6.6-stable patches

added patches:
	btrfs-fix-use-after-free-in-btrfs_encoded_read_endio.patch
	f2fs-fix-to-wait-dio-completion.patch
	mmc-sdhci-msm-fix-crypto-key-eviction.patch
	selinux-ignore-unknown-extended-permissions.patch

diff --git a/queue-6.6/btrfs-fix-use-after-free-in-btrfs_encoded_read_endio.patch b/queue-6.6/btrfs-fix-use-after-free-in-btrfs_encoded_read_endio.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c6fba67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-6.6/btrfs-fix-use-after-free-in-btrfs_encoded_read_endio.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+From 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 18:16:48 +0100
+Subject: btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
+
+From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+
+commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc upstream.
+
+Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is
+happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU
+runner device:
+
+  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780
+  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219
+
+  CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15
+  Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020
+  Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs]
+  Call Trace:
+   <TASK>
+   dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0
+   ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
+   print_report+0x174/0x505
+   ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
+   ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410
+   ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
+   kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0
+   ? lock_release+0x708/0x780
+   ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60
+   lock_release+0x708/0x780
+   ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
+   ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
+   ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
+   _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60
+   __wake_up+0x44/0x60
+   btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs]
+   btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs]
+   ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780
+   ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0
+   ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
+   ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460
+   ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0
+   ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460
+   process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460
+   ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
+   ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240
+   worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0
+   ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
+   kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0
+   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+   ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
+   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
+   </TASK>
+
+  Allocated by task 3661:
+   kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
+   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
+   __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
+   btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs]
+   send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs]
+   process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs]
+   changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs]
+   btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs]
+   _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs]
+   btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs]
+   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0
+   do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
+   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+
+  Freed by task 3661:
+   kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
+   kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
+   kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
+   __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70
+   kfree+0x143/0x490
+   btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs]
+   send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs]
+   process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs]
+   changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs]
+   btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs]
+   _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs]
+   btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs]
+   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0
+   do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
+   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+
+  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00
+   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96
+  The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
+   freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60)
+
+  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
+  page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83
+  flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
+  page_type: f5(slab)
+  raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004
+  raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
+  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
+
+  Memory state around the buggy address:
+   ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
+   ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
+  >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
+                              ^
+   ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
+   ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+  ==================================================================
+
+Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that
+the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on
+the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler.
+
+Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in
+btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct
+btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack.
+
+Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when
+analyzing the vmcore after a crash:
+
+*(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = {
+       .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){
+               .lock = (spinlock_t){
+                       .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){
+                               .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){
+                                       .val = (atomic_t){
+                                               .counter = (int)-2005885696,
+                                       },
+                                       .locked = (u8)0,
+                                       .pending = (u8)157,
+                                       .locked_pending = (u16)40192,
+                                       .tail = (u16)34928,
+                               },
+                               .magic = (unsigned int)536325682,
+                               .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29,
+                               .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0,
+                               .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){
+                                       .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c,
+                                       .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 },
+                                       .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "",
+                                       .wait_type_outer = (u8)37,
+                                       .wait_type_inner = (u8)178,
+                                       .lock_type = (u8)154,
+                               },
+                       },
+                       .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 },
+                       .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){
+                               .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c,
+                               .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 },
+                               .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "",
+                               .wait_type_outer = (u8)37,
+                               .wait_type_inner = (u8)178,
+                               .lock_type = (u8)154,
+                       },
+               },
+               .head = (struct list_head){
+                       .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca,
+                       .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47,
+               },
+       },
+       .pending = (atomic_t){
+               .counter = (int)-1491499288,
+       },
+       .status = (blk_status_t)130,
+}
+
+Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the
+large negative atomic values of ->pending or
+->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic
+0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus
+pointer values for ->wait->head.
+
+To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the
+corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on
+x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic
+operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already
+decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not
+completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread
+continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the
+atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and
+continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the
+test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a
+use-after-free.
+
+Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
+Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com>
+Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl")
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
+Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9@foxmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/inode.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+@@ -9972,7 +9972,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(str
+                */
+               WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status);
+       }
+-      if (!atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending))
++      if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending))
+               wake_up(&priv->wait);
+       bio_put(&bbio->bio);
+ }

diff --git a/queue-6.6/f2fs-fix-to-wait-dio-completion.patch b/queue-6.6/f2fs-fix-to-wait-dio-completion.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..d5827b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-6.6/f2fs-fix-to-wait-dio-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 15:17:11 +0800
+Subject: f2fs: fix to wait dio completion
+
+From: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
+
+commit 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d upstream.
+
+It should wait all existing dio write IOs before block removal,
+otherwise, previous direct write IO may overwrite data in the
+block which may be reused by other inode.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
+[ Resolve line conflicts to make it work on 6.6.y ]
+Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9@foxmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/f2fs/file.c |   13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
++++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
+@@ -1037,6 +1037,13 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap
+                               return err;
+               }
+ 
++              /*
++               * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after
++               * IO completion.
++               */
++              if (attr->ia_size < old_size)
++                      inode_dio_wait(inode);
++
+               f2fs_down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]);
+               filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping);
+ 
+@@ -1873,6 +1880,12 @@ static long f2fs_fallocate(struct file *
+       if (ret)
+               goto out;
+ 
++      /*
++       * wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after IO
++       * completion.
++       */
++      inode_dio_wait(inode);
++
+       if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
+               if (offset >= inode->i_size)
+                       goto out;

diff --git a/queue-6.6/mmc-sdhci-msm-fix-crypto-key-eviction.patch b/queue-6.6/mmc-sdhci-msm-fix-crypto-key-eviction.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..a97863e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-6.6/mmc-sdhci-msm-fix-crypto-key-eviction.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 8d90a86ed053226a297ce062f4d9f4f521e05c4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 20:19:48 -0800
+Subject: mmc: sdhci-msm: fix crypto key eviction
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit 8d90a86ed053226a297ce062f4d9f4f521e05c4c upstream.
+
+Commit c7eed31e235c ("mmc: sdhci-msm: Switch to the new ICE API")
+introduced an incorrect check of the algorithm ID into the key eviction
+path, and thus qcom_ice_evict_key() is no longer ever called.  Fix it.
+
+Fixes: c7eed31e235c ("mmc: sdhci-msm: Switch to the new ICE API")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Message-ID: <20241213041958.202565-6-ebiggers@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c |   16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c
+@@ -1867,20 +1867,20 @@ static int sdhci_msm_program_key(struct
+       struct sdhci_msm_host *msm_host = sdhci_pltfm_priv(pltfm_host);
+       union cqhci_crypto_cap_entry cap;
+ 
++      if (!(cfg->config_enable & CQHCI_CRYPTO_CONFIGURATION_ENABLE))
++              return qcom_ice_evict_key(msm_host->ice, slot);
++
+       /* Only AES-256-XTS has been tested so far. */
+       cap = cq_host->crypto_cap_array[cfg->crypto_cap_idx];
+       if (cap.algorithm_id != CQHCI_CRYPTO_ALG_AES_XTS ||
+               cap.key_size != CQHCI_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE_256)
+               return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-      if (cfg->config_enable & CQHCI_CRYPTO_CONFIGURATION_ENABLE)
+-              return qcom_ice_program_key(msm_host->ice,
+-                                          QCOM_ICE_CRYPTO_ALG_AES_XTS,
+-                                          QCOM_ICE_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE_256,
+-                                          cfg->crypto_key,
+-                                          cfg->data_unit_size, slot);
+-      else
+-              return qcom_ice_evict_key(msm_host->ice, slot);
++      return qcom_ice_program_key(msm_host->ice,
++                                  QCOM_ICE_CRYPTO_ALG_AES_XTS,
++                                  QCOM_ICE_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE_256,
++                                  cfg->crypto_key,
++                                  cfg->data_unit_size, slot);
+ }
+ 
+ #else /* CONFIG_MMC_CRYPTO */

diff --git a/queue-6.6/selinux-ignore-unknown-extended-permissions.patch b/queue-6.6/selinux-ignore-unknown-extended-permissions.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..83c71ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-6.6/selinux-ignore-unknown-extended-permissions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 900f83cf376bdaf798b6f5dcb2eae0c822e908b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Thi=C3=A9baud=20Weksteen?= <tweek@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2024 12:09:19 +1100
+Subject: selinux: ignore unknown extended permissions
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
+
+commit 900f83cf376bdaf798b6f5dcb2eae0c822e908b6 upstream.
+
+When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead
+of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be
+added without interfering with older kernels.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
+Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ security/selinux/ss/services.c |    8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
++++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+@@ -956,7 +956,10 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(st
+                                       xpermd->driver))
+                       return;
+       } else {
+-              BUG();
++              pr_warn_once(
++                      "SELinux: unknown extended permission (%u) will be ignored\n",
++                      node->datum.u.xperms->specified);
++              return;
+       }
+ 
+       if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+@@ -993,7 +996,8 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(st
+                                       node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+               }
+       } else {
+-              BUG();
++              pr_warn_once("SELinux: unknown specified key (%u)\n",
++                           node->key.specified);
+       }
+ }
+ 

diff --git a/queue-6.6/series b/queue-6.6/series
index b9df4e32115d750bc250df9e5e31b6320944f1f7..78a82af01fca583e9389bba49e0f7dc9b02668dc 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-6.6/series
+++ b/queue-6.6/series
@@ -111,3 +111,7 @@ usb-typec-ucsi-glink-fix-off-by-one-in-connector_sta.patch
 usb-xhci-avoid-queuing-redundant-stop-endpoint-comma.patch
 alsa-ump-shut-up-truncated-string-warning.patch
 platform-x86-mlx-platform-call-pci_dev_put-to-balanc.patch
+f2fs-fix-to-wait-dio-completion.patch
+selinux-ignore-unknown-extended-permissions.patch
+btrfs-fix-use-after-free-in-btrfs_encoded_read_endio.patch
+mmc-sdhci-msm-fix-crypto-key-eviction.patch