG_WARN,"X509_get_notAfter(cert) is in the past");
+  t = now + CERT_ALLOW_SKEW;
+  if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(cert), &t) < 0) {
+    log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Certificate already expired; possible clock skew.");
     goto done;
   }
   

diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index cd6b02e0ed23ed6cdacae18dcfd64adf0195c324..c5f170a6a0d8a32d71544a7dba38fa4ec73a9f89 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 
 #include "or.h"
 
+/* How far in the future do we allow a router to get? (seconds) */
+#define ROUTER_ALLOW_SKEW (30*60)
+
 extern or_options_t options; /* command-line and config-file options */
 
 static int the_directory_is_dirty = 1;
@@ -219,7 +222,12 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(const char **desc)
   tor_free(desc_tmp);
   /* Okay.  Now check whether the fingerprint is recognized. */
   if (!dirserv_router_fingerprint_is_known(ri)) {
-    log(LOG_WARN, "Identity is unrecognized for descriptor");
+    log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity is unrecognized for descriptor");
+    goto err;
+  }
+  /* Is there too much clock skew? */
+  if (ri->published_on > time(NULL)+ROUTER_ALLOW_SKEW) {
+    log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Publication time for nickname %s is too far in the future; possible clock skew.", ri->nickname);
     goto err;
   }
   /* Do we already have an entry for this router? */