### Changes between 4.0.0 and 4.0.1 [9 Jun 2026]
+ * Fixed excessive allocation of the handshake message buffer (aka HollowByte)
+
+ Previously, we would allocate a buffer large enough to hold the full size of
+ an incoming handshake message as advertised by the peer. This could be quite
+ large (although it is bounded, e.g. for ClientHello this is approximately
+ 128 KiB). If the peer then fails to send the full handshake message, then the
+ endpoint is left waiting for the remainder of the message to arrive and the
+ memory is still allocated (i.e. a Slowloris attack). To prevent this, we
+ incrementally grow the buffer as we receive the data.
+
+ This issue was reported by Okta Red Team.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
* Fixed heap use-after-free in `PKCS7_verify()`.
Severity: High
and AES-SIV modes.
([CVE-2026-45446])
+ * Fixed excessive allocation of the handshake message buffer (aka HollowByte)
+
* Fixed a regression introduced in 4.0.0 that led to a `openssl pkey`
command crash when it was invoked to encrypt a private key with password
being provided interactively.