--- /dev/null
+ o Security fixes:
+ - Tear down the circuit if we get an unexpected SENDME cell. Clients
+ could use this trick to make their circuits receive cells faster
+ than our flow control would have allowed, or to gum up the network,
+ or possibly to do targeted memory denial-of-service attacks on
+ entry nodes. Fixes bug 6252. Bugfix on the 54th commit on Tor --
+ from July 2002, before the release of Tor 0.0.0.
+
case RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME:
if (!rh.stream_id) {
if (layer_hint) {
+ if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
+ CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. "
+ "Closing circ.");
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
+ }
layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.",
layer_hint->package_window);
circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint);
} else {
+ if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
+ CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from client. "
+ "Closing circ.");
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
+ }
circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,
"circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.",