--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * EAP peer method: EAP-AKA' (draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10.txt)
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
+ * license.
+ *
+ * See README and COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "eap_peer/eap_i.h"
+#include "pcsc_funcs.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "eap_peer/eap_config.h"
+#ifdef CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR
+#include "hlr_auc_gw/milenage.h"
+#endif /* CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR */
+
+
+struct eap_aka_data {
+ u8 ik[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN], ck[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN], res[EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t res_len;
+ u8 nonce_s[EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN];
+ u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN];
+ u8 k_aut[EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN];
+ u8 k_encr[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN];
+ u8 msk[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN];
+ u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+ u8 rand[EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN], autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
+ u8 auts[EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN];
+
+ int num_id_req, num_notification;
+ u8 *pseudonym;
+ size_t pseudonym_len;
+ u8 *reauth_id;
+ size_t reauth_id_len;
+ int reauth;
+ unsigned int counter, counter_too_small;
+ u8 *last_eap_identity;
+ size_t last_eap_identity_len;
+ enum {
+ CONTINUE, RESULT_SUCCESS, RESULT_FAILURE, SUCCESS, FAILURE
+ } state;
+
+ struct wpabuf *id_msgs;
+ int prev_id;
+ int result_ind, use_result_ind;
+};
+
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
+static const char * eap_aka_state_txt(int state)
+{
+ switch (state) {
+ case CONTINUE:
+ return "CONTINUE";
+ case RESULT_SUCCESS:
+ return "RESULT_SUCCESS";
+ case RESULT_FAILURE:
+ return "RESULT_FAILURE";
+ case SUCCESS:
+ return "SUCCESS";
+ case FAILURE:
+ return "FAILURE";
+ default:
+ return "?";
+ }
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
+
+
+static void eap_aka_state(struct eap_aka_data *data, int state)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: %s -> %s",
+ eap_aka_state_txt(data->state),
+ eap_aka_state_txt(state));
+ data->state = state;
+}
+
+
+static void * eap_aka_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data;
+ const char *phase1 = eap_get_config_phase1(sm);
+
+ data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE);
+ data->prev_id = -1;
+
+ data->result_ind = phase1 && os_strstr(phase1, "result_ind=1") != NULL;
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ if (data) {
+ os_free(data->pseudonym);
+ os_free(data->reauth_id);
+ os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
+ wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
+ os_free(data);
+ }
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_umts_auth(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data)
+{
+ struct eap_peer_config *conf;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication algorithm");
+
+ conf = eap_get_config(sm);
+ if (conf == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (conf->pcsc) {
+ return scard_umts_auth(sm->scard_ctx, data->rand,
+ data->autn, data->res, &data->res_len,
+ data->ik, data->ck, data->auts);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR
+ if (conf->password) {
+ u8 opc[16], k[16], sqn[6];
+ const char *pos;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Use internal Milenage "
+ "implementation for UMTS authentication");
+ if (conf->password_len < 78) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: invalid Milenage "
+ "password");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pos = (const char *) conf->password;
+ if (hexstr2bin(pos, k, 16))
+ return -1;
+ pos += 32;
+ if (*pos != ':')
+ return -1;
+ pos++;
+
+ if (hexstr2bin(pos, opc, 16))
+ return -1;
+ pos += 32;
+ if (*pos != ':')
+ return -1;
+ pos++;
+
+ if (hexstr2bin(pos, sqn, 6))
+ return -1;
+
+ return milenage_check(opc, k, sqn, data->rand, data->autn,
+ data->ik, data->ck,
+ data->res, &data->res_len, data->auts);
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Use hardcoded Kc and SRES values for "
+ "testing");
+
+ /* These hardcoded Kc and SRES values are used for testing.
+ * Could consider making them configurable. */
+ os_memset(data->res, '2', EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN);
+ data->res_len = EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN;
+ os_memset(data->ik, '3', EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+ os_memset(data->ck, '4', EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+ {
+ u8 autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
+ os_memset(autn, '1', EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+ if (os_memcmp(autn, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: AUTN did not match "
+ "with expected value");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+#if 0
+ {
+ static int test_resync = 1;
+ if (test_resync) {
+ /* Test Resynchronization */
+ test_resync = 0;
+ return -2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+
+#else /* CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED */
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: No UMTS authentication algorith "
+ "enabled");
+ return -1;
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED */
+}
+
+
+#define CLEAR_PSEUDONYM 0x01
+#define CLEAR_REAUTH_ID 0x02
+#define CLEAR_EAP_ID 0x04
+
+static void eap_aka_clear_identities(struct eap_aka_data *data, int id)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: forgetting old%s%s%s",
+ id & CLEAR_PSEUDONYM ? " pseudonym" : "",
+ id & CLEAR_REAUTH_ID ? " reauth_id" : "",
+ id & CLEAR_EAP_ID ? " eap_id" : "");
+ if (id & CLEAR_PSEUDONYM) {
+ os_free(data->pseudonym);
+ data->pseudonym = NULL;
+ data->pseudonym_len = 0;
+ }
+ if (id & CLEAR_REAUTH_ID) {
+ os_free(data->reauth_id);
+ data->reauth_id = NULL;
+ data->reauth_id_len = 0;
+ }
+ if (id & CLEAR_EAP_ID) {
+ os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
+ data->last_eap_identity = NULL;
+ data->last_eap_identity_len = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_learn_ids(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ if (attr->next_pseudonym) {
+ os_free(data->pseudonym);
+ data->pseudonym = os_malloc(attr->next_pseudonym_len);
+ if (data->pseudonym == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No memory for "
+ "next pseudonym");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_memcpy(data->pseudonym, attr->next_pseudonym,
+ attr->next_pseudonym_len);
+ data->pseudonym_len = attr->next_pseudonym_len;
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM",
+ data->pseudonym,
+ data->pseudonym_len);
+ }
+
+ if (attr->next_reauth_id) {
+ os_free(data->reauth_id);
+ data->reauth_id = os_malloc(attr->next_reauth_id_len);
+ if (data->reauth_id == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No memory for "
+ "next reauth_id");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_memcpy(data->reauth_id, attr->next_reauth_id,
+ attr->next_reauth_id_len);
+ data->reauth_id_len = attr->next_reauth_id_len;
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID",
+ data->reauth_id,
+ data->reauth_id_len);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_add_id_msg(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ const struct wpabuf *msg)
+{
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
+ data->id_msgs = wpabuf_dup(msg);
+ return data->id_msgs == NULL ? -1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ if (wpabuf_resize(&data->id_msgs, wpabuf_len(msg)) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wpabuf_put_buf(data->id_msgs, msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_add_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg)
+{
+ const u8 *addr;
+ size_t len;
+ u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_CHECKCODE");
+
+ if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * No EAP-AKA/Identity packets were exchanged - send empty
+ * checkcode.
+ */
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, NULL, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
+ addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
+ len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE data", addr, len);
+ sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, hash,
+ EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN);
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_verify_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ const u8 *checkcode, size_t checkcode_len)
+{
+ const u8 *addr;
+ size_t len;
+ u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+
+ if (checkcode == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
+ if (checkcode_len != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
+ "indicates that AKA/Identity messages were "
+ "used, but they were not");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (checkcode_len != EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
+ "indicates that AKA/Identity message were not "
+ "used, but they were");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
+ addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
+ len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
+ sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+
+ if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_client_error(struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
+ int err)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
+ data->num_id_req = 0;
+ data->num_notification = 0;
+
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE, err, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_authentication_reject(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
+ data->num_id_req = 0;
+ data->num_notification = 0;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Authentication-Reject "
+ "(id=%d)", id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_synchronization_failure(
+ struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ data->num_id_req = 0;
+ data->num_notification = 0;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Synchronization-Failure "
+ "(id=%d)", id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_AUTS");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_full(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS, data->auts,
+ EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id,
+ enum eap_sim_id_req id_req)
+{
+ const u8 *identity = NULL;
+ size_t identity_len = 0;
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ data->reauth = 0;
+ if (id_req == ANY_ID && data->reauth_id) {
+ identity = data->reauth_id;
+ identity_len = data->reauth_id_len;
+ data->reauth = 1;
+ } else if ((id_req == ANY_ID || id_req == FULLAUTH_ID) &&
+ data->pseudonym) {
+ identity = data->pseudonym;
+ identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID);
+ } else if (id_req != NO_ID_REQ) {
+ identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
+ if (identity) {
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM |
+ CLEAR_REAUTH_ID);
+ }
+ }
+ if (id_req != NO_ID_REQ)
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_EAP_ID);
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Identity (id=%d)", id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY);
+
+ if (identity) {
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IDENTITY",
+ identity, identity_len);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IDENTITY, identity_len,
+ identity, identity_len);
+ }
+
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_challenge(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d)", id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RES");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RES, data->res_len * 8,
+ data->res, data->res_len);
+ eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg);
+ if (data->use_result_ind) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id, int counter_too_small,
+ const u8 *nonce_s)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+ unsigned int counter;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Reauthentication (id=%d)",
+ id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV, EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA);
+
+ if (counter_too_small) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ counter = data->counter_too_small;
+ } else
+ counter = data->counter;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER %d", counter);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, counter, NULL, 0);
+
+ if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr, EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt "
+ "AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg);
+ if (data->use_result_ind) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, nonce_s,
+ EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_notification(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id, u16 notification)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+ u8 *k_aut = (notification & 0x4000) == 0 ? data->k_aut : NULL;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Notification (id=%d)", id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION);
+ if (k_aut && data->reauth) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV,
+ EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER %d", data->counter);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, data->counter,
+ NULL, 0);
+ if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr,
+ EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt "
+ "AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (k_aut) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
+ }
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ int id_error;
+ struct wpabuf *buf;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Identity");
+
+ id_error = 0;
+ switch (attr->id_req) {
+ case NO_ID_REQ:
+ break;
+ case ANY_ID:
+ if (data->num_id_req > 0)
+ id_error++;
+ data->num_id_req++;
+ break;
+ case FULLAUTH_ID:
+ if (data->num_id_req > 1)
+ id_error++;
+ data->num_id_req++;
+ break;
+ case PERMANENT_ID:
+ if (data->num_id_req > 2)
+ id_error++;
+ data->num_id_req++;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (id_error) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Too many ID requests "
+ "used within one authentication");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ buf = eap_aka_response_identity(sm, data, id, attr->id_req);
+
+ if (data->prev_id != id) {
+ eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, reqData);
+ eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, buf);
+ data->prev_id = id;
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ const u8 *identity;
+ size_t identity_len;
+ int res;
+ struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Challenge");
+
+ if (attr->checkcode &&
+ eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
+ attr->checkcode_len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
+ "message");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ data->reauth = 0;
+ if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
+ "did not include%s%s%s",
+ !attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "",
+ !attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "",
+ !attr->autn ? " AT_AUTN" : "");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+ os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(data->autn, attr->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+
+ res = eap_aka_umts_auth(sm, data);
+ if (res == -1) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
+ "failed (AUTN)");
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+ } else if (res == -2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
+ "failed (AUTN seq# -> AUTS)");
+ return eap_aka_synchronization_failure(data, id);
+ } else if (res) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication failed");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+ if (data->last_eap_identity) {
+ identity = data->last_eap_identity;
+ identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
+ } else if (data->pseudonym) {
+ identity = data->pseudonym;
+ identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
+ } else
+ identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK "
+ "derivation", identity, identity_len);
+ eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
+ data->mk);
+ eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk,
+ data->emsk);
+ if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0))
+ {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
+ "used invalid AT_MAC");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ /* Old reauthentication and pseudonym identities must not be used
+ * anymore. In other words, if no new identities are received, full
+ * authentication will be used on next reauthentication. */
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | CLEAR_REAUTH_ID |
+ CLEAR_EAP_ID);
+
+ if (attr->encr_data) {
+ u8 *decrypted;
+ decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
+ attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv,
+ &eattr, 0);
+ if (decrypted == NULL) {
+ return eap_aka_client_error(
+ data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+ eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ }
+
+ if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
+ data->use_result_ind = 1;
+
+ if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
+ eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
+ RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ data->num_id_req = 0;
+ data->num_notification = 0;
+ /* RFC 4187 specifies that counter is initialized to one after
+ * fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement
+ * reauth verification. */
+ data->counter = 0;
+ return eap_aka_response_challenge(data, id);
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
+ u8 *decrypted;
+
+ if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message after "
+ "reauth did not include encrypted data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
+ attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
+ 0);
+ if (decrypted == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
+ "data from notification message");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter != data->counter) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Counter in notification "
+ "message does not match with counter in reauth "
+ "message");
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_process_notification_auth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ if (attr->mac == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_MAC in after_auth "
+ "Notification message");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0))
+ {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message "
+ "used invalid AT_MAC");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (data->reauth &&
+ eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(data, attr)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid notification "
+ "message after reauth");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_notification(
+ struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Notification");
+ if (data->num_notification > 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: too many notification "
+ "rounds (only one allowed)");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+ data->num_notification++;
+ if (attr->notification == -1) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_NOTIFICATION in "
+ "Notification message");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ if ((attr->notification & 0x4000) == 0 &&
+ eap_aka_process_notification_auth(data, reqData, attr)) {
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ eap_sim_report_notification(sm->msg_ctx, attr->notification, 1);
+ if (attr->notification >= 0 && attr->notification < 32768) {
+ eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
+ } else if (attr->notification == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS &&
+ data->state == RESULT_SUCCESS)
+ eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
+ return eap_aka_response_notification(data, id, attr->notification);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_reauthentication(
+ struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
+ u8 *decrypted;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Reauthentication");
+
+ if (attr->checkcode &&
+ eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
+ attr->checkcode_len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
+ "message");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ if (data->reauth_id == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Server is trying "
+ "reauthentication, but no reauth_id available");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ data->reauth = 1;
+ if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0))
+ {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
+ "did not have valid AT_MAC");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
+ "message did not include encrypted data");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
+ attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
+ 0);
+ if (decrypted == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
+ "data from reauthentication message");
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet",
+ !eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "",
+ eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : "");
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ }
+
+ if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter <= data->counter) {
+ struct wpabuf *res;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) Invalid counter "
+ "(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter);
+ data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter;
+
+ eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(eattr.counter, data->reauth_id,
+ data->reauth_id_len, eattr.nonce_s,
+ data->mk, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current
+ * reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication.
+ * However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity
+ * packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be
+ * used in MK derivation. */
+ os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
+ data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id;
+ data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len;
+ data->reauth_id = NULL;
+ data->reauth_id_len = 0;
+
+ res = eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 1, eattr.nonce_s);
+ os_free(decrypted);
+
+ return res;
+ }
+ data->counter = eattr.counter;
+
+ os_memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NONCE_S",
+ data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+
+ eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter,
+ data->reauth_id, data->reauth_id_len,
+ data->nonce_s, data->mk, data->msk,
+ data->emsk);
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
+ eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
+
+ if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
+ data->use_result_ind = 1;
+
+ if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
+ eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
+ RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ data->num_id_req = 0;
+ data->num_notification = 0;
+ if (data->counter > EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Maximum number of "
+ "fast reauths performed - force fullauth");
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
+ }
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ return eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 0, data->nonce_s);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ const struct eap_hdr *req;
+ u8 subtype, id;
+ struct wpabuf *res;
+ const u8 *pos;
+ struct eap_sim_attrs attr;
+ size_t len;
+
+ wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: EAP data", reqData);
+ if (eap_get_config_identity(sm, &len) == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Identity not configured");
+ eap_sm_request_identity(sm);
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME, reqData,
+ &len);
+ if (pos == NULL || len < 1) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ req = wpabuf_head(reqData);
+ id = req->identifier;
+ len = be_to_host16(req->length);
+
+ ret->ignore = FALSE;
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;
+
+ subtype = *pos++;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Subtype=%d", subtype);
+ pos += 2; /* Reserved */
+
+ if (eap_sim_parse_attr(pos, wpabuf_head_u8(reqData) + len, &attr, 1,
+ 0)) {
+ res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ switch (subtype) {
+ case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY:
+ res = eap_aka_process_identity(sm, data, id, reqData, &attr);
+ break;
+ case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE:
+ res = eap_aka_process_challenge(sm, data, id, reqData, &attr);
+ break;
+ case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION:
+ res = eap_aka_process_notification(sm, data, id, reqData,
+ &attr);
+ break;
+ case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION:
+ res = eap_aka_process_reauthentication(sm, data, id, reqData,
+ &attr);
+ break;
+ case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Client-Error");
+ res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ break;
+ default:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unknown subtype=%d", subtype);
+ res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
+ break;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (data->state == FAILURE) {
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
+ } else if (data->state == SUCCESS) {
+ ret->decision = data->use_result_ind ?
+ DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC : DECISION_COND_SUCC;
+ /*
+ * It is possible for the server to reply with AKA
+ * Notification, so we must allow the method to continue and
+ * not only accept EAP-Success at this point.
+ */
+ ret->methodState = data->use_result_ind ?
+ METHOD_DONE : METHOD_MAY_CONT;
+ } else if (data->state == RESULT_FAILURE)
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT;
+ else if (data->state == RESULT_SUCCESS)
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT;
+
+ if (ret->methodState == METHOD_DONE) {
+ ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_aka_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ return data->pseudonym || data->reauth_id;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_EAP_ID);
+ data->prev_id = -1;
+ wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
+ data->id_msgs = NULL;
+ data->use_result_ind = 0;
+}
+
+
+static void * eap_aka_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ data->num_id_req = 0;
+ data->num_notification = 0;
+ eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE);
+ return priv;
+}
+
+
+static const u8 * eap_aka_get_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+
+ if (data->reauth_id) {
+ *len = data->reauth_id_len;
+ return data->reauth_id;
+ }
+
+ if (data->pseudonym) {
+ *len = data->pseudonym_len;
+ return data->pseudonym;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_aka_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ return data->state == SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+static u8 * eap_aka_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (data->state != SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = os_malloc(EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *len = EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(key, data->msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+
+static u8 * eap_aka_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (data->state != SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = os_malloc(EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *len = EAP_EMSK_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(key, data->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+
+int eap_peer_aka_prime_register(void)
+{
+ struct eap_method *eap;
+ int ret;
+
+ eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+ EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ "AKA'");
+ if (eap == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ eap->init = eap_aka_init;
+ eap->deinit = eap_aka_deinit;
+ eap->process = eap_aka_process;
+ eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_aka_isKeyAvailable;
+ eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey;
+ eap->has_reauth_data = eap_aka_has_reauth_data;
+ eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth;
+ eap->init_for_reauth = eap_aka_init_for_reauth;
+ eap->get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity;
+ eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk;
+
+ ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
+ if (ret)
+ eap_peer_method_free(eap);
+ return ret;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * hostapd / EAP-AKA' (draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10.txt)
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
+ * license.
+ *
+ * See README and COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "eap_server/eap_i.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h"
+#include "eap_server/eap_sim_db.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+
+
+struct eap_aka_data {
+ u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN];
+ u8 nonce_s[EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN];
+ u8 k_aut[EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN];
+ u8 k_encr[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN];
+ u8 msk[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN];
+ u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+ u8 rand[EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN];
+ u8 autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
+ u8 ck[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
+ u8 ik[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
+ u8 res[EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t res_len;
+ enum {
+ IDENTITY, CHALLENGE, REAUTH, NOTIFICATION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
+ } state;
+ char *next_pseudonym;
+ char *next_reauth_id;
+ u16 counter;
+ struct eap_sim_reauth *reauth;
+ int auts_reported; /* whether the current AUTS has been reported to the
+ * eap_sim_db */
+ u16 notification;
+ int use_result_ind;
+
+ struct wpabuf *id_msgs;
+ int pending_id;
+};
+
+
+static void eap_aka_determine_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ int before_identity, int after_reauth);
+
+
+static const char * eap_aka_state_txt(int state)
+{
+ switch (state) {
+ case IDENTITY:
+ return "IDENTITY";
+ case CHALLENGE:
+ return "CHALLENGE";
+ case REAUTH:
+ return "REAUTH";
+ case SUCCESS:
+ return "SUCCESS";
+ case FAILURE:
+ return "FAILURE";
+ case NOTIFICATION:
+ return "NOTIFICATION";
+ default:
+ return "Unknown?!";
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_state(struct eap_aka_data *data, int state)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: %s -> %s",
+ eap_aka_state_txt(data->state),
+ eap_aka_state_txt(state));
+ data->state = state;
+}
+
+
+static void * eap_aka_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data;
+
+ if (sm->eap_sim_db_priv == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: eap_sim_db not configured");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ data->state = IDENTITY;
+ eap_aka_determine_identity(sm, data, 1, 0);
+ data->pending_id = -1;
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_reset(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ os_free(data->next_pseudonym);
+ os_free(data->next_reauth_id);
+ wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
+ os_free(data);
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_add_id_msg(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ const struct wpabuf *msg)
+{
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
+ data->id_msgs = wpabuf_dup(msg);
+ return data->id_msgs == NULL ? -1 : 0;
+ }
+
+ if (wpabuf_resize(&data->id_msgs, wpabuf_len(msg)) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wpabuf_put_buf(data->id_msgs, msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_add_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg)
+{
+ const u8 *addr;
+ size_t len;
+ u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_CHECKCODE");
+
+ if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * No EAP-AKA/Identity packets were exchanged - send empty
+ * checkcode.
+ */
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, NULL, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
+ addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
+ len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE data", addr, len);
+ sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, hash,
+ EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN);
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_verify_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ const u8 *checkcode, size_t checkcode_len)
+{
+ const u8 *addr;
+ size_t len;
+ u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+
+ if (checkcode == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
+ if (checkcode_len != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from peer "
+ "indicates that AKA/Identity messages were "
+ "used, but they were not");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (checkcode_len != EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from peer indicates "
+ "that AKA/Identity message were not used, but they "
+ "were");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
+ addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
+ len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
+ sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+
+ if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_build_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+ struct wpabuf *buf;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Generating Identity");
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_REQUEST, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY);
+ if (eap_sim_db_identity_known(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, 0, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * RFC 4187, Chap. 4.1.4 recommends that identity from EAP is
+ * ignored and the AKA/Identity is used to request the
+ * identity.
+ */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ANY_ID_REQ");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_ANY_ID_REQ, 0, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ buf = eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, buf) < 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(buf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ data->pending_id = id;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_build_encr(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg, u16 counter,
+ const u8 *nonce_s)
+{
+ os_free(data->next_pseudonym);
+ data->next_pseudonym =
+ eap_sim_db_get_next_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, 1);
+ os_free(data->next_reauth_id);
+ if (data->counter <= EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
+ data->next_reauth_id =
+ eap_sim_db_get_next_reauth_id(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, 1);
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Max fast re-authentication "
+ "count exceeded - force full authentication");
+ data->next_reauth_id = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (data->next_pseudonym == NULL && data->next_reauth_id == NULL &&
+ counter == 0 && nonce_s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV, EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA);
+
+ if (counter > 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER (%u)", counter);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, counter, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (nonce_s) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_NONCE_S");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_NONCE_S, 0, nonce_s,
+ EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+ }
+
+ if (data->next_pseudonym) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM (%s)",
+ data->next_pseudonym);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM,
+ os_strlen(data->next_pseudonym),
+ (u8 *) data->next_pseudonym,
+ os_strlen(data->next_pseudonym));
+ }
+
+ if (data->next_reauth_id) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID (%s)",
+ data->next_reauth_id);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID,
+ os_strlen(data->next_reauth_id),
+ (u8 *) data->next_reauth_id,
+ os_strlen(data->next_reauth_id));
+ }
+
+ if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr, EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt "
+ "AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_build_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Generating Challenge");
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_REQUEST, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RAND");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RAND, 0, data->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTN, 0, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
+
+ if (eap_aka_build_encr(sm, data, msg, 0, NULL)) {
+ eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg);
+
+ if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_build_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Generating Re-authentication");
+
+ if (os_get_random(data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN))
+ return NULL;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: NONCE_S",
+ data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+
+ eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk,
+ data->emsk);
+ eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len, data->nonce_s, data->mk,
+ data->msk, data->emsk);
+
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_REQUEST, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION);
+
+ if (eap_aka_build_encr(sm, data, msg, data->counter, data->nonce_s)) {
+ eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg);
+
+ if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_build_notification(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Generating Notification");
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_REQUEST, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_NOTIFICATION (%d)", data->notification);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_NOTIFICATION, data->notification,
+ NULL, 0);
+ if (data->use_result_ind) {
+ if (data->reauth) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV,
+ EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER (%u)",
+ data->counter);
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, data->counter,
+ NULL, 0);
+
+ if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr,
+ EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to "
+ "encrypt AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
+ eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
+ }
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_buildReq(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, u8 id)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+
+ data->auts_reported = 0;
+ switch (data->state) {
+ case IDENTITY:
+ return eap_aka_build_identity(sm, data, id);
+ case CHALLENGE:
+ return eap_aka_build_challenge(sm, data, id);
+ case REAUTH:
+ return eap_aka_build_reauth(sm, data, id);
+ case NOTIFICATION:
+ return eap_aka_build_notification(sm, data, id);
+ default:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unknown state %d in "
+ "buildReq", data->state);
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_aka_check(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ struct wpabuf *respData)
+{
+ const u8 *pos;
+ size_t len;
+
+ pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME, respData,
+ &len);
+ if (pos == NULL || len < 3) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Invalid frame");
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_aka_subtype_ok(struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 subtype)
+{
+ if (subtype == EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR ||
+ subtype == EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ switch (data->state) {
+ case IDENTITY:
+ if (subtype != EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected response "
+ "subtype %d", subtype);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CHALLENGE:
+ if (subtype != EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE &&
+ subtype != EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected response "
+ "subtype %d", subtype);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case REAUTH:
+ if (subtype != EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected response "
+ "subtype %d", subtype);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case NOTIFICATION:
+ if (subtype != EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected response "
+ "subtype %d", subtype);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected state (%d) for "
+ "processing a response", data->state);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_determine_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ int before_identity, int after_reauth)
+{
+ const u8 *identity;
+ size_t identity_len;
+ int res;
+
+ identity = NULL;
+ identity_len = 0;
+
+ if (after_reauth && data->reauth) {
+ identity = data->reauth->identity;
+ identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len;
+ } else if (sm->identity && sm->identity_len > 0 &&
+ sm->identity[0] == EAP_AKA_PERMANENT_PREFIX) {
+ identity = sm->identity;
+ identity_len = sm->identity_len;
+ } else {
+ identity = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv,
+ sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len,
+ &identity_len);
+ if (identity == NULL) {
+ data->reauth = eap_sim_db_get_reauth_entry(
+ sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len);
+ if (data->reauth) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Using fast "
+ "re-authentication");
+ identity = data->reauth->identity;
+ identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len;
+ data->counter = data->reauth->counter;
+ os_memcpy(data->mk, data->reauth->mk,
+ EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (identity == NULL ||
+ eap_sim_db_identity_known(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len) < 0) {
+ if (before_identity) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Permanent user name "
+ "not known - send AKA-Identity request");
+ eap_aka_state(data, IDENTITY);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unknown whether the "
+ "permanent user name is known; try to use "
+ "it");
+ /* eap_sim_db_get_aka_auth() will report failure, if
+ * this identity is not known. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Identity",
+ identity, identity_len);
+
+ if (!after_reauth && data->reauth) {
+ eap_aka_state(data, REAUTH);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ res = eap_sim_db_get_aka_auth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
+ identity_len, data->rand, data->autn,
+ data->ik, data->ck, data->res,
+ &data->res_len, sm);
+ if (res == EAP_SIM_DB_PENDING) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AKA authentication data "
+ "not yet available - pending request");
+ sm->method_pending = METHOD_PENDING_WAIT;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ data->reauth = NULL;
+ data->counter = 0; /* reset re-auth counter since this is full auth */
+
+ if (res != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Failed to get AKA "
+ "authentication data for the peer");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (sm->method_pending == METHOD_PENDING_WAIT) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AKA authentication data "
+ "available - abort pending wait");
+ sm->method_pending = METHOD_PENDING_NONE;
+ }
+
+ identity_len = sm->identity_len;
+ while (identity_len > 0 && sm->identity[identity_len - 1] == '\0') {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Workaround - drop last null "
+ "character from identity");
+ identity_len--;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Identity for MK derivation",
+ sm->identity, identity_len);
+
+ eap_aka_derive_mk(sm->identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
+ data->mk);
+ eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk,
+ data->emsk);
+
+ eap_aka_state(data, CHALLENGE);
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Processing Identity");
+
+ if (attr->mac || attr->iv || attr->encr_data) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected attribute "
+ "received in EAP-Response/AKA-Identity");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (attr->identity) {
+ os_free(sm->identity);
+ sm->identity = os_malloc(attr->identity_len);
+ if (sm->identity) {
+ os_memcpy(sm->identity, attr->identity,
+ attr->identity_len);
+ sm->identity_len = attr->identity_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ eap_aka_determine_identity(sm, data, 0, 0);
+ if (eap_get_id(respData) == data->pending_id) {
+ data->pending_id = -1;
+ eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, respData);
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ const u8 *identity;
+ size_t identity_len;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Processing Challenge");
+
+ if (attr->checkcode &&
+ eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
+ attr->checkcode_len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
+ "message");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (attr->mac == NULL ||
+ eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, NULL, 0)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
+ "did not include valid AT_MAC");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * AT_RES is padded, so verify that there is enough room for RES and
+ * that the RES length in bits matches with the expected RES.
+ */
+ if (attr->res == NULL || attr->res_len < data->res_len ||
+ attr->res_len_bits != data->res_len * 8 ||
+ os_memcmp(attr->res, data->res, data->res_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message did not "
+ "include valid AT_RES (attr len=%lu, res len=%lu "
+ "bits, expected %lu bits)",
+ (unsigned long) attr->res_len,
+ (unsigned long) attr->res_len_bits,
+ (unsigned long) data->res_len * 8);
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Challenge response includes the "
+ "correct AT_MAC");
+ if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) {
+ data->use_result_ind = 1;
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ } else
+ eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
+
+ identity = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len, &identity_len);
+ if (identity == NULL) {
+ identity = sm->identity;
+ identity_len = sm->identity_len;
+ }
+
+ if (data->next_pseudonym) {
+ eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
+ identity_len,
+ data->next_pseudonym);
+ data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
+ }
+ if (data->next_reauth_id) {
+ eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
+ identity_len,
+ data->next_reauth_id, data->counter + 1,
+ data->mk);
+ data->next_reauth_id = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_sync_failure(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Processing Synchronization-Failure");
+
+ if (attr->auts == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Synchronization-Failure "
+ "message did not include valid AT_AUTS");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Avoid re-reporting AUTS when processing pending EAP packet by
+ * maintaining a local flag stating whether this AUTS has already been
+ * reported. */
+ if (!data->auts_reported &&
+ eap_sim_db_resynchronize(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity,
+ sm->identity_len, attr->auts,
+ data->rand)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Resynchronization failed");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+ data->auts_reported = 1;
+
+ /* Try again after resynchronization */
+ eap_aka_determine_identity(sm, data, 0, 0);
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
+ u8 *decrypted = NULL;
+ const u8 *identity, *id2;
+ size_t identity_len, id2_len;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Processing Reauthentication");
+
+ if (attr->mac == NULL ||
+ eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, data->nonce_s,
+ EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication message "
+ "did not include valid AT_MAC");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
+ "message did not include encrypted data");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
+ attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
+ 0);
+ if (decrypted == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
+ "data from reauthentication message");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (eattr.counter != data->counter) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication message "
+ "used incorrect counter %u, expected %u",
+ eattr.counter, data->counter);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ decrypted = NULL;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication response includes "
+ "the correct AT_MAC");
+
+ if (eattr.counter_too_small) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication response "
+ "included AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL - starting full "
+ "authentication");
+ eap_aka_determine_identity(sm, data, 0, 1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) {
+ data->use_result_ind = 1;
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ } else
+ eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
+
+ if (data->reauth) {
+ identity = data->reauth->identity;
+ identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len;
+ } else {
+ identity = sm->identity;
+ identity_len = sm->identity_len;
+ }
+
+ id2 = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
+ identity_len, &id2_len);
+ if (id2) {
+ identity = id2;
+ identity_len = id2_len;
+ }
+
+ if (data->next_pseudonym) {
+ eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
+ identity_len, data->next_pseudonym);
+ data->next_pseudonym = NULL;
+ }
+ if (data->next_reauth_id) {
+ eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity,
+ identity_len, data->next_reauth_id,
+ data->counter + 1, data->mk);
+ data->next_reauth_id = NULL;
+ } else {
+ eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
+ data->reauth = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+fail:
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth);
+ data->reauth = NULL;
+ os_free(decrypted);
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_client_error(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Client reported error %d",
+ attr->client_error_code);
+ if (data->notification == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS && data->use_result_ind)
+ eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
+ else
+ eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_authentication_reject(
+ struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Client rejected authentication");
+ eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process_notification(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct wpabuf *respData,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Client replied to notification");
+ if (data->notification == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS && data->use_result_ind)
+ eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
+ else
+ eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
+}
+
+
+static void eap_aka_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ struct wpabuf *respData)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ const u8 *pos, *end;
+ u8 subtype;
+ size_t len;
+ struct eap_sim_attrs attr;
+
+ pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME, respData,
+ &len);
+ if (pos == NULL || len < 3)
+ return;
+
+ end = pos + len;
+ subtype = *pos;
+ pos += 3;
+
+ if (eap_aka_subtype_ok(data, subtype)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unrecognized or unexpected "
+ "EAP-AKA Subtype in EAP Response");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (eap_sim_parse_attr(pos, end, &attr, 1, 0)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse attributes");
+ data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH;
+ eap_aka_state(data, NOTIFICATION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (subtype == EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR) {
+ eap_aka_process_client_error(sm, data, respData, &attr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (subtype == EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT) {
+ eap_aka_process_authentication_reject(sm, data, respData,
+ &attr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (data->state) {
+ case IDENTITY:
+ eap_aka_process_identity(sm, data, respData, &attr);
+ break;
+ case CHALLENGE:
+ if (subtype == EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE) {
+ eap_aka_process_sync_failure(sm, data, respData,
+ &attr);
+ } else {
+ eap_aka_process_challenge(sm, data, respData, &attr);
+ }
+ break;
+ case REAUTH:
+ eap_aka_process_reauth(sm, data, respData, &attr);
+ break;
+ case NOTIFICATION:
+ eap_aka_process_notification(sm, data, respData, &attr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unknown state %d in "
+ "process", data->state);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_aka_isDone(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ return data->state == SUCCESS || data->state == FAILURE;
+}
+
+
+static u8 * eap_aka_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (data->state != SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = os_malloc(EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ os_memcpy(key, data->msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ *len = EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN;
+ return key;
+}
+
+
+static u8 * eap_aka_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (data->state != SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = os_malloc(EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ os_memcpy(key, data->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ *len = EAP_EMSK_LEN;
+ return key;
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_aka_isSuccess(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
+ return data->state == SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+int eap_server_aka_prime_register(void)
+{
+ struct eap_method *eap;
+ int ret;
+
+ eap = eap_server_method_alloc(EAP_SERVER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+ EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ "AKA'");
+ if (eap == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ eap->init = eap_aka_init;
+ eap->reset = eap_aka_reset;
+ eap->buildReq = eap_aka_buildReq;
+ eap->check = eap_aka_check;
+ eap->process = eap_aka_process;
+ eap->isDone = eap_aka_isDone;
+ eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey;
+ eap->isSuccess = eap_aka_isSuccess;
+ eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk;
+
+ ret = eap_server_method_register(eap);
+ if (ret)
+ eap_server_method_free(eap);
+ return ret;
+}
projects / thirdparty / hostap.git / commitdiff
