#include <lastlog.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/pam_misc.h>
+
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
# include <libaudit.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-#include <crypt.h>
+# include <crypt.h>
#endif
#include "c.h"
#define LOGIN_TIMEOUT 60
#ifdef USE_TTY_GROUP
-# define TTY_MODE 0620
+# define TTY_MODE 0620
#else
-# define TTY_MODE 0600
+# define TTY_MODE 0600
#endif
-#define TTYGRPNAME "tty" /* name of group to own ttys */
+#define TTYGRPNAME "tty" /* name of group to own ttys */
/*
* This bounds the time given to login. Not a define so it can
struct passwd *pwd;
static struct passwd pwdcopy;
-char hostaddress[16]; /* used in checktty.c */
-char *hostname; /* idem */
-static char *username, *tty_name, *tty_number;
-static pid_t pid;
+char hostaddress[16]; /* used in checktty.c */
+char *hostname; /* idem */
+static char *username, *tty_name, *tty_number;
+static pid_t pid;
-static void timedout (int);
-static void sigint (int);
-static void motd (void);
-static void dolastlog (int quiet);
+static void timedout(int);
+static void sigint(int);
+static void motd(void);
+static void dolastlog(int quiet);
/* Nice and simple code provided by Linus Torvalds 16-Feb-93 */
/* Nonblocking stuff by Maciej W. Rozycki, macro@ds2.pg.gda.pl, 1999.
connection. I believe login should open the line in the non-blocking mode
leaving the decision to make a connection to getty (where it actually
belongs). */
-static void
-opentty(const char * tty) {
+static void opentty(const char *tty)
+{
int i, fd, flags;
fd = open(tty, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
/* More precisely, the problem is ttyn := ttyname(0); ...; chown(ttyn);
here ttyname() might return "/tmp/x", a hardlink to a pseudotty. */
/* All of this is a problem only when login is suid, which it isnt. */
-static void
-check_ttyname(char *ttyn) {
+static void check_ttyname(char *ttyn)
+{
struct stat statbuf;
if (ttyn == NULL
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
/* true if the filedescriptor fd is a console tty, very Linux specific */
-static int
-consoletty(int fd) {
- struct stat stb;
-
- if ((fstat(fd, &stb) >= 0)
- && (major(stb.st_rdev) == TTY_MAJOR)
- && (minor(stb.st_rdev) < 64)) {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
+static int consoletty(int fd)
+{
+ struct stat stb;
+
+ if ((fstat(fd, &stb) >= 0)
+ && (major(stb.st_rdev) == TTY_MAJOR)
+ && (minor(stb.st_rdev) < 64)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif
* The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
*/
static void
-logbtmp(const char *line, const char *username, const char *hostname) {
+logbtmp(const char *line, const char *username, const char *hostname)
+{
struct utmp ut;
struct timeval tv;
strncpy(ut.ut_id, line + 3, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, line, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
-#if defined(_HAVE_UT_TV) /* in <utmpbits.h> included by <utmp.h> */
+#if defined(_HAVE_UT_TV) /* in <utmpbits.h> included by <utmp.h> */
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ut.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ut.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
{
time_t t;
time(&t);
- ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+ ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
}
#endif
- ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; /* XXX doesn't matter */
+ ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; /* XXX doesn't matter */
ut.ut_pid = pid;
if (hostname) {
xstrncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
if (hostaddress[0])
- memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, hostaddress, sizeof(ut.ut_addr_v6));
+ memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, hostaddress,
+ sizeof(ut.ut_addr_v6));
}
#if HAVE_UPDWTMP /* bad luck for ancient systems */
updwtmp(_PATH_BTMP, &ut);
#endif
}
-
static int child_pid = 0;
static volatile int got_sig = 0;
* Also, parent who is session leader is able (before setsid() in child) to
* inform child when controlling tty goes away (e.g. modem hangup, SIGHUP).
*/
-static void
-sig_handler(int signal)
+static void sig_handler(int signal)
{
- if(child_pid)
+ if (child_pid)
kill(-child_pid, signal);
else
got_sig = 1;
- if(signal == SIGTERM)
- kill(-child_pid, SIGHUP); /* because the shell often ignores SIGTERM */
+ if (signal == SIGTERM)
+ kill(-child_pid, SIGHUP); /* because the shell often ignores SIGTERM */
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
static void
logaudit(const char *tty, const char *username, const char *hostname,
- struct passwd *pwd, int status)
+ struct passwd *pwd, int status)
{
int audit_fd;
pwd = getpwnam(username);
audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
- NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- pwd ? pwd->pw_uid : (unsigned int) -1, hostname, NULL, tty, status);
+ NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ pwd ? pwd->pw_uid : (unsigned int)-1, hostname,
+ NULL, tty, status);
close(audit_fd);
}
-#else /* ! HAVE_LIBAUDIT */
-# define logaudit(tty, username, hostname, pwd, status)
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBAUDIT */
+#else /* ! HAVE_LIBAUDIT */
+#define logaudit(tty, username, hostname, pwd, status)
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBAUDIT */
/* encapsulate stupid "void **" pam_get_item() API */
-static int loginpam_get_username(pam_handle_t *pamh, char **name)
+static int loginpam_get_username(pam_handle_t * pamh, char **name)
{
- const void *item = (void *) *name;
+ const void *item = (void *)*name;
int rc;
rc = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &item);
- *name = (char *) item;
+ *name = (char *)item;
return rc;
}
-static int loginpam_err(pam_handle_t *pamh, int retcode)
+static int loginpam_err(pam_handle_t * pamh, int retcode)
{
const char *msg = pam_strerror(pamh, retcode);
* The open(2) seems as the surest solution.
* -- kzak@redhat.com (10-Apr-2009)
*/
-int
-effective_access(const char *path, int mode)
+int effective_access(const char *path, int mode)
{
int fd = open(path, mode);
if (fd != -1)
return fd == -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- extern int optind;
- extern char *optarg, **environ;
- struct group *gr;
- register int ch;
- register char *p;
- int fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt;
- int quietlog, passwd_req;
- char *domain, *ttyn;
- char tbuf[PATH_MAX + 2];
- char *termenv;
- char *childArgv[10];
- char *buff;
- int childArgc = 0;
- int retcode;
- pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
- struct pam_conv conv = { misc_conv, NULL };
- struct sigaction sa, oldsa_hup, oldsa_term;
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg, **environ;
+ struct group *gr;
+ register int ch;
+ register char *p;
+ int fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt;
+ int quietlog, passwd_req;
+ char *domain, *ttyn;
+ char tbuf[PATH_MAX + 2];
+ char *termenv;
+ char *childArgv[10];
+ char *buff;
+ int childArgc = 0;
+ int retcode;
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ struct pam_conv conv = { misc_conv, NULL };
+ struct sigaction sa, oldsa_hup, oldsa_term;
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
- char vcsn[20], vcsan[20];
+ char vcsn[20], vcsan[20];
#endif
- pid = getpid();
-
- signal(SIGALRM, timedout);
- siginterrupt(SIGALRM,1); /* we have to interrupt syscalls like ioclt() */
- alarm((unsigned int)timeout);
- signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
-
- setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
- bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
- textdomain(PACKAGE);
-
- setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
- initproctitle(argc, argv);
-
- /*
- * -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment
- * -f is used to skip a second login authentication
- * -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote
- * host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp
- */
- gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf));
- domain = strchr(tbuf, '.');
-
- username = tty_name = hostname = NULL;
- fflag = hflag = pflag = 0;
- passwd_req = 1;
-
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1)
- switch (ch) {
- case 'f':
- fflag = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'h':
- if (getuid()) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- _("login: -h for super-user only.\n"));
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- hflag = 1;
- if (domain && (p = strchr(optarg, '.')) &&
- strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0)
- *p = 0;
-
- hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */
- {
- struct addrinfo hints, *info = NULL;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
-
- hostaddress[0] = 0;
-
- if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &info)==0 && info) {
- if (info->ai_family == AF_INET) {
- struct sockaddr_in *sa =
- (struct sockaddr_in *) info->ai_addr;
- memcpy(hostaddress, &(sa->sin_addr),
- sizeof(sa->sin_addr));
+ pid = getpid();
+
+ signal(SIGALRM, timedout);
+ siginterrupt(SIGALRM, 1); /* we have to interrupt syscalls like ioclt() */
+ alarm((unsigned int)timeout);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+ bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+ setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
+ initproctitle(argc, argv);
+
+ /*
+ * -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment
+ * -f is used to skip a second login authentication
+ * -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote
+ * host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp
+ */
+ gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf));
+ domain = strchr(tbuf, '.');
+
+ username = tty_name = hostname = NULL;
+ fflag = hflag = pflag = 0;
+ passwd_req = 1;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1)
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'f':
+ fflag = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'h':
+ if (getuid()) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ _("login: -h for super-user only.\n"));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- else if (info->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
- struct sockaddr_in6 *sa =
- (struct sockaddr_in6 *) info->ai_addr;
- memcpy(hostaddress, &(sa->sin6_addr),
- sizeof(sa->sin6_addr));
+ hflag = 1;
+ if (domain && (p = strchr(optarg, '.')) &&
+ strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0)
+ *p = 0;
+
+ hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */
+ {
+ struct addrinfo hints, *info = NULL;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+
+ hostaddress[0] = 0;
+
+ if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &info)
+ == 0 && info) {
+ if (info->ai_family == AF_INET) {
+ struct sockaddr_in *sa =
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)info->
+ ai_addr;
+ memcpy(hostaddress,
+ &(sa->sin_addr),
+ sizeof(sa->sin_addr));
+ } else if (info->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sa =
+ (struct sockaddr_in6 *)
+ info->ai_addr;
+ memcpy(hostaddress,
+ &(sa->sin6_addr),
+ sizeof(sa->sin6_addr));
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(info);
+ }
}
- freeaddrinfo(info);
+ break;
+
+ case 'p':
+ pflag = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, _("usage: login [-fp] [username]\n"));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- }
- break;
-
- case 'p':
- pflag = 1;
- break;
-
- case '?':
- default:
- fprintf(stderr,
- _("usage: login [-fp] [username]\n"));
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- argc -= optind;
- argv += optind;
-
- if (*argv) {
- char *p = *argv;
- username = strdup(p);
-
- /* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */
- /* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */
- while(*p)
- *p++ = ' ';
- }
-
- for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--)
- close(cnt);
-
- /* note that libc checks that the file descriptor is a terminal, so we don't
- * have to call isatty() here */
- ttyn = ttyname(0);
- check_ttyname(ttyn);
-
- if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- tty_name = ttyn+5;
- else
- tty_name = ttyn;
-
- if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0)
- tty_number = ttyn+8;
- else {
- char *p = ttyn;
- while (*p && !isdigit(*p)) p++;
- tty_number = p;
- }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if (*argv) {
+ char *p = *argv;
+ username = strdup(p);
+
+ /* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */
+ /* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */
+ while (*p)
+ *p++ = ' ';
+ }
+
+ for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--)
+ close(cnt);
+
+ /* note that libc checks that the file descriptor is a terminal, so we don't
+ * have to call isatty() here */
+ ttyn = ttyname(0);
+ check_ttyname(ttyn);
+
+ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ tty_name = ttyn + 5;
+ else
+ tty_name = ttyn;
+
+ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0)
+ tty_number = ttyn + 8;
+ else {
+ char *p = ttyn;
+ while (*p && !isdigit(*p))
+ p++;
+ tty_number = p;
+ }
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
- /* find names of Virtual Console devices, for later mode change */
- snprintf(vcsn, sizeof(vcsn), "/dev/vcs%s", tty_number);
- snprintf(vcsan, sizeof(vcsan), "/dev/vcsa%s", tty_number);
+ /* find names of Virtual Console devices, for later mode change */
+ snprintf(vcsn, sizeof(vcsn), "/dev/vcs%s", tty_number);
+ snprintf(vcsan, sizeof(vcsan), "/dev/vcsa%s", tty_number);
#endif
- /* set pgid to pid */
- setpgrp();
- /* this means that setsid() will fail */
+ /* set pgid to pid */
+ setpgrp();
+ /* this means that setsid() will fail */
- {
- struct termios tt, ttt;
+ {
+ struct termios tt, ttt;
- tcgetattr(0, &tt);
- ttt = tt;
- ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL;
+ tcgetattr(0, &tt);
+ ttt = tt;
+ ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL;
- /* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */
- if (fchown(0, 0, 0)) {
- ; /* glibc warn_unused_result */
+ /* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */
+ if (fchown(0, 0, 0)) {
+ ; /* glibc warn_unused_result */
+ }
+
+ fchmod(0, TTY_MODE);
+
+ /* Kill processes left on this tty */
+ tcsetattr(0, TCSAFLUSH, &ttt);
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */
+ vhangup();
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */
+ opentty(ttyn);
+
+ /* restore tty modes */
+ tcsetattr(0, TCSAFLUSH, &tt);
}
- fchmod(0, TTY_MODE);
+ openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
- /* Kill processes left on this tty */
- tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&ttt);
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */
- vhangup();
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ /*
+ * username is initialized to NULL
+ * and if specified on the command line it is set.
+ * Therefore, we are safe not setting it to anything
+ */
- /* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */
- opentty(ttyn);
+ retcode = pam_start(hflag ? "remote" : "login", username, &conv, &pamh);
+ if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ warnx(_("PAM failure, aborting: %s"),
+ pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Couldn't initialize PAM: %s"),
+ pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
- /* restore tty modes */
- tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&tt);
- }
+ /* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
+ * depending on how much we know
+ */
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
- openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
- /*
- * username is initialized to NULL
- * and if specified on the command line it is set.
- * Therefore, we are safe not setting it to anything
- */
+ /*
+ * Andrew.Taylor@cal.montage.ca: Provide a user prompt to PAM
+ * so that the "login: " prompt gets localized. Unfortunately,
+ * PAM doesn't have an interface to specify the "Password: " string
+ * (yet).
+ */
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER_PROMPT, _("login: "));
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
+
+ if (username) {
+ /* we need't the original username. We have to follow PAM. */
+ free(username);
+ username = NULL;
+ }
- retcode = pam_start(hflag?"remote":"login",username, &conv, &pamh);
- if(retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- warnx(_("PAM failure, aborting: %s"), pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Couldn't initialize PAM: %s"),
- pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- /* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
- * depending on how much we know
- */
- retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
-
- retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
-
- /*
- * Andrew.Taylor@cal.montage.ca: Provide a user prompt to PAM
- * so that the "login: " prompt gets localized. Unfortunately,
- * PAM doesn't have an interface to specify the "Password: " string
- * (yet).
- */
- retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER_PROMPT, _("login: "));
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
-
- if (username) {
- /* we need't the original username. We have to follow PAM. */
- free(username);
- username = NULL;
- }
-
- /* if fflag == 1, then the user has already been authenticated */
- if (fflag && (getuid() == 0))
- passwd_req = 0;
- else
- passwd_req = 1;
+ /* if fflag == 1, then the user has already been authenticated */
+ if (fflag && (getuid() == 0))
+ passwd_req = 0;
+ else
+ passwd_req = 1;
+
+ if (passwd_req == 1) {
+ int failcount = 0;
+
+ /* if we didn't get a user on the command line, set it to NULL */
+ loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
+
+ /* there may be better ways to deal with some of these
+ conditions, but at least this way I don't think we'll
+ be giving away information... */
+ /* Perhaps someday we can trust that all PAM modules will
+ pay attention to failure count and get rid of MAX_LOGIN_TRIES? */
+
+ retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+ while ((failcount++ < LOGIN_MAX_TRIES) &&
+ ((retcode == PAM_AUTH_ERR) ||
+ (retcode == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ||
+ (retcode == PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT) ||
+ (retcode == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL))) {
+ loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
+
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ _("FAILED LOGIN %d FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
+ failcount, hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh,
+ retcode));
+ logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
+ logaudit(tty_name, username, hostname, NULL, 0);
+
+ fprintf(stderr, _("Login incorrect\n\n"));
+ pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, NULL);
+ retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+ }
- if(passwd_req == 1) {
- int failcount=0;
-
- /* if we didn't get a user on the command line, set it to NULL */
- loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
-
- /* there may be better ways to deal with some of these
- conditions, but at least this way I don't think we'll
- be giving away information... */
- /* Perhaps someday we can trust that all PAM modules will
- pay attention to failure count and get rid of MAX_LOGIN_TRIES? */
-
- retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
- while((failcount++ < LOGIN_MAX_TRIES) &&
- ((retcode == PAM_AUTH_ERR) ||
- (retcode == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ||
- (retcode == PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT) ||
- (retcode == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL))) {
- loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
-
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN %d FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
- failcount, hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
- logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
- logaudit(tty_name, username, hostname, NULL, 0);
-
- fprintf(stderr,_("Login incorrect\n\n"));
- pam_set_item(pamh,PAM_USER,NULL);
- retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode)) {
+ loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
+
+ if (retcode == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ _
+ ("TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%d) FROM %s FOR "
+ "%s, %s"), failcount, hostname,
+ username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
+ else
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ _
+ ("FAILED LOGIN SESSION FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
+ hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh,
+ retcode));
+ logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
+ logaudit(tty_name, username, hostname, NULL, 0);
+
+ fprintf(stderr, _("\nLogin incorrect\n"));
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
}
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode)) {
- loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
-
- if (retcode == PAM_MAXTRIES)
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%d) FROM %s FOR "
- "%s, %s"), failcount, hostname, username,
- pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
- else
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN SESSION FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
- hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
- logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
- logaudit(tty_name, username, hostname, NULL, 0);
-
- fprintf(stderr,_("\nLogin incorrect\n"));
- pam_end(pamh, retcode);
- exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ /*
+ * Authentication may be skipped (for example, during krlogin, rlogin, etc...),
+ * but it doesn't mean that we can skip other account checks. The account
+ * could be disabled or password expired (althought kerberos ticket is valid).
+ * -- kzak@redhat.com (22-Feb-2006)
+ */
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
+
+ if (retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+ retcode = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
+
+ /*
+ * Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage
+ * First get the username that we are actually using, though.
+ */
+ retcode = loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
+
+ if (!username || !*username) {
+ warnx(_("\nSession setup problem, abort."));
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("NULL user name in %s:%d. Abort."),
+ __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- }
-
- /*
- * Authentication may be skipped (for example, during krlogin, rlogin, etc...),
- * but it doesn't mean that we can skip other account checks. The account
- * could be disabled or password expired (althought kerberos ticket is valid).
- * -- kzak@redhat.com (22-Feb-2006)
- */
- retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
-
- if (retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
- retcode = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
-
- /*
- * Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage
- * First get the username that we are actually using, though.
- */
- retcode = loginpam_get_username(pamh, &username);
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
-
- if (!username || !*username) {
- warnx(_("\nSession setup problem, abort."));
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("NULL user name in %s:%d. Abort."),
- __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
- pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- if (!(pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
- warnx(_("\nSession setup problem, abort."));
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Invalid user name \"%s\" in %s:%d. Abort."),
- username, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
- pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- /*
- * Create a copy of the pwd struct - otherwise it may get
- * clobbered by PAM
- */
- memcpy(&pwdcopy, pwd, sizeof(*pwd));
- pwd = &pwdcopy;
- pwd->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name);
- pwd->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
- pwd->pw_gecos = strdup(pwd->pw_gecos);
- pwd->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir);
- pwd->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell);
- if (!pwd->pw_name || !pwd->pw_passwd || !pwd->pw_gecos ||
- !pwd->pw_dir || !pwd->pw_shell) {
- warnx(_("out of memory"));
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory");
- pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- username = pwd->pw_name;
-
- /*
- * Initialize the supplementary group list.
- * This should be done before pam_setcred because
- * the PAM modules might add groups during pam_setcred.
- */
- if (initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "initgroups: %m");
- warnx(_("\nSession setup problem, abort."));
- pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
-
- retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
- if (is_pam_failure(retcode)) {
- pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
- loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
- }
-
- /* committed to login -- turn off timeout */
- alarm((unsigned int)0);
-
- endpwent();
-
- /* This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to
- read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted
- filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid
- making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid.
-
- A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux
- having the BSD setreuid() */
- {
- char tmpstr[PATH_MAX];
- uid_t ruid = getuid();
- gid_t egid = getegid();
-
- /* avoid snprintf - old systems do not have it, or worse,
- have a libc in which snprintf is the same as sprintf */
- if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(_PATH_HUSHLOGIN) + 2 > PATH_MAX)
- quietlog = 0;
- else {
- sprintf(tmpstr, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, _PATH_HUSHLOGIN);
- setregid(-1, pwd->pw_gid);
- setreuid(0, pwd->pw_uid);
- quietlog = (effective_access(tmpstr, O_RDONLY) == 0);
- setuid(0); /* setreuid doesn't do it alone! */
- setreuid(ruid, 0);
- setregid(-1, egid);
+ if (!(pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
+ warnx(_("\nSession setup problem, abort."));
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Invalid user name \"%s\" in %s:%d. Abort."),
+ username, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- }
- /* for linux, write entries in utmp and wtmp */
- {
- struct utmp ut;
- struct utmp *utp;
- struct timeval tv;
+ /*
+ * Create a copy of the pwd struct - otherwise it may get
+ * clobbered by PAM
+ */
+ memcpy(&pwdcopy, pwd, sizeof(*pwd));
+ pwd = &pwdcopy;
+ pwd->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name);
+ pwd->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
+ pwd->pw_gecos = strdup(pwd->pw_gecos);
+ pwd->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir);
+ pwd->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell);
+ if (!pwd->pw_name || !pwd->pw_passwd || !pwd->pw_gecos ||
+ !pwd->pw_dir || !pwd->pw_shell) {
+ warnx(_("out of memory"));
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory");
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ username = pwd->pw_name;
- utmpname(_PATH_UTMP);
- setutent();
-
- /* Find pid in utmp.
-login sometimes overwrites the runlevel entry in /var/run/utmp,
-confusing sysvinit. I added a test for the entry type, and the problem
-was gone. (In a runlevel entry, st_pid is not really a pid but some number
-calculated from the previous and current runlevel).
-Michael Riepe <michael@stud.uni-hannover.de>
- */
- while ((utp = getutent()))
- if (utp->ut_pid == pid
- && utp->ut_type >= INIT_PROCESS
- && utp->ut_type <= DEAD_PROCESS)
- break;
+ /*
+ * Initialize the supplementary group list.
+ * This should be done before pam_setcred because
+ * the PAM modules might add groups during pam_setcred.
+ */
+ if (initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "initgroups: %m");
+ warnx(_("\nSession setup problem, abort."));
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode))
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
- /* If we can't find a pre-existing entry by pid, try by line.
- BSD network daemons may rely on this. (anonymous) */
- if (utp == NULL) {
- setutent();
- ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
- strncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
- utp = getutline(&ut);
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+ if (is_pam_failure(retcode)) {
+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
+ loginpam_err(pamh, retcode);
}
- if (utp) {
- memcpy(&ut, utp, sizeof(ut));
- } else {
- /* some gettys/telnetds don't initialize utmp... */
- memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ /* committed to login -- turn off timeout */
+ alarm((unsigned int)0);
+
+ endpwent();
+
+ {
+ /*
+ * Check per accout setting.
+ *
+ * This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to
+ * read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted
+ * filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid
+ * making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid.
+ *
+ * A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux
+ * having the BSD setreuid()
+ */
+ char tmpstr[PATH_MAX];
+ uid_t ruid = getuid();
+ gid_t egid = getegid();
+
+ /* avoid snprintf - old systems do not have it, or worse,
+ have a libc in which snprintf is the same as sprintf */
+ if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(_PATH_HUSHLOGIN) + 2 >
+ PATH_MAX)
+ quietlog = 0;
+ else {
+ sprintf(tmpstr, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, _PATH_HUSHLOGIN);
+ setregid(-1, pwd->pw_gid);
+ setreuid(0, pwd->pw_uid);
+ quietlog = (effective_access(tmpstr, O_RDONLY) == 0);
+ setuid(0); /* setreuid doesn't do it alone! */
+ setreuid(ruid, 0);
+ setregid(-1, egid);
+ }
}
- if (ut.ut_id[0] == 0)
- strncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_number, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
+ /* for linux, write entries in utmp and wtmp */
+ {
+ struct utmp ut;
+ struct utmp *utp;
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ utmpname(_PATH_UTMP);
+ setutent();
+
+ /* Find pid in utmp.
+ login sometimes overwrites the runlevel entry in /var/run/utmp,
+ confusing sysvinit. I added a test for the entry type, and the problem
+ was gone. (In a runlevel entry, st_pid is not really a pid but some number
+ calculated from the previous and current runlevel).
+ Michael Riepe <michael@stud.uni-hannover.de>
+ */
+ while ((utp = getutent()))
+ if (utp->ut_pid == pid
+ && utp->ut_type >= INIT_PROCESS
+ && utp->ut_type <= DEAD_PROCESS)
+ break;
+
+ /* If we can't find a pre-existing entry by pid, try by line.
+ BSD network daemons may rely on this. (anonymous) */
+ if (utp == NULL) {
+ setutent();
+ ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
+ strncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ utp = getutline(&ut);
+ }
- strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
- xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ if (utp) {
+ memcpy(&ut, utp, sizeof(ut));
+ } else {
+ /* some gettys/telnetds don't initialize utmp... */
+ memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ }
+
+ if (ut.ut_id[0] == 0)
+ strncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_number, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
+
+ strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
#ifdef _HAVE_UT_TV /* in <utmpbits.h> included by <utmp.h> */
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- ut.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
- ut.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+ ut.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+ ut.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
#else
- {
- time_t t;
- time(&t);
- ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
- /* glibc2 #defines it as ut_tv.tv_sec */
- }
+ {
+ time_t t;
+ time(&t);
+ ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+ /* glibc2 #defines it as ut_tv.tv_sec */
+ }
#endif
- ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
- ut.ut_pid = pid;
- if (hostname) {
- xstrncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
- if (hostaddress[0])
- memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, hostaddress, sizeof(ut.ut_addr_v6));
- }
+ ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+ ut.ut_pid = pid;
+ if (hostname) {
+ xstrncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+ if (hostaddress[0])
+ memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, hostaddress,
+ sizeof(ut.ut_addr_v6));
+ }
- pututline(&ut);
- endutent();
+ pututline(&ut);
+ endutent();
#if HAVE_UPDWTMP
- updwtmp(_PATH_WTMP, &ut);
+ updwtmp(_PATH_WTMP, &ut);
#else
- /* Probably all this locking below is just nonsense,
- and the short version is OK as well. */
- {
- int lf, wtmp;
- if ((lf = open(_PATH_WTMPLOCK, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0660)) >= 0) {
- flock(lf, LOCK_EX);
- if ((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) {
- write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut));
- close(wtmp);
+ /* Probably all this locking below is just nonsense,
+ and the short version is OK as well. */
+ {
+ int lf, wtmp;
+ if ((lf =
+ open(_PATH_WTMPLOCK, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY,
+ 0660)) >= 0) {
+ flock(lf, LOCK_EX);
+ if ((wtmp =
+ open(_PATH_WTMP,
+ O_APPEND | O_WRONLY)) >= 0) {
+ write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut));
+ close(wtmp);
+ }
+ flock(lf, LOCK_UN);
+ close(lf);
+ }
}
- flock(lf, LOCK_UN);
- close(lf);
- }
- }
#endif
- }
+ }
- logaudit(tty_name, username, hostname, pwd, 1);
- dolastlog(quietlog);
+ logaudit(tty_name, username, hostname, pwd, 1);
+ dolastlog(quietlog);
- if (fchown(0, pwd->pw_uid,
- (gr = getgrnam(TTYGRPNAME)) ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid))
- warn(_("change terminal owner failed"));
+ if (fchown(0, pwd->pw_uid,
+ (gr = getgrnam(TTYGRPNAME)) ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid))
+ warn(_("change terminal owner failed"));
- fchmod(0, TTY_MODE);
+ fchmod(0, TTY_MODE);
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
- /* if tty is one of the VC's then change owner and mode of the
- special /dev/vcs devices as well */
- if (consoletty(0)) {
-
- if (chown(vcsn, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid)))
- warn(_("change terminal owner failed"));
- if (chown(vcsan, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid)))
- warn(_("change terminal owner failed"));
-
- chmod(vcsn, TTY_MODE);
- chmod(vcsan, TTY_MODE);
- }
+ /* if tty is one of the VC's then change owner and mode of the
+ special /dev/vcs devices as well */
+ if (consoletty(0)) {
+
+ if (chown(vcsn, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid)))
+ warn(_("change terminal owner failed"));
+ if (chown(vcsan, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid)))
+ warn(_("change terminal owner failed"));
+
+ chmod(vcsn, TTY_MODE);
+ chmod(vcsan, TTY_MODE);
+ }
#endif
- if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0 && pwd->pw_gid) {
- syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setgid() failed"));
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
-
- if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0')
- pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
-
- /* preserve TERM even without -p flag */
- {
- char *ep;
-
- if(!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep))))
- termenv = "dumb";
- }
-
- /* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */
- if (!pflag)
- {
- environ = (char**)malloc(sizeof(char*));
- memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char*));
- }
-
- setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */
- if(pwd->pw_uid)
- setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
- else
- setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1);
-
- setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1);
- setenv("TERM", termenv, 1);
-
- /* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */
- {
- char tmp[PATH_MAX];
- /* avoid snprintf */
- if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < PATH_MAX) {
- sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name);
- setenv("MAIL",tmp,0);
- }
- }
-
- /* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but
- HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it.
- */
- setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1);
-
- {
- int i;
- char ** env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
-
- if (env != NULL) {
- for (i=0; env[i]; i++) {
- putenv(env[i]);
- /* D(("env[%d] = %s", i,env[i])); */
- }
+ if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0 && pwd->pw_gid) {
+ syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setgid() failed"));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- }
- setproctitle("login", username);
+ if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0')
+ pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
- if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4))
- syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DIALUP AT %s BY %s"), tty_name, pwd->pw_name);
+ /* preserve TERM even without -p flag */
+ {
+ char *ep;
- /* allow tracking of good logins.
- -steve philp (sphilp@mail.alliance.net) */
+ if (!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep))))
+ termenv = "dumb";
+ }
- if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) {
- if (hostname)
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s"),
- tty_name, hostname);
- else
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s"), tty_name);
- } else {
- if (hostname)
- syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s"), tty_name,
- pwd->pw_name, hostname);
+ /* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */
+ if (!pflag) {
+ environ = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char *));
+ memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char *));
+ }
+
+ setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */
+ if (pwd->pw_uid)
+ setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
else
- syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s"), tty_name,
- pwd->pw_name);
- }
+ setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1);
- if (!quietlog) {
- motd();
+ setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1);
+ setenv("TERM", termenv, 1);
-#ifdef LOGIN_STAT_MAIL
- /*
- * This turns out to be a bad idea: when the mail spool
- * is NFS mounted, and the NFS connection hangs, the
- * login hangs, even root cannot login.
- * Checking for mail should be done from the shell.
+ /* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */
+ {
+ char tmp[PATH_MAX];
+ /* avoid snprintf */
+ if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < PATH_MAX) {
+ sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name);
+ setenv("MAIL", tmp, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but
+ HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it.
*/
+ setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1);
+
{
- struct stat st;
- char *mail;
+ int i;
+ char **env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+
+ if (env != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) {
+ putenv(env[i]);
+ /* D(("env[%d] = %s", i,env[i])); */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ setproctitle("login", username);
+
+ if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4))
+ syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DIALUP AT %s BY %s"), tty_name,
+ pwd->pw_name);
+
+ /* allow tracking of good logins.
+ -steve philp (sphilp@mail.alliance.net) */
- mail = getenv("MAIL");
- if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) {
- if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime)
- printf(_("You have new mail.\n"));
+ if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) {
+ if (hostname)
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s"),
+ tty_name, hostname);
else
- printf(_("You have mail.\n"));
- }
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s"), tty_name);
+ } else {
+ if (hostname)
+ syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s"),
+ tty_name, pwd->pw_name, hostname);
+ else
+ syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s"), tty_name,
+ pwd->pw_name);
}
+
+ if (!quietlog) {
+ motd();
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_STAT_MAIL
+ /*
+ * This turns out to be a bad idea: when the mail spool
+ * is NFS mounted, and the NFS connection hangs, the
+ * login hangs, even root cannot login.
+ * Checking for mail should be done from the shell.
+ */
+ {
+ struct stat st;
+ char *mail;
+
+ mail = getenv("MAIL");
+ if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) {
+ if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime)
+ printf(_("You have new mail.\n"));
+ else
+ printf(_("You have mail.\n"));
+ }
+ }
#endif
- }
-
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
-
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
- sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
-
- sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &oldsa_hup); /* ignore when TIOCNOTTY */
-
- /*
- * detach the controlling tty
- * -- we needn't the tty in parent who waits for child only.
- * The child calls setsid() that detach from the tty as well.
- */
- ioctl(0, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
-
- /*
- * We have care about SIGTERM, because leave PAM session without
- * pam_close_session() is pretty bad thing.
- */
- sa.sa_handler = sig_handler;
- sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, NULL);
- sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &oldsa_term);
-
- closelog();
-
- /*
- * We must fork before setuid() because we need to call
- * pam_close_session() as root.
- */
-
- child_pid = fork();
- if (child_pid < 0) {
- /* error in fork() */
- warn(_("failure forking"));
- pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
- pam_end(pamh, pam_close_session(pamh, 0));
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- if (child_pid) {
- /* parent - wait for child to finish, then cleanup session */
- close(0);
- close(1);
- close(2);
- sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
- sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
- sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
-
- /* wait as long as any child is there */
- while(wait(NULL) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
- ;
- openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
- pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
- pam_end(pamh, pam_close_session(pamh, 0));
- exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
- }
-
- /* child */
-
- /* restore to old state */
- sigaction(SIGHUP, &oldsa_hup, NULL);
- sigaction(SIGTERM, &oldsa_term, NULL);
- if(got_sig)
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-
- /*
- * Problem: if the user's shell is a shell like ash that doesnt do
- * setsid() or setpgrp(), then a ctrl-\, sending SIGQUIT to every
- * process in the pgrp, will kill us.
- */
-
- /* start new session */
- setsid();
-
- /* make sure we have a controlling tty */
- opentty(ttyn);
- openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); /* reopen */
-
- /*
- * TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group.
- */
- if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1))
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("TIOCSCTTY failed: %m"));
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
-
- /* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */
- if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) {
- syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setuid() failed"));
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- /* wait until here to change directory! */
- if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
- warn(_("%s: change directory failed"), pwd->pw_dir);
- if (chdir("/"))
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- pwd->pw_dir = "/";
- printf(_("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"));
- }
-
- /* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */
- if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) {
- buff = xmalloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6);
-
- strcpy(buff, "exec ");
- strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell);
- childArgv[childArgc++] = "/bin/sh";
- childArgv[childArgc++] = "-sh";
- childArgv[childArgc++] = "-c";
- childArgv[childArgc++] = buff;
- } else {
- tbuf[0] = '-';
- xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = strrchr(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ?
- p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell),
- sizeof(tbuf)-1);
-
- childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell;
- childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf;
- }
-
- childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL;
-
- execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1);
-
- if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh"))
- warn(_("couldn't exec shell script"));
- else
- warn(_("no shell"));
-
- exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
+
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
+
+ sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &oldsa_hup); /* ignore when TIOCNOTTY */
+
+ /*
+ * detach the controlling tty
+ * -- we needn't the tty in parent who waits for child only.
+ * The child calls setsid() that detach from the tty as well.
+ */
+ ioctl(0, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * We have care about SIGTERM, because leave PAM session without
+ * pam_close_session() is pretty bad thing.
+ */
+ sa.sa_handler = sig_handler;
+ sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, NULL);
+ sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &oldsa_term);
+
+ closelog();
+
+ /*
+ * We must fork before setuid() because we need to call
+ * pam_close_session() as root.
+ */
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ if (child_pid < 0) {
+ /* error in fork() */
+ warn(_("failure forking"));
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ pam_end(pamh, pam_close_session(pamh, 0));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ if (child_pid) {
+ /* parent - wait for child to finish, then cleanup session */
+ close(0);
+ close(1);
+ close(2);
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
+ sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
+
+ /* wait as long as any child is there */
+ while (wait(NULL) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ;
+ openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ pam_end(pamh, pam_close_session(pamh, 0));
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ /* child */
+
+ /* restore to old state */
+ sigaction(SIGHUP, &oldsa_hup, NULL);
+ sigaction(SIGTERM, &oldsa_term, NULL);
+ if (got_sig)
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ /*
+ * Problem: if the user's shell is a shell like ash that doesnt do
+ * setsid() or setpgrp(), then a ctrl-\, sending SIGQUIT to every
+ * process in the pgrp, will kill us.
+ */
+
+ /* start new session */
+ setsid();
+
+ /* make sure we have a controlling tty */
+ opentty(ttyn);
+ openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); /* reopen */
+
+ /*
+ * TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1))
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("TIOCSCTTY failed: %m"));
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */
+ if (setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) {
+ syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setuid() failed"));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /* wait until here to change directory! */
+ if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
+ warn(_("%s: change directory failed"), pwd->pw_dir);
+ if (chdir("/"))
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ pwd->pw_dir = "/";
+ printf(_("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"));
+ }
+
+ /* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */
+ if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) {
+ buff = xmalloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6);
+
+ strcpy(buff, "exec ");
+ strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell);
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = "/bin/sh";
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = "-sh";
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = "-c";
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = buff;
+ } else {
+ tbuf[0] = '-';
+ xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = strrchr(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ?
+ p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell), sizeof(tbuf) - 1);
+
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell;
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf;
+ }
+
+ childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL;
+
+ execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1);
+
+ if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh"))
+ warn(_("couldn't exec shell script"));
+ else
+ warn(_("no shell"));
+
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* the process just exits if the second timeout expires.
*/
-static void
-timedout2(int sig __attribute__((__unused__))) {
+static void timedout2(int sig __attribute__ ((__unused__)))
+{
struct termios ti;
/* reset echo */
tcgetattr(0, &ti);
ti.c_lflag |= ECHO;
tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &ti);
- exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); /* %% */
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); /* %% */
}
-static void
-timedout(int sig __attribute__((__unused__))) {
+static void timedout(int sig __attribute__ ((__unused__)))
+{
signal(SIGALRM, timedout2);
alarm(10);
/* TRANSLATORS: The standard value for %d is 60. */
jmp_buf motdinterrupt;
-void
-motd(void) {
- int fd, nchars;
- void (*oldint)(int);
- char tbuf[8192];
-
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_MOTDFILE, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
- return;
- oldint = signal(SIGINT, sigint);
- if (setjmp(motdinterrupt) == 0)
- while ((nchars = read(fd, tbuf, sizeof(tbuf))) > 0) {
- if (write(fileno(stdout), tbuf, nchars)) {
- ; /* glibc warn_unused_result */
- }
- }
- signal(SIGINT, oldint);
- close(fd);
+void motd(void)
+{
+ int fd, nchars;
+ void (*oldint) (int);
+ char tbuf[8192];
+
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_MOTDFILE, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
+ return;
+ oldint = signal(SIGINT, sigint);
+ if (setjmp(motdinterrupt) == 0)
+ while ((nchars = read(fd, tbuf, sizeof(tbuf))) > 0) {
+ if (write(fileno(stdout), tbuf, nchars)) {
+ ; /* glibc warn_unused_result */
+ }
+ }
+ signal(SIGINT, oldint);
+ close(fd);
}
-void
-sigint(int sig __attribute__((__unused__))) {
- longjmp(motdinterrupt, 1);
+void sigint(int sig __attribute__ ((__unused__)))
+{
+ longjmp(motdinterrupt, 1);
}
-void
-dolastlog(int quiet) {
- struct lastlog ll;
- int fd;
-
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_LASTLOG, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
- lseek(fd, (off_t)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof(ll), SEEK_SET);
- if (!quiet) {
- if (read(fd, (char *)&ll, sizeof(ll)) == sizeof(ll) &&
- ll.ll_time != 0) {
- time_t ll_time = (time_t) ll.ll_time;
-
- printf(_("Last login: %.*s "),
- 24-5, ctime(&ll_time));
-
- if (*ll.ll_host != '\0')
- printf(_("from %.*s\n"),
- (int)sizeof(ll.ll_host), ll.ll_host);
- else
- printf(_("on %.*s\n"),
- (int)sizeof(ll.ll_line), ll.ll_line);
- }
- lseek(fd, (off_t)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof(ll), SEEK_SET);
- }
- memset((char *)&ll, 0, sizeof(ll));
+void dolastlog(int quiet)
+{
+ struct lastlog ll;
+ int fd;
+
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_LASTLOG, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
+ lseek(fd, (off_t) pwd->pw_uid * sizeof(ll), SEEK_SET);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ if (read(fd, (char *)&ll, sizeof(ll)) == sizeof(ll) &&
+ ll.ll_time != 0) {
+ time_t ll_time = (time_t) ll.ll_time;
+
+ printf(_("Last login: %.*s "),
+ 24 - 5, ctime(&ll_time));
+
+ if (*ll.ll_host != '\0')
+ printf(_("from %.*s\n"),
+ (int)sizeof(ll.ll_host),
+ ll.ll_host);
+ else
+ printf(_("on %.*s\n"),
+ (int)sizeof(ll.ll_line),
+ ll.ll_line);
+ }
+ lseek(fd, (off_t) pwd->pw_uid * sizeof(ll), SEEK_SET);
+ }
+ memset((char *)&ll, 0, sizeof(ll));
- {
- time_t t;
- time(&t);
- ll.ll_time = t; /* ll_time is always 32bit */
- }
+ {
+ time_t t;
+ time(&t);
+ ll.ll_time = t; /* ll_time is always 32bit */
+ }
- xstrncpy(ll.ll_line, tty_name, sizeof(ll.ll_line));
- if (hostname)
- xstrncpy(ll.ll_host, hostname, sizeof(ll.ll_host));
+ xstrncpy(ll.ll_line, tty_name, sizeof(ll.ll_line));
+ if (hostname)
+ xstrncpy(ll.ll_host, hostname, sizeof(ll.ll_host));
- if (write(fd, (char *)&ll, sizeof(ll)) < 0)
- warn(_("write lastlog failed"));
- close(fd);
- }
+ if (write(fd, (char *)&ll, sizeof(ll)) < 0)
+ warn(_("write lastlog failed"));
+ close(fd);
+ }
}
/* Should not be called from PAM code... */
-void
-sleepexit(int eval) {
- sleep(LOGIN_EXIT_TIMEOUT);
- exit(eval);
+void sleepexit(int eval)
+{
+ sleep(LOGIN_EXIT_TIMEOUT);
+ exit(eval);
}
projects / thirdparty / util-linux.git / commitdiff
