]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssh-portable.git/commitdiff
upstream: add "ext-info-in-auth@openssh.com" extension
authordjm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:45:49 +0000 (14:45 +0000)
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:51:46 +0000 (01:51 +1100)
This adds another transport protocol extension to allow a sshd to send
SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication, after the server has
learned the username that is being logged in to.

This lets sshd to update the acceptable signature algoritms for public
key authentication, and allows these to be varied via sshd_config(5)
"Match" directives, which are evaluated after the server learns the
username being authenticated.

Full details in the PROTOCOL file

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de7da7f2b6c32a46043d75fcd49b0cbb7db7779

PROTOCOL
auth2.c
kex.c
kex.h
monitor_wrap.c
sshconnect2.c
sshd.c

index ded935eb6752acef48baf6388941a4a669d91eb2..1894d573d739a497f9ad4220ff15171cb4d0488f 100644 (file)
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -163,6 +163,25 @@ b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
    duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
    SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
 
+1.10 transport: SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication
+
+This protocol extension allows the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO to be sent
+during user authentication. RFC8308 does allow a second
+SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO notification, but it may only be sent at the end
+of user authentication and this is too late to signal per-user
+server signature algorithms.
+
+Support for receiving the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message during user
+authentication is signalled by the client including a
+"ext-info-in-auth@openssh.com" key via its initial SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO
+set after the SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message.
+
+A server that supports this extension MAY send a second
+SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message any time after the client's first
+SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, regardless of whether it succeed or fails.
+The client SHOULD be prepared to update the server-sig-algs that
+it received during an earlier SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with the later one.
+
 2. Connection protocol changes
 
 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
@@ -771,4 +790,4 @@ master instance and later clients.
 OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented
 in the PROTOCOL.agent file.
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.50 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.51 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index c628999e0bb62d574469329ce4b4c7abf9e7db4a..271789a77942580e17ae4043dac892b0f02f822f 100644 (file)
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.167 2023/08/28 09:48:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.168 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -172,6 +173,8 @@ do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh)
        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
 
        ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
+       if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c)
+               ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_input_ext_info);
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
        ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success);
        ssh->authctxt = NULL;
@@ -211,6 +214,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
                debug("bad service request %s", service);
                ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service);
        }
+       ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &dispatch_protocol_error);
        r = 0;
  out:
        free(service);
@@ -313,6 +317,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
                if (use_privsep)
                        mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
                userauth_banner(ssh);
+               if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+                       fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
                if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
                        ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
                            "no authentication methods enabled");
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index d478ff6e721d4bf4bff39dae8f627f8317ad43d5..cbb2af5965c02d75468ff438b09fa68ebd7036dd 100644 (file)
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.183 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.184 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
        if (kexalgos == NULL)
                kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
        if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
-           "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+           "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
            "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
                fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
 
@@ -505,36 +505,138 @@ kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
            SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
 }
 
+void
+kex_set_server_sig_algs(struct ssh *ssh, const char *allowed_algs)
+{
+       char *alg, *oalgs, *algs, *sigalgs;
+       const char *sigalg;
+
+       /*
+        * NB. allowed algorithms may contain certificate algorithms that
+        * map to a specific plain signature type, e.g.
+        * rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com => rsa-sha2-512
+        * We need to be careful here to match these, retain the mapping
+        * and only add each signature algorithm once.
+        */
+       if ((sigalgs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+               fatal_f("sshkey_alg_list failed");
+       oalgs = algs = xstrdup(allowed_algs);
+       free(ssh->kex->server_sig_algs);
+       ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = NULL;
+       for ((alg = strsep(&algs, ",")); alg != NULL && *alg != '\0';
+           (alg = strsep(&algs, ","))) {
+               if ((sigalg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(alg)) == NULL)
+                       continue;
+               if (!has_any_alg(sigalg, sigalgs))
+                       continue;
+               /* Don't add an algorithm twice. */
+               if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs != NULL &&
+                   has_any_alg(sigalg, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs))
+                       continue;
+               xextendf(&ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, ",", "%s", sigalg);
+       }
+       free(oalgs);
+       free(sigalgs);
+       if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL)
+               ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = xstrdup("");
+}
+
 static int
-kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
 {
        int r;
-       char *algs;
 
-       debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
-       if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+       if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL &&
+           (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-       /* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */
-       if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 3)) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 3)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
            "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "0")) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "0")) != 0 ||
-           (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
+               error_fr(r, "compose");
+               return r;
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_compose_ext_info_client(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+       int r;
+
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ext-info-in-auth@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
                error_fr(r, "compose");
                goto out;
        }
        /* success */
        r = 0;
  out:
-       free(algs);
+       return r;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_maybe_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       int r;
+       struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
+
+       if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) == 0)
+               return 0;
+       if (!ssh->kex->ext_info_c && !ssh->kex->ext_info_s)
+               return 0;
+
+       /* Compose EXT_INFO packet. */
+       if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+       if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c &&
+           (r = kex_compose_ext_info_server(ssh, m)) != 0)
+               goto fail;
+       if (ssh->kex->ext_info_s &&
+           (r = kex_compose_ext_info_client(ssh, m)) != 0)
+               goto fail;
+
+       /* Send the actual KEX_INFO packet */
+       debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
+       if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, m)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+               error_f("send EXT_INFO");
+               goto fail;
+       }
+
+       r = 0;
+
+ fail:
+       sshbuf_free(m);
        return r;
 }
 
+int
+kex_server_update_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       int r;
+
+       if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_HAS_EXT_INFO_IN_AUTH) == 0)
+               return 0;
+
+       debug_f("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
+       if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+               error_f("send EXT_INFO");
+               return r;
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
 int
 kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
@@ -546,9 +648,8 @@ kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
                return r;
        debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
-       if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
-               if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
-                       return r;
+       if ((r = kex_maybe_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+               return r;
        debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
        return 0;
 }
@@ -570,10 +671,61 @@ kex_ext_info_check_ver(struct kex *kex, const char *name,
        return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+kex_ext_info_client_parse(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name,
+    const u_char *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+       int r;
+
+       /* NB. some messages are only accepted in the initial EXT_INFO */
+       if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
+               /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
+               if (memchr(value, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
+                       error_f("nul byte in %s", name);
+                       return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+               }
+               debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, value);
+               free(ssh->kex->server_sig_algs);
+               ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = xstrdup((const char *)value);
+       } else if (ssh->kex->ext_info_received == 1 &&
+           strcmp(name, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com") == 0) {
+               if ((r = kex_ext_info_check_ver(ssh->kex, name, value, vlen,
+                   "0", KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND)) != 0) {
+                       return r;
+               }
+       } else if (ssh->kex->ext_info_received == 1 &&
+           strcmp(name, "ping@openssh.com") == 0) {
+               if ((r = kex_ext_info_check_ver(ssh->kex, name, value, vlen,
+                   "0", KEX_HAS_PING)) != 0) {
+                       return r;
+               }
+       } else
+               debug_f("%s (unrecognised)", name);
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_ext_info_server_parse(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name,
+    const u_char *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+       int r;
+
+       if (strcmp(name, "ext-info-in-auth@openssh.com") == 0) {
+               if ((r = kex_ext_info_check_ver(ssh->kex, name, value, vlen,
+                   "0", KEX_HAS_EXT_INFO_IN_AUTH)) != 0) {
+                       return r;
+               }
+       } else
+               debug_f("%s (unrecognised)", name);
+       return 0;
+}
+
 int
 kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 {
        struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+       const int max_ext_info = kex->server ? 1 : 2;
        u_int32_t i, ninfo;
        char *name;
        u_char *val;
@@ -581,6 +733,10 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
        int r;
 
        debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
+       if (++kex->ext_info_received > max_ext_info) {
+               error("too many SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO messages sent by peer");
+               return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+       }
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
        if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
                return r;
@@ -596,34 +752,16 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
                        free(name);
                        return r;
                }
-               if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
-                       /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
-                       if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
-                               error_f("nul byte in %s", name);
-                               free(name);
-                               free(val);
-                               return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-                       }
-                       debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, val);
-                       kex->server_sig_algs = val;
-                       val = NULL;
-               } else if (strcmp(name,
-                   "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com") == 0) {
-                       if ((r = kex_ext_info_check_ver(kex, name, val, vlen,
-                           "0", KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND)) != 0) {
-                               free(name);
-                               free(val);
+               debug3_f("extension %s", name);
+               if (kex->server) {
+                       if ((r = kex_ext_info_server_parse(ssh, name,
+                           val, vlen)) != 0)
                                return r;
-                       }
-               } else if (strcmp(name, "ping@openssh.com") == 0) {
-                       if ((r = kex_ext_info_check_ver(kex, name, val, vlen,
-                           "0", KEX_HAS_PING)) != 0) {
-                               free(name);
-                               free(val);
+               } else {
+                       if ((r = kex_ext_info_client_parse(ssh, name,
+                           val, vlen)) != 0)
                                return r;
-                       }
-               } else
-                       debug_f("%s (unrecognised)", name);
+               }
                free(name);
                free(val);
        }
@@ -637,6 +775,8 @@ kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
        int r;
 
        debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+       if (kex->ext_info_c && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
+               ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_input_ext_info);
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
        if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -1044,6 +1184,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
                        kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
                            "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
                } else {
+                       kex->ext_info_s = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-s");
                        kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
                            "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
                }
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 272ebb43d79d2e8c915bcf7a1c2881c9d5be4171..ba3a6a4eaf36ff9cf82a8b49cde9679085f43b13 100644 (file)
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.120 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.121 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ enum kex_exchange {
 #define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED     0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
 #define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED     0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
 #define KEX_HAS_PING                   0x0020
+#define KEX_HAS_EXT_INFO_IN_AUTH       0x0040
 
 struct sshenc {
        char    *name;
@@ -149,7 +150,9 @@ struct kex {
        u_int   kex_type;
        char    *server_sig_algs;
        int     ext_info_c;
+       int     ext_info_s;
        int     kex_strict;
+       int     ext_info_received;
        struct sshbuf *my;
        struct sshbuf *peer;
        struct sshbuf *client_version;
@@ -209,6 +212,8 @@ int  kex_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 int     kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *);
 int     kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *);
 int     kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *);
+int     kex_server_update_ext_info(struct ssh *);
+void    kex_set_server_sig_algs(struct ssh *, const char *);
 
 int     kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
 int     kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
index 3533cf0692c085cf27a77f6e3438a2839db3403f..6270d1398f5360ea7145ea41c5e84d3ecf9f9888 100644 (file)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.128 2023/03/31 00:44:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.129 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -340,8 +340,8 @@ out:
                log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
        process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
        process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options);
+       kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
        free(newopts);
-
        sshbuf_free(m);
 
        return (pw);
index 0cccbcc43c1ae319f1518fdd195fb4e472d4340b..fab1e36bea0323a50fcf1a2ceff7d970c78ba010 100644 (file)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.370 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.371 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -459,10 +459,8 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
        authctxt.mech_tried = 0;
 #endif
        authctxt.agent_fd = -1;
-       pubkey_prepare(ssh, &authctxt);
-       if (authctxt.method == NULL) {
+       if (authctxt.method == NULL)
                fatal_f("internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
-       }
 
        if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
            (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 ||
@@ -521,7 +519,9 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
        /* initial userauth request */
        userauth_none(ssh);
 
-       ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error);
+       /* accept EXT_INFO at any time during userauth */
+       ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, ssh->kex->ext_info_s ?
+           &kex_input_ext_info : &input_userauth_error);
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
        ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
@@ -1678,10 +1678,10 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
        struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
        struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
        struct sshkey *key;
-       int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
+       int disallowed, agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
        size_t j;
        struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
-       char *ident;
+       char *cp, *ident;
 
        TAILQ_INIT(&agent);     /* keys from the agent */
        TAILQ_INIT(&files);     /* keys from the config file */
@@ -1799,16 +1799,30 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
        TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &files, next);
        /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms */
        TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
-               if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) {
-                       debug("Skipping %s key %s - "
-                           "corresponding algo not in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms",
-                           sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
-                       TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
-                       sshkey_free(id->key);
-                       free(id->filename);
-                       memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+               disallowed = 0;
+               cp = NULL;
+               if (id->key == NULL)
                        continue;
+               if (!key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) {
+                       debug("Skipping %s key %s - corresponding algorithm "
+                           "not in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms",
+                           sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
+                       disallowed = 1;
+               } else if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs != NULL &&
+                   (cp = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) {
+                       debug("Skipping %s key %s - corresponding algorithm "
+                           "not supported by server",
+                           sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
+                       disallowed = 1;
                }
+               free(cp);
+               if (!disallowed)
+                       continue;
+               /* remove key */
+               TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
+               sshkey_free(id->key);
+               free(id->filename);
+               memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
        }
        /* List the keys we plan on using */
        TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
@@ -1854,6 +1868,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
        Identity *id;
        int sent = 0;
        char *ident;
+       static int prepared;
+
+       if (!prepared) {
+               pubkey_prepare(ssh, authctxt);
+               prepared = 1;
+       }
 
        while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
                if (id->tried++)
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 8524808f94b9c4adee180c4ec367af9d0dcac218..9cbe92293371621920518f47dd37fc84819689b1 100644 (file)
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.600 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.601 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -2405,7 +2405,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
        /* start key exchange */
        if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
                fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+       kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
        kex = ssh->kex;
+
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;