return FLAGS_SET(r, O_PATH);
}
-int fd_verify_safe_flags(int fd) {
+int fd_verify_safe_flags_full(int fd, int extra_flags) {
int flags, unexpected_flags;
/* Check if an extrinsic fd is safe to work on (by a privileged service). This ensures that clients
* can't trick a privileged service into giving access to a file the client doesn't already have
* access to (especially via something like O_PATH).
*
- * O_NOFOLLOW: For some reason the kernel will return this flag from fcntl; it doesn't go away
+ * O_NOFOLLOW: For some reason the kernel will return this flag from fcntl(); it doesn't go away
* immediately after open(). It should have no effect whatsoever to an already-opened FD,
* and since we refuse O_PATH it should be safe.
*
* RAW_O_LARGEFILE: glibc secretly sets this and neglects to hide it from us if we call fcntl.
* See comment in missing_fcntl.h for more details about this.
*
- * O_DIRECTORY: this is set for directories, which are totally fine
+ * If 'extra_flags' is specified as non-zero the included flags are also allowed.
*/
assert(fd >= 0);
if (flags < 0)
return -errno;
- unexpected_flags = flags & ~(O_ACCMODE|O_NOFOLLOW|RAW_O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY);
+ unexpected_flags = flags & ~(O_ACCMODE|O_NOFOLLOW|RAW_O_LARGEFILE|extra_flags);
if (unexpected_flags != 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTEIO),
"Unexpected flags set for extrinsic fd: 0%o",
(unsigned) unexpected_flags);
- return 0;
+ return flags & (O_ACCMODE | extra_flags); /* return the flags variable, but remove the noise */
}
int read_nr_open(void) {
int fd_reopen_condition(int fd, int flags, int mask, int *ret_new_fd);
int fd_is_opath(int fd);
-int fd_verify_safe_flags(int fd);
+
+int fd_verify_safe_flags_full(int fd, int extra_flags);
+static inline int fd_verify_safe_flags(int fd) {
+ return fd_verify_safe_flags_full(fd, 0);
+}
int read_nr_open(void);
int fd_get_diskseq(int fd, uint64_t *ret);