]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
3.0-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 9 Aug 2012 19:49:20 +0000 (12:49 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 9 Aug 2012 19:49:20 +0000 (12:49 -0700)
added patches:
random-create-add_device_randomness-interface.patch
random-use-lockless-techniques-in-the-interrupt-path.patch

queue-3.0/random-create-add_device_randomness-interface.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-3.0/random-use-lockless-techniques-in-the-interrupt-path.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-3.0/series

diff --git a/queue-3.0/random-create-add_device_randomness-interface.patch b/queue-3.0/random-create-add_device_randomness-interface.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..ea82fce
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2012 11:16:01 -0400
+Subject: random: create add_device_randomness() interface
+
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+
+commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream.
+
+Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
+random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
+even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
+numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
+entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
+for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
+entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+
+[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
+  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
+  in question. ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c  |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/linux/random.h |    1 +
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -125,11 +125,20 @@
+  * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
+  * from the devices are:
+  *
++ *    void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
+  *    void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+  *                                unsigned int value);
+  *    void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
+  *    void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+  *
++ * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
++ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
++ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
++ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
++ * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
++ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
++ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
++ *
+  * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
+  * the event type information from the hardware.
+  *
+@@ -646,6 +655,25 @@ static void set_timer_rand_state(unsigne
+ }
+ #endif
++/*
++ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input and nonblocking
++ * pools to help initialize them to unique values.
++ *
++ * None of this adds any entropy, it is meant to avoid the
++ * problem of the nonblocking pool having similar initial state
++ * across largely identical devices.
++ */
++void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
++{
++      unsigned long time = get_cycles() ^ jiffies;
++
++      mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size, NULL);
++      mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
++      mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size, NULL);
++      mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
++
+ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state;
+ /*
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct rnd_state {
+ extern void rand_initialize_irq(int irq);
++extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+                                unsigned int value);
+ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
diff --git a/queue-3.0/random-use-lockless-techniques-in-the-interrupt-path.patch b/queue-3.0/random-use-lockless-techniques-in-the-interrupt-path.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..512b9f0
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+From 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2012 10:38:30 -0400
+Subject: random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path
+
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+
+commit 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c upstream.
+
+The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
+a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
+This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
+random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.
+
+Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ struct entropy_store {
+       /* read-write data: */
+       spinlock_t lock;
+       unsigned add_ptr;
++      unsigned input_rotate;
+       int entropy_count;
+       int entropy_total;
+-      int input_rotate;
+       unsigned int initialized:1;
+       __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+ };
+@@ -468,26 +468,24 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+  * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
+  * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
+  */
+-static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+-                                 int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
++static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
++                           int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+ {
+       unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+       int input_rotate;
+       int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
+       const char *bytes = in;
+       __u32 w;
+-      unsigned long flags;
+-      /* Taps are constant, so we can load them without holding r->lock.  */
+       tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
+       tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
+       tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
+       tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
+       tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
+-      spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-      input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
+-      i = r->add_ptr;
++      smp_rmb();
++      input_rotate = ACCESS_ONCE(r->input_rotate);
++      i = ACCESS_ONCE(r->add_ptr);
+       /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
+       while (nbytes--) {
+@@ -514,19 +512,23 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+               input_rotate += i ? 7 : 14;
+       }
+-      r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
+-      r->add_ptr = i;
++      ACCESS_ONCE(r->input_rotate) = input_rotate;
++      ACCESS_ONCE(r->add_ptr) = i;
++      smp_wmb();
+       if (out)
+               for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+                       ((__u32 *)out)[j] = r->pool[(i - j) & wordmask];
+-
+-      spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+ }
+-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
++static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
++                           int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+ {
+-       mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
++      unsigned long flags;
++
++      spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
++      __mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
++      spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+ }
+ struct fast_pool {
+@@ -564,23 +566,22 @@ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f, const void *in, int nbytes)
+  */
+ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+ {
+-      unsigned long flags;
+-      int entropy_count;
++      int entropy_count, orig;
+       if (!nbits)
+               return;
+-      spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-
+       DEBUG_ENT("added %d entropy credits to %s\n", nbits, r->name);
+-      entropy_count = r->entropy_count;
++retry:
++      entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+       entropy_count += nbits;
+       if (entropy_count < 0) {
+               DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow\n");
+               entropy_count = 0;
+       } else if (entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS)
+               entropy_count = r->poolinfo->POOLBITS;
+-      r->entropy_count = entropy_count;
++      if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
++              goto retry;
+       if (!r->initialized && nbits > 0) {
+               r->entropy_total += nbits;
+@@ -593,7 +594,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+               wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
+               kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+       }
+-      spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+ }
+ /*********************************************************************
+@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
+               sample.cycles = get_cycles();
+       sample.num = num;
+-      mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample));
++      mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample), NULL);
+       /*
+        * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
+       fast_pool->last = now;
+       r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool;
+-      mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
++      __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool), NULL);
+       /*
+        * If we don't have a valid cycle counter, and we see
+        * back-to-back timer interrupts, then skip giving credit for
+@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+               bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
+                                       random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
+-              mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
++              mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes, NULL);
+               credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
+       }
+ }
+@@ -890,9 +890,11 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+       int i;
+       __u32 hash[5], workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+       __u8 extract[64];
++      unsigned long flags;
+       /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
+       sha_init(hash);
++      spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+       for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
+               sha_transform(hash, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
+@@ -905,7 +907,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+        * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
+        * hash.
+        */
+-      mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
++      __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
++      spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+       /*
+        * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a portion of the
+@@ -928,11 +931,10 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+ }
+ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+-                             size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
++                               size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+ {
+       ssize_t ret = 0, i;
+       __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+-      unsigned long flags;
+       xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
+       nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
+@@ -941,6 +943,8 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+               extract_buf(r, tmp);
+               if (fips_enabled) {
++                      unsigned long flags;
++
+                       spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+                       if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
+                               panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
+@@ -1034,22 +1038,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+ {
+       int i;
+-      ktime_t now;
+-      unsigned long flags;
++      ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
++      unsigned long rv;
+-      spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+       r->entropy_count = 0;
+       r->entropy_total = 0;
+-      spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-
+-      now = ktime_get_real();
+-      mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
+-      for (i = r->poolinfo->POOLBYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof flags) {
+-              if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags))
++      mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL);
++      for (i = r->poolinfo->POOLBYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
++              if (!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+                       break;
+-              mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags));
++              mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
+       }
+-      mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
++      mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
+ }
+ static int rand_initialize(void)
+@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+               count -= bytes;
+               p += bytes;
+-              mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
++              mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes, NULL);
+               cond_resched();
+       }
index 789cf1af65e918bf87a1835e3437feab6b5e263f..ff8dd6f7269b295d1a6907ce5e26c6e47043955e 100644 (file)
@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ x86-nops-missing-break-resulting-in-incorrect-selection-on-intel.patch
 random-add-support-for-architectural-random-hooks.patch
 random-use-arch_get_random_int-instead-of-cycle-counter-if-avail.patch
 random-make-add_interrupt_randomness-do-something-sane.patch
+random-use-lockless-techniques-in-the-interrupt-path.patch
+random-create-add_device_randomness-interface.patch