tree-wide: fix typo

diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 3b79730e34071a15a2247ecd5b2ad5955f66412c..048680a68af2ff393698eb996b2ec5c93e418bbc 100644 (file)
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Features:
   these signatures into one object, and then include the result in the UKI.
   Then, if you bind a LUKS volume to public key X it really only can be
   unlocked during early boot, and you bind a LUKS volume to public key Y it
-  realy only can be unlocked during later boot, and so on.
+  really only can be unlocked during later boot, and so on.
 
 * dissection policy should enforce that unlocking can only take place by
   certain means, i.e. only via pw, only via tpm2, or only via fido, or a

diff --git a/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c b/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c
index 6a5c2a9bea02799a7d8ca32b6d4716549eaf4ed7..171b2c96b37d9b8e3dfbb0611f503b774e221cad 100644 (file)
--- a/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c
+++ b/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static EFI_STATUS install_security_override_one(EFI_GUID guid, SecurityOverride
 
 /* This replaces the platform provided security arch protocols (defined in the UEFI Platform Initialization
  * Specification) with the provided override instances. If not running in secure boot or the protocols are
- * not available nothing happens. The override instances are provided with the neccessary info to undo this
+ * not available nothing happens. The override instances are provided with the necessary info to undo this
  * in uninstall_security_override(). */
 void install_security_override(SecurityOverride *override, SecurityOverride *override2) {
         assert(override);