io_uring/net: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs()

sqe->len is __u32 but gets stored into sr->len which is int. When
userspace passes sqe->len values exceeding INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF),
sr->len overflows to a negative value. This negative value propagates
through the bundle recv/send path:

  1. io_recv(): sel.val = sr->len (ssize_t gets -1)
  2. io_recv_buf_select(): arg.max_len = sel->val (size_t gets
     0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
  3. io_ring_buffers_peek(): buf->len is not clamped because max_len
     is astronomically large
  4. iov[].iov_len = 0xFFFFFFFF flows into io_bundle_nbufs()
  5. io_bundle_nbufs(): min_t(int, 0xFFFFFFFF, ret) yields -1,
     causing ret to increase instead of decrease, creating an
     infinite loop that reads past the allocated iov[] array

This results in a slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() from
the kmalloc-64 slab, as nbufs increments past the allocated iovec
entries.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ae05c8 by task exp/145
  Call Trace:
   io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160
   io_recv_finish+0x117/0xe20
   io_recv+0x2db/0x1160

Fix this by rejecting negative sr->len values early in both
io_sendmsg_prep() and io_recvmsg_prep(). Since sqe->len is __u32,
any value > INT_MAX indicates overflow and is not a valid length.

Fixes: a05d1f625c7a ("io_uring/net: support bundles for send")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Junxi Qian <qjx1298677004@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260329153909.279046-1-qjx1298677004@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

diff --git a/io_uring/net.c b/io_uring/net.c
index d27adbe3f20be50d80d20987050cf8cd5161ed38..8885d944130a1196224e6a298be588a6dc1c12ce 100644 (file)
--- a/io_uring/net.c
+++ b/io_uring/net.c
@@ -421,6 +421,8 @@ int io_sendmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
 
        sr->done_io = 0;
        sr->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+       if (unlikely(sr->len < 0))
+               return -EINVAL;
        sr->flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->ioprio);
        if (sr->flags & ~SENDMSG_FLAGS)
                return -EINVAL;
@@ -791,6 +793,8 @@ int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
 
        sr->umsg = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr));
        sr->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+       if (unlikely(sr->len < 0))
+               return -EINVAL;
        sr->flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->ioprio);
        if (sr->flags & ~RECVMSG_FLAGS)
                return -EINVAL;