increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
fraction of your paths. (Default: 1)
+**UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards** **0**|**1**::
+ If this option is set to 1, we try to use our entry guards as directory
+ guards, and failing that, pick more nodes to act as our directory guards.
+ This helps prevent an adversary from enumerating clients. It's only
+ available for clients (non-relay, non-bridge) that aren't configured to
+ download any non-default directory material. It doesn't currently
+ do anything when we lack a live consensus. (Default: 1)
+
**NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3)
+**NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__::
+ If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to make sure we
+ have at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. (Default: 3)
+
**SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP