--- /dev/null
+From c28f31deeacda307acfee2f18c0ad904e5123aac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Angelos Oikonomopoulos <angelos@igalia.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 10:51:50 +0200
+Subject: arm64: Don't call NULL in do_compat_alignment_fixup()
+
+From: Angelos Oikonomopoulos <angelos@igalia.com>
+
+commit c28f31deeacda307acfee2f18c0ad904e5123aac upstream.
+
+do_alignment_t32_to_handler() only fixes up alignment faults for
+specific instructions; it returns NULL otherwise (e.g. LDREX). When
+that's the case, signal to the caller that it needs to proceed with the
+regular alignment fault handling (i.e. SIGBUS). Without this patch, the
+kernel panics:
+
+ Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
+ Mem abort info:
+ ESR = 0x0000000086000006
+ EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
+ SET = 0, FnV = 0
+ EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
+ FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
+ user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800164aa000
+ [0000000000000000] pgd=0800081fdbd22003, p4d=0800081fdbd22003, pud=08000815d51c6003, pmd=0000000000000000
+ Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000006 [#1] SMP
+ Modules linked in: cfg80211 rfkill xt_nat xt_tcpudp xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter veth nvme_fa>
+ libcrc32c crc32c_generic raid0 multipath linear dm_mod dax raid1 md_mod xhci_pci nvme xhci_hcd nvme_core t10_pi usbcore igb crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_ce crct10dif_common usb_common i2c_algo_bit i2c>
+ CPU: 2 PID: 3932954 Comm: WPEWebProcess Not tainted 6.1.0-31-arm64 #1 Debian 6.1.128-1
+ Hardware name: GIGABYTE MP32-AR1-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021
+ pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+ pc : 0x0
+ lr : do_compat_alignment_fixup+0xd8/0x3dc
+ sp : ffff80000f973dd0
+ x29: ffff80000f973dd0 x28: ffff081b42526180 x27: 0000000000000000
+ x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
+ x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001
+ x20: 00000000e8551f00 x19: ffff80000f973eb0 x18: 0000000000000000
+ x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
+ x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
+ x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffaebc949bc488
+ x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
+ x5 : 0000000000400000 x4 : 0000fffffffffffe x3 : 0000000000000000
+ x2 : ffff80000f973eb0 x1 : 00000000e8551f00 x0 : 0000000000000001
+ Call trace:
+ 0x0
+ do_alignment_fault+0x40/0x50
+ do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xa0
+ el0_da+0x48/0xf0
+ el0t_32_sync_handler+0x110/0x140
+ el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194
+ Code: bad PC value
+ ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
+
+Signed-off-by: Angelos Oikonomopoulos <angelos@igalia.com>
+Fixes: 3fc24ef32d3b ("arm64: compat: Implement misalignment fixups for multiword loads")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.1.x
+Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250401085150.148313-1-angelos@igalia.com
+Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c
+@@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ int do_compat_alignment_fixup(unsigned l
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++ if (!handler)
++ return 1;
+ type = handler(addr, instr, regs);
+
+ if (type == TYPE_ERROR || type == TYPE_FAULT)
--- /dev/null
+From af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 17:00:03 +0100
+Subject: exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec
+
+From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+
+commit af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0 upstream.
+
+check_unsafe_exec() sets fs->in_exec under cred_guard_mutex, then execve()
+paths clear fs->in_exec lockless. This is fine if exec succeeds, but if it
+fails we have the following race:
+
+ T1 sets fs->in_exec = 1, fails, drops cred_guard_mutex
+
+ T2 sets fs->in_exec = 1
+
+ T1 clears fs->in_exec
+
+ T2 continues with fs->in_exec == 0
+
+Change fs/exec.c to clear fs->in_exec with cred_guard_mutex held.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+1c486d0b62032c82a968@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67dc67f0.050a0220.25ae54.001f.GAE@google.com/
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250324160003.GA8878@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/exec.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/exec.c
++++ b/fs/exec.c
+@@ -1229,13 +1229,12 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm *
+ */
+ bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
+
+- /*
+- * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
+- */
++ /* Make this the only thread in the thread group */
+ retval = de_thread(me);
+ if (retval)
+ goto out;
+-
++ /* see the comment in check_unsafe_exec() */
++ current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+ /*
+ * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
+ */
+@@ -1497,6 +1496,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binpr
+ }
+ free_arg_pages(bprm);
+ if (bprm->cred) {
++ /* in case exec fails before de_thread() succeeds */
++ current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ abort_creds(bprm->cred);
+ }
+@@ -1618,6 +1619,10 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct lin
+ * suid exec because the differently privileged task
+ * will be able to manipulate the current directory, etc.
+ * It would be nice to force an unshare instead...
++ *
++ * Otherwise we set fs->in_exec = 1 to deny clone(CLONE_FS)
++ * from another sub-thread until de_thread() succeeds, this
++ * state is protected by cred_guard_mutex we hold.
+ */
+ n_fs = 1;
+ spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
+@@ -1862,7 +1867,6 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binp
+
+ sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
+ /* execve succeeded */
+- current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+ current->in_execve = 0;
+ rseq_execve(current);
+ user_events_execve(current);
+@@ -1881,7 +1885,6 @@ out:
+ force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV);
+
+ sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
+- current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+ current->in_execve = 0;
+
+ return retval;
--- /dev/null
+From 59c30e31425833385e6644ad33151420e37eabe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2025 23:48:48 +0900
+Subject: exfat: fix potential wrong error return from get_block
+
+From: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
+
+commit 59c30e31425833385e6644ad33151420e37eabe1 upstream.
+
+If there is no error, get_block() should return 0. However, when bh_read()
+returns 1, get_block() also returns 1 in the same manner.
+
+Let's set err to 0, if there is no error from bh_read()
+
+Fixes: 11a347fb6cef ("exfat: change to get file size from DataLength")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
+Reviewed-by: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/exfat/inode.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/exfat/inode.c
++++ b/fs/exfat/inode.c
+@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ static int exfat_get_block(struct inode
+ /* Zero unwritten part of a block */
+ memset(bh_result->b_data + size, 0,
+ bh_result->b_size - size);
++
++ err = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The range has not been written, clear the mapped flag
--- /dev/null
+From 1bb7ff4204b6d4927e982cd256286c09ed4fd8ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 15:34:42 +0900
+Subject: exfat: fix random stack corruption after get_block
+
+From: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
+
+commit 1bb7ff4204b6d4927e982cd256286c09ed4fd8ca upstream.
+
+When get_block is called with a buffer_head allocated on the stack, such
+as do_mpage_readpage, stack corruption due to buffer_head UAF may occur in
+the following race condition situation.
+
+ <CPU 0> <CPU 1>
+mpage_read_folio
+ <<bh on stack>>
+ do_mpage_readpage
+ exfat_get_block
+ bh_read
+ __bh_read
+ get_bh(bh)
+ submit_bh
+ wait_on_buffer
+ ...
+ end_buffer_read_sync
+ __end_buffer_read_notouch
+ unlock_buffer
+ <<keep going>>
+ ...
+ ...
+ ...
+ ...
+<<bh is not valid out of mpage_read_folio>>
+ .
+ .
+another_function
+ <<variable A on stack>>
+ put_bh(bh)
+ atomic_dec(bh->b_count)
+ * stack corruption here *
+
+This patch returns -EAGAIN if a folio does not have buffers when bh_read
+needs to be called. By doing this, the caller can fallback to functions
+like block_read_full_folio(), create a buffer_head in the folio, and then
+call get_block again.
+
+Let's do not call bh_read() with on-stack buffer_head.
+
+Fixes: 11a347fb6cef ("exfat: change to get file size from DataLength")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Tested-by: Yeongjin Gil <youngjin.gil@samsung.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
+Reviewed-by: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/exfat/inode.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/exfat/inode.c
++++ b/fs/exfat/inode.c
+@@ -344,7 +344,8 @@ static int exfat_get_block(struct inode
+ * The block has been partially written,
+ * zero the unwritten part and map the block.
+ */
+- loff_t size, off, pos;
++ loff_t size, pos;
++ void *addr;
+
+ max_blocks = 1;
+
+@@ -355,17 +356,41 @@ static int exfat_get_block(struct inode
+ if (!bh_result->b_folio)
+ goto done;
+
++ /*
++ * No buffer_head is allocated.
++ * (1) bmap: It's enough to fill bh_result without I/O.
++ * (2) read: The unwritten part should be filled with 0
++ * If a folio does not have any buffers,
++ * let's returns -EAGAIN to fallback to
++ * per-bh IO like block_read_full_folio().
++ */
++ if (!folio_buffers(bh_result->b_folio)) {
++ err = -EAGAIN;
++ goto done;
++ }
++
+ pos = EXFAT_BLK_TO_B(iblock, sb);
+ size = ei->valid_size - pos;
+- off = pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
++ addr = folio_address(bh_result->b_folio) +
++ offset_in_folio(bh_result->b_folio, pos);
+
+- folio_set_bh(bh_result, bh_result->b_folio, off);
++ /* Check if bh->b_data points to proper addr in folio */
++ if (bh_result->b_data != addr) {
++ exfat_fs_error_ratelimit(sb,
++ "b_data(%p) != folio_addr(%p)",
++ bh_result->b_data, addr);
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ /* Read a block */
+ err = bh_read(bh_result, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+- goto unlock_ret;
++ goto done;
+
+- folio_zero_segment(bh_result->b_folio, off + size,
+- off + sb->s_blocksize);
++ /* Zero unwritten part of a block */
++ memset(bh_result->b_data + size, 0,
++ bh_result->b_size - size);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The range has not been written, clear the mapped flag
+@@ -376,6 +401,8 @@ static int exfat_get_block(struct inode
+ }
+ done:
+ bh_result->b_size = EXFAT_BLK_TO_B(max_blocks, sb);
++ if (err < 0)
++ clear_buffer_mapped(bh_result);
+ unlock_ret:
+ mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_lock);
+ return err;
--- /dev/null
+From f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 00:38:42 -0400
+Subject: ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs
+
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+
+commit f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 upstream.
+
+This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit
+4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in
+statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information
+where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the
+remaining quota.
+
+This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for
+this bug.
+
+Cc: stable@kernel.org
+Fixes: 689c958cbe6b ("ext4: add project quota support")
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ext4/super.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
+@@ -6813,22 +6813,29 @@ static int ext4_statfs_project(struct su
+ dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit);
+ limit >>= sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+
+- if (limit && buf->f_blocks > limit) {
++ if (limit) {
++ uint64_t remaining = 0;
++
+ curblock = (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curspace +
+ dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_rsvspace) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+- buf->f_blocks = limit;
+- buf->f_bfree = buf->f_bavail =
+- (buf->f_blocks > curblock) ?
+- (buf->f_blocks - curblock) : 0;
++ if (limit > curblock)
++ remaining = limit - curblock;
++
++ buf->f_blocks = min(buf->f_blocks, limit);
++ buf->f_bfree = min(buf->f_bfree, remaining);
++ buf->f_bavail = min(buf->f_bavail, remaining);
+ }
+
+ limit = min_not_zero(dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit,
+ dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit);
+- if (limit && buf->f_files > limit) {
+- buf->f_files = limit;
+- buf->f_ffree =
+- (buf->f_files > dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes) ?
+- (buf->f_files - dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes) : 0;
++ if (limit) {
++ uint64_t remaining = 0;
++
++ if (limit > dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes)
++ remaining = limit - dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes;
++
++ buf->f_files = min(buf->f_files, limit);
++ buf->f_ffree = min(buf->f_ffree, remaining);
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&dquot->dq_dqb_lock);
--- /dev/null
+From d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Acs, Jakub" <acsjakub@amazon.de>
+Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:46:49 +0000
+Subject: ext4: fix OOB read when checking dotdot dir
+
+From: Acs, Jakub <acsjakub@amazon.de>
+
+commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 upstream.
+
+Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir
+entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later
+on, when the corrupted directory is removed).
+
+ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.'
+and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads
+the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry()
+and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir
+entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the
+same data block.
+
+If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the
+sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data
+block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the
+memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to
+ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer
+which results in out-of-bounds mem access.
+
+Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir
+entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony
+dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero).
+
+Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another
+structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is
+really an OOB read.
+
+This issue was found by syzkaller tool.
+
+Call Trace:
+[ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
+[ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375
+[ 38.595158]
+[ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1
+[ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
+[ 38.595304] Call Trace:
+[ 38.595308] <TASK>
+[ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0
+[ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0
+[ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
+[ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250
+[ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
+[ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90
+[ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
+[ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
+[ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
+[ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990
+[ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10
+[ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10
+[ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0
+[ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10
+[ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10
+[ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140
+[ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
+[ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140
+[ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670
+[ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190
+[ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0
+[ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10
+[ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0
+[ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130
+[ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
+[ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+
+Fixes: ac27a0ec112a0 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
+Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
+Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: security@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ext4/dir.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/dir.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c
+@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *f
+ else if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(de->inode) >
+ le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
+ error_msg = "inode out of bounds";
++ else if (unlikely(next_offset == size && de->name_len == 1 &&
++ de->name[0] == '.'))
++ error_msg = "'.' directory cannot be the last in data block";
+ else
+ return 0;
+
--- /dev/null
+From a8dfb2168906944ea61acfc87846b816eeab882d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
+Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 11:25:22 +0300
+Subject: jfs: add index corruption check to DT_GETPAGE()
+
+From: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
+
+commit a8dfb2168906944ea61acfc87846b816eeab882d upstream.
+
+If the file system is corrupted, the header.stblindex variable
+may become greater than 127. Because of this, an array access out
+of bounds may occur:
+
+------------[ cut here ]------------
+UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096:10
+index 237 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot[128]'
+CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor740 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
+ ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
+ __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
+ dtReadFirst+0x622/0xc50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096
+ dtReadNext fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3147 [inline]
+ jfs_readdir+0x9aa/0x3c50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:2862
+ wrap_directory_iterator+0x91/0xd0 fs/readdir.c:65
+ iterate_dir+0x571/0x800 fs/readdir.c:108
+ __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:403 [inline]
+ __se_sys_getdents64+0x1e2/0x4b0 fs/readdir.c:389
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+ </TASK>
+---[ end trace ]---
+
+Add a stblindex check for corruption.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+9120834fc227768625ba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9120834fc227768625ba
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c
++++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c
+@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ do { \
+ if (!(RC)) { \
+ if (((P)->header.nextindex > \
+ (((BN) == 0) ? DTROOTMAXSLOT : (P)->header.maxslot)) || \
+- ((BN) && ((P)->header.maxslot > DTPAGEMAXSLOT))) { \
++ ((BN) && (((P)->header.maxslot > DTPAGEMAXSLOT) || \
++ ((P)->header.stblindex >= DTPAGEMAXSLOT)))) { \
+ BT_PUTPAGE(MP); \
+ jfs_error((IP)->i_sb, \
+ "DT_GETPAGE: dtree page corrupt\n"); \
--- /dev/null
+From fdf480da5837c23b146c4743c18de97202fcab37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 21:05:53 +0000
+Subject: jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()
+
+From: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
+
+commit fdf480da5837c23b146c4743c18de97202fcab37 upstream.
+
+During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
+attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
+"ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().
+
+Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
+INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:
+
+ int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+
+Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
+limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
+"size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).
+
+The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in
+print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
+type), this is then stored inside a variable called
+"int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which
+is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
+the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
+18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
+on each iteration:
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
+ linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
+ remaining -= rowsize;
+
+ hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
+ linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
+
+ ...
+ }
+
+The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken
+since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
+the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer
+to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of
+bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following
+for loop:
+
+ for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
+ if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
+ goto overflow2;
+ ch = ptr[j];
+ ...
+ }
+
+To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)"
+before it is utilised.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5
+Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/jfs/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c
++++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
+@@ -559,11 +559,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, s
+
+ size_check:
+ if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
+- int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
++ if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) {
++ printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n",
++ EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
++ } else {
++ int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+
+- printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
+- print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
+- ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
++ printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
++ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
++ ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
++ }
+ ea_release(inode, ea_buf);
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto clean_up;
--- /dev/null
+From bab703ed8472aa9d109c5f8c1863921533363dae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2025 12:19:28 +0900
+Subject: ksmbd: add bounds check for create lease context
+
+From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+
+commit bab703ed8472aa9d109c5f8c1863921533363dae upstream.
+
+Add missing bounds check for create lease context.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/oplock.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
+@@ -1505,6 +1505,10 @@ struct lease_ctx_info *parse_lease_state
+ if (sizeof(struct lease_context_v2) == le32_to_cpu(cc->DataLength)) {
+ struct create_lease_v2 *lc = (struct create_lease_v2 *)cc;
+
++ if (le16_to_cpu(cc->DataOffset) + le32_to_cpu(cc->DataLength) <
++ sizeof(struct create_lease_v2) - 4)
++ return NULL;
++
+ memcpy(lreq->lease_key, lc->lcontext.LeaseKey, SMB2_LEASE_KEY_SIZE);
+ lreq->req_state = lc->lcontext.LeaseState;
+ lreq->flags = lc->lcontext.LeaseFlags;
+@@ -1517,6 +1521,10 @@ struct lease_ctx_info *parse_lease_state
+ } else {
+ struct create_lease *lc = (struct create_lease *)cc;
+
++ if (le16_to_cpu(cc->DataOffset) + le32_to_cpu(cc->DataLength) <
++ sizeof(struct create_lease))
++ return NULL;
++
+ memcpy(lreq->lease_key, lc->lcontext.LeaseKey, SMB2_LEASE_KEY_SIZE);
+ lreq->req_state = lc->lcontext.LeaseState;
+ lreq->flags = lc->lcontext.LeaseFlags;
--- /dev/null
+From 542027e123fc0bfd61dd59e21ae0ee4ef2101b29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 18:21:47 +0900
+Subject: ksmbd: add bounds check for durable handle context
+
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+
+commit 542027e123fc0bfd61dd59e21ae0ee4ef2101b29 upstream.
+
+Add missing bounds check for durable handle context.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+@@ -2704,6 +2704,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) +
++ le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) <
++ sizeof(struct create_durable_reconn_v2_req)) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ recon_v2 = (struct create_durable_reconn_v2_req *)context;
+ persistent_id = recon_v2->Fid.PersistentFileId;
+ dh_info->fp = ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd(persistent_id);
+@@ -2737,6 +2744,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) +
++ le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) <
++ sizeof(struct create_durable_reconn_req)) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ recon = (struct create_durable_reconn_req *)context;
+ persistent_id = recon->Data.Fid.PersistentFileId;
+ dh_info->fp = ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd(persistent_id);
+@@ -2761,6 +2775,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
++
++ if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) +
++ le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) <
++ sizeof(struct create_durable_req_v2)) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto out;
++ }
+
+ durable_v2_blob =
+ (struct create_durable_req_v2 *)context;
--- /dev/null
+From c8b5b7c5da7d0c31c9b7190b4a7bba5281fc4780 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2025 09:11:23 +0900
+Subject: ksmbd: fix null pointer dereference in alloc_preauth_hash()
+
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+
+commit c8b5b7c5da7d0c31c9b7190b4a7bba5281fc4780 upstream.
+
+The Client send malformed smb2 negotiate request. ksmbd return error
+response. Subsequently, the client can send smb2 session setup even
+thought conn->preauth_info is not allocated.
+This patch add KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP status of connection to ignore
+session setup request if smb2 negotiate phase is not complete.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Tested-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-26505
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/connection.h | 11 +++++++++++
+ fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 4 ++--
+ fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/connection.h
++++ b/fs/smb/server/connection.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum {
+ KSMBD_SESS_EXITING,
+ KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT,
+ KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE,
++ KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP,
+ KSMBD_SESS_RELEASING
+ };
+
+@@ -187,6 +188,11 @@ static inline bool ksmbd_conn_need_negot
+ return READ_ONCE(conn->status) == KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE;
+ }
+
++static inline bool ksmbd_conn_need_setup(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
++{
++ return READ_ONCE(conn->status) == KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP;
++}
++
+ static inline bool ksmbd_conn_need_reconnect(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
+ {
+ return READ_ONCE(conn->status) == KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT;
+@@ -217,6 +223,11 @@ static inline void ksmbd_conn_set_need_n
+ WRITE_ONCE(conn->status, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
+ }
+
++static inline void ksmbd_conn_set_need_setup(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
++{
++ WRITE_ONCE(conn->status, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
++}
++
+ static inline void ksmbd_conn_set_need_reconnect(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
+ {
+ WRITE_ONCE(conn->status, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT);
+--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+@@ -374,13 +374,13 @@ void destroy_previous_session(struct ksm
+ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT);
+ err = ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(conn, id);
+ if (err) {
+- ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
++ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&prev_sess->file_table);
+ prev_sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED;
+- ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
++ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
+ ksmbd_launch_ksmbd_durable_scavenger();
+ out:
+ up_write(&conn->session_lock);
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ int smb2_handle_negotiate(struct ksmbd_w
+ }
+
+ conn->srv_sec_mode = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityMode);
+- ksmbd_conn_set_need_negotiate(conn);
++ ksmbd_conn_set_need_setup(conn);
+
+ err_out:
+ ksmbd_conn_unlock(conn);
+@@ -1271,6 +1271,9 @@ static int alloc_preauth_hash(struct ksm
+ if (sess->Preauth_HashValue)
+ return 0;
+
++ if (!conn->preauth_info)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
+ sess->Preauth_HashValue = kmemdup(conn->preauth_info->Preauth_HashValue,
+ PREAUTH_HASHVALUE_SIZE, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
+ if (!sess->Preauth_HashValue)
+@@ -1674,6 +1677,11 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *w
+
+ ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Received smb2 session setup request\n");
+
++ if (!ksmbd_conn_need_setup(conn) && !ksmbd_conn_good(conn)) {
++ work->send_no_response = 1;
++ return rc;
++ }
++
+ WORK_BUFFERS(work, req, rsp);
+
+ rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(9);
+@@ -1909,7 +1917,7 @@ out_err:
+ if (try_delay) {
+ ksmbd_conn_set_need_reconnect(conn);
+ ssleep(5);
+- ksmbd_conn_set_need_negotiate(conn);
++ ksmbd_conn_set_need_setup(conn);
+ }
+ }
+ smb2_set_err_rsp(work);
+@@ -2243,7 +2251,7 @@ int smb2_session_logoff(struct ksmbd_wor
+ ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
+ sess->user = NULL;
+ }
+- ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(sess_id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
++ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(sess_id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
+
+ rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(4);
+ err = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, rsp, sizeof(struct smb2_logoff_rsp));
--- /dev/null
+From beff0bc9d69bc8e733f9bca28e2d3df5b3e10e42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2025 06:58:15 +0000
+Subject: ksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check
+
+From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+
+commit beff0bc9d69bc8e733f9bca28e2d3df5b3e10e42 upstream.
+
+The dacloffset field was originally typed as int and used in an
+unchecked addition, which could overflow and bypass the existing
+bounds check in both smb_check_perm_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl().
+
+This could result in out-of-bounds memory access and a kernel crash
+when dereferencing the DACL pointer.
+
+This patch converts dacloffset to unsigned int and uses
+check_add_overflow() to validate access to the DACL.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+@@ -1026,7 +1026,9 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
+ struct dentry *parent = path->dentry->d_parent;
+ struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt);
+ int inherited_flags = 0, flags = 0, i, nt_size = 0, pdacl_size;
+- int rc = 0, dacloffset, pntsd_type, pntsd_size, acl_len, aces_size;
++ int rc = 0, pntsd_type, pntsd_size, acl_len, aces_size;
++ unsigned int dacloffset;
++ size_t dacl_struct_end;
+ u16 num_aces, ace_cnt = 0;
+ char *aces_base;
+ bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(d_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode);
+@@ -1035,8 +1037,11 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
+ parent, &parent_pntsd);
+ if (pntsd_size <= 0)
+ return -ENOENT;
++
+ dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(parent_pntsd->dacloffset);
+- if (!dacloffset || (dacloffset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size)) {
++ if (!dacloffset ||
++ check_add_overflow(dacloffset, sizeof(struct smb_acl), &dacl_struct_end) ||
++ dacl_struct_end > (size_t)pntsd_size) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_parent_pntsd;
+ }
+@@ -1240,7 +1245,9 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
+ struct smb_ntsd *pntsd = NULL;
+ struct smb_acl *pdacl;
+ struct posix_acl *posix_acls;
+- int rc = 0, pntsd_size, acl_size, aces_size, pdacl_size, dacl_offset;
++ int rc = 0, pntsd_size, acl_size, aces_size, pdacl_size;
++ unsigned int dacl_offset;
++ size_t dacl_struct_end;
+ struct smb_sid sid;
+ int granted = le32_to_cpu(*pdaccess & ~FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE);
+ struct smb_ace *ace;
+@@ -1259,7 +1266,8 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
+
+ dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
+ if (!dacl_offset ||
+- (dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size))
++ check_add_overflow(dacl_offset, sizeof(struct smb_acl), &dacl_struct_end) ||
++ dacl_struct_end > (size_t)pntsd_size)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ pdacl = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset));
--- /dev/null
+From fa4cdb8cbca7d6cb6aa13e4d8d83d1103f6345db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 21:22:51 +0900
+Subject: ksmbd: fix session use-after-free in multichannel connection
+
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+
+commit fa4cdb8cbca7d6cb6aa13e4d8d83d1103f6345db upstream.
+
+There is a race condition between session setup and
+ksmbd_sessions_deregister. The session can be freed before the connection
+is added to channel list of session.
+This patch check reference count of session before freeing it.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Sean Heelan <seanheelan@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/auth.c | 4 ++--
+ fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 14 ++++++++------
+ fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 7 ++++---
+ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/auth.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/auth.c
+@@ -1016,9 +1016,9 @@ static int ksmbd_get_encryption_key(stru
+
+ ses_enc_key = enc ? sess->smb3encryptionkey :
+ sess->smb3decryptionkey;
+- if (enc)
+- ksmbd_user_session_get(sess);
+ memcpy(key, ses_enc_key, SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE);
++ if (!enc)
++ ksmbd_user_session_put(sess);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static void ksmbd_expire_session(struct
+ down_write(&sessions_table_lock);
+ down_write(&conn->session_lock);
+ xa_for_each(&conn->sessions, id, sess) {
+- if (atomic_read(&sess->refcnt) == 0 &&
++ if (atomic_read(&sess->refcnt) <= 1 &&
+ (sess->state != SMB2_SESSION_VALID ||
+ time_after(jiffies,
+ sess->last_active + SMB2_SESSION_TIMEOUT))) {
+@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ void ksmbd_sessions_deregister(struct ks
+ down_write(&conn->session_lock);
+ xa_erase(&conn->sessions, sess->id);
+ up_write(&conn->session_lock);
+- ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
++ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sess->refcnt))
++ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+@@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ void ksmbd_sessions_deregister(struct ks
+ if (xa_empty(&sess->ksmbd_chann_list)) {
+ xa_erase(&conn->sessions, sess->id);
+ hash_del(&sess->hlist);
+- ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
++ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sess->refcnt))
++ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
+ }
+ }
+ up_write(&conn->session_lock);
+@@ -328,8 +330,8 @@ void ksmbd_user_session_put(struct ksmbd
+
+ if (atomic_read(&sess->refcnt) <= 0)
+ WARN_ON(1);
+- else
+- atomic_dec(&sess->refcnt);
++ else if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sess->refcnt))
++ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
+ }
+
+ struct preauth_session *ksmbd_preauth_session_alloc(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
+@@ -436,7 +438,7 @@ static struct ksmbd_session *__session_c
+ xa_init(&sess->rpc_handle_list);
+ sess->sequence_number = 1;
+ rwlock_init(&sess->tree_conns_lock);
+- atomic_set(&sess->refcnt, 1);
++ atomic_set(&sess->refcnt, 2);
+
+ ret = __init_smb2_session(sess);
+ if (ret)
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+@@ -2235,13 +2235,14 @@ int smb2_session_logoff(struct ksmbd_wor
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+- ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&sess->file_table);
+ down_write(&conn->session_lock);
+ sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED;
+ up_write(&conn->session_lock);
+
+- ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
+- sess->user = NULL;
++ if (sess->user) {
++ ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
++ sess->user = NULL;
++ }
+ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(sess_id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
+
+ rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(4);
--- /dev/null
+From 15a9605f8d69dc85005b1a00c31a050b8625e1aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 09:20:19 +0900
+Subject: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_sessions_deregister()
+
+From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+
+commit 15a9605f8d69dc85005b1a00c31a050b8625e1aa upstream.
+
+In multichannel mode, UAF issue can occur in session_deregister
+when the second channel sets up a session through the connection of
+the first channel. session that is freed through the global session
+table can be accessed again through ->sessions of connection.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ void ksmbd_sessions_deregister(struct ks
+ if (!ksmbd_chann_del(conn, sess) &&
+ xa_empty(&sess->ksmbd_chann_list)) {
+ hash_del(&sess->hlist);
++ down_write(&conn->session_lock);
++ xa_erase(&conn->sessions, sess->id);
++ up_write(&conn->session_lock);
+ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
+ }
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From bf21e29d78cd2c2371023953d9c82dfef82ebb36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2025 16:06:01 +0000
+Subject: ksmbd: validate zero num_subauth before sub_auth is accessed
+
+From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+
+commit bf21e29d78cd2c2371023953d9c82dfef82ebb36 upstream.
+
+Access psid->sub_auth[psid->num_subauth - 1] without checking
+if num_subauth is non-zero leads to an out-of-bounds read.
+This patch adds a validation step to ensure num_subauth != 0
+before sub_auth is accessed.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
+Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+@@ -270,6 +270,11 @@ static int sid_to_id(struct mnt_idmap *i
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
++ if (psid->num_subauth == 0) {
++ pr_err("%s: zero subauthorities!\n", __func__);
++ return -EIO;
++ }
++
+ if (sidtype == SIDOWNER) {
+ kuid_t uid;
+ uid_t id;
--- /dev/null
+From d26638bfcdfc5c8c4e085dc3f5976a0443abab3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 17:25:35 -0800
+Subject: KVM: SVM: Don't change target vCPU state on AP Creation VMGEXIT error
+
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+
+commit d26638bfcdfc5c8c4e085dc3f5976a0443abab3c upstream.
+
+If KVM rejects an AP Creation event, leave the target vCPU state as-is.
+Nothing in the GHCB suggests the hypervisor is *allowed* to muck with vCPU
+state on failure, let alone required to do so. Furthermore, kicking only
+in the !ON_INIT case leads to divergent behavior, and even the "kick" case
+is non-deterministic.
+
+E.g. if an ON_INIT request fails, the guest can successfully retry if the
+fixed AP Creation request is made prior to sending INIT. And if a !ON_INIT
+fails, the guest can successfully retry if the fixed AP Creation request is
+handled before the target vCPU processes KVM's
+KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE.
+
+Fixes: e366f92ea99e ("KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227012541.3234589-5-seanjc@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 ++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+@@ -3969,16 +3969,12 @@ static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vc
+
+ /*
+ * The target vCPU is valid, so the vCPU will be kicked unless the
+- * request is for CREATE_ON_INIT. For any errors at this stage, the
+- * kick will place the vCPU in an non-runnable state.
++ * request is for CREATE_ON_INIT.
+ */
+ kick = true;
+
+ mutex_lock(&target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
+
+- target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+- target_svm->sev_es.snp_ap_waiting_for_reset = true;
+-
+ /* Interrupt injection mode shouldn't change for AP creation */
+ if (request < SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY) {
+ u64 sev_features;
+@@ -4024,20 +4020,23 @@ static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vc
+ target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+ break;
+ case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY:
++ target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP creation request [%#x] from guest\n",
+ request);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+- break;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+-out:
++ target_svm->sev_es.snp_ap_waiting_for_reset = true;
++
+ if (kick) {
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, target_vcpu);
+ kvm_vcpu_kick(target_vcpu);
+ }
+
++out:
+ mutex_unlock(&target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
--- /dev/null
+From f656cfbc7a293a039d6a0c7100e1c846845148c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Murad Masimov <m.masimov@mt-integration.ru>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 13:51:30 +0300
+Subject: media: streamzap: fix race between device disconnection and urb callback
+
+From: Murad Masimov <m.masimov@mt-integration.ru>
+
+commit f656cfbc7a293a039d6a0c7100e1c846845148c1 upstream.
+
+Syzkaller has reported a general protection fault at function
+ir_raw_event_store_with_filter(). This crash is caused by a NULL pointer
+dereference of dev->raw pointer, even though it is checked for NULL in
+the same function, which means there is a race condition. It occurs due
+to the incorrect order of actions in the streamzap_disconnect() function:
+rc_unregister_device() is called before usb_kill_urb(). The dev->raw
+pointer is freed and set to NULL in rc_unregister_device(), and only
+after that usb_kill_urb() waits for in-progress requests to finish.
+
+If rc_unregister_device() is called while streamzap_callback() handler is
+not finished, this can lead to accessing freed resources. Thus
+rc_unregister_device() should be called after usb_kill_urb().
+
+Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
+
+Fixes: 8e9e60640067 ("V4L/DVB: staging/lirc: port lirc_streamzap to ir-core")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: syzbot+34008406ee9a31b13c73@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=34008406ee9a31b13c73
+Signed-off-by: Murad Masimov <m.masimov@mt-integration.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c
++++ b/drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c
+@@ -385,8 +385,8 @@ static void streamzap_disconnect(struct
+ if (!sz)
+ return;
+
+- rc_unregister_device(sz->rdev);
+ usb_kill_urb(sz->urb_in);
++ rc_unregister_device(sz->rdev);
+ usb_free_urb(sz->urb_in);
+ usb_free_coherent(usbdev, sz->buf_in_len, sz->buf_in, sz->dma_in);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 36cef585e2a31e4ddf33a004b0584a7a572246de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
+Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2025 17:58:25 +0300
+Subject: media: vimc: skip .s_stream() for stopped entities
+
+From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
+
+commit 36cef585e2a31e4ddf33a004b0584a7a572246de upstream.
+
+Syzbot reported [1] a warning prompted by a check in call_s_stream()
+that checks whether .s_stream() operation is warranted for unstarted
+or stopped subdevs.
+
+Add a simple fix in vimc_streamer_pipeline_terminate() ensuring that
+entities skip a call to .s_stream() unless they have been previously
+properly started.
+
+[1] Syzbot report:
+------------[ cut here ]------------
+WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5933 at drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-subdev.c:460 call_s_stream+0x2df/0x350 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-subdev.c:460
+Modules linked in:
+CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5933 Comm: syz-executor330 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-syzkaller-00362-g2d8308bf5b67 #0
+...
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ vimc_streamer_pipeline_terminate+0x218/0x320 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c:62
+ vimc_streamer_pipeline_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c:101 [inline]
+ vimc_streamer_s_stream+0x650/0x9a0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c:203
+ vimc_capture_start_streaming+0xa1/0x130 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-capture.c:256
+ vb2_start_streaming+0x15f/0x5a0 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:1789
+ vb2_core_streamon+0x2a7/0x450 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:2348
+ vb2_streamon drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-v4l2.c:875 [inline]
+ vb2_ioctl_streamon+0xf4/0x170 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-v4l2.c:1118
+ __video_do_ioctl+0xaf0/0xf00 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3122
+ video_usercopy+0x4d2/0x1620 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3463
+ v4l2_ioctl+0x1ba/0x250 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c:366
+ vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
+ __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
+ __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_ioctl+0x190/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:892
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+RIP: 0033:0x7f2b85c01b19
+...
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+5bcd7c809d365e14c4df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5bcd7c809d365e14c4df
+Fixes: adc589d2a208 ("media: vimc: Add vimc-streamer for stream control")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c
++++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ static void vimc_streamer_pipeline_termi
+ continue;
+
+ sd = media_entity_to_v4l2_subdev(ved->ent);
++ /*
++ * Do not call .s_stream() to stop an already
++ * stopped/unstarted subdev.
++ */
++ if (!v4l2_subdev_is_streaming(sd))
++ continue;
+ v4l2_subdev_call(sd, video, s_stream, 0);
+ }
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 8977752c8056a6a094a279004a49722da15bace3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 20:37:43 +0100
+Subject: mm/gup: reject FOLL_SPLIT_PMD with hugetlb VMAs
+
+From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+
+commit 8977752c8056a6a094a279004a49722da15bace3 upstream.
+
+Patch series "mm: fixes for device-exclusive entries (hmm)", v2.
+
+Discussing the PageTail() call in make_device_exclusive_range() with
+Willy, I recently discovered [1] that device-exclusive handling does not
+properly work with THP, making the hmm-tests selftests fail if THPs are
+enabled on the system.
+
+Looking into more details, I found that hugetlb is not properly fenced,
+and I realized that something that was bugging me for longer -- how
+device-exclusive entries interact with mapcounts -- completely breaks
+migration/swapout/split/hwpoison handling of these folios while they have
+device-exclusive PTEs.
+
+The program below can be used to allocate 1 GiB worth of pages and making
+them device-exclusive on a kernel with CONFIG_TEST_HMM.
+
+Once they are device-exclusive, these folios cannot get swapped out
+(proc$pid/smaps_rollup will always indicate 1 GiB RSS no matter how much
+one forces memory reclaim), and when having a memory block onlined to
+ZONE_MOVABLE, trying to offline it will loop forever and complain about
+failed migration of a page that should be movable.
+
+# echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state
+# echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state
+# ./hmm-swap &
+... wait until everything is device-exclusive
+# echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state
+[ 285.193431][T14882] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
+ index:0x7f20671f7 pfn:0x442b6a
+[ 285.196618][T14882] memcg:ffff888179298000
+[ 285.198085][T14882] anon flags: 0x5fff0000002091c(referenced|uptodate|
+ dirty|active|owner_2|swapbacked|node=1|zone=3|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
+[ 285.201734][T14882] raw: ...
+[ 285.204464][T14882] raw: ...
+[ 285.207196][T14882] page dumped because: migration failure
+[ 285.209072][T14882] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
+[ 285.210915][T14882] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype
+ Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO),
+ id 14926, tgid 14926 (hmm-swap), ts 254506295376, free_ts 227402023774
+[ 285.216765][T14882] post_alloc_hook+0x197/0x1b0
+[ 285.218874][T14882] get_page_from_freelist+0x76e/0x3280
+[ 285.220864][T14882] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x38e/0x2740
+[ 285.223302][T14882] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fc/0x540
+[ 285.225130][T14882] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x36/0x340
+[ 285.227222][T14882] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xee/0x1a0
+[ 285.229074][T14882] __handle_mm_fault+0x2b38/0x56a0
+[ 285.230822][T14882] handle_mm_fault+0x368/0x9f0
+...
+
+This series fixes all issues I found so far. There is no easy way to fix
+without a bigger rework/cleanup. I have a bunch of cleanups on top (some
+previous sent, some the result of the discussion in v1) that I will send
+out separately once this landed and I get to it.
+
+I wish we could just use some special present PROT_NONE PTEs instead of
+these (non-present, non-none) fake-swap entries; but that just results in
+the same problem we keep having (lack of spare PTE bits), and staring at
+other similar fake-swap entries, that ship has sailed.
+
+With this series, make_device_exclusive() doesn't actually belong into
+mm/rmap.c anymore, but I'll leave moving that for another day.
+
+I only tested this series with the hmm-tests selftests due to lack of HW,
+so I'd appreciate some testing, especially if the interaction between two
+GPUs wanting a device-exclusive entry works as expected.
+
+<program>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+
+struct hmm_dmirror_cmd {
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u64 ptr;
+ __u64 npages;
+ __u64 cpages;
+ __u64 faults;
+};
+
+const size_t size = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024ul;
+const size_t chunk_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024ul;
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ struct hmm_dmirror_cmd cmd;
+ size_t cur_size;
+ int fd, ret;
+ char *addr, *mirror;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/hmm_dmirror1", O_RDWR, 0);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ perror("open failed\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
+ perror("mmap failed\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ madvise(addr, size, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE);
+ memset(addr, 1, size);
+
+ mirror = malloc(chunk_size);
+
+ for (cur_size = 0; cur_size < size; cur_size += chunk_size) {
+ cmd.addr = (uintptr_t)addr + cur_size;
+ cmd.ptr = (uintptr_t)mirror;
+ cmd.npages = chunk_size / getpagesize();
+ ret = ioctl(fd, HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE, &cmd);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("ioctl failed\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ pause();
+ return 0;
+}
+</program>
+
+[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/25e02685-4f1d-47fa-be5b-01ff85bb0ce2@redhat.com
+
+
+This patch (of 17):
+
+We only have two FOLL_SPLIT_PMD users. While uprobe refuses hugetlb
+early, make_device_exclusive_range() can end up getting called on hugetlb
+VMAs.
+
+Right now, this means that with a PMD-sized hugetlb page, we can end up
+calling split_huge_pmd(), because pmd_trans_huge() also succeeds with
+hugetlb PMDs.
+
+For example, using a modified hmm-test selftest one can trigger:
+
+[ 207.017134][T14945] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[ 207.018614][T14945] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:87!
+[ 207.019716][T14945] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
+[ 207.021072][T14945] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: ...
+[ 207.023036][T14945] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
+[ 207.024834][T14945] RIP: 0010:page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510
+[ 207.026128][T14945] Code: ...
+[ 207.029965][T14945] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cb8f348 EFLAGS: 00010293
+[ 207.031139][T14945] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffffff8249a0cd
+[ 207.032649][T14945] RDX: ffff88811e883c80 RSI: ffffffff8249a357 RDI: ffff88811e883c80
+[ 207.034183][T14945] RBP: ffff888105c0a050 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
+[ 207.035688][T14945] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001
+[ 207.037203][T14945] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000
+[ 207.038711][T14945] FS: 00007f2783275740(0000) GS:ffff8881f4980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+[ 207.040407][T14945] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+[ 207.041660][T14945] CR2: 00007f2782c00000 CR3: 0000000132356000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
+[ 207.043196][T14945] PKRU: 55555554
+[ 207.043880][T14945] Call Trace:
+[ 207.044506][T14945] <TASK>
+[ 207.045086][T14945] ? __die+0x51/0x92
+[ 207.045864][T14945] ? die+0x29/0x50
+[ 207.046596][T14945] ? do_trap+0x250/0x320
+[ 207.047430][T14945] ? do_error_trap+0xe7/0x220
+[ 207.048346][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510
+[ 207.049535][T14945] ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40
+[ 207.050494][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510
+[ 207.051681][T14945] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2e/0x50
+[ 207.052589][T14945] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
+[ 207.053596][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x1fd/0x510
+[ 207.054790][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510
+[ 207.055993][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510
+[ 207.057195][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510
+[ 207.058384][T14945] __page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x34b/0x5a0
+[ 207.059524][T14945] ? __pfx___page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x10/0x10
+[ 207.060775][T14945] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
+[ 207.061940][T14945] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
+[ 207.062967][T14945] pmdp_huge_clear_flush+0x279/0x360
+[ 207.064024][T14945] split_huge_pmd_locked+0x82b/0x3750
+...
+
+Before commit 9cb28da54643 ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic
+follow_page_mask code"), we would have ignored the flag; instead, let's
+simply refuse the combination completely in check_vma_flags(): the caller
+is likely not prepared to handle any hugetlb folios.
+
+We'll teach make_device_exclusive_range() separately to ignore any hugetlb
+folios as a future-proof safety net.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-1-david@redhat.com
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-2-david@redhat.com
+Fixes: 9cb28da54643 ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code")
+Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
+Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
+Tested-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
+Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
+Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
+Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
+Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
+Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
+Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
+Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
+Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
+Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
+Cc: Lyude <lyude@redhat.com>
+Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
+Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
+Cc: Yanteng Si <si.yanteng@linux.dev>
+Cc: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@ffwll.ch>
+Cc: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/gup.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/mm/gup.c
++++ b/mm/gup.c
+@@ -1283,6 +1283,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are
+ if ((gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM) && vma_is_fsdax(vma))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
++ if ((gup_flags & FOLL_SPLIT_PMD) && is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ if (vma_is_secretmem(vma))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1b0449544c6482179ac84530b61fc192a6527bfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 16:39:39 +0800
+Subject: mm/vmscan: don't try to reclaim hwpoison folio
+
+From: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
+
+commit 1b0449544c6482179ac84530b61fc192a6527bfd upstream.
+
+Syzkaller reports a bug as follows:
+
+Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x18b00e at process virtual address 0x20ffd000
+Memory failure: 0x18b00e: dirty swapcache page still referenced by 2 users
+Memory failure: 0x18b00e: recovery action for dirty swapcache page: Failed
+page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x20ffd pfn:0x18b00e
+memcg:ffff0000dd6d9000
+anon flags: 0x5ffffe00482011(locked|dirty|arch_1|swapbacked|hwpoison|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
+raw: 005ffffe00482011 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff0000e232a7c9
+raw: 0000000000020ffd 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff ffff0000dd6d9000
+page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_uptodate(folio))
+------------[ cut here ]------------
+kernel BUG at mm/swap_state.c:184!
+Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
+Modules linked in:
+CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.6.0-gcb097e7de84e #3
+Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
+pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+pc : add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158
+lr : add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158
+sp : ffff800087f37340
+x29: ffff800087f37340 x28: fffffc00052c0380 x27: ffff800087f37780
+x26: ffff800087f37490 x25: ffff800087f37c78 x24: ffff800087f377a0
+x23: ffff800087f37c50 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: fffffc00052c03b4
+x20: 0000000000000000 x19: fffffc00052c0380 x18: 0000000000000000
+x17: 296f696c6f662865 x16: 7461646f7470755f x15: 747365745f6f696c
+x14: 6f6621284f494c4f x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff600036d8b97b
+x11: 1fffe00036d8b97a x10: ffff600036d8b97a x9 : dfff800000000000
+x8 : 00009fffc9274686 x7 : ffff0001b6c5cbd3 x6 : 0000000000000001
+x5 : ffff0000c25896c0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
+x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000c25896c0 x0 : 0000000000000000
+Call trace:
+ add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158
+ shrink_folio_list+0x12ac/0x2648
+ shrink_inactive_list+0x318/0x948
+ shrink_lruvec+0x450/0x720
+ shrink_node_memcgs+0x280/0x4a8
+ shrink_node+0x128/0x978
+ balance_pgdat+0x4f0/0xb20
+ kswapd+0x228/0x438
+ kthread+0x214/0x230
+ ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
+
+I can reproduce this issue with the following steps:
+
+1) When a dirty swapcache page is isolated by reclaim process and the
+ page isn't locked, inject memory failure for the page.
+ me_swapcache_dirty() clears uptodate flag and tries to delete from lru,
+ but fails. Reclaim process will put the hwpoisoned page back to lru.
+
+2) The process that maps the hwpoisoned page exits, the page is deleted
+ the page will never be freed and will be in the lru forever.
+
+3) If we trigger a reclaim again and tries to reclaim the page,
+ add_to_swap() will trigger VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO due to the uptodate flag is
+ cleared.
+
+To fix it, skip the hwpoisoned page in shrink_folio_list(). Besides, the
+hwpoison folio may not be unmapped by hwpoison_user_mappings() yet, unmap
+it in shrink_folio_list(), otherwise the folio will fail to be unmaped by
+hwpoison_user_mappings() since the folio isn't in lru list.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250318083939.987651-3-tujinjiang@huawei.com
+Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
+Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
+Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
+Cc: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong@huawei.com>
+Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger,kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/vmscan.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/mm/vmscan.c
++++ b/mm/vmscan.c
+@@ -1112,6 +1112,13 @@ retry:
+ if (!folio_trylock(folio))
+ goto keep;
+
++ if (folio_contain_hwpoisoned_page(folio)) {
++ unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, folio_pfn(folio), false);
++ folio_unlock(folio);
++ folio_put(folio);
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_active(folio), folio);
+
+ nr_pages = folio_nr_pages(folio);
--- /dev/null
+From c11bcbc0a517acf69282c8225059b2a8ac5fe628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
+Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 18:56:25 +0000
+Subject: mm: zswap: fix crypto_free_acomp() deadlock in zswap_cpu_comp_dead()
+
+From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
+
+commit c11bcbc0a517acf69282c8225059b2a8ac5fe628 upstream.
+
+Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding
+the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock
+(through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()).
+
+On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through
+crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation
+results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.
+
+The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the
+following scenario:
+
+(1) Task A running on CPU #1:
+ crypto_alloc_acomp_node()
+ Holds scomp_lock
+ Enters reclaim
+ Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)
+
+(2) Task A is descheduled
+
+(3) CPU #1 goes offline
+ zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1)
+ Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1))
+ Calls crypto_free_acomp()
+ Waits for scomp_lock
+
+(4) Task A running on CPU #2:
+ Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1
+ DEADLOCK
+
+Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU
+acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is
+unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for
+consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the
+future.
+
+With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex
+held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes
+acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations
+before holding the mutex.
+
+Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place
+before the mutex dereference.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226185625.2672936-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
+Fixes: 12dcb0ef5406 ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug")
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
+Reported-by: syzbot+1a517ccfcbc6a7ab0f82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67bcea51.050a0220.bbfd1.0096.GAE@google.com/
+Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
+Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
+Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
+Cc: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/zswap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/mm/zswap.c
++++ b/mm/zswap.c
+@@ -881,18 +881,32 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_dead(unsigned
+ {
+ struct zswap_pool *pool = hlist_entry(node, struct zswap_pool, node);
+ struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx = per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, cpu);
++ struct acomp_req *req;
++ struct crypto_acomp *acomp;
++ u8 *buffer;
++
++ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx))
++ return 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex);
+- if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx)) {
+- if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->req))
+- acomp_request_free(acomp_ctx->req);
+- acomp_ctx->req = NULL;
+- if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->acomp))
+- crypto_free_acomp(acomp_ctx->acomp);
+- kfree(acomp_ctx->buffer);
+- }
++ req = acomp_ctx->req;
++ acomp = acomp_ctx->acomp;
++ buffer = acomp_ctx->buffer;
++ acomp_ctx->req = NULL;
++ acomp_ctx->acomp = NULL;
++ acomp_ctx->buffer = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex);
+
++ /*
++ * Do the actual freeing after releasing the mutex to avoid subtle
++ * locking dependencies causing deadlocks.
++ */
++ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(req))
++ acomp_request_free(req);
++ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp))
++ crypto_free_acomp(acomp);
++ kfree(buffer);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3834a759afb817e23a7a2f09c2c9911b0ce5c588 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 22:02:25 +0800
+Subject: mmc: omap: Fix memory leak in mmc_omap_new_slot
+
+From: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
+
+commit 3834a759afb817e23a7a2f09c2c9911b0ce5c588 upstream.
+
+Add err_free_host label to properly pair mmc_alloc_host() with
+mmc_free_host() in GPIO error paths. The allocated host memory was
+leaked when GPIO lookups failed.
+
+Fixes: e519f0bb64ef ("ARM/mmc: Convert old mmci-omap to GPIO descriptors")
+Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318140226.19650-1-linmq006@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mmc/host/omap.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/host/omap.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/host/omap.c
+@@ -1272,19 +1272,25 @@ static int mmc_omap_new_slot(struct mmc_
+ /* Check for some optional GPIO controls */
+ slot->vsd = devm_gpiod_get_index_optional(host->dev, "vsd",
+ id, GPIOD_OUT_LOW);
+- if (IS_ERR(slot->vsd))
+- return dev_err_probe(host->dev, PTR_ERR(slot->vsd),
++ if (IS_ERR(slot->vsd)) {
++ r = dev_err_probe(host->dev, PTR_ERR(slot->vsd),
+ "error looking up VSD GPIO\n");
++ goto err_free_host;
++ }
+ slot->vio = devm_gpiod_get_index_optional(host->dev, "vio",
+ id, GPIOD_OUT_LOW);
+- if (IS_ERR(slot->vio))
+- return dev_err_probe(host->dev, PTR_ERR(slot->vio),
++ if (IS_ERR(slot->vio)) {
++ r = dev_err_probe(host->dev, PTR_ERR(slot->vio),
+ "error looking up VIO GPIO\n");
++ goto err_free_host;
++ }
+ slot->cover = devm_gpiod_get_index_optional(host->dev, "cover",
+ id, GPIOD_IN);
+- if (IS_ERR(slot->cover))
+- return dev_err_probe(host->dev, PTR_ERR(slot->cover),
++ if (IS_ERR(slot->cover)) {
++ r = dev_err_probe(host->dev, PTR_ERR(slot->cover),
+ "error looking up cover switch GPIO\n");
++ goto err_free_host;
++ }
+
+ host->slots[id] = slot;
+
+@@ -1344,6 +1350,7 @@ err_remove_slot_name:
+ device_remove_file(&mmc->class_dev, &dev_attr_slot_name);
+ err_remove_host:
+ mmc_remove_host(mmc);
++err_free_host:
+ mmc_free_host(mmc);
+ return r;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From cbef7442fba510b7eb229dcc9f39d3dde4a159a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 14:18:51 +0000
+Subject: mmc: sdhci-msm: fix dev reference leaked through of_qcom_ice_get
+
+From: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
+
+commit cbef7442fba510b7eb229dcc9f39d3dde4a159a4 upstream.
+
+The driver leaks the device reference taken with
+of_find_device_by_node(). Fix the leak by using devm_of_qcom_ice_get().
+
+Fixes: c7eed31e235c ("mmc: sdhci-msm: Switch to the new ICE API")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
+Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250117-qcom-ice-fix-dev-leak-v2-2-1ffa5b6884cb@linaro.org
+Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c
+@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@ static int sdhci_msm_ice_init(struct sdh
+ if (!(cqhci_readl(cq_host, CQHCI_CAP) & CQHCI_CAP_CS))
+ return 0;
+
+- ice = of_qcom_ice_get(dev);
++ ice = devm_of_qcom_ice_get(dev);
+ if (ice == ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP)) {
+ dev_warn(dev, "Disabling inline encryption support\n");
+ ice = NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From 49d162635151d0dd04935070d7cf67137ab863aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 13:17:12 +0100
+Subject: mmc: sdhci-omap: Disable MMC_CAP_AGGRESSIVE_PM for eMMC/SD
+
+From: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+
+commit 49d162635151d0dd04935070d7cf67137ab863aa upstream.
+
+We have received reports about cards can become corrupt related to the
+aggressive PM support. Let's make a partial revert of the change that
+enabled the feature.
+
+Reported-by: David Owens <daowens01@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
+Reported-by: Robert Nelson <robertcnelson@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Robert Nelson <robertcnelson@gmail.com>
+Fixes: 3edf588e7fe0 ("mmc: sdhci-omap: Allow SDIO card power off and enable aggressive PM")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250312121712.1168007-1-ulf.hansson@linaro.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-omap.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-omap.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-omap.c
+@@ -1339,8 +1339,8 @@ static int sdhci_omap_probe(struct platf
+ /* R1B responses is required to properly manage HW busy detection. */
+ mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_NEED_RSP_BUSY;
+
+- /* Allow card power off and runtime PM for eMMC/SD card devices */
+- mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_POWER_OFF_CARD | MMC_CAP_AGGRESSIVE_PM;
++ /* Enable SDIO card power off. */
++ mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_POWER_OFF_CARD;
+
+ ret = sdhci_setup_host(host);
+ if (ret)
--- /dev/null
+From a41fcca4b342811b473bbaa4b44f1d34d87fcce6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
+Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2025 15:07:04 +0100
+Subject: mmc: sdhci-pxav3: set NEED_RSP_BUSY capability
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
+
+commit a41fcca4b342811b473bbaa4b44f1d34d87fcce6 upstream.
+
+Set the MMC_CAP_NEED_RSP_BUSY capability for the sdhci-pxav3 host to
+prevent conversion of R1B responses to R1. Without this, the eMMC card
+in the samsung,coreprimevelte smartphone using the Marvell PXA1908 SoC
+with this mmc host doesn't probe with the ETIMEDOUT error originating in
+__mmc_poll_for_busy.
+
+Note that the other issues reported for this phone and host, namely
+floods of "Tuning failed, falling back to fixed sampling clock" dmesg
+messages for the eMMC and unstable SDIO are not mitigated by this
+change.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310153340.5593-1-ulf.hansson@linaro.org/
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/D7204PWIGQGI.1FRFQPPIEE2P9@matfyz.cz/
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250115-pxa1908-lkml-v14-0-847d24f3665a@skole.hr/
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
+Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
+Tested-by: Duje Mihanović <duje.mihanovic@skole.hr>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310140707.23459-1-balejk@matfyz.cz
+Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pxav3.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pxav3.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pxav3.c
+@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ static int sdhci_pxav3_probe(struct plat
+ if (!IS_ERR(pxa->clk_core))
+ clk_prepare_enable(pxa->clk_core);
+
++ host->mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_NEED_RSP_BUSY;
+ /* enable 1/8V DDR capable */
+ host->mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_1_8V_DDR;
+
--- /dev/null
+From 26a80762153ba0dc98258b5e6d2e9741178c5114 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2025 23:06:38 -0400
+Subject: NFSD: Add a Kconfig setting to enable delegated timestamps
+
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+
+commit 26a80762153ba0dc98258b5e6d2e9741178c5114 upstream.
+
+After three tries, we still see test failures with delegated
+timestamps. Disable them by default, but leave the implementation
+intact so that development can continue.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/Kconfig | 12 +++++++++++-
+ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/Kconfig
++++ b/fs/nfsd/Kconfig
+@@ -172,6 +172,16 @@ config NFSD_LEGACY_CLIENT_TRACKING
+ recoverydir, or spawn a process directly using a usermodehelper
+ upcall.
+
+- These legacy client tracking methods have proven to be probelmatic
++ These legacy client tracking methods have proven to be problematic
+ and will be removed in the future. Say Y here if you need support
+ for them in the interim.
++
++config NFSD_V4_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS
++ bool "Support delegated timestamps"
++ depends on NFSD_V4
++ default n
++ help
++ NFSD implements delegated timestamps according to
++ draft-ietf-nfsv4-delstid-08 "Extending the Opening of Files". This
++ is currently an experimental feature and is therefore left disabled
++ by default.
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+@@ -5958,11 +5958,23 @@ nfsd4_verify_setuid_write(struct nfsd4_o
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS
++static bool nfsd4_want_deleg_timestamps(const struct nfsd4_open *open)
++{
++ return open->op_deleg_want & OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS;
++}
++#else /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS */
++static bool nfsd4_want_deleg_timestamps(const struct nfsd4_open *open)
++{
++ return false;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG NFSD_V4_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS */
++
+ static struct nfs4_delegation *
+ nfs4_set_delegation(struct nfsd4_open *open, struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp,
+ struct svc_fh *parent)
+ {
+- bool deleg_ts = open->op_deleg_want & OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS;
++ bool deleg_ts = nfsd4_want_deleg_timestamps(open);
+ struct nfs4_client *clp = stp->st_stid.sc_client;
+ struct nfs4_file *fp = stp->st_stid.sc_file;
+ struct nfs4_clnt_odstate *odstate = stp->st_clnt_odstate;
+@@ -6161,8 +6173,8 @@ static void
+ nfs4_open_delegation(struct nfsd4_open *open, struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp,
+ struct svc_fh *currentfh)
+ {
+- bool deleg_ts = open->op_deleg_want & OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_DELEG_TIMESTAMPS;
+ struct nfs4_openowner *oo = openowner(stp->st_stateowner);
++ bool deleg_ts = nfsd4_want_deleg_timestamps(open);
+ struct nfs4_client *clp = stp->st_stid.sc_client;
+ struct svc_fh *parent = NULL;
+ struct nfs4_delegation *dp;
--- /dev/null
+From d1bc15b147d35b4cb7ca99a9a7d79d41ca342c13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 09:08:29 -0500
+Subject: nfsd: allow SC_STATUS_FREEABLE when searching via nfs4_lookup_stateid()
+
+From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+
+commit d1bc15b147d35b4cb7ca99a9a7d79d41ca342c13 upstream.
+
+The pynfs DELEG8 test fails when run against nfsd. It acquires a
+delegation and then lets the lease time out. It then tries to use the
+deleg stateid and expects to see NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED, but it gets
+bad NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead.
+
+When a delegation is revoked, it's initially marked with
+SC_STATUS_REVOKED, or SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED and later, it's marked
+with the SC_STATUS_FREEABLE flag, which denotes that it is waiting for
+s FREE_STATEID call.
+
+nfs4_lookup_stateid() accepts a statusmask that includes the status
+flags that a found stateid is allowed to have. Currently, that mask
+never includes SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, which means that revoked delegations
+are (almost) never found.
+
+Add SC_STATUS_FREEABLE to the always-allowed status flags, and remove it
+from nfsd4_delegreturn() since it's now always implied.
+
+Fixes: 8dd91e8d31fe ("nfsd: fix race between laundromat and free_stateid")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+@@ -7051,7 +7051,7 @@ nfsd4_lookup_stateid(struct nfsd4_compou
+ */
+ statusmask |= SC_STATUS_REVOKED;
+
+- statusmask |= SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED;
++ statusmask |= SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_FREEABLE;
+
+ if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid) ||
+ CLOSE_STATEID(stateid))
+@@ -7706,9 +7706,7 @@ nfsd4_delegreturn(struct svc_rqst *rqstp
+ if ((status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0)))
+ return status;
+
+- status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG,
+- SC_STATUS_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_FREEABLE,
+- &s, nn);
++ status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, SC_STATUS_REVOKED, &s, nn);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+ dp = delegstateid(s);
--- /dev/null
+From 930b64ca0c511521f0abdd1d57ce52b2a6e3476b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 13:12:13 -0500
+Subject: nfsd: don't ignore the return code of svc_proc_register()
+
+From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+
+commit 930b64ca0c511521f0abdd1d57ce52b2a6e3476b upstream.
+
+Currently, nfsd_proc_stat_init() ignores the return value of
+svc_proc_register(). If the procfile creation fails, then the kernel
+will WARN when it tries to remove the entry later.
+
+Fix nfsd_proc_stat_init() to return the same type of pointer as
+svc_proc_register(), and fix up nfsd_net_init() to check that and fail
+the nfsd_net construction if it occurs.
+
+svc_proc_register() can fail if the dentry can't be allocated, or if an
+identical dentry already exists. The second case is pretty unlikely in
+the nfsd_net construction codepath, so if this happens, return -ENOMEM.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+e34ad04f27991521104c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/67a47501.050a0220.19061f.05f9.GAE@google.com/
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9
+Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ fs/nfsd/stats.c | 4 ++--
+ fs/nfsd/stats.h | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
+@@ -2204,8 +2204,14 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_net_init(stru
+ NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
+ if (retval)
+ goto out_repcache_error;
++
+ memset(&nn->nfsd_svcstats, 0, sizeof(nn->nfsd_svcstats));
+ nn->nfsd_svcstats.program = &nfsd_programs[0];
++ if (!nfsd_proc_stat_init(net)) {
++ retval = -ENOMEM;
++ goto out_proc_error;
++ }
++
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nn->nfsd_versions); i++)
+ nn->nfsd_versions[i] = nfsd_support_version(i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nn->nfsd4_minorversions); i++)
+@@ -2215,13 +2221,14 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_net_init(stru
+ nfsd4_init_leases_net(nn);
+ get_random_bytes(&nn->siphash_key, sizeof(nn->siphash_key));
+ seqlock_init(&nn->writeverf_lock);
+- nfsd_proc_stat_init(net);
+ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NFS_LOCALIO)
+ spin_lock_init(&nn->local_clients_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nn->local_clients);
+ #endif
+ return 0;
+
++out_proc_error:
++ percpu_counter_destroy_many(nn->counter, NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
+ out_repcache_error:
+ nfsd_idmap_shutdown(net);
+ out_idmap_error:
+--- a/fs/nfsd/stats.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/stats.c
+@@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ static int nfsd_show(struct seq_file *se
+
+ DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(nfsd);
+
+-void nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net)
++struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net)
+ {
+ struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
+
+- svc_proc_register(net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops);
++ return svc_proc_register(net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops);
+ }
+
+ void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown(struct net *net)
+--- a/fs/nfsd/stats.h
++++ b/fs/nfsd/stats.h
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ #include <uapi/linux/nfsd/stats.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
+
+-void nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net);
++struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net);
+ void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown(struct net *net);
+
+ static inline void nfsd_stats_rc_hits_inc(struct nfsd_net *nn)
--- /dev/null
+From d093c90892607be505e801469d6674459e69ab89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 11:32:58 -0500
+Subject: nfsd: fix management of listener transports
+
+From: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
+
+commit d093c90892607be505e801469d6674459e69ab89 upstream.
+
+Currently, when no active threads are running, a root user using nfsdctl
+command can try to remove a particular listener from the list of previously
+added ones, then start the server by increasing the number of threads,
+it leads to the following problem:
+
+[ 158.835354] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
+[ 158.835603] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 9145 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0
+[ 158.836017] Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace overlay isofs uinput snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill ip_set nf_tables qrtr sunrpc vfat fat uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 videodev videobuf2_common snd_hda_codec_generic mc e1000e snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore sg loop dm_multipath dm_mod nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce vmwgfx sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sr_mod sha1_ce cdrom nvme drm_client_lib drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_core drm_kms_helper nvme_auth drm fuse
+[ 158.840093] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9145 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B W 6.13.0-rc6+ #7
+[ 158.840624] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN
+[ 158.840802] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/VBSA, BIOS VMW201.00V.24006586.BA64.2406042154 06/04/2024
+[ 158.841220] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+[ 158.841563] pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0
+[ 158.841780] lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0
+[ 158.842000] sp : ffff800089be7d80
+[ 158.842147] x29: ffff800089be7d80 x28: ffff00008e68c148 x27: ffff00008e68c148
+[ 158.842492] x26: ffff0002e3b5c000 x25: ffff600011cd1829 x24: ffff00008653c010
+[ 158.842832] x23: ffff00008653c000 x22: 1fffe00011cd1829 x21: ffff00008653c028
+[ 158.843175] x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffff00008653c010 x18: 0000000000000000
+[ 158.843505] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
+[ 158.843836] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff600050a26493
+[ 158.844143] x11: 1fffe00050a26492 x10: ffff600050a26492 x9 : dfff800000000000
+[ 158.844475] x8 : 00009fffaf5d9b6e x7 : ffff000285132493 x6 : 0000000000000001
+[ 158.844823] x5 : ffff000285132490 x4 : ffff600050a26493 x3 : ffff8000805e72bc
+[ 158.845174] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000098588000
+[ 158.845528] Call trace:
+[ 158.845658] refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 (P)
+[ 158.845894] svc_recv+0x58c/0x680 [sunrpc]
+[ 158.846183] nfsd+0x1fc/0x348 [nfsd]
+[ 158.846390] kthread+0x274/0x2f8
+[ 158.846546] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
+[ 158.846714] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
+
+nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() would manipulate the list of transports of
+server's sv_permsocks and close the specified listener but the other
+list of transports (server's sp_xprts list) would not be changed leading
+to the problem above.
+
+Instead, determined if the nfsdctl is trying to remove a listener, in
+which case, delete all the existing listener transports and re-create
+all-but-the-removed ones.
+
+Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command")
+Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
+@@ -1917,6 +1917,7 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_
+ struct svc_serv *serv;
+ LIST_HEAD(permsocks);
+ struct nfsd_net *nn;
++ bool delete = false;
+ int err, rem;
+
+ mutex_lock(&nfsd_mutex);
+@@ -1977,34 +1978,28 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_
+ }
+ }
+
+- /* For now, no removing old sockets while server is running */
+- if (serv->sv_nrthreads && !list_empty(&permsocks)) {
++ /*
++ * If there are listener transports remaining on the permsocks list,
++ * it means we were asked to remove a listener.
++ */
++ if (!list_empty(&permsocks)) {
+ list_splice_init(&permsocks, &serv->sv_permsocks);
+- spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
+- err = -EBUSY;
+- goto out_unlock_mtx;
++ delete = true;
+ }
++ spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
+
+- /* Close the remaining sockets on the permsocks list */
+- while (!list_empty(&permsocks)) {
+- xprt = list_first_entry(&permsocks, struct svc_xprt, xpt_list);
+- list_move(&xprt->xpt_list, &serv->sv_permsocks);
+-
+- /*
+- * Newly-created sockets are born with the BUSY bit set. Clear
+- * it if there are no threads, since nothing can pick it up
+- * in that case.
+- */
+- if (!serv->sv_nrthreads)
+- clear_bit(XPT_BUSY, &xprt->xpt_flags);
+-
+- set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->xpt_flags);
+- spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
+- svc_xprt_close(xprt);
+- spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
++ /* Do not remove listeners while there are active threads. */
++ if (serv->sv_nrthreads) {
++ err = -EBUSY;
++ goto out_unlock_mtx;
+ }
+
+- spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);
++ /*
++ * Since we can't delete an arbitrary llist entry, destroy the
++ * remaining listeners and recreate the list.
++ */
++ if (delete)
++ svc_xprt_destroy_all(serv, net);
+
+ /* walk list of addrs again, open any that still don't exist */
+ nlmsg_for_each_attr(attr, info->nlhdr, GENL_HDRLEN, rem) {
+@@ -2031,6 +2026,9 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_
+
+ xprt = svc_find_listener(serv, xcl_name, net, sa);
+ if (xprt) {
++ if (delete)
++ WARN_ONCE(1, "Transport type=%s already exists\n",
++ xcl_name);
+ svc_xprt_put(xprt);
+ continue;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 370345b4bd184a49ac68d6591801e5e3605b355a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2025 16:50:18 -0500
+Subject: NFSD: Never return NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN when removing a directory
+
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+
+commit 370345b4bd184a49ac68d6591801e5e3605b355a upstream.
+
+RFC 8881 Section 18.25.4 paragraph 5 tells us that the server
+should return NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN only if the target object is an
+opened file. This suggests that returning this status when removing
+a directory will confuse NFS clients.
+
+This is a version-specific issue; nfsd_proc_remove/rmdir() and
+nfsd3_proc_remove/rmdir() already return nfserr_access as
+appropriate.
+
+Unfortunately there is no quick way for nfsd4_remove() to determine
+whether the target object is a file or not, so the check is done in
+in nfsd_unlink() for now.
+
+Reported-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
+Fixes: 466e16f0920f ("nfsd: check for EBUSY from vfs_rmdir/vfs_unink.")
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+@@ -1931,9 +1931,17 @@ out:
+ return err;
+ }
+
+-/*
+- * Unlink a file or directory
+- * N.B. After this call fhp needs an fh_put
++/**
++ * nfsd_unlink - remove a directory entry
++ * @rqstp: RPC transaction context
++ * @fhp: the file handle of the parent directory to be modified
++ * @type: enforced file type of the object to be removed
++ * @fname: the name of directory entry to be removed
++ * @flen: length of @fname in octets
++ *
++ * After this call fhp needs an fh_put.
++ *
++ * Returns a generic NFS status code in network byte-order.
+ */
+ __be32
+ nfsd_unlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
+@@ -2007,10 +2015,14 @@ out_drop_write:
+ fh_drop_write(fhp);
+ out_nfserr:
+ if (host_err == -EBUSY) {
+- /* name is mounted-on. There is no perfect
+- * error status.
++ /*
++ * See RFC 8881 Section 18.25.4 para 4: NFSv4 REMOVE
++ * wants a status unique to the object type.
+ */
+- err = nfserr_file_open;
++ if (type != S_IFDIR)
++ err = nfserr_file_open;
++ else
++ err = nfserr_acces;
+ }
+ out:
+ return err != nfs_ok ? err : nfserrno(host_err);
--- /dev/null
+From d7d8e3169b56e7696559a2427c922c0d55debcec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2025 16:50:17 -0500
+Subject: NFSD: nfsd_unlink() clobbers non-zero status returned from fh_fill_pre_attrs()
+
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+
+commit d7d8e3169b56e7696559a2427c922c0d55debcec upstream.
+
+If fh_fill_pre_attrs() returns a non-zero status, the error flow
+takes it through out_unlock, which then overwrites the returned
+status code with
+
+ err = nfserrno(host_err);
+
+Fixes: a332018a91c4 ("nfsd: handle failure to collect pre/post-op attrs more sanely")
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 4 +---
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+@@ -2011,11 +2011,9 @@ out_nfserr:
+ * error status.
+ */
+ err = nfserr_file_open;
+- } else {
+- err = nfserrno(host_err);
+ }
+ out:
+- return err;
++ return err != nfs_ok ? err : nfserrno(host_err);
+ out_unlock:
+ inode_unlock(dirp);
+ goto out_drop_write;
--- /dev/null
+From 230ca758453c63bd38e4d9f4a21db698f7abada8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 22:42:20 +0800
+Subject: nfsd: put dl_stid if fail to queue dl_recall
+
+From: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
+
+commit 230ca758453c63bd38e4d9f4a21db698f7abada8 upstream.
+
+Before calling nfsd4_run_cb to queue dl_recall to the callback_wq, we
+increment the reference count of dl_stid.
+We expect that after the corresponding work_struct is processed, the
+reference count of dl_stid will be decremented through the callback
+function nfsd4_cb_recall_release.
+However, if the call to nfsd4_run_cb fails, the incremented reference
+count of dl_stid will not be decremented correspondingly, leading to the
+following nfs4_stid leak:
+unreferenced object 0xffff88812067b578 (size 344):
+ comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044002 (age 5541.241s)
+ hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+ 01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b b8 02 c0 e2 81 88 ff ff ....kkkk........
+ 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de .kkkkkkk.....N..
+ backtrace:
+ kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700
+ nfsd4_process_open1+0x34/0x300
+ nfsd4_open+0x2d1/0x9d0
+ nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30
+ nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0
+ svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0
+ svc_process+0x2a3/0x320
+ nfsd+0x180/0x2e0
+ kthread+0x199/0x1d0
+ ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
+unreferenced object 0xffff8881499f4d28 (size 368):
+ comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044005 (age 5541.239s)
+ hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff ........0M.I....
+ 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 0M.I.... .......
+ backtrace:
+ kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700
+ nfs4_alloc_stid+0x29/0x210
+ alloc_init_deleg+0x92/0x2e0
+ nfs4_set_delegation+0x284/0xc00
+ nfs4_open_delegation+0x216/0x3f0
+ nfsd4_process_open2+0x2b3/0xee0
+ nfsd4_open+0x770/0x9d0
+ nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30
+ nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0
+ svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0
+ svc_process+0x2a3/0x320
+ nfsd+0x180/0x2e0
+ kthread+0x199/0x1d0
+ ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
+Fix it by checking the result of nfsd4_run_cb and call nfs4_put_stid if
+fail to queue dl_recall.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+@@ -1050,6 +1050,12 @@ static struct nfs4_ol_stateid * nfs4_all
+ return openlockstateid(stid);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * As the sc_free callback of deleg, this may be called by nfs4_put_stid
++ * in nfsd_break_one_deleg.
++ * Considering nfsd_break_one_deleg is called with the flc->flc_lock held,
++ * this function mustn't ever sleep.
++ */
+ static void nfs4_free_deleg(struct nfs4_stid *stid)
+ {
+ struct nfs4_delegation *dp = delegstateid(stid);
+@@ -5414,6 +5420,7 @@ static const struct nfsd4_callback_ops n
+
+ static void nfsd_break_one_deleg(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
+ {
++ bool queued;
+ /*
+ * We're assuming the state code never drops its reference
+ * without first removing the lease. Since we're in this lease
+@@ -5422,7 +5429,10 @@ static void nfsd_break_one_deleg(struct
+ * we know it's safe to take a reference.
+ */
+ refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
+- WARN_ON_ONCE(!nfsd4_run_cb(&dp->dl_recall));
++ queued = nfsd4_run_cb(&dp->dl_recall);
++ WARN_ON_ONCE(!queued);
++ if (!queued)
++ nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid);
+ }
+
+ /* Called from break_lease() with flc_lock held. */
--- /dev/null
+From 8a388c1fabeb6606e16467b23242416c0dbeffad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 17:09:24 -0500
+Subject: NFSD: Skip sending CB_RECALL_ANY when the backchannel isn't up
+
+From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+
+commit 8a388c1fabeb6606e16467b23242416c0dbeffad upstream.
+
+NFSD sends CB_RECALL_ANY to clients when the server is low on
+memory or that client has a large number of delegations outstanding.
+
+We've seen cases where NFSD attempts to send CB_RECALL_ANY requests
+to disconnected clients, and gets confused. These calls never go
+anywhere if a backchannel transport to the target client isn't
+available. Before the server can send any backchannel operation, the
+client has to connect first and then do a BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION.
+
+This patch doesn't address the root cause of the confusion, but
+there's no need to queue up these optional operations if they can't
+go anywhere.
+
+Fixes: 44df6f439a17 ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition")
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+@@ -6882,14 +6882,19 @@ deleg_reaper(struct nfsd_net *nn)
+ spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
+ list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &nn->client_lru) {
+ clp = list_entry(pos, struct nfs4_client, cl_lru);
+- if (clp->cl_state != NFSD4_ACTIVE ||
+- list_empty(&clp->cl_delegations) ||
+- atomic_read(&clp->cl_delegs_in_recall) ||
+- test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_RECALL_ANY, &clp->cl_flags) ||
+- (ktime_get_boottime_seconds() -
+- clp->cl_ra_time < 5)) {
++
++ if (clp->cl_state != NFSD4_ACTIVE)
++ continue;
++ if (list_empty(&clp->cl_delegations))
++ continue;
++ if (atomic_read(&clp->cl_delegs_in_recall))
++ continue;
++ if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_RECALL_ANY, &clp->cl_flags))
++ continue;
++ if (ktime_get_boottime_seconds() - clp->cl_ra_time < 5)
++ continue;
++ if (clp->cl_cb_state != NFSD4_CB_UP)
+ continue;
+- }
+ list_add(&clp->cl_ra_cblist, &cblist);
+
+ /* release in nfsd4_cb_recall_any_release */
--- /dev/null
+From 667f053b05f00a007738cd7ed6fa1901de19dc7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
+Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 19:52:08 +0100
+Subject: PCI/bwctrl: Fix NULL pointer dereference on bus number exhaustion
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
+
+commit 667f053b05f00a007738cd7ed6fa1901de19dc7e upstream.
+
+When BIOS neglects to assign bus numbers to PCI bridges, the kernel
+attempts to correct that during PCI device enumeration. If it runs out
+of bus numbers, no pci_bus is allocated and the "subordinate" pointer in
+the bridge's pci_dev remains NULL.
+
+The PCIe bandwidth controller erroneously does not check for a NULL
+subordinate pointer and dereferences it on probe.
+
+Bandwidth control of unusable devices below the bridge is of questionable
+utility, so simply error out instead. This mirrors what PCIe hotplug does
+since commit 62e4492c3063 ("PCI: Prevent NULL dereference during pciehp
+probe").
+
+The PCI core emits a message with KERN_INFO severity if it has run out of
+bus numbers. PCIe hotplug emits an additional message with KERN_ERR
+severity to inform the user that hotplug functionality is disabled at the
+bridge. A similar message for bandwidth control does not seem merited,
+given that its only purpose so far is to expose an up-to-date link speed
+in sysfs and throttle the link speed on certain laptops with limited
+Thermal Design Power. So error out silently.
+
+User-visible messages:
+
+ pci 0000:16:02.0: bridge configuration invalid ([bus 00-00]), reconfiguring
+ [...]
+ pci_bus 0000:45: busn_res: [bus 45-74] end is updated to 74
+ pci 0000:16:02.0: devices behind bridge are unusable because [bus 45-74] cannot be assigned for them
+ [...]
+ pcieport 0000:16:02.0: pciehp: Hotplug bridge without secondary bus, ignoring
+ [...]
+ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference
+ RIP: pcie_update_link_speed
+ pcie_bwnotif_enable
+ pcie_bwnotif_probe
+ pcie_port_probe_service
+ really_probe
+
+Fixes: 665745f27487 ("PCI/bwctrl: Re-add BW notification portdrv as PCIe BW controller")
+Reported-by: Wouter Bijlsma <wouter@wouterbijlsma.nl>
+Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219906
+Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
+Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
+Tested-by: Wouter Bijlsma <wouter@wouterbijlsma.nl>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3b6c8d973aedc48860640a9d75d20528336f1f3c.1742669372.git.lukas@wunner.de
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/pci/pcie/bwctrl.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/bwctrl.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/bwctrl.c
+@@ -294,6 +294,10 @@ static int pcie_bwnotif_probe(struct pci
+ struct pci_dev *port = srv->port;
+ int ret;
+
++ /* Can happen if we run out of bus numbers during enumeration. */
++ if (!port->subordinate)
++ return -ENODEV;
++
+ struct pcie_bwctrl_data *data = devm_kzalloc(&srv->device,
+ sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
--- /dev/null
+From 5b3c08ae9ed324743f5f7286940d45caeb656e6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Candice Li <candice.li@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2025 13:41:01 +0800
+Subject: Remove unnecessary firmware version check for gc v9_4_2
+
+From: Candice Li <candice.li@amd.com>
+
+commit 5b3c08ae9ed324743f5f7286940d45caeb656e6e upstream.
+
+GC v9_4_2 uses a new versioning scheme for CP firmware, making
+the warning ("CP firmware version too old, please update!") irrelevant.
+
+Signed-off-by: Candice Li <candice.li@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c
+@@ -1269,6 +1269,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_check_fw_write_wait
+ adev->gfx.mec_fw_write_wait = false;
+
+ if ((amdgpu_ip_version(adev, GC_HWIP, 0) != IP_VERSION(9, 4, 1)) &&
++ (amdgpu_ip_version(adev, GC_HWIP, 0) != IP_VERSION(9, 4, 2)) &&
+ ((adev->gfx.mec_fw_version < 0x000001a5) ||
+ (adev->gfx.mec_feature_version < 46) ||
+ (adev->gfx.pfp_fw_version < 0x000000b7) ||
arm-9443-1-require-linker-to-support-keep-within-overlay-for-dce.patch
arm-9444-1-add-keep-keyword-to-arm_vectors.patch
media-omap3isp-handle-arm-dma_iommu_mapping.patch
+remove-unnecessary-firmware-version-check-for-gc-v9_4_2.patch
+mmc-omap-fix-memory-leak-in-mmc_omap_new_slot.patch
+mmc-sdhci-pxav3-set-need_rsp_busy-capability.patch
+mmc-sdhci-omap-disable-mmc_cap_aggressive_pm-for-emmc-sd.patch
+mmc-sdhci-msm-fix-dev-reference-leaked-through-of_qcom_ice_get.patch
+kvm-svm-don-t-change-target-vcpu-state-on-ap-creation-vmgexit-error.patch
+ksmbd-add-bounds-check-for-durable-handle-context.patch
+ksmbd-add-bounds-check-for-create-lease-context.patch
+ksmbd-fix-use-after-free-in-ksmbd_sessions_deregister.patch
+ksmbd-fix-session-use-after-free-in-multichannel-connection.patch
+ksmbd-fix-overflow-in-dacloffset-bounds-check.patch
+ksmbd-validate-zero-num_subauth-before-sub_auth-is-accessed.patch
+ksmbd-fix-null-pointer-dereference-in-alloc_preauth_hash.patch
+exfat-fix-random-stack-corruption-after-get_block.patch
+exfat-fix-potential-wrong-error-return-from-get_block.patch
+tracing-fix-use-after-free-in-print_graph_function_flags-during-tracer-switching.patch
+tracing-ensure-module-defining-synth-event-cannot-be-unloaded-while-tracing.patch
+tracing-fix-synth-event-printk-format-for-str-fields.patch
+tracing-osnoise-fix-possible-recursive-locking-for-cpus_read_lock.patch
+tracing-verify-event-formats-that-have-p.patch
+mm-vmscan-don-t-try-to-reclaim-hwpoison-folio.patch
+mm-gup-reject-foll_split_pmd-with-hugetlb-vmas.patch
+arm64-don-t-call-null-in-do_compat_alignment_fixup.patch
+wifi-mt76-mt7921-fix-kernel-panic-due-to-null-pointer-dereference.patch
+ext4-don-t-over-report-free-space-or-inodes-in-statvfs.patch
+ext4-fix-oob-read-when-checking-dotdot-dir.patch
+pci-bwctrl-fix-null-pointer-dereference-on-bus-number-exhaustion.patch
+jfs-fix-slab-out-of-bounds-read-in-ea_get.patch
+jfs-add-index-corruption-check-to-dt_getpage.patch
+mm-zswap-fix-crypto_free_acomp-deadlock-in-zswap_cpu_comp_dead.patch
+exec-fix-the-racy-usage-of-fs_struct-in_exec.patch
+media-vimc-skip-.s_stream-for-stopped-entities.patch
+media-streamzap-fix-race-between-device-disconnection-and-urb-callback.patch
+nfsd-don-t-ignore-the-return-code-of-svc_proc_register.patch
+nfsd-allow-sc_status_freeable-when-searching-via-nfs4_lookup_stateid.patch
+nfsd-put-dl_stid-if-fail-to-queue-dl_recall.patch
+nfsd-add-a-kconfig-setting-to-enable-delegated-timestamps.patch
+nfsd-fix-management-of-listener-transports.patch
+nfsd-nfsd_unlink-clobbers-non-zero-status-returned-from-fh_fill_pre_attrs.patch
+nfsd-never-return-nfs4err_file_open-when-removing-a-directory.patch
+nfsd-skip-sending-cb_recall_any-when-the-backchannel-isn-t-up.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 21581dd4e7ff6c07d0ab577e3c32b13a74b31522 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 18:09:05 +0000
+Subject: tracing: Ensure module defining synth event cannot be unloaded while tracing
+
+From: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
+
+commit 21581dd4e7ff6c07d0ab577e3c32b13a74b31522 upstream.
+
+Currently, using synth_event_delete() will fail if the event is being
+used (tracing in progress), but that is normally done in the module exit
+function. At that stage, failing is problematic as returning a non-zero
+status means the module will become locked (impossible to unload or
+reload again).
+
+Instead, ensure the module exit function does not get called in the
+first place by increasing the module refcnt when the event is enabled.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Fixes: 35ca5207c2d11 ("tracing: Add synthetic event command generation functions")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250318180906.226841-1-douglas.raillard@arm.com
+Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
+Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+@@ -852,6 +852,34 @@ static struct trace_event_fields synth_e
+ {}
+ };
+
++static int synth_event_reg(struct trace_event_call *call,
++ enum trace_reg type, void *data)
++{
++ struct synth_event *event = container_of(call, struct synth_event, call);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case TRACE_REG_REGISTER:
++ case TRACE_REG_PERF_REGISTER:
++ if (!try_module_get(event->mod))
++ return -EBUSY;
++ break;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
++
++ int ret = trace_event_reg(call, type, data);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER:
++ case TRACE_REG_PERF_UNREGISTER:
++ module_put(event->mod);
++ break;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
++ return ret;
++}
++
+ static int register_synth_event(struct synth_event *event)
+ {
+ struct trace_event_call *call = &event->call;
+@@ -881,7 +909,7 @@ static int register_synth_event(struct s
+ goto out;
+ }
+ call->flags = TRACE_EVENT_FL_TRACEPOINT;
+- call->class->reg = trace_event_reg;
++ call->class->reg = synth_event_reg;
+ call->class->probe = trace_event_raw_event_synth;
+ call->data = event;
+ call->tp = event->tp;
--- /dev/null
+From 4d38328eb442dc06aec4350fd9594ffa6488af02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2025 16:52:02 +0000
+Subject: tracing: Fix synth event printk format for str fields
+
+From: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
+
+commit 4d38328eb442dc06aec4350fd9594ffa6488af02 upstream.
+
+The printk format for synth event uses "%.*s" to print string fields,
+but then only passes the pointer part as var arg.
+
+Replace %.*s with %s as the C string is guaranteed to be null-terminated.
+
+The output in print fmt should never have been updated as __get_str()
+handles the string limit because it can access the length of the string in
+the string meta data that is saved in the ring buffer.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Fixes: 8db4d6bfbbf92 ("tracing: Change synthetic event string format to limit printed length")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250325165202.541088-1-douglas.raillard@arm.com
+Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static const char *synth_field_fmt(char
+ else if (strcmp(type, "gfp_t") == 0)
+ fmt = "%x";
+ else if (synth_field_is_string(type))
+- fmt = "%.*s";
++ fmt = "%s";
+ else if (synth_field_is_stack(type))
+ fmt = "%s";
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7f81f27b1093e4895e87b74143c59c055c3b1906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 12:21:37 +0000
+Subject: tracing: Fix use-after-free in print_graph_function_flags during tracer switching
+
+From: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
+
+commit 7f81f27b1093e4895e87b74143c59c055c3b1906 upstream.
+
+Kairui reported a UAF issue in print_graph_function_flags() during
+ftrace stress testing [1]. This issue can be reproduced if puting a
+'mdelay(10)' after 'mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock)' in s_start(),
+and executing the following script:
+
+ $ echo function_graph > current_tracer
+ $ cat trace > /dev/null &
+ $ sleep 5 # Ensure the 'cat' reaches the 'mdelay(10)' point
+ $ echo timerlat > current_tracer
+
+The root cause lies in the two calls to print_graph_function_flags
+within print_trace_line during each s_show():
+
+ * One through 'iter->trace->print_line()';
+ * Another through 'event->funcs->trace()', which is hidden in
+ print_trace_fmt() before print_trace_line returns.
+
+Tracer switching only updates the former, while the latter continues
+to use the print_line function of the old tracer, which in the script
+above is print_graph_function_flags.
+
+Moreover, when switching from the 'function_graph' tracer to the
+'timerlat' tracer, s_start only calls graph_trace_close of the
+'function_graph' tracer to free 'iter->private', but does not set
+it to NULL. This provides an opportunity for 'event->funcs->trace()'
+to use an invalid 'iter->private'.
+
+To fix this issue, set 'iter->private' to NULL immediately after
+freeing it in graph_trace_close(), ensuring that an invalid pointer
+is not passed to other tracers. Additionally, clean up the unnecessary
+'iter->private = NULL' during each 'cat trace' when using wakeup and
+irqsoff tracers.
+
+ [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231112150030.84609-1-ryncsn@gmail.com/
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250320122137.23635-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
+Fixes: eecb91b9f98d ("tracing: Fix memleak due to race between current_tracer and trace")
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMgjq7BW79KDSCyp+tZHjShSzHsScSiJxn5ffskp-QzVM06fxw@mail.gmail.com/
+Reported-by: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 1 +
+ kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c | 2 --
+ kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c | 2 --
+ 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c
+@@ -1511,6 +1511,7 @@ void graph_trace_close(struct trace_iter
+ if (data) {
+ free_percpu(data->cpu_data);
+ kfree(data);
++ iter->private = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c
+@@ -250,8 +250,6 @@ static void irqsoff_trace_open(struct tr
+ {
+ if (is_graph(iter->tr))
+ graph_trace_open(iter);
+- else
+- iter->private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ static void irqsoff_trace_close(struct trace_iterator *iter)
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c
+@@ -188,8 +188,6 @@ static void wakeup_trace_open(struct tra
+ {
+ if (is_graph(iter->tr))
+ graph_trace_open(iter);
+- else
+- iter->private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ static void wakeup_trace_close(struct trace_iterator *iter)
--- /dev/null
+From 7e6b3fcc9c5294aeafed0dbe1a09a1bc899bd0f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>
+Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 09:52:49 +0000
+Subject: tracing/osnoise: Fix possible recursive locking for cpus_read_lock()
+
+From: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>
+
+commit 7e6b3fcc9c5294aeafed0dbe1a09a1bc899bd0f2 upstream.
+
+Lockdep reports this deadlock log:
+
+osnoise: could not start sampling thread
+============================================
+WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
+--------------------------------------------
+ CPU0
+ ----
+ lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
+ lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
+
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ print_deadlock_bug+0x282/0x3c0
+ __lock_acquire+0x1610/0x29a0
+ lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
+ cpus_read_lock+0x49/0x120
+ stop_per_cpu_kthreads+0x7/0x60
+ start_kthread+0x103/0x120
+ osnoise_hotplug_workfn+0x5e/0x90
+ process_one_work+0x44f/0xb30
+ worker_thread+0x33e/0x5e0
+ kthread+0x206/0x3b0
+ ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
+ </TASK>
+
+This is the deadlock scenario:
+osnoise_hotplug_workfn()
+ guard(cpus_read_lock)(); // first lock call
+ start_kthread(cpu)
+ if (IS_ERR(kthread)) {
+ stop_per_cpu_kthreads(); {
+ cpus_read_lock(); // second lock call. Cause the AA deadlock
+ }
+ }
+
+It is not necessary to call stop_per_cpu_kthreads() which stops osnoise
+kthread for every other CPUs in the system if a failure occurs during
+hotplug of a certain CPU.
+For start_per_cpu_kthreads(), if the start_kthread() call fails,
+this function calls stop_per_cpu_kthreads() to handle the error.
+Therefore, similarly, there is no need to call stop_per_cpu_kthreads()
+again within start_kthread().
+So just remove stop_per_cpu_kthreads() from start_kthread to solve this issue.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250321095249.2739397-1-ranxiaokai627@163.com
+Fixes: c8895e271f79 ("trace/osnoise: Support hotplug operations")
+Signed-off-by: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c
+@@ -2032,7 +2032,6 @@ static int start_kthread(unsigned int cp
+
+ if (IS_ERR(kthread)) {
+ pr_err(BANNER "could not start sampling thread\n");
+- stop_per_cpu_kthreads();
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From ea8d7647f9ddf1f81e2027ed305299797299aa03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 19:53:11 -0400
+Subject: tracing: Verify event formats that have "%*p.."
+
+From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+
+commit ea8d7647f9ddf1f81e2027ed305299797299aa03 upstream.
+
+The trace event verifier checks the formats of trace events to make sure
+that they do not point at memory that is not in the trace event itself or
+in data that will never be freed. If an event references data that was
+allocated when the event triggered and that same data is freed before the
+event is read, then the kernel can crash by reading freed memory.
+
+The verifier runs at boot up (or module load) and scans the print formats
+of the events and checks their arguments to make sure that dereferenced
+pointers are safe. If the format uses "%*p.." the verifier will ignore it,
+and that could be dangerous. Cover this case as well.
+
+Also add to the sample code a use case of "%*pbl".
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/bcba4d76-2c3f-4d11-baf0-02905db953dd@oracle.com/
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Fixes: 5013f454a352c ("tracing: Add check of trace event print fmts for dereferencing pointers")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250327195311.2d89ec66@gandalf.local.home
+Reported-by: Libo Chen <libo.chen@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Libo Chen <libo.chen@oracle.com>
+Tested-by: Libo Chen <libo.chen@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 7 +++++++
+ samples/trace_events/trace-events-sample.h | 8 ++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
+@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ static void test_event_printk(struct tra
+ case '%':
+ continue;
+ case 'p':
++ do_pointer:
+ /* Find dereferencing fields */
+ switch (fmt[i + 1]) {
+ case 'B': case 'R': case 'r':
+@@ -498,6 +499,12 @@ static void test_event_printk(struct tra
+ continue;
+ if (fmt[i + j] == '*') {
+ star = true;
++ /* Handle %*pbl case */
++ if (!j && fmt[i + 1] == 'p') {
++ arg++;
++ i++;
++ goto do_pointer;
++ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((fmt[i + j] == 's')) {
+--- a/samples/trace_events/trace-events-sample.h
++++ b/samples/trace_events/trace-events-sample.h
+@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(foo_bar,
+ __assign_cpumask(cpum, cpumask_bits(mask));
+ ),
+
+- TP_printk("foo %s %d %s %s %s %s %s %s (%s) (%s) %s", __entry->foo, __entry->bar,
++ TP_printk("foo %s %d %s %s %s %s %s %s (%s) (%s) %s [%d] %*pbl",
++ __entry->foo, __entry->bar,
+
+ /*
+ * Notice here the use of some helper functions. This includes:
+@@ -370,7 +371,10 @@ TRACE_EVENT(foo_bar,
+
+ __get_str(str), __get_str(lstr),
+ __get_bitmask(cpus), __get_cpumask(cpum),
+- __get_str(vstr))
++ __get_str(vstr),
++ __get_dynamic_array_len(cpus),
++ __get_dynamic_array_len(cpus),
++ __get_dynamic_array(cpus))
+ );
+
+ /*
--- /dev/null
+From adc3fd2a2277b7cc0b61692463771bf9bd298036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ming Yen Hsieh <mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 11:33:42 +0800
+Subject: wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix kernel panic due to null pointer dereference
+
+From: Ming Yen Hsieh <mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com>
+
+commit adc3fd2a2277b7cc0b61692463771bf9bd298036 upstream.
+
+Address a kernel panic caused by a null pointer dereference in the
+`mt792x_rx_get_wcid` function. The issue arises because the `deflink` structure
+is not properly initialized with the `sta` context. This patch ensures that the
+`deflink` structure is correctly linked to the `sta` context, preventing the
+null pointer dereference.
+
+ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000400
+ #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
+ #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
+ PGD 0 P4D 0
+ Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
+ CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 470 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Not tainted 6.12.13-gentoo-dist #1
+ Hardware name: /AMD HUDSON-M1, BIOS 4.6.4 11/15/2011
+ RIP: 0010:mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib]
+ RSP: 0018:ffffa147c055fd98 EFLAGS: 00010202
+ RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e9ecb652000 RCX: 0000000000000000
+ RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e9ecb652000
+ RBP: 0000000000000685 R08: ffff8e9ec6570000 R09: 0000000000000000
+ R10: ffff8e9ecd2ca000 R11: ffff8e9f22a217c0 R12: 0000000038010119
+ R13: 0000000080843801 R14: ffff8e9ec6570000 R15: ffff8e9ecb652000
+ FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e9f22a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+ CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+ CR2: 0000000000000400 CR3: 000000000d2ea000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
+ ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0
+ ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60
+ ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80
+ ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
+ ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
+ ? mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib]
+ mt7921_queue_rx_skb+0x1c6/0xaa0 [mt7921_common]
+ mt76u_alloc_queues+0x784/0x810 [mt76_usb]
+ ? __pfx___mt76_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [mt76]
+ __mt76_worker_fn+0x4f/0x80 [mt76]
+ kthread+0xd2/0x100
+ ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+ ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
+ ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
+ </TASK>
+ ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
+
+Reported-by: Nick Morrow <usbwifi2024@gmail.com>
+Closes: https://github.com/morrownr/USB-WiFi/issues/577
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 90c10286b176 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: Update mt792x_rx_get_wcid for per-link STA")
+Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com>
+Tested-by: Salah Coronya <salah.coronya@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218033343.1999648-1-mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com
+Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c
+@@ -811,6 +811,7 @@ int mt7921_mac_sta_add(struct mt76_dev *
+ msta->deflink.wcid.phy_idx = mvif->bss_conf.mt76.band_idx;
+ msta->deflink.wcid.tx_info |= MT_WCID_TX_INFO_SET;
+ msta->deflink.last_txs = jiffies;
++ msta->deflink.sta = msta;
+
+ ret = mt76_connac_pm_wake(&dev->mphy, &dev->pm);
+ if (ret)
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
