static thread_local sd_id128_t saved_machine_id = {};
int r;
- assert_return(ret, -EINVAL);
-
if (sd_id128_is_null(saved_machine_id)) {
r = id128_read("/etc/machine-id", ID128_FORMAT_PLAIN, &saved_machine_id);
if (r < 0)
return -ENOMEDIUM;
}
- *ret = saved_machine_id;
+ if (ret)
+ *ret = saved_machine_id;
return 0;
}
static thread_local sd_id128_t saved_boot_id = {};
int r;
- assert_return(ret, -EINVAL);
-
if (sd_id128_is_null(saved_boot_id)) {
r = id128_read("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id", ID128_FORMAT_UUID, &saved_boot_id);
if (r == -ENOENT && proc_mounted() == 0)
return -ENOMEDIUM;
}
- *ret = saved_boot_id;
+ if (ret)
+ *ret = saved_boot_id;
return 0;
}
static thread_local sd_id128_t saved_invocation_id = {};
int r;
- assert_return(ret, -EINVAL);
-
if (sd_id128_is_null(saved_invocation_id)) {
/* We first check the environment. The environment variable is primarily relevant for user
* services, and sufficiently safe as long as no privilege boundary is involved. */
r = get_invocation_from_environment(&saved_invocation_id);
- if (r >= 0) {
- *ret = saved_invocation_id;
- return 0;
- } else if (r != -ENXIO)
- return r;
-
- /* The kernel keyring is relevant for system services (as for user services we don't store
- * the invocation ID in the keyring, as there'd be no trust benefit in that). */
- r = get_invocation_from_keyring(&saved_invocation_id);
+ if (r == -ENXIO)
+ /* The kernel keyring is relevant for system services (as for user services we don't
+ * store the invocation ID in the keyring, as there'd be no trust benefit in that). */
+ r = get_invocation_from_keyring(&saved_invocation_id);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
- *ret = saved_invocation_id;
+ if (ret)
+ *ret = saved_invocation_id;
return 0;
}