BUG: hlua: fix stack overflow in httpclient headers conversion

hlua_httpclient_table_to_hdrs() declares a VLA of size
global.tune.max_http_hdr (default 101) on the stack but never checks
hdr_num against that bound. A Lua script that supplies a header table
with more than 101 values writes struct http_hdr entries (two ist =
two heap pointers + two lengths) past the end of the VLA, smashing
the stack frame.

Trigger from any Lua action/task/service:

    local hc = core.httpclient()
    local v = {}
    for i = 1, 300 do v[i] = "x" end
    hc:get{ url = "http://127.0.0.1/", headers = { ["X"] = v } }

Each out-of-bounds entry writes a heap pointer (controllable
allocation contents via istdup) plus an attacker-chosen length onto
the stack, overwriting the saved return address. With no stack
canary, this is direct RCE; with a canary, it requires a leak first.

Reachable from any deployment that loads Lua scripts. While Lua
scripts are nominally trusted, this turns "can edit Lua" into "can
execute arbitrary native code", which is a meaningful boundary in
many setups (Lua sandbox escape).

This must be backported as far as the httpclient Lua API exists.

diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c
index 6e56583df21ae4312d4eff89e09a8c915d9a1706..c66849c48e8f4a7646504d399a753a8fe5d5bf55 100644 (file)
--- a/src/hlua.c
+++ b/src/hlua.c
@@ -8069,6 +8069,11 @@ struct http_hdr *hlua_httpclient_table_to_hdrs(lua_State *L)
                                goto next_value;
                        }
 
+                       if (hdr_num >= global.tune.max_http_hdr) {
+                               lua_pop(L, 2);
+                               goto skip_headers;
+                       }
+
                        v = lua_tolstring(L, -1, &vlen);
                        value = ist2(v, vlen);
                        name = ist2(n, nlen);