curl_setup: use SIZE_MAX instead of SIZE_T_MAX

As SIZE_MAX exists in C99

Assisted-by: Stefan Eissing
Assisted-by: Jay Satiro
Ref: #18406
Closes #18426

diff --git a/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c b/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c
index 18803ed50b4b8a5a0193c8c7a1b3307851760289..007cc770d9be3c5c4cfbc5f456c37d52924d0631 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c
+++ b/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static ssize_t on_session_send(nghttp2_session *h2,
   if(!nwritten)
     return NGHTTP2_ERR_WOULDBLOCK;
 
-  return (nwritten  > SSIZE_T_MAX) ?
+  return (nwritten  > SSIZE_MAX) ?
     NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE : (ssize_t)nwritten;
 }
 
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ static ssize_t tunnel_send_callback(nghttp2_session *session,
 
   CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] tunnel_send_callback -> %zd",
               ts->stream_id, nread);
-  return (nread  > SSIZE_T_MAX) ?
+  return (nread  > SSIZE_MAX) ?
     NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE : (ssize_t)nread;
 }
 

diff --git a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
index fc0a97b55663913d7630b7482daaba30c85c8a06..e040db2ab659755c6697c3fcae21d7987fe3c5c0 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
+++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash(const char *password,
   size_t len = strlen(password);
   unsigned char *pw;
   CURLcode result;
-  if(len > SIZE_T_MAX/2) /* avoid integer overflow */
+  if(len > SIZE_MAX/2) /* avoid integer overflow */
     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
   pw = len ? malloc(len * 2) : (unsigned char *)strdup("");
   if(!pw)

diff --git a/lib/curl_setup.h b/lib/curl_setup.h
index 12108e6df162efcc2f46254ca86bd583a4c6e17b..790255612368150bb103ce48969297d047be774a 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/curl_setup.h
+++ b/lib/curl_setup.h
@@ -618,21 +618,21 @@
 #  endif
 #endif
 
-#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
 /* some limits.h headers have this defined, some do not */
 #if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4)
-#define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U
+#define SIZE_MAX 18446744073709551615U
 #else
-#define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U
+#define SIZE_MAX 4294967295U
 #endif
 #endif
 
-#ifndef SSIZE_T_MAX
+#ifndef SSIZE_MAX
 /* some limits.h headers have this defined, some do not */
 #if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4)
-#define SSIZE_T_MAX 9223372036854775807
+#define SSIZE_MAX 9223372036854775807
 #else
-#define SSIZE_T_MAX 2147483647
+#define SSIZE_MAX 2147483647
 #endif
 #endif
 

diff --git a/lib/curlx/dynbuf.h b/lib/curlx/dynbuf.h
index 27335a6fbf4a146029f363008e740632edfdbc11..00ca047893604bd12cd3c27820689791e6364a5f 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/curlx/dynbuf.h
+++ b/lib/curlx/dynbuf.h
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int curlx_dyn_vprintf(struct dynbuf *dyn, const char *format, va_list ap_save);
 char *curlx_dyn_take(struct dynbuf *s, size_t *plen);
 
 /* Dynamic buffer max sizes */
-#define MAX_DYNBUF_SIZE (SIZE_T_MAX/2)
+#define MAX_DYNBUF_SIZE (SIZE_MAX/2)
 
 #define DYN_DOH_RESPONSE    3000
 #define DYN_DOH_CNAME       256

diff --git a/lib/curlx/strparse.c b/lib/curlx/strparse.c
index ecdf5b96153d1a445e2a040ed88d6dc7a33241c8..a29d8be2fdb74a27b7bae95f1f9a52be524ca7e9 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/curlx/strparse.c
+++ b/lib/curlx/strparse.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int str_num_base(const char **linep, curl_off_t *nump, curl_off_t max,
     (base == 16) ? 'f' : '7';
   DEBUGASSERT(linep && *linep && nump);
   DEBUGASSERT((base == 8) || (base == 10) || (base == 16));
-  DEBUGASSERT(max >= 0); /* mostly to catch SIZE_T_MAX, which is too large */
+  DEBUGASSERT(max >= 0); /* mostly to catch SIZE_MAX, which is too large */
   *nump = 0;
   p = *linep;
   if(!valid_digit(*p, m))

diff --git a/lib/curlx/warnless.c b/lib/curlx/warnless.c
index c6cb7c6e5e38de3b936227f5942cffdff4fbc209..bb636a93270fa0e68d5fed159919cabff7cbe3ef 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/curlx/warnless.c
+++ b/lib/curlx/warnless.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ unsigned long curlx_uztoul(size_t uznum)
 #  pragma warning(disable:810) /* conversion may lose significant bits */
 #endif
 
-#if ULONG_MAX < SIZE_T_MAX
+#if ULONG_MAX < SIZE_MAX
   DEBUGASSERT(uznum <= (size_t) CURL_MASK_ULONG);
 #endif
   return (unsigned long)(uznum & (size_t) CURL_MASK_ULONG);
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ unsigned int curlx_uztoui(size_t uznum)
 #  pragma warning(disable:810) /* conversion may lose significant bits */
 #endif
 
-#if UINT_MAX < SIZE_T_MAX
+#if UINT_MAX < SIZE_MAX
   DEBUGASSERT(uznum <= (size_t) CURL_MASK_UINT);
 #endif
   return (unsigned int)(uznum & (size_t) CURL_MASK_UINT);
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int curlx_sztosi(ssize_t sznum)
 #endif
 
   DEBUGASSERT(sznum >= 0);
-#if INT_MAX < SSIZE_T_MAX
+#if INT_MAX < SSIZE_MAX
   DEBUGASSERT((size_t) sznum <= (size_t) CURL_MASK_SINT);
 #endif
   return (int)(sznum & (ssize_t) CURL_MASK_SINT);

diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
index e550abc8f84792fa08066e73aa39a744bd89d5e7..7c95c2ff7e4be7c42015a1e2e7204f26922101a9 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/http2.c
+++ b/lib/http2.c
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static ssize_t send_callback(nghttp2_session *h2,
     ctx->nw_out_blocked = 1;
     return NGHTTP2_ERR_WOULDBLOCK;
   }
-  return (nwritten  > SSIZE_T_MAX) ?
+  return (nwritten  > SSIZE_MAX) ?
     NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE : (ssize_t)nwritten;
 }
 

diff --git a/lib/sendf.c b/lib/sendf.c
index 9959de4eab8ff1bda9e23b909168064457ceec20..551bb5ca81a6bddb8e847a056599e60e68d3a478 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/sendf.c
+++ b/lib/sendf.c
@@ -218,15 +218,15 @@ static size_t get_max_body_write_len(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t limit)
       return 0;
     }
 #if SIZEOF_CURL_OFF_T > SIZEOF_SIZE_T
-    else if(remain_diff > SSIZE_T_MAX) {
-      return SIZE_T_MAX;
+    else if(remain_diff > SSIZE_MAX) {
+      return SIZE_MAX;
     }
 #endif
     else {
       return (size_t)remain_diff;
     }
   }
-  return SIZE_T_MAX;
+  return SIZE_MAX;
 }
 
 struct cw_download_ctx {

diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
index 16841773823b3846eecf92018627eeed671c68a4..5adfe4dbebb09e4ed0ac36704a402b64642b67dc 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/setopt.c
+++ b/lib/setopt.c
@@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@ static CURLcode setopt_cptr(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
       /*
        *  Check that requested length does not overflow the size_t type.
        */
-      else if(s->postfieldsize > SIZE_T_MAX)
+      else if(s->postfieldsize > SIZE_MAX)
         return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
 #endif
       else {

diff --git a/lib/strdup.c b/lib/strdup.c
index 69c41a5e252722943ac976a3f4d2f6c828fbe55e..66fd7c60eb5f030532b364430d964bcb483d76af 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/strdup.c
+++ b/lib/strdup.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ wchar_t *Curl_wcsdup(const wchar_t *src)
 {
   size_t length = wcslen(src);
 
-  if(length > (SIZE_T_MAX / sizeof(wchar_t)) - 1)
+  if(length > (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(wchar_t)) - 1)
     return (wchar_t *)NULL; /* integer overflow */
 
   return (wchar_t *)Curl_memdup(src, (length + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));

diff --git a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
index 8fc5d41b9a38415a64628a9d33053cae7b416481..ebf026fcf5ff93bb557d97032bad69b92263fbfc 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
+++ b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(const char *authzid,
   plen = strlen(passwd);
 
   /* Compute binary message length. Check for overflows. */
-  if((zlen > SIZE_T_MAX/4) || (clen > SIZE_T_MAX/4) ||
-     (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2)))
+  if((zlen > SIZE_MAX/4) || (clen > SIZE_MAX/4) ||
+     (plen > (SIZE_MAX/2 - 2)))
     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
   plainlen = zlen + clen + plen + 2;
 

diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
index 3c572806e25ca013809beb8e07245604bd1baf8e..20eae443d86af2fdd78b33c1d91f14a0542a695a 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_gtls_shared_creds_create(struct Curl_easy *data,
 CURLcode Curl_gtls_shared_creds_up_ref(struct gtls_shared_creds *creds)
 {
   DEBUGASSERT(creds);
-  if(creds->refcount < SIZE_T_MAX) {
+  if(creds->refcount < SIZE_MAX) {
     ++creds->refcount;
     return CURLE_OK;
   }

diff --git a/src/tool_urlglob.c b/src/tool_urlglob.c
index 964789875565c1a2674993e0d7a865aca49afdc8..9e7ee8c767afe2f811ff74d2a8a013e096659eed 100644 (file)
--- a/src/tool_urlglob.c
+++ b/src/tool_urlglob.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static CURLcode glob_set(struct URLGlob *glob, const char **patternp,
       if(pat->c.set.elem) {
         char **arr;
 
-        if(pat->c.set.size >= (curl_off_t)(SIZE_T_MAX/(sizeof(char *))))
+        if(pat->c.set.size >= (curl_off_t)(SIZE_MAX/(sizeof(char *))))
           return globerror(glob, "range overflow", 0, CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT);
 
         arr = realloc(pat->c.set.elem, (size_t)(pat->c.set.size + 1) *