--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file circuitlist.h
+ * \brief Header file for circuitlist.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H
+#define TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H
+
+#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
+
+/** Circuit state: I'm the origin, still haven't done all my handshakes. */
+#define CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING 0
+/** Circuit state: Waiting to process the onionskin. */
+#define CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING 1
+/** Circuit state: I'd like to deliver a create, but my n_chan is still
+ * connecting. */
+#define CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT 2
+/** Circuit state: the circuit is open but we don't want to actually use it
+ * until we find out if a better guard will be available.
+ */
+#define CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT 3
+/** Circuit state: onionskin(s) processed, ready to send/receive cells. */
+#define CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN 4
+
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ 1
+
+/* these circuits were initiated elsewhere */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MIN_ 1
+/** OR-side circuit purpose: normal circuit, at OR. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR 1
+/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the service, waiting for intro from
+ * clients. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT 2
+/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the client, waiting for the service.
+ */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING 3
+/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, both circuits have this purpose. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED 4
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ 4
+
+/* these circuits originate at this node */
+
+/* here's how circ client-side purposes work:
+ * normal circuits are C_GENERAL.
+ * circuits that are c_introducing are either on their way to
+ * becoming open, or they are open and waiting for a
+ * suitable rendcirc before they send the intro.
+ * circuits that are c_introduce_ack_wait have sent the intro,
+ * but haven't gotten a response yet.
+ * circuits that are c_establish_rend are either on their way
+ * to becoming open, or they are open and have sent the
+ * establish_rendezvous cell but haven't received an ack.
+ * circuits that are c_rend_ready are open and have received a
+ * rend ack, but haven't heard from the service yet. if they have a
+ * buildstate->pending_final_cpath then they're expecting a
+ * cell from the service, else they're not.
+ * circuits that are c_rend_ready_intro_acked are open, and
+ * some intro circ has sent its intro and received an ack.
+ * circuits that are c_rend_joined are open, have heard from
+ * the service, and are talking to it.
+ */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: Normal circuit, with cpath. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL 5
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MIN_ 6
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, connecting to intro point. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING 6
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point,
+ * waiting for ACK/NAK. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT 7
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, introduced and acked, closing.
+ */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED 8
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for ack. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND 9
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY 10
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service,
+ * INTRODUCE has been acknowledged. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED 11
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, rendezvous established. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED 12
+/** This circuit is used for getting hsdirs */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET 13
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_ 13
+/** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 14
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 14
+
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ 15
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for
+ * introductions. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 15
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully
+ * established intro. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 16
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend
+ * point. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 17
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous
+ * established. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 18
+/** This circuit is used for uploading hsdirs */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST 19
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_ 19
+
+/** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 20
+/** A controller made this circuit and Tor should not use it. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 21
+/** This circuit is used for path bias probing only */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 22
+
+/** This circuit is used for vanguards/restricted paths.
+ *
+ * This type of circuit is *only* created preemptively and never
+ * on-demand. When an HS operation needs to take place (e.g. connect to an
+ * intro point), these circuits are then cannibalized and repurposed to the
+ * actual needed HS purpose. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS 23
+
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 23
+/** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect
+ * to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255
+
+/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that
+ * originated at this node. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(p) ((p)>CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_)
+/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that originated
+ * here to serve as a client. (Hidden services don't count here.) */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(p) \
+ ((p)> CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ && \
+ (p)<=CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_)
+/** True iff the circuit_t <b>c</b> is actually an origin_circuit_t. */
+#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c) (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN((c)->purpose))
+/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for an established rendezvous
+ * circuit. */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ESTABLISHED_REND(p) \
+ ((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED || \
+ (p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)
+/** True iff the circuit_t c is actually an or_circuit_t */
+#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORCIRC(c) (((circuit_t *)(c))->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC)
+
+/** True iff this circuit purpose should count towards the global
+ * pending rate limit (set by MaxClientCircuitsPending). We count all
+ * general purpose circuits, as well as the first step of client onion
+ * service connections (HSDir gets). */
+#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_COUNTS_TOWARDS_MAXPENDING(p) \
+ ((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || \
+ (p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET)
+
+/** Convert a circuit_t* to a pointer to the enclosing or_circuit_t. Assert
+ * if the cast is impossible. */
+or_circuit_t *TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *);
+const or_circuit_t *CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *);
+/** Convert a circuit_t* to a pointer to the enclosing origin_circuit_t.
+ * Assert if the cast is impossible. */
+origin_circuit_t *TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *);
+const origin_circuit_t *CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *);
+
+MOCK_DECL(smartlist_t *, circuit_get_global_list, (void));
+smartlist_t *circuit_get_global_origin_circuit_list(void);
+int circuit_any_opened_circuits(void);
+int circuit_any_opened_circuits_cached(void);
+void circuit_cache_opened_circuit_state(int circuits_are_opened);
+
+const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state);
+const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose);
+const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_hs_state_string(uint8_t purpose);
+const char *circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose);
+void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity);
+void circuit_set_p_circid_chan(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id,
+ channel_t *chan);
+void circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circuit_t *circ, circid_t id,
+ channel_t *chan);
+void channel_mark_circid_unusable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id);
+void channel_mark_circid_usable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id);
+time_t circuit_id_when_marked_unusable_on_channel(circid_t circ_id,
+ channel_t *chan);
+void circuit_set_state(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t state);
+void circuit_close_all_marked(void);
+int32_t circuit_initial_package_window(void);
+origin_circuit_t *origin_circuit_new(void);
+or_circuit_t *or_circuit_new(circid_t p_circ_id, channel_t *p_chan);
+circuit_t *circuit_get_by_circid_channel(circid_t circ_id,
+ channel_t *chan);
+circuit_t *
+circuit_get_by_circid_channel_even_if_marked(circid_t circ_id,
+ channel_t *chan);
+int circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan);
+circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn);
+void circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(
+ const rend_data_t *rend_data);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start,
+ const uint8_t *digest, uint8_t purpose);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_intro_circ(origin_circuit_t *start);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_rp_circ(origin_circuit_t *start);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_hsdir_circ(origin_circuit_t *start);
+origin_circuit_t *circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose,
+ extend_info_t *info, int flags);
+void circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void);
+void circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable(void);
++void circuit_synchronize_written_or_bandwidth(const circuit_t *c,
++ circuit_channel_direction_t dir);
+MOCK_DECL(void, circuit_mark_for_close_, (circuit_t *circ, int reason,
+ int line, const char *file));
+int circuit_get_cpath_len(origin_circuit_t *circ);
+int circuit_get_cpath_opened_len(const origin_circuit_t *);
+void circuit_clear_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
+crypt_path_t *circuit_get_cpath_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ, int hopnum);
+void circuit_get_all_pending_on_channel(smartlist_t *out,
+ channel_t *chan);
+int circuit_count_pending_on_channel(channel_t *chan);
+
+#define circuit_mark_for_close(c, reason) \
+ circuit_mark_for_close_((c), (reason), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__)
+
+void assert_cpath_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp);
+MOCK_DECL(void, assert_circuit_ok,(const circuit_t *c));
+void circuit_free_all(void);
+void circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation);
+
+void circuit_clear_testing_cell_stats(circuit_t *circ);
+
+void channel_note_destroy_pending(channel_t *chan, circid_t id);
+MOCK_DECL(void, channel_note_destroy_not_pending,
+ (channel_t *chan, circid_t id));
+
+smartlist_t *circuit_find_circuits_to_upgrade_from_guard_wait(void);
+
+#ifdef CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
+STATIC void circuit_free_(circuit_t *circ);
+#define circuit_free(circ) FREE_AND_NULL(circuit_t, circuit_free_, (circ))
+STATIC size_t n_cells_in_circ_queues(const circuit_t *c);
+STATIC uint32_t circuit_max_queued_data_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now);
+STATIC uint32_t circuit_max_queued_cell_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now);
+STATIC uint32_t circuit_max_queued_item_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now);
+#endif /* defined(CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H) */
--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file or.h
+ * \brief Master header file for Tor-specific functionality.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_OR_H
+#define TOR_OR_H
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H
+#include <signal.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
+#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h"
+#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
+#include "lib/container/map.h"
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/defs/dh_sizes.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/binascii.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/cstring.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+#include "lib/err/torerr.h"
+#include "lib/fs/dir.h"
+#include "lib/fs/files.h"
+#include "lib/fs/mmap.h"
+#include "lib/fs/path.h"
+#include "lib/fs/userdb.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/addsub.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/bits.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/logic.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/muldiv.h"
+#include "lib/log/escape.h"
+#include "lib/log/ratelim.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h"
+#include "lib/net/address.h"
+#include "lib/net/inaddr.h"
+#include "lib/net/socket.h"
+#include "lib/string/compat_ctype.h"
+#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
+#include "lib/string/parse_int.h"
+#include "lib/string/printf.h"
+#include "lib/string/scanf.h"
+#include "lib/string/util_string.h"
+#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
+#include "lib/thread/threads.h"
+#include "lib/time/compat_time.h"
+#include "lib/wallclock/approx_time.h"
+#include "lib/wallclock/timeval.h"
+
+#include "ht.h"
+
+// These, more than other includes, are for keeping the other struct
+// definitions working. We should remove them when we minimize our includes.
+#include "core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h"
+
+struct ed25519_public_key_t;
+struct curve25519_public_key_t;
+
+/* These signals are defined to help handle_control_signal work.
+ */
+#ifndef SIGHUP
+#define SIGHUP 1
+#endif
+#ifndef SIGINT
+#define SIGINT 2
+#endif
+#ifndef SIGUSR1
+#define SIGUSR1 10
+#endif
+#ifndef SIGUSR2
+#define SIGUSR2 12
+#endif
+#ifndef SIGTERM
+#define SIGTERM 15
+#endif
+/* Controller signals start at a high number so we don't
+ * conflict with system-defined signals. */
+#define SIGNEWNYM 129
+#define SIGCLEARDNSCACHE 130
+#define SIGHEARTBEAT 131
+
+#if (SIZEOF_CELL_T != 0)
+/* On Irix, stdlib.h defines a cell_t type, so we need to make sure
+ * that our stuff always calls cell_t something different. */
+#define cell_t tor_cell_t
+#endif
+
+/** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */
+#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_))
+
+/** Length of longest allowable configured nickname. */
+#define MAX_NICKNAME_LEN 19
+/** Length of a router identity encoded as a hexadecimal digest, plus
+ * possible dollar sign. */
+#define MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN (HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1)
+/** Maximum length of verbose router identifier: dollar sign, hex ID digest,
+ * equal sign or tilde, nickname. */
+#define MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN (1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN)
+
+/** For HTTP parsing: Maximum number of bytes we'll accept in the headers
+ * of an HTTP request or response. */
+#define MAX_HEADERS_SIZE 50000
+
+/** Maximum size, in bytes, of a single router descriptor uploaded to us
+ * as a directory authority. Caches and clients fetch whatever descriptors
+ * the authorities tell them to fetch, and don't care about size. */
+#define MAX_DESCRIPTOR_UPLOAD_SIZE 20000
+
+/** Maximum size of a single extrainfo document, as above. */
+#define MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE 50000
+
+/** Minimum lifetime for an onion key in days. */
+#define MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (1)
+
+/** Maximum lifetime for an onion key in days. */
+#define MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (90)
+
+/** Default lifetime for an onion key in days. */
+#define DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (28)
+
+/** Minimum grace period for acceptance of an onion key in days.
+ * The maximum value is defined in proposal #274 as being the current network
+ * consensus parameter for "onion-key-rotation-days". */
+#define MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS (1)
+
+/** Default grace period for acceptance of an onion key in days. */
+#define DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS (7)
+
+/** How often we should check the network consensus if it is time to rotate or
+ * expire onion keys. */
+#define ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL (60*60)
+
+/** How often do we rotate TLS contexts? */
+#define MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL (2*60*60)
+
+/** How old do we allow a router to get before removing it
+ * from the router list? In seconds. */
+#define ROUTER_MAX_AGE (60*60*48)
+/** How old can a router get before we (as a server) will no longer
+ * consider it live? In seconds. */
+#define ROUTER_MAX_AGE_TO_PUBLISH (60*60*24)
+/** How old do we let a saved descriptor get before force-removing it? */
+#define OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE (60*60*24*5)
+
+/* Proxy client types */
+#define PROXY_NONE 0
+#define PROXY_CONNECT 1
+#define PROXY_SOCKS4 2
+#define PROXY_SOCKS5 3
+/* !!!! If there is ever a PROXY_* type over 3, we must grow the proxy_type
+ * field in or_connection_t */
+
+/* Pluggable transport proxy type. Don't use this in or_connection_t,
+ * instead use the actual underlying proxy type (see above). */
+#define PROXY_PLUGGABLE 4
+
+/** How many circuits do we want simultaneously in-progress to handle
+ * a given stream? */
+#define MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM 2
+
+/* These RELAY_COMMAND constants define values for relay cell commands, and
+* must match those defined in tor-spec.txt. */
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN 1
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_DATA 2
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_END 3
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED 4
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME 5
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND 6
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED 7
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE 8
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED 9
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_DROP 10
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE 11
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED 12
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR 13
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2 14
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED2 15
+
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO 32
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS 33
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 34
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 35
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 36
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2 37
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED 38
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED 39
+#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK 40
+
+/* Reasons why an OR connection is closed. */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_DONE 1
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_REFUSED 2 /* connection refused */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY 3
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_CONNRESET 4 /* connection reset by peer */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_TIMEOUT 5
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_NO_ROUTE 6 /* no route to host/net */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_IO_ERROR 7 /* read/write error */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_RESOURCE_LIMIT 8 /* sockets, buffers, etc */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING 9 /* PT failed or not available */
+#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC 10
+
+/* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a stream. See tor-spec.txt for
+ * documentation of these. The values must match. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_MISC 1
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED 2
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED 3
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY 4
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY 5
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_DONE 6
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT 7
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE 8
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING 9
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL 10
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT 11
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET 12
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 13
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY 14
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY 15
+
+/* These high-numbered end reasons are not part of the official spec,
+ * and are not intended to be put in relay end cells. They are here
+ * to be more informative when sending back socks replies to the
+ * application. */
+/* XXXX 256 is no longer used; feel free to reuse it. */
+/** We were unable to attach the connection to any circuit at all. */
+/* XXXX the ways we use this one don't make a lot of sense. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH 257
+/** We can't connect to any directories at all, so we killed our streams
+ * before they can time out. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_NET_UNREACHABLE 258
+/** This is a SOCKS connection, and the client used (or misused) the SOCKS
+ * protocol in a way we couldn't handle. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL 259
+/** This is a transparent proxy connection, but we can't extract the original
+ * target address:port. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST 260
+/** This is a connection on the NATD port, and the destination IP:Port was
+ * either ill-formed or out-of-range. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST 261
+/** The target address is in a private network (like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1);
+ * you don't want to do that over a randomly chosen exit */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_PRIVATE_ADDR 262
+/** This is an HTTP tunnel connection and the client used or misused HTTP in a
+ * way we can't handle.
+ */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_HTTPPROTOCOL 263
+
+/** Bitwise-and this value with endreason to mask out all flags. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_MASK 511
+
+/** Bitwise-or this with the argument to control_event_stream_status
+ * to indicate that the reason came from an END cell. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE 512
+/** Bitwise-or this with the argument to control_event_stream_status
+ * to indicate that we already sent a CLOSED stream event. */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED 1024
+/** Bitwise-or this with endreason to indicate that we already sent
+ * a socks reply, and no further reply needs to be sent from
+ * connection_mark_unattached_ap(). */
+#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED 2048
+
+/* 'type' values to use in RESOLVED cells. Specified in tor-spec.txt. */
+#define RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME 0
+#define RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 4
+#define RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 6
+#define RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR_TRANSIENT 0xF0
+#define RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR 0xF1
+
+/* Negative reasons are internal: we never send them in a DESTROY or TRUNCATE
+ * call; they only go to the controller for tracking */
+
+/* Closing introduction point that were opened in parallel. */
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT -4
+
+/** Our post-timeout circuit time measurement period expired.
+ * We must give up now */
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED -3
+
+/** We couldn't build a path for this circuit. */
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH -2
+/** Catch-all "other" reason for closing origin circuits. */
+#define END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN -1
+
+/* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a circuit. See tor-spec.txt
+ * section 5.4 for documentation of these. */
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_MIN_ 0
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_NONE 0
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 1
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL 2
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_REQUESTED 3
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_HIBERNATING 4
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT 5
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED 6
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_OR_IDENTITY 7
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED 8
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED 9
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT 10
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_DESTROYED 11
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE 12
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_MAX_ 12
+
+/** Bitwise-OR this with the argument to circuit_mark_for_close() or
+ * control_event_circuit_status() to indicate that the reason was
+ * passed through from a destroy or truncate cell. */
+#define END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE 512
+
+/** Length of 'y' portion of 'y.onion' URL. */
+#define REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 16
+
+/** Length of 'y.onion' including '.onion' URL. */
+#define REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN (16+1+5)
+
+/** Length of a binary-encoded rendezvous service ID. */
+#define REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN 10
+
+/** Time period for which a v2 descriptor will be valid. */
+#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY (24*60*60)
+
+/** Time period within which two sets of v2 descriptors will be uploaded in
+ * parallel. */
+#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS (60*60)
+
+/** Number of non-consecutive replicas (i.e. distributed somewhere
+ * in the ring) for a descriptor. */
+#define REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS 2
+
+/** Number of consecutive replicas for a descriptor. */
+#define REND_NUMBER_OF_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS 3
+
+/** Length of v2 descriptor ID (32 base32 chars = 160 bits). */
+#define REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 BASE32_DIGEST_LEN
+
+/** Length of the base32-encoded secret ID part of versioned hidden service
+ * descriptors. */
+#define REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32 BASE32_DIGEST_LEN
+
+/** Length of the base32-encoded hash of an introduction point's
+ * identity key. */
+#define REND_INTRO_POINT_ID_LEN_BASE32 BASE32_DIGEST_LEN
+
+/** Length of the descriptor cookie that is used for client authorization
+ * to hidden services. */
+#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN 16
+
+/** Length of the base64-encoded descriptor cookie that is used for
+ * exchanging client authorization between hidden service and client. */
+#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64 22
+
+/** Length of client identifier in encrypted introduction points for hidden
+ * service authorization type 'basic'. */
+#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ID_LEN 4
+
+/** Multiple of the number of clients to which the real number of clients
+ * is padded with fake clients for hidden service authorization type
+ * 'basic'. */
+#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE 16
+
+/** Length of client entry consisting of client identifier and encrypted
+ * session key for hidden service authorization type 'basic'. */
+#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN (REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ID_LEN \
+ + CIPHER_KEY_LEN)
+
+/** Maximum size of v2 hidden service descriptors. */
+#define REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE (20 * 1024)
+
+/** Legal characters for use in authorized client names for a hidden
+ * service. */
+#define REND_LEGAL_CLIENTNAME_CHARACTERS \
+ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+-_"
+
+/** Maximum length of authorized client names for a hidden service. */
+#define REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN 16
+
+/** Length of the rendezvous cookie that is used to connect circuits at the
+ * rendezvous point. */
+#define REND_COOKIE_LEN DIGEST_LEN
+
+/** Client authorization type that a hidden service performs. */
+typedef enum rend_auth_type_t {
+ REND_NO_AUTH = 0,
+ REND_BASIC_AUTH = 1,
+ REND_STEALTH_AUTH = 2,
+} rend_auth_type_t;
+
+/** Client-side configuration of authorization for a hidden service. */
+typedef struct rend_service_authorization_t {
+ uint8_t descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
+ char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN+1];
+ rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
+} rend_service_authorization_t;
+
+/** Client- and server-side data that is used for hidden service connection
+ * establishment. Not all fields contain data depending on where this struct
+ * is used. */
+typedef struct rend_data_t {
+ /* Hidden service protocol version of this base object. */
+ uint32_t version;
+
+ /** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to. This
+ * contains binary identity digest of the directory of size DIGEST_LEN. */
+ smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp;
+
+ /** Rendezvous cookie used by both, client and service. */
+ char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
+
+ /** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */
+ int nr_streams;
+} rend_data_t;
+
+typedef struct rend_data_v2_t {
+ /* Rendezvous base data. */
+ rend_data_t base_;
+
+ /** Onion address (without the .onion part) that a client requests. */
+ char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
+
+ /** Descriptor ID for each replicas computed from the onion address. If
+ * the onion address is empty, this array MUST be empty. We keep them so
+ * we know when to purge our entry in the last hsdir request table. */
+ char descriptor_id[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS][DIGEST_LEN];
+
+ /** (Optional) descriptor cookie that is used by a client. */
+ char descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
+
+ /** Authorization type for accessing a service used by a client. */
+ rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
+
+ /** Descriptor ID for a client request. The control port command HSFETCH
+ * uses this. It's set if the descriptor query should only use this
+ * descriptor ID. */
+ char desc_id_fetch[DIGEST_LEN];
+
+ /** Hash of the hidden service's PK used by a service. */
+ char rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+} rend_data_v2_t;
+
+/* From a base rend_data_t object <b>d</d>, return the v2 object. */
+static inline
+rend_data_v2_t *TO_REND_DATA_V2(const rend_data_t *d)
+{
+ tor_assert(d);
+ tor_assert(d->version == 2);
+ return DOWNCAST(rend_data_v2_t, d);
+}
+
+/* Stub because we can't include hs_ident.h. */
+struct hs_ident_edge_conn_t;
+struct hs_ident_dir_conn_t;
+struct hs_ident_circuit_t;
+
+typedef struct hsdir_index_t hsdir_index_t;
+
+/** Time interval for tracking replays of DH public keys received in
+ * INTRODUCE2 cells. Used only to avoid launching multiple
+ * simultaneous attempts to connect to the same rendezvous point. */
+#define REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL (5 * 60)
+
+/** Used to indicate which way a cell is going on a circuit. */
+typedef enum {
+ CELL_DIRECTION_IN=1, /**< The cell is moving towards the origin. */
+ CELL_DIRECTION_OUT=2, /**< The cell is moving away from the origin. */
+} cell_direction_t;
+
++/**
++ * An enum to allow us to specify which channel in a circuit
++ * we're interested in.
++ *
++ * This is needed because our data structures and other fields
++ * for channel delivery are disassociated from the channel.
++ */
++typedef enum {
++ CIRCUIT_N_CHAN = 0,
++ CIRCUIT_P_CHAN = 1
++} circuit_channel_direction_t;
++
+/** Initial value for both sides of a circuit transmission window when the
+ * circuit is initialized. Measured in cells. */
+#define CIRCWINDOW_START 1000
+#define CIRCWINDOW_START_MIN 100
+#define CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX 1000
+/** Amount to increment a circuit window when we get a circuit SENDME. */
+#define CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT 100
+/** Initial value on both sides of a stream transmission window when the
+ * stream is initialized. Measured in cells. */
+#define STREAMWINDOW_START 500
+#define STREAMWINDOW_START_MAX 500
+/** Amount to increment a stream window when we get a stream SENDME. */
+#define STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT 50
+
+/** Maximum number of queued cells on a circuit for which we are the
+ * midpoint before we give up and kill it. This must be >= circwindow
+ * to avoid killing innocent circuits, and >= circwindow*2 to give
+ * leaky-pipe a chance of working someday. The ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH
+ * ratio controls the margin of error between emitting a warning and
+ * killing the circuit.
+ */
+#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS (CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX*2)
+/** Ratio of hard (circuit kill) to soft (warning) thresholds for the
+ * ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS tests.
+ */
+#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH (1.1f)
+
+/* Cell commands. These values are defined in tor-spec.txt. */
+#define CELL_PADDING 0
+#define CELL_CREATE 1
+#define CELL_CREATED 2
+#define CELL_RELAY 3
+#define CELL_DESTROY 4
+#define CELL_CREATE_FAST 5
+#define CELL_CREATED_FAST 6
+#define CELL_VERSIONS 7
+#define CELL_NETINFO 8
+#define CELL_RELAY_EARLY 9
+#define CELL_CREATE2 10
+#define CELL_CREATED2 11
+#define CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE 12
+
+#define CELL_VPADDING 128
+#define CELL_CERTS 129
+#define CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE 130
+#define CELL_AUTHENTICATE 131
+#define CELL_AUTHORIZE 132
+#define CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ 132
+
+/** How long to test reachability before complaining to the user. */
+#define TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT (20*60)
+
+/** Legal characters in a nickname. */
+#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
+ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+
+/** Name to use in client TLS certificates if no nickname is given. Once
+ * Tor 0.1.2.x is obsolete, we can remove this. */
+#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_NICKNAME "client"
+
+/** Name chosen by routers that don't configure nicknames */
+#define UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME "Unnamed"
+
+/** Number of bytes in a SOCKS4 header. */
+#define SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN 8
+
+/*
+ * Relay payload:
+ * Relay command [1 byte]
+ * Recognized [2 bytes]
+ * Stream ID [2 bytes]
+ * Partial SHA-1 [4 bytes]
+ * Length [2 bytes]
+ * Relay payload [498 bytes]
+ */
+
+/** Number of bytes in a cell, minus cell header. */
+#define CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE 509
+/** Number of bytes in a cell transmitted over the network, in the longest
+ * form */
+#define CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE 514
+
+/** Maximum length of a header on a variable-length cell. */
+#define VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE 7
+
+static int get_cell_network_size(int wide_circ_ids);
+static inline int get_cell_network_size(int wide_circ_ids)
+{
+ return wide_circ_ids ? CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE : CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE - 2;
+}
+static int get_var_cell_header_size(int wide_circ_ids);
+static inline int get_var_cell_header_size(int wide_circ_ids)
+{
+ return wide_circ_ids ? VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE :
+ VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
+}
+static int get_circ_id_size(int wide_circ_ids);
+static inline int get_circ_id_size(int wide_circ_ids)
+{
+ return wide_circ_ids ? 4 : 2;
+}
+
+/** Number of bytes in a relay cell's header (not including general cell
+ * header). */
+#define RELAY_HEADER_SIZE (1+2+2+4+2)
+/** Largest number of bytes that can fit in a relay cell payload. */
+#define RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE (CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE-RELAY_HEADER_SIZE)
+
+/** Identifies a circuit on an or_connection */
+typedef uint32_t circid_t;
+/** Identifies a stream on a circuit */
+typedef uint16_t streamid_t;
+
+/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_s is in channel.h */
+
+typedef struct channel_s channel_t;
+
+/* channel_listener_t typedef; struct channel_listener_s is in channel.h */
+
+typedef struct channel_listener_s channel_listener_t;
+
+/* TLS channel stuff */
+
+typedef struct channel_tls_s channel_tls_t;
+
+/* circuitmux_t typedef; struct circuitmux_s is in circuitmux.h */
+
+typedef struct circuitmux_s circuitmux_t;
+
+typedef struct cell_t cell_t;
+typedef struct var_cell_t var_cell_t;
+typedef struct packed_cell_t packed_cell_t;
+typedef struct cell_queue_t cell_queue_t;
+typedef struct destroy_cell_t destroy_cell_t;
+typedef struct destroy_cell_queue_t destroy_cell_queue_t;
+typedef struct ext_or_cmd_t ext_or_cmd_t;
+
+/** Beginning of a RELAY cell payload. */
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t command; /**< The end-to-end relay command. */
+ uint16_t recognized; /**< Used to tell whether cell is for us. */
+ streamid_t stream_id; /**< Which stream is this cell associated with? */
+ char integrity[4]; /**< Used to tell whether cell is corrupted. */
+ uint16_t length; /**< How long is the payload body? */
+} relay_header_t;
+
+typedef struct socks_request_t socks_request_t;
+typedef struct entry_port_cfg_t entry_port_cfg_t;
+typedef struct server_port_cfg_t server_port_cfg_t;
+
+/** Minimum length of the random part of an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell. */
+#define OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN 32
+
+/**
+ * @name Certificate types for CERTS cells.
+ *
+ * These values are defined by the protocol, and affect how an X509
+ * certificate in a CERTS cell is interpreted and used.
+ *
+ * @{ */
+/** A certificate that authenticates a TLS link key. The subject key
+ * must match the key used in the TLS handshake; it must be signed by
+ * the identity key. */
+#define OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK 1
+/** A self-signed identity certificate. The subject key must be a
+ * 1024-bit RSA key. */
+#define OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 2
+/** A certificate that authenticates a key used in an AUTHENTICATE cell
+ * in the v3 handshake. The subject key must be a 1024-bit RSA key; it
+ * must be signed by the identity key */
+#define OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 3
+/* DOCDOC */
+#define OR_CERT_TYPE_RSA_ED_CROSSCERT 7
+/**@}*/
+
+/** The first supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell. It contains
+ * a bunch of structures signed with an RSA1024 key. The signed
+ * structures include a HMAC using negotiated TLS secrets, and a digest
+ * of all cells sent or received before the AUTHENTICATE cell (including
+ * the random server-generated AUTH_CHALLENGE cell).
+ */
+#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET 1
+/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET, but instead of using the
+ * negotiated TLS secrets, uses exported keying material from the TLS
+ * session as described in RFC 5705.
+ *
+ * Not used by today's tors, since everything that supports this
+ * also supports ED25519_SHA256_5705, which is better.
+ **/
+#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705 2
+/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705, but uses an Ed25519 identity key to
+ * authenticate. */
+#define AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 3
+/*
+ * NOTE: authchallenge_type_is_better() relies on these AUTHTYPE codes
+ * being sorted in order of preference. If we someday add one with
+ * a higher numerical value that we don't like as much, we should revise
+ * authchallenge_type_is_better().
+ */
+
+/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client and
+ * server can generate independently (when using RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET). It
+ * contains everything except the client's timestamp, the client's randomly
+ * generated nonce, and the signature. */
+#define V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN (8+(32*6))
+/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client
+ * signs. */
+#define V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN (V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN + 8 + 16)
+
+typedef struct or_handshake_certs_t or_handshake_certs_t;
+typedef struct or_handshake_state_t or_handshake_state_t;
+
+/** Length of Extended ORPort connection identifier. */
+#define EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN DIGEST_LEN /* 20 */
+/*
+ * OR_CONN_HIGHWATER and OR_CONN_LOWWATER moved from connection_or.c so
+ * channeltls.c can see them too.
+ */
+
+/** When adding cells to an OR connection's outbuf, keep adding until the
+ * outbuf is at least this long, or we run out of cells. */
+#define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER (32*1024)
+
+/** Add cells to an OR connection's outbuf whenever the outbuf's data length
+ * drops below this size. */
+#define OR_CONN_LOWWATER (16*1024)
+
+typedef struct connection_t connection_t;
+typedef struct control_connection_t control_connection_t;
+typedef struct dir_connection_t dir_connection_t;
+typedef struct edge_connection_t edge_connection_t;
+typedef struct entry_connection_t entry_connection_t;
+typedef struct listener_connection_t listener_connection_t;
+typedef struct or_connection_t or_connection_t;
+
+/** Cast a connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/
+#define TO_CONN(c) (&(((c)->base_)))
+
+/** Cast a entry_connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/
+#define ENTRY_TO_CONN(c) (TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(c)))
+
+typedef struct addr_policy_t addr_policy_t;
+
+typedef struct cached_dir_t cached_dir_t;
+
+/** Enum used to remember where a signed_descriptor_t is stored and how to
+ * manage the memory for signed_descriptor_body. */
+typedef enum {
+ /** The descriptor isn't stored on disk at all: the copy in memory is
+ * canonical; the saved_offset field is meaningless. */
+ SAVED_NOWHERE=0,
+ /** The descriptor is stored in the cached_routers file: the
+ * signed_descriptor_body is meaningless; the signed_descriptor_len and
+ * saved_offset are used to index into the mmaped cache file. */
+ SAVED_IN_CACHE,
+ /** The descriptor is stored in the cached_routers.new file: the
+ * signed_descriptor_body and saved_offset fields are both set. */
+ /* FFFF (We could also mmap the file and grow the mmap as needed, or
+ * lazy-load the descriptor text by using seek and read. We don't, for
+ * now.)
+ */
+ SAVED_IN_JOURNAL
+} saved_location_t;
+#define saved_location_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(saved_location_t)
+
+/** Enumeration: what directory object is being downloaded?
+ * This determines which schedule is selected to perform the download. */
+typedef enum {
+ DL_SCHED_GENERIC = 0,
+ DL_SCHED_CONSENSUS = 1,
+ DL_SCHED_BRIDGE = 2,
+} download_schedule_t;
+#define download_schedule_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(download_schedule_t)
+
+/** Enumeration: is the download schedule for downloading from an authority,
+ * or from any available directory mirror?
+ * During bootstrap, "any" means a fallback (or an authority, if there
+ * are no fallbacks).
+ * When we have a valid consensus, "any" means any directory server. */
+typedef enum {
+ DL_WANT_ANY_DIRSERVER = 0,
+ DL_WANT_AUTHORITY = 1,
+} download_want_authority_t;
+#define download_want_authority_bitfield_t \
+ ENUM_BF(download_want_authority_t)
+
+/** Enumeration: do we want to increment the schedule position each time a
+ * connection is attempted (these attempts can be concurrent), or do we want
+ * to increment the schedule position after a connection fails? */
+typedef enum {
+ DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_FAILURE = 0,
+ DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_ATTEMPT = 1,
+} download_schedule_increment_t;
+#define download_schedule_increment_bitfield_t \
+ ENUM_BF(download_schedule_increment_t)
+
+typedef struct download_status_t download_status_t;
+
+/** If n_download_failures is this high, the download can never happen. */
+#define IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD 255
+
+/** The max size we expect router descriptor annotations we create to
+ * be. We'll accept larger ones if we see them on disk, but we won't
+ * create any that are larger than this. */
+#define ROUTER_ANNOTATION_BUF_LEN 256
+
+typedef struct signed_descriptor_t signed_descriptor_t;
+
+/** A signed integer representing a country code. */
+typedef int16_t country_t;
+
+/** Flags used to summarize the declared protocol versions of a relay,
+ * so we don't need to parse them again and again. */
+typedef struct protover_summary_flags_t {
+ /** True iff we have a proto line for this router, or a versions line
+ * from which we could infer the protocols. */
+ unsigned int protocols_known:1;
+
+ /** True iff this router has a version or protocol list that allows it to
+ * accept EXTEND2 cells. This requires Relay=2. */
+ unsigned int supports_extend2_cells:1;
+
+ /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to negotiate
+ * ed25519 identity keys on a link handshake with us. This
+ * requires LinkAuth=3. */
+ unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_compat:1;
+
+ /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to negotiate
+ * ed25519 identity keys on a link handshake, at all. This requires some
+ * LinkAuth=X for X >= 3. */
+ unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any:1;
+
+ /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an
+ * introduction point supporting ed25519 authentication key which is part of
+ * the v3 protocol detailed in proposal 224. This requires HSIntro=4. */
+ unsigned int supports_ed25519_hs_intro : 1;
+
+ /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an hidden
+ * service directory supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224. This
+ * requires HSDir=2. */
+ unsigned int supports_v3_hsdir : 1;
+
+ /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an hidden
+ * service rendezvous point supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224.
+ * This requires HSRend=2. */
+ unsigned int supports_v3_rendezvous_point: 1;
+} protover_summary_flags_t;
+
+typedef struct routerinfo_t routerinfo_t;
+typedef struct extrainfo_t extrainfo_t;
+typedef struct routerstatus_t routerstatus_t;
+
+typedef struct microdesc_t microdesc_t;
+typedef struct node_t node_t;
+typedef struct vote_microdesc_hash_t vote_microdesc_hash_t;
+typedef struct vote_routerstatus_t vote_routerstatus_t;
+typedef struct document_signature_t document_signature_t;
+typedef struct networkstatus_voter_info_t networkstatus_voter_info_t;
+typedef struct networkstatus_sr_info_t networkstatus_sr_info_t;
+
+/** Enumerates recognized flavors of a consensus networkstatus document. All
+ * flavors of a consensus are generated from the same set of votes, but they
+ * present different types information to different versions of Tor. */
+typedef enum {
+ FLAV_NS = 0,
+ FLAV_MICRODESC = 1,
+} consensus_flavor_t;
+
+/** How many different consensus flavors are there? */
+#define N_CONSENSUS_FLAVORS ((int)(FLAV_MICRODESC)+1)
+
+typedef struct networkstatus_t networkstatus_t;
+typedef struct ns_detached_signatures_t ns_detached_signatures_t;
+typedef struct desc_store_t desc_store_t;
+typedef struct routerlist_t routerlist_t;
+typedef struct extend_info_t extend_info_t;
+typedef struct authority_cert_t authority_cert_t;
+
+/** Bitfield enum type listing types of information that directory authorities
+ * can be authoritative about, and that directory caches may or may not cache.
+ *
+ * Note that the granularity here is based on authority granularity and on
+ * cache capabilities. Thus, one particular bit may correspond in practice to
+ * a few types of directory info, so long as every authority that pronounces
+ * officially about one of the types prounounces officially about all of them,
+ * and so long as every cache that caches one of them caches all of them.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ NO_DIRINFO = 0,
+ /** Serves/signs v3 directory information: votes, consensuses, certs */
+ V3_DIRINFO = 1 << 2,
+ /** Serves bridge descriptors. */
+ BRIDGE_DIRINFO = 1 << 4,
+ /** Serves extrainfo documents. */
+ EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO=1 << 5,
+ /** Serves microdescriptors. */
+ MICRODESC_DIRINFO=1 << 6,
+} dirinfo_type_t;
+
+#define ALL_DIRINFO ((dirinfo_type_t)((1<<7)-1))
+
+#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000
+#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST 0x0001
+#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR 0x0002
+#define MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE 0x0002
+
+typedef struct onion_handshake_state_t onion_handshake_state_t;
+typedef struct relay_crypto_t relay_crypto_t;
+typedef struct crypt_path_t crypt_path_t;
+typedef struct crypt_path_reference_t crypt_path_reference_t;
+
+#define CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN (20*2+16*2)
+
+typedef struct cpath_build_state_t cpath_build_state_t;
+
+struct create_cell_t;
+
+/** Entry in the cell stats list of a circuit; used only if CELL_STATS
+ * events are enabled. */
+typedef struct testing_cell_stats_entry_t {
+ uint8_t command; /**< cell command number. */
+ /** Waiting time in centiseconds if this event is for a removed cell,
+ * or 0 if this event is for adding a cell to the queue. 22 bits can
+ * store more than 11 hours, enough to assume that a circuit with this
+ * delay would long have been closed. */
+ unsigned int waiting_time:22;
+ unsigned int removed:1; /**< 0 for added to, 1 for removed from queue. */
+ unsigned int exitward:1; /**< 0 for app-ward, 1 for exit-ward. */
+} testing_cell_stats_entry_t;
+
+typedef struct circuit_t circuit_t;
+typedef struct origin_circuit_t origin_circuit_t;
+typedef struct or_circuit_t or_circuit_t;
+
+/** Largest number of relay_early cells that we can send on a given
+ * circuit. */
+#define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8
+
+typedef enum path_state_t path_state_t;
+#define path_state_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(path_state_t)
+
+#if REND_COOKIE_LEN != DIGEST_LEN
+#error "The REND_TOKEN_LEN macro assumes REND_COOKIE_LEN == DIGEST_LEN"
+#endif
+#define REND_TOKEN_LEN DIGEST_LEN
+
+/** Convert a circuit subtype to a circuit_t. */
+#define TO_CIRCUIT(x) (&((x)->base_))
+
+/** @name Isolation flags
+
+ Ways to isolate client streams
+
+ @{
+*/
+/** Isolate based on destination port */
+#define ISO_DESTPORT (1u<<0)
+/** Isolate based on destination address */
+#define ISO_DESTADDR (1u<<1)
+/** Isolate based on SOCKS authentication */
+#define ISO_SOCKSAUTH (1u<<2)
+/** Isolate based on client protocol choice */
+#define ISO_CLIENTPROTO (1u<<3)
+/** Isolate based on client address */
+#define ISO_CLIENTADDR (1u<<4)
+/** Isolate based on session group (always on). */
+#define ISO_SESSIONGRP (1u<<5)
+/** Isolate based on newnym epoch (always on). */
+#define ISO_NYM_EPOCH (1u<<6)
+/** Isolate all streams (Internal only). */
+#define ISO_STREAM (1u<<7)
+/**@}*/
+
+/** Default isolation level for ports. */
+#define ISO_DEFAULT (ISO_CLIENTADDR|ISO_SOCKSAUTH|ISO_SESSIONGRP|ISO_NYM_EPOCH)
+
+/** Indicates that we haven't yet set a session group on a port_cfg_t. */
+#define SESSION_GROUP_UNSET -1
+/** Session group reserved for directory connections */
+#define SESSION_GROUP_DIRCONN -2
+/** Session group reserved for resolve requests launched by a controller */
+#define SESSION_GROUP_CONTROL_RESOLVE -3
+/** First automatically allocated session group number */
+#define SESSION_GROUP_FIRST_AUTO -4
+
+typedef struct port_cfg_t port_cfg_t;
+typedef struct routerset_t routerset_t;
+
+/** A magic value for the (Socks|OR|...)Port options below, telling Tor
+ * to pick its own port. */
+#define CFG_AUTO_PORT 0xc4005e
+
+typedef struct or_options_t or_options_t;
+
+#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_protocol_warning_severity_level())
+
+typedef struct or_state_t or_state_t;
+
+#define MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN 256
+
+/********************************* circuitbuild.c **********************/
+
+/** How many hops does a general-purpose circuit have by default? */
+#define DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN 3
+
+/* Circuit Build Timeout "public" structures. */
+
+/** Precision multiplier for the Bw weights */
+#define BW_WEIGHT_SCALE 10000
+#define BW_MIN_WEIGHT_SCALE 1
+#define BW_MAX_WEIGHT_SCALE INT32_MAX
+
+typedef struct circuit_build_times_s circuit_build_times_t;
+
+/********************************* config.c ***************************/
+
+/********************************* connection_edge.c *************************/
+
+/** Enumerates possible origins of a client-side address mapping. */
+typedef enum {
+ /** We're remapping this address because the controller told us to. */
+ ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER,
+ /** We're remapping this address because of an AutomapHostsOnResolve
+ * configuration. */
+ ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP,
+ /** We're remapping this address because our configuration (via torrc, the
+ * command line, or a SETCONF command) told us to. */
+ ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC,
+ /** We're remapping this address because we have TrackHostExit configured,
+ * and we want to remember to use the same exit next time. */
+ ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT,
+ /** We're remapping this address because we got a DNS resolution from a
+ * Tor server that told us what its value was. */
+ ADDRMAPSRC_DNS,
+
+ /** No remapping has occurred. This isn't a possible value for an
+ * addrmap_entry_t; it's used as a null value when we need to answer "Why
+ * did this remapping happen." */
+ ADDRMAPSRC_NONE
+} addressmap_entry_source_t;
+#define addressmap_entry_source_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(addressmap_entry_source_t)
+
+#define WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL (24*60*60)
+
+/********************************* dirvote.c ************************/
+
+typedef struct vote_timing_t vote_timing_t;
+
+/********************************* microdesc.c *************************/
+
+typedef struct microdesc_cache_t microdesc_cache_t;
+
+/********************************* rendcommon.c ***************************/
+
+typedef struct rend_authorized_client_t rend_authorized_client_t;
+typedef struct rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t
+ rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t;
+
+/** The maximum number of non-circuit-build-timeout failures a hidden
+ * service client will tolerate while trying to build a circuit to an
+ * introduction point. See also rend_intro_point_t.unreachable_count. */
+#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES 5
+
+/** The minimum and maximum number of distinct INTRODUCE2 cells which a
+ * hidden service's introduction point will receive before it begins to
+ * expire. */
+#define INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS 16384
+/* Double the minimum value so the interval is [min, min * 2]. */
+#define INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS \
+ (INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS * 2)
+
+/** The minimum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
+ * before expiring due to old age. (If it receives
+ * INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS INTRODUCE2 cells, it may expire
+ * sooner.)
+ *
+ * XXX Should this be configurable? */
+#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS (18*60*60)
+/** The maximum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
+ * before expiring due to old age.
+ *
+ * XXX Should this be configurable? */
+#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS (24*60*60)
+
+/** The maximum number of circuit creation retry we do to an intro point
+ * before giving up. We try to reuse intro point that fails during their
+ * lifetime so this is a hard limit on the amount of time we do that. */
+#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES 3
+
+typedef struct rend_intro_point_t rend_intro_point_t;
+typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t rend_service_descriptor_t;
+
+/********************************* routerlist.c ***************************/
+
+typedef struct dir_server_t dir_server_t;
+
+#define RELAY_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH (75*1024)
+#define BRIDGE_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH (50*1024)
+
+#define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX
+
+typedef struct tor_version_t tor_version_t;
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_OR_H) */
projects / thirdparty / tor.git / commitdiff
