Add section on safe renegotiation.

diff --git a/doc/gnutls.texi b/doc/gnutls.texi
index f0e1f883d4c49f60c8252cee66cf9f7e900307bc..1e09e4114f99c8bed61fd7d0ef2289b29b499578 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/gnutls.texi
+++ b/doc/gnutls.texi
@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ also supports @acronym{X.509} and @acronym{OpenPGP} @xcite{RFC4880}.
 * Selecting cryptographic key sizes::
 * On SSL 2 and older protocols::
 * On Record Padding::
+* Safe Renegotiation::
 @end menu
 
 @node TLS layers
@@ -1229,6 +1230,71 @@ here are some links:
 
 @url{http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.tls/3079}
 
+@node Safe Renegotiation
+@section Safe Renegotiation
+@cindex renegotiation
+
+Some application protocols and implementations uses the TLS
+renegotiation feature in a manner that enables attackers to insert
+content of his choice in the beginning of a TLS session.
+
+The simplest example is HTTP.  For HTTP one attack works by having the
+attacker simulate a client and connect to a server, with server-only
+authentication, and send some data intended to cause harm.  When the
+proper client attempts to contact the server, the attacker hijacks
+that connection and uses the TLS renegotiation feature with the server
+and splices in the client connection to the already established
+connection between the client and server.  The attacker will not be
+able to read the data exchanged between the client and the server.
+However, some server implementations will (incorrectly) assume that
+the data sent by the attacker was sent by the now authenticated
+client.  The result is a prefix plain-text injection attack.
+
+While fixing these application protocols and implementations would be
+one natural reaction, an extension to TLS has been designed that
+cryptographically binds together any renegotiated handshakes with the
+initial negotiation.  When the extension is used, the attack is
+detected and the session can be terminated.  The extension is
+specified in @xcite{RFC5746}.
+
+GnuTLS supports the safe renegotiation extension.  By default, GnuTLS
+clients will attempt to negotiate the safe renegotiation extension
+when talking to servers.  Also by default, GnuTLS servers will accept
+the extension when presented by clients.  However, by default GnuTLS
+client and servers will not refuse renegotiation attempts when the
+extension has not been negotiated, as this would break backwards
+compatibility and cause too much operational problems.  We will likely
+reconsider these defaults in the future.
+
+To modify the default behaviour, we have introduced three new priority
+strings.  The priority strings can be used by applications
+(@pxref{gnutls_priority_set}) and end users (e.g., @code{--priority}
+parameter to @code{gnutls-cli} and @code{gnutls-serv}).
+
+The @code{%UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION} priority string requests what is
+today the default behaviour, i.e., that handshakes without the safe
+renegotiation extension is permitted.  To make more use of the
+extension, you may provide the @code{%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION} priority
+string.  In this mode, clients will require that the server supports
+the extension for the initial handshake, and servers will require that
+the client supports the extension for renegotiated handshakes.  If you
+want to make a server refuse even initial handshakes without the safe
+renegotiation extension, use the @code{%INITIAL_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION}
+priority string.  It is possible to disable use of the extension
+completely by using the @code{%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION} priority
+string however this is recommended against except for debugging.
+
+For applications we have introduced three new APIs related to safe
+renegotiation.  The @ref{gnutls_safe_renegotiation_status} function is
+used to check if the extension has been negotiated on a session, and
+can be used both by clients and servers.  The
+@ref{gnutls_safe_renegotiation_set} function allows applications to
+request that the extension should be disabled (or re-enabled) in
+handshakes for the session.  The
+@ref{gnutls_safe_negotiation_set_initial} function is only relevant
+for servers, and is used to enforce that clients support the extension
+even on the initial handshake.
+
 @node Authentication methods
 @chapter Authentication Methods
 
@@ -4210,6 +4276,11 @@ Thompson, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy
 Certificate Profile", June 2004, available from
 @url{http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820}.
 
+@item @anchor{RFC5746}[RFC5746]
+E. Rescorla, M. Ray, S. Dispensa, and N. Oskov, "Transport Layer
+Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension", February 2010,
+available from @url{http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5746}.
+
 @item @anchor{TLSTKT}[TLSTKT]
 Joseph Salowey, Hao Zhou, Pasi Eronen, Hannes Tschofenig, "Transport
 Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State",