--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 12:22:25 +0300
+Subject: bridge: switchdev: Clear forward mark when transmitting packet
+
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 79e99bdd60b484af9afe0147e85a13e66d5c1cdb ]
+
+Commit 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for
+stacked devices") added the 'offload_fwd_mark' bit to the skb in order
+to allow drivers to indicate to the bridge driver that they already
+forwarded the packet in L2.
+
+In case the bit is set, before transmitting the packet from each port,
+the port's mark is compared with the mark stored in the skb's control
+block. If both marks are equal, we know the packet arrived from a switch
+device that already forwarded the packet and it's not re-transmitted.
+
+However, if the packet is transmitted from the bridge device itself
+(e.g., br0), we should clear the 'offload_fwd_mark' bit as the mark
+stored in the skb's control block isn't valid.
+
+This scenario can happen in rare cases where a packet was trapped during
+L3 forwarding and forwarded by the kernel to a bridge device.
+
+Fixes: 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices")
+Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Reported-by: Yotam Gigi <yotamg@mellanox.com>
+Tested-by: Yotam Gigi <yotamg@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bridge/br_device.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/br_device.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_device.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ netdev_tx_t br_dev_xmit(struct sk_buff *
+ brstats->tx_bytes += skb->len;
+ u64_stats_update_end(&brstats->syncp);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV
++ skb->offload_fwd_mark = 0;
++#endif
+ BR_INPUT_SKB_CB(skb)->brdev = dev;
+
+ skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 22:48:48 +0200
+Subject: cxgb4: Fix stack out-of-bounds read due to wrong size to t4_record_mbox()
+
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 0f3086868e8889a823a6e0f3d299102aa895d947 ]
+
+Passing commands for logging to t4_record_mbox() with size
+MBOX_LEN, when the actual command size is actually smaller,
+causes out-of-bounds stack accesses in t4_record_mbox() while
+copying command words here:
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size / 8; i++)
+ entry->cmd[i] = be64_to_cpu(cmd[i]);
+
+Up to 48 bytes from the stack are then leaked to debugfs.
+
+This happens whenever we send (and log) commands described by
+structs fw_sched_cmd (32 bytes leaked), fw_vi_rxmode_cmd (48),
+fw_hello_cmd (48), fw_bye_cmd (48), fw_initialize_cmd (48),
+fw_reset_cmd (48), fw_pfvf_cmd (32), fw_eq_eth_cmd (16),
+fw_eq_ctrl_cmd (32), fw_eq_ofld_cmd (32), fw_acl_mac_cmd(16),
+fw_rss_glb_config_cmd(32), fw_rss_vi_config_cmd(32),
+fw_devlog_cmd(32), fw_vi_enable_cmd(48), fw_port_cmd(32),
+fw_sched_cmd(32), fw_devlog_cmd(32).
+
+The cxgb4vf driver got this right instead.
+
+When we call t4_record_mbox() to log a command reply, a MBOX_LEN
+size can be used though, as get_mbox_rpl() will fill cmd_rpl up
+completely.
+
+Fixes: 7f080c3f2ff0 ("cxgb4: Add support to enable logging of firmware mailbox commands")
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/t4_hw.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/t4_hw.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/t4_hw.c
+@@ -317,12 +317,12 @@ int t4_wr_mbox_meat_timeout(struct adapt
+
+ if (v != MBOX_OWNER_DRV) {
+ ret = (v == MBOX_OWNER_FW) ? -EBUSY : -ETIMEDOUT;
+- t4_record_mbox(adap, cmd, MBOX_LEN, access, ret);
++ t4_record_mbox(adap, cmd, size, access, ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy in the new mailbox command and send it on its way ... */
+- t4_record_mbox(adap, cmd, MBOX_LEN, access, 0);
++ t4_record_mbox(adap, cmd, size, access, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i += 8)
+ t4_write_reg64(adap, data_reg + i, be64_to_cpu(*p++));
+
+@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ int t4_wr_mbox_meat_timeout(struct adapt
+ }
+
+ ret = (pcie_fw & PCIE_FW_ERR_F) ? -ENXIO : -ETIMEDOUT;
+- t4_record_mbox(adap, cmd, MBOX_LEN, access, ret);
++ t4_record_mbox(adap, cmd, size, access, ret);
+ dev_err(adap->pdev_dev, "command %#x in mailbox %d timed out\n",
+ *(const u8 *)cmd, mbox);
+ t4_report_fw_error(adap);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 15:24:47 -0700
+Subject: fsl/man: Inherit parent device and of_node
+
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit a1a50c8e4c241a505b7270e1a3c6e50d94e794b1 ]
+
+Junote Cai reported that he was not able to get a DSA setup involving the
+Freescale DPAA/FMAN driver to work and narrowed it down to
+of_find_net_device_by_node(). This function requires the network device's
+device reference to be correctly set which is the case here, though we have
+lost any device_node association there.
+
+The problem is that dpaa_eth_add_device() allocates a "dpaa-ethernet" platform
+device, and later on dpaa_eth_probe() is called but SET_NETDEV_DEV() won't be
+propagating &pdev->dev.of_node properly. Fix this by inherenting both the parent
+device and the of_node when dpaa_eth_add_device() creates the platform device.
+
+Fixes: 3933961682a3 ("fsl/fman: Add FMan MAC driver")
+Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
+@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ static struct platform_device *dpaa_eth_
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+
++ pdev->dev.of_node = node;
++ pdev->dev.parent = priv->dev;
++
+ ret = platform_device_add_data(pdev, &data, sizeof(data));
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Claudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@nxp.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 10:45:28 +0300
+Subject: gianfar: Fix Tx flow control deactivation
+
+From: Claudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@nxp.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 5d621672bc1a1e5090c1ac5432a18c79e0e13e03 ]
+
+The wrong register is checked for the Tx flow control bit,
+it should have been maccfg1 not maccfg2.
+This went unnoticed for so long probably because the impact is
+hardly visible, not to mention the tangled code from adjust_link().
+First, link flow control (i.e. handling of Rx/Tx link level pause frames)
+is disabled by default (needs to be enabled via 'ethtool -A').
+Secondly, maccfg2 always returns 0 for tx_flow_oldval (except for a few
+old boards), which results in Tx flow control remaining always on
+once activated.
+
+Fixes: 45b679c9a3ccd9e34f28e6ec677b812a860eb8eb ("gianfar: Implement PAUSE frame generation support")
+Signed-off-by: Claudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@nxp.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
+@@ -3690,7 +3690,7 @@ static noinline void gfar_update_link_st
+ u32 tempval1 = gfar_read(®s->maccfg1);
+ u32 tempval = gfar_read(®s->maccfg2);
+ u32 ecntrl = gfar_read(®s->ecntrl);
+- u32 tx_flow_oldval = (tempval & MACCFG1_TX_FLOW);
++ u32 tx_flow_oldval = (tempval1 & MACCFG1_TX_FLOW);
+
+ if (phydev->duplex != priv->oldduplex) {
+ if (!(phydev->duplex))
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 17:26:33 +0800
+Subject: ip6_gre: update mtu properly in ip6gre_err
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 5c25f30c93fdc5bf25e62101aeaae7a4f9b421b3 ]
+
+Now when probessing ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, ip6gre_err only subtracts the
+offset of gre header from mtu info. The expected mtu of gre device
+should also subtract gre header. Otherwise, the next packets still
+can't be sent out.
+
+Jianlin found this issue when using the topo:
+ client(ip6gre)<---->(nic1)route(nic2)<----->(ip6gre)server
+
+and reducing nic2's mtu, then both tcp and sctp's performance with
+big size data became 0.
+
+This patch is to fix it by also subtracting grehdr (tun->tun_hlen)
+from mtu info when updating gre device's mtu in ip6gre_err(). It
+also needs to subtract ETH_HLEN if gre dev'type is ARPHRD_ETHER.
+
+Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
+@@ -432,7 +432,9 @@ static void ip6gre_err(struct sk_buff *s
+ }
+ break;
+ case ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
+- mtu = be32_to_cpu(info) - offset;
++ mtu = be32_to_cpu(info) - offset - t->tun_hlen;
++ if (t->dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
++ mtu -= ETH_HLEN;
+ if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+ mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+ t->dev->mtu = mtu;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2017 14:08:34 +0800
+Subject: ip_tunnel: fix setting ttl and tos value in collect_md mode
+
+From: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 0f693f1995cf002432b70f43ce73f79bf8d0b6c9 ]
+
+ttl and tos variables are declared and assigned, but are not used in
+iptunnel_xmit() function.
+
+Fixes: cfc7381b3002 ("ip_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPIP tunnel")
+Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
+Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
+@@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ void ip_md_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *s
+ ip_rt_put(rt);
+ goto tx_dropped;
+ }
+- iptunnel_xmit(NULL, rt, skb, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, proto, key->tos,
+- key->ttl, df, !net_eq(tunnel->net, dev_net(dev)));
++ iptunnel_xmit(NULL, rt, skb, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, proto, tos, ttl,
++ df, !net_eq(tunnel->net, dev_net(dev)));
+ return;
+ tx_error:
+ dev->stats.tx_errors++;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 14:40:53 +0200
+Subject: ipv6: accept 64k - 1 packet length in ip6_find_1stfragopt()
+
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 3de33e1ba0506723ab25734e098cf280ecc34756 ]
+
+A packet length of exactly IPV6_MAXPLEN is allowed, we should
+refuse parsing options only if the size is 64KiB or more.
+
+While at it, remove one extra variable and one assignment which
+were also introduced by the commit that introduced the size
+check. Checking the sum 'offset + len' and only later adding
+'len' to 'offset' doesn't provide any advantage over directly
+summing to 'offset' and checking it.
+
+Fixes: 6399f1fae4ec ("ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragopt")
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/output_core.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
+@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *
+
+ while (offset <= packet_len) {
+ struct ipv6_opt_hdr *exthdr;
+- unsigned int len;
+
+ switch (**nexthdr) {
+
+@@ -112,10 +111,9 @@ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *
+
+ exthdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) +
+ offset);
+- len = ipv6_optlen(exthdr);
+- if (len + offset >= IPV6_MAXPLEN)
++ offset += ipv6_optlen(exthdr);
++ if (offset > IPV6_MAXPLEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+- offset += len;
+ *nexthdr = &exthdr->nexthdr;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 09:47:10 -0700
+Subject: ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node
+
+From: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit c5cff8561d2d0006e972bd114afd51f082fee77c ]
+
+We currently keep rt->rt6i_node pointing to the fib6_node for the route.
+And some functions make use of this pointer to dereference the fib6_node
+from rt structure, e.g. rt6_check(). However, as there is neither
+refcount nor rcu taken when dereferencing rt->rt6i_node, it could
+potentially cause crashes as rt->rt6i_node could be set to NULL by other
+CPUs when doing a route deletion.
+This patch introduces an rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node and
+makes sure the functions that dereference it takes rcu_read_lock().
+
+Note: there is no "Fixes" tag because this bug was there in a very
+early stage.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/ip6_fib.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
+ net/ipv6/route.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h
++++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct fib6_node {
+ __u16 fn_flags;
+ int fn_sernum;
+ struct rt6_info *rr_ptr;
++ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ };
+
+ #ifndef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
+@@ -165,13 +166,40 @@ static inline void rt6_update_expires(st
+ rt0->rt6i_flags |= RTF_EXPIRES;
+ }
+
++/* Function to safely get fn->sernum for passed in rt
++ * and store result in passed in cookie.
++ * Return true if we can get cookie safely
++ * Return false if not
++ */
++static inline bool rt6_get_cookie_safe(const struct rt6_info *rt,
++ u32 *cookie)
++{
++ struct fib6_node *fn;
++ bool status = false;
++
++ rcu_read_lock();
++ fn = rcu_dereference(rt->rt6i_node);
++
++ if (fn) {
++ *cookie = fn->fn_sernum;
++ status = true;
++ }
++
++ rcu_read_unlock();
++ return status;
++}
++
+ static inline u32 rt6_get_cookie(const struct rt6_info *rt)
+ {
++ u32 cookie = 0;
++
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
+ (unlikely(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOCACHE) && rt->dst.from))
+ rt = (struct rt6_info *)(rt->dst.from);
+
+- return rt->rt6i_node ? rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum : 0;
++ rt6_get_cookie_safe(rt, &cookie);
++
++ return cookie;
+ }
+
+ static inline void ip6_rt_put(struct rt6_info *rt)
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
+@@ -148,11 +148,23 @@ static struct fib6_node *node_alloc(void
+ return fn;
+ }
+
+-static void node_free(struct fib6_node *fn)
++static void node_free_immediate(struct fib6_node *fn)
++{
++ kmem_cache_free(fib6_node_kmem, fn);
++}
++
++static void node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+ {
++ struct fib6_node *fn = container_of(head, struct fib6_node, rcu);
++
+ kmem_cache_free(fib6_node_kmem, fn);
+ }
+
++static void node_free(struct fib6_node *fn)
++{
++ call_rcu(&fn->rcu, node_free_rcu);
++}
++
+ static void rt6_rcu_free(struct rt6_info *rt)
+ {
+ call_rcu(&rt->dst.rcu_head, dst_rcu_free);
+@@ -589,9 +601,9 @@ insert_above:
+
+ if (!in || !ln) {
+ if (in)
+- node_free(in);
++ node_free_immediate(in);
+ if (ln)
+- node_free(ln);
++ node_free_immediate(ln);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+@@ -1020,7 +1032,7 @@ int fib6_add(struct fib6_node *root, str
+ root, and then (in failure) stale node
+ in main tree.
+ */
+- node_free(sfn);
++ node_free_immediate(sfn);
+ err = PTR_ERR(sn);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
+@@ -1267,7 +1267,9 @@ static void rt6_dst_from_metrics_check(s
+
+ static struct dst_entry *rt6_check(struct rt6_info *rt, u32 cookie)
+ {
+- if (!rt->rt6i_node || (rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum != cookie))
++ u32 rt_cookie;
++
++ if (!rt6_get_cookie_safe(rt, &rt_cookie) || rt_cookie != cookie)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (rt6_check_expired(rt))
+@@ -1335,8 +1337,14 @@ static void ip6_link_failure(struct sk_b
+ if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) {
+ dst_hold(&rt->dst);
+ ip6_del_rt(rt);
+- } else if (rt->rt6i_node && (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_DEFAULT)) {
+- rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum = -1;
++ } else {
++ struct fib6_node *fn;
++
++ rcu_read_lock();
++ fn = rcu_dereference(rt->rt6i_node);
++ if (fn && (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_DEFAULT))
++ fn->fn_sernum = -1;
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+ }
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:26:19 +0200
+Subject: ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction
+
+From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit ba1cc08d9488c94cb8d94f545305688b72a2a300 ]
+
+fib6_net_exit only frees the main and local tables. If another table was
+created with fib6_alloc_table, we leak it when the netns is destroyed.
+
+Fix this in the same way ip_fib_net_exit cleans up tables, by walking
+through the whole hashtable of fib6_table's. We can get rid of the
+special cases for local and main, since they're also part of the
+hashtable.
+
+Reproducer:
+ ip netns add x
+ ip -net x -6 rule add from 6003:1::/64 table 100
+ ip netns del x
+
+Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
+Fixes: 58f09b78b730 ("[NETNS][IPV6] ip6_fib - make it per network namespace")
+Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
+@@ -201,6 +201,12 @@ static void rt6_release(struct rt6_info
+ }
+ }
+
++static void fib6_free_table(struct fib6_table *table)
++{
++ inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&table->tb6_peers);
++ kfree(table);
++}
++
+ static void fib6_link_table(struct net *net, struct fib6_table *tb)
+ {
+ unsigned int h;
+@@ -1893,15 +1899,22 @@ out_timer:
+
+ static void fib6_net_exit(struct net *net)
+ {
++ unsigned int i;
++
+ rt6_ifdown(net, NULL);
+ del_timer_sync(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer);
+
+-#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
+- inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&net->ipv6.fib6_local_tbl->tb6_peers);
+- kfree(net->ipv6.fib6_local_tbl);
+-#endif
+- inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl->tb6_peers);
+- kfree(net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl);
++ for (i = 0; i < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; i++) {
++ struct hlist_head *head = &net->ipv6.fib_table_hash[i];
++ struct hlist_node *tmp;
++ struct fib6_table *tb;
++
++ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(tb, tmp, head, tb6_hlist) {
++ hlist_del(&tb->tb6_hlist);
++ fib6_free_table(tb);
++ }
++ }
++
+ kfree(net->ipv6.fib_table_hash);
+ kfree(net->ipv6.rt6_stats);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 15:03:10 -0700
+Subject: ipv6: fix sparse warning on rt6i_node
+
+From: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 4e587ea71bf924f7dac621f1351653bd41e446cb ]
+
+Commit c5cff8561d2d adds rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node. This
+generates a new sparse warning on rt->rt6i_node related code:
+ net/ipv6/route.c:1394:30: error: incompatible types in comparison
+ expression (different address spaces)
+ ./include/net/ip6_fib.h:187:14: error: incompatible types in comparison
+ expression (different address spaces)
+
+This commit adds "__rcu" tag for rt6i_node and makes sure corresponding
+rcu API is used for it.
+After this fix, sparse no longer generates the above warning.
+
+Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node")
+Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/ip6_fib.h | 2 +-
+ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 +-
+ net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 11 +++++++----
+ net/ipv6/route.c | 3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h
++++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ struct rt6_info {
+ * the same cache line.
+ */
+ struct fib6_table *rt6i_table;
+- struct fib6_node *rt6i_node;
++ struct fib6_node __rcu *rt6i_node;
+
+ struct in6_addr rt6i_gateway;
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+@@ -5443,7 +5443,7 @@ static void __ipv6_ifa_notify(int event,
+ * our DAD process, so we don't need
+ * to do it again
+ */
+- if (!(ifp->rt->rt6i_node))
++ if (!rcu_access_pointer(ifp->rt->rt6i_node))
+ ip6_ins_rt(ifp->rt);
+ if (ifp->idev->cnf.forwarding)
+ addrconf_join_anycast(ifp);
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
+@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ add:
+
+ rt->dst.rt6_next = iter;
+ *ins = rt;
+- rt->rt6i_node = fn;
++ rcu_assign_pointer(rt->rt6i_node, fn);
+ atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
+ inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info, nlflags);
+ info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_entries++;
+@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ add:
+ return err;
+
+ *ins = rt;
+- rt->rt6i_node = fn;
++ rcu_assign_pointer(rt->rt6i_node, fn);
+ rt->dst.rt6_next = iter->dst.rt6_next;
+ atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
+ inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info, NLM_F_REPLACE);
+@@ -1459,8 +1459,9 @@ static void fib6_del_route(struct fib6_n
+
+ int fib6_del(struct rt6_info *rt, struct nl_info *info)
+ {
++ struct fib6_node *fn = rcu_dereference_protected(rt->rt6i_node,
++ lockdep_is_held(&rt->rt6i_table->tb6_lock));
+ struct net *net = info->nl_net;
+- struct fib6_node *fn = rt->rt6i_node;
+ struct rt6_info **rtp;
+
+ #if RT6_DEBUG >= 2
+@@ -1649,7 +1650,9 @@ static int fib6_clean_node(struct fib6_w
+ if (res) {
+ #if RT6_DEBUG >= 2
+ pr_debug("%s: del failed: rt=%p@%p err=%d\n",
+- __func__, rt, rt->rt6i_node, res);
++ __func__, rt,
++ rcu_access_pointer(rt->rt6i_node),
++ res);
+ #endif
+ continue;
+ }
+--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
+@@ -1361,7 +1361,8 @@ static void rt6_do_update_pmtu(struct rt
+ static bool rt6_cache_allowed_for_pmtu(const struct rt6_info *rt)
+ {
+ return !(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) &&
+- (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || rt->rt6i_node);
++ (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
++ rcu_access_pointer(rt->rt6i_node));
+ }
+
+ static void __ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, const struct sock *sk,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 15:48:47 -0700
+Subject: ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 32a805baf0fb70b6dbedefcd7249ac7f580f9e3b ]
+
+IPv6 FIB should use FIB6_TABLE_HASHSZ, not FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ.
+
+Fixes: ba1cc08d9488 ("ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
+@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ static void fib6_net_exit(struct net *ne
+ rt6_ifdown(net, NULL);
+ del_timer_sync(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer);
+
+- for (i = 0; i < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; i++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < FIB6_TABLE_HASHSZ; i++) {
+ struct hlist_head *head = &net->ipv6.fib_table_hash[i];
+ struct hlist_node *tmp;
+ struct fib6_table *tb;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 09:29:31 -0700
+Subject: kcm: do not attach PF_KCM sockets to avoid deadlock
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 351050ecd6523374b370341cc29fe61e2201556b ]
+
+syzkaller had no problem to trigger a deadlock, attaching a KCM socket
+to another one (or itself). (original syzkaller report was a very
+confusing lockdep splat during a sendmsg())
+
+It seems KCM claims to only support TCP, but no enforcement is done,
+so we might need to add additional checks.
+
+Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Acked-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
++++ b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
+@@ -1381,6 +1381,10 @@ static int kcm_attach(struct socket *soc
+ if (!csk)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ /* We must prevent loops or risk deadlock ! */
++ if (csk->sk_family == PF_KCM)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ psock = kmem_cache_zalloc(kcm_psockp, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!psock)
+ return -ENOMEM;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 15:36:08 +0200
+Subject: macsec: add genl family module alias
+
+From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 78362998f58c7c271e2719dcd0aaced435c801f9 ]
+
+This helps tools such as wpa_supplicant can start even if the macsec
+module isn't loaded yet.
+
+Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
+Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/macsec.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
++++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
+@@ -3510,6 +3510,7 @@ module_init(macsec_init);
+ module_exit(macsec_exit);
+
+ MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK("macsec");
++MODULE_ALIAS_GENL_FAMILY("macsec");
+
+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("MACsec IEEE 802.1AE");
+ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 10:52:31 +0200
+Subject: mlxsw: spectrum: Forbid linking to devices that have uppers
+
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 25cc72a33835ed8a6f53180a822cadab855852ac ]
+
+The mlxsw driver relies on NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER events to configure the
+device in case a port is enslaved to a master netdev such as bridge or
+bond.
+
+Since the driver ignores events unrelated to its ports and their
+uppers, it's possible to engineer situations in which the device's data
+path differs from the kernel's.
+
+One example to such a situation is when a port is enslaved to a bond
+that is already enslaved to a bridge. When the bond was enslaved the
+driver ignored the event - as the bond wasn't one of its uppers - and
+therefore a bridge port instance isn't created in the device.
+
+Until such configurations are supported forbid them by checking that the
+upper device doesn't have uppers of its own.
+
+Fixes: 0d65fc13042f ("mlxsw: spectrum: Implement LAG port join/leave")
+Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Reported-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com>
+Tested-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c | 6 ++++++
+ include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 ++
+ net/core/dev.c | 3 ++-
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
+@@ -4172,6 +4172,8 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_netdevice_port_upper
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!info->linking)
+ break;
++ if (netdev_has_any_upper_dev(upper_dev))
++ return -EINVAL;
+ /* HW limitation forbids to put ports to multiple bridges. */
+ if (netif_is_bridge_master(upper_dev) &&
+ !mlxsw_sp_master_bridge_check(mlxsw_sp, upper_dev))
+@@ -4185,6 +4187,10 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_netdevice_port_upper
+ if (netif_is_lag_port(dev) && is_vlan_dev(upper_dev) &&
+ !netif_is_lag_master(vlan_dev_real_dev(upper_dev)))
+ return -EINVAL;
++ if (!info->linking)
++ break;
++ if (netdev_has_any_upper_dev(upper_dev))
++ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER:
+ upper_dev = info->upper_dev;
+--- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
++++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
+@@ -3901,6 +3901,8 @@ struct net_device *netdev_all_upper_get_
+ updev; \
+ updev = netdev_all_upper_get_next_dev_rcu(dev, &(iter)))
+
++bool netdev_has_any_upper_dev(struct net_device *dev);
++
+ void *netdev_lower_get_next_private(struct net_device *dev,
+ struct list_head **iter);
+ void *netdev_lower_get_next_private_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -5337,12 +5337,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(netdev_has_upper_dev);
+ * Find out if a device is linked to an upper device and return true in case
+ * it is. The caller must hold the RTNL lock.
+ */
+-static bool netdev_has_any_upper_dev(struct net_device *dev)
++bool netdev_has_any_upper_dev(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
+ return !list_empty(&dev->all_adj_list.upper);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(netdev_has_any_upper_dev);
+
+ /**
+ * netdev_master_upper_dev_get - Get master upper device
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: stephen hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 16:49:16 -0700
+Subject: netvsc: fix deadlock betwen link status and removal
+
+From: stephen hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 9b4e946ce14e20d7addbfb7d9139e604f9fda107 ]
+
+There is a deadlock possible when canceling the link status
+delayed work queue. The removal process is run with RTNL held,
+and the link status callback is acquring RTNL.
+
+Resolve the issue by using trylock and rescheduling.
+If cancel is in process, that block it from happening.
+
+Fixes: 122a5f6410f4 ("staging: hv: use delayed_work for netvsc_send_garp()")
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
++++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
+@@ -1084,7 +1084,12 @@ static void netvsc_link_change(struct wo
+ bool notify = false, reschedule = false;
+ unsigned long flags, next_reconfig, delay;
+
+- rtnl_lock();
++ /* if changes are happening, comeback later */
++ if (!rtnl_trylock()) {
++ schedule_delayed_work(&ndev_ctx->dwork, LINKCHANGE_INT);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (ndev_ctx->start_remove)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:29:41 -0400
+Subject: packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer
+
+From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit edbd58be15a957f6a760c4a514cd475217eb97fd ]
+
+... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.
+
+Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
+Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/packet/af_packet.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
+@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ struct timespec ts;
+ __u32 ts_status;
+ bool is_drop_n_account = false;
++ bool do_vnet = false;
+
+ /* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT.
+ * We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing
+@@ -2201,8 +2202,10 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
+ (maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
+ po->tp_reserve;
+- if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
++ if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
+ netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
++ do_vnet = true;
++ }
+ macoff = netoff - maclen;
+ }
+ if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
+@@ -2219,8 +2222,10 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
+ }
+ snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
+- if ((int)snaplen < 0)
++ if ((int)snaplen < 0) {
+ snaplen = 0;
++ do_vnet = false;
++ }
+ }
+ } else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen >
+ GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) {
+@@ -2233,6 +2238,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) {
+ snaplen = 0;
+ macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len;
++ do_vnet = false;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+@@ -2258,7 +2264,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+
+- if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
++ if (do_vnet) {
+ if (__packet_rcv_vnet(skb, h.raw + macoff -
+ sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr))) {
+ spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 15:59:49 +0200
+Subject: qlge: avoid memcpy buffer overflow
+
+From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit e58f95831e7468d25eb6e41f234842ecfe6f014f ]
+
+gcc-8.0.0 (snapshot) points out that we copy a variable-length string
+into a fixed length field using memcpy() with the destination length,
+and that ends up copying whatever follows the string:
+
+ inlined from 'ql_core_dump' at drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlge/qlge_dbg.c:1106:2:
+drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlge/qlge_dbg.c:708:2: error: 'memcpy' reading 15 bytes from a region of size 14 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
+ memcpy(seg_hdr->description, desc, (sizeof(seg_hdr->description)) - 1);
+
+Changing it to use strncpy() will instead zero-pad the destination,
+which seems to be the right thing to do here.
+
+The bug is probably harmless, but it seems like a good idea to address
+it in stable kernels as well, if only for the purpose of building with
+gcc-8 without warnings.
+
+Fixes: a61f80261306 ("qlge: Add ethtool register dump function.")
+Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlge/qlge_dbg.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlge/qlge_dbg.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlge/qlge_dbg.c
+@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static void ql_build_coredump_seg_header
+ seg_hdr->cookie = MPI_COREDUMP_COOKIE;
+ seg_hdr->segNum = seg_number;
+ seg_hdr->segSize = seg_size;
+- memcpy(seg_hdr->description, desc, (sizeof(seg_hdr->description)) - 1);
++ strncpy(seg_hdr->description, desc, (sizeof(seg_hdr->description)) - 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 11:26:13 +0200
+Subject: Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks"
+
+From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ]
+
+This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb.
+
+After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API
+for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this
+fix-up patch. As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot
+memory leak it any-longer.
+
+Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
+Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
+Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/inet_frag.h | 7 +------
+ net/ieee802154/6lowpan/reassembly.c | 11 +++--------
+ net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 12 +++---------
+ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 12 +++---------
+ net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 12 +++---------
+ 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/inet_frag.h
++++ b/include/net/inet_frag.h
+@@ -103,15 +103,10 @@ struct inet_frags {
+ int inet_frags_init(struct inet_frags *);
+ void inet_frags_fini(struct inet_frags *);
+
+-static inline int inet_frags_init_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
++static inline void inet_frags_init_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
+ {
+ atomic_set(&nf->mem, 0);
+- return 0;
+ }
+-static inline void inet_frags_uninit_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
+-{
+-}
+-
+ void inet_frags_exit_net(struct netns_frags *nf, struct inet_frags *f);
+
+ void inet_frag_kill(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct inet_frags *f);
+--- a/net/ieee802154/6lowpan/reassembly.c
++++ b/net/ieee802154/6lowpan/reassembly.c
+@@ -580,19 +580,14 @@ static int __net_init lowpan_frags_init_
+ {
+ struct netns_ieee802154_lowpan *ieee802154_lowpan =
+ net_ieee802154_lowpan(net);
+- int res;
+
+ ieee802154_lowpan->frags.high_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_HIGH_THRESH;
+ ieee802154_lowpan->frags.low_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_LOW_THRESH;
+ ieee802154_lowpan->frags.timeout = IPV6_FRAG_TIMEOUT;
+
+- res = inet_frags_init_net(&ieee802154_lowpan->frags);
+- if (res)
+- return res;
+- res = lowpan_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
+- if (res)
+- inet_frags_uninit_net(&ieee802154_lowpan->frags);
+- return res;
++ inet_frags_init_net(&ieee802154_lowpan->frags);
++
++ return lowpan_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
+ }
+
+ static void __net_exit lowpan_frags_exit_net(struct net *net)
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
+@@ -835,8 +835,6 @@ static void __init ip4_frags_ctl_registe
+
+ static int __net_init ipv4_frags_init_net(struct net *net)
+ {
+- int res;
+-
+ /* Fragment cache limits.
+ *
+ * The fragment memory accounting code, (tries to) account for
+@@ -862,13 +860,9 @@ static int __net_init ipv4_frags_init_ne
+
+ net->ipv4.frags.max_dist = 64;
+
+- res = inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
+- if (res)
+- return res;
+- res = ip4_frags_ns_ctl_register(net);
+- if (res)
+- inet_frags_uninit_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
+- return res;
++ inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
++
++ return ip4_frags_ns_ctl_register(net);
+ }
+
+ static void __net_exit ipv4_frags_exit_net(struct net *net)
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
+@@ -622,18 +622,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_frag6_gather);
+
+ static int nf_ct_net_init(struct net *net)
+ {
+- int res;
+-
+ net->nf_frag.frags.high_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_HIGH_THRESH;
+ net->nf_frag.frags.low_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_LOW_THRESH;
+ net->nf_frag.frags.timeout = IPV6_FRAG_TIMEOUT;
+- res = inet_frags_init_net(&net->nf_frag.frags);
+- if (res)
+- return res;
+- res = nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_register(net);
+- if (res)
+- inet_frags_uninit_net(&net->nf_frag.frags);
+- return res;
++ inet_frags_init_net(&net->nf_frag.frags);
++
++ return nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_register(net);
+ }
+
+ static void nf_ct_net_exit(struct net *net)
+--- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
+@@ -709,19 +709,13 @@ static void ip6_frags_sysctl_unregister(
+
+ static int __net_init ipv6_frags_init_net(struct net *net)
+ {
+- int res;
+-
+ net->ipv6.frags.high_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_HIGH_THRESH;
+ net->ipv6.frags.low_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_LOW_THRESH;
+ net->ipv6.frags.timeout = IPV6_FRAG_TIMEOUT;
+
+- res = inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv6.frags);
+- if (res)
+- return res;
+- res = ip6_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
+- if (res)
+- inet_frags_uninit_net(&net->ipv6.frags);
+- return res;
++ inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv6.frags);
++
++ return ip6_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
+ }
+
+ static void __net_exit ipv6_frags_exit_net(struct net *net)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 17:49:29 -0700
+Subject: Revert "net: phy: Correctly process PHY_HALTED in phy_stop_machine()"
+
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit ebc8254aeae34226d0bc8fda309fd9790d4dccfe ]
+
+This reverts commit 7ad813f208533cebfcc32d3d7474dc1677d1b09a ("net: phy:
+Correctly process PHY_HALTED in phy_stop_machine()") because it is
+creating the possibility for a NULL pointer dereference.
+
+David Daney provide the following call trace and diagram of events:
+
+When ndo_stop() is called we call:
+
+ phy_disconnect()
+ +---> phy_stop_interrupts() implies: phydev->irq = PHY_POLL;
+ +---> phy_stop_machine()
+ | +---> phy_state_machine()
+ | +----> queue_delayed_work(): Work queued.
+ +--->phy_detach() implies: phydev->attached_dev = NULL;
+
+Now at a later time the queued work does:
+
+ phy_state_machine()
+ +---->netif_carrier_off(phydev->attached_dev): Oh no! It is NULL:
+
+ CPU 12 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
+0000000000000048, epc == ffffffff80de37ec, ra == ffffffff80c7c
+Oops[#1]:
+CPU: 12 PID: 1502 Comm: kworker/12:1 Not tainted 4.9.43-Cavium-Octeon+ #1
+Workqueue: events_power_efficient phy_state_machine
+task: 80000004021ed100 task.stack: 8000000409d70000
+$ 0 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff84720060 0000000000000048 0000000000000004
+$ 4 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000004 0000000000000000
+$ 8 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffff98f3 0000000000000000
+$12 : 8000000409d73fe0 0000000000009c00 ffffffff846547c8 000000000000af3b
+$16 : 80000004096bab68 80000004096babd0 0000000000000000 80000004096ba800
+$20 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff81090000 0000000000000008
+$24 : 0000000000000061 ffffffff808637b0
+$28 : 8000000409d70000 8000000409d73cf0 80000000271bd300 ffffffff80c7804c
+Hi : 000000000000002a
+Lo : 000000000000003f
+epc : ffffffff80de37ec netif_carrier_off+0xc/0x58
+ra : ffffffff80c7804c phy_state_machine+0x48c/0x4f8
+Status: 14009ce3 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL IE
+Cause : 00800008 (ExcCode 02)
+BadVA : 0000000000000048
+PrId : 000d9501 (Cavium Octeon III)
+Modules linked in:
+Process kworker/12:1 (pid: 1502, threadinfo=8000000409d70000,
+task=80000004021ed100, tls=0000000000000000)
+Stack : 8000000409a54000 80000004096bab68 80000000271bd300 80000000271c1e00
+ 0000000000000000 ffffffff808a1708 8000000409a54000 80000000271bd300
+ 80000000271bd320 8000000409a54030 ffffffff80ff0f00 0000000000000001
+ ffffffff81090000 ffffffff808a1ac0 8000000402182080 ffffffff84650000
+ 8000000402182080 ffffffff84650000 ffffffff80ff0000 8000000409a54000
+ ffffffff808a1970 0000000000000000 80000004099e8000 8000000402099240
+ 0000000000000000 ffffffff808a8598 0000000000000000 8000000408eeeb00
+ 8000000409a54000 00000000810a1d00 0000000000000000 8000000409d73de8
+ 8000000409d73de8 0000000000000088 000000000c009c00 8000000409d73e08
+ 8000000409d73e08 8000000402182080 ffffffff808a84d0 8000000402182080
+ ...
+Call Trace:
+[<ffffffff80de37ec>] netif_carrier_off+0xc/0x58
+[<ffffffff80c7804c>] phy_state_machine+0x48c/0x4f8
+[<ffffffff808a1708>] process_one_work+0x158/0x368
+[<ffffffff808a1ac0>] worker_thread+0x150/0x4c0
+[<ffffffff808a8598>] kthread+0xc8/0xe0
+[<ffffffff808617f0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
+
+The original motivation for this change originated from Marc Gonzales
+indicating that his network driver did not have its adjust_link callback
+executing with phydev->link = 0 while he was expecting it.
+
+PHYLIB has never made any such guarantees ever because phy_stop() merely just
+tells the workqueue to move into PHY_HALTED state which will happen
+asynchronously.
+
+Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
+Reported-by: David Daney <ddaney.cavm@gmail.com>
+Fixes: 7ad813f20853 ("net: phy: Correctly process PHY_HALTED in phy_stop_machine()")
+Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/phy/phy.c | 3 ---
+ 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/phy/phy.c
++++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy.c
+@@ -674,9 +674,6 @@ void phy_stop_machine(struct phy_device
+ if (phydev->state > PHY_UP && phydev->state != PHY_HALTED)
+ phydev->state = PHY_UP;
+ mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock);
+-
+- /* Now we can run the state machine synchronously */
+- phy_state_machine(&phydev->state_queue.work);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 11:26:08 +0200
+Subject: Revert "net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting"
+
+From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit fb452a1aa3fd4034d7999e309c5466ff2d7005aa ]
+
+This reverts commit 6d7b857d541ecd1d9bd997c97242d4ef94b19de2.
+
+There is a bug in fragmentation codes use of the percpu_counter API,
+that can cause issues on systems with many CPUs.
+
+The frag_mem_limit() just reads the global counter (fbc->count),
+without considering other CPUs can have upto batch size (130K) that
+haven't been subtracted yet. Due to the 3MBytes lower thresh limit,
+this become dangerous at >=24 CPUs (3*1024*1024/130000=24).
+
+The correct API usage would be to use __percpu_counter_compare() which
+does the right thing, and takes into account the number of (online)
+CPUs and batch size, to account for this and call __percpu_counter_sum()
+when needed.
+
+We choose to revert the use of the lib/percpu_counter API for frag
+memory accounting for several reasons:
+
+1) On systems with CPUs > 24, the heavier fully locked
+ __percpu_counter_sum() is always invoked, which will be more
+ expensive than the atomic_t that is reverted to.
+
+Given systems with more than 24 CPUs are becoming common this doesn't
+seem like a good option. To mitigate this, the batch size could be
+decreased and thresh be increased.
+
+2) The add_frag_mem_limit+sub_frag_mem_limit pairs happen on the RX
+ CPU, before SKBs are pushed into sockets on remote CPUs. Given
+ NICs can only hash on L2 part of the IP-header, the NIC-RXq's will
+ likely be limited. Thus, a fair chance that atomic add+dec happen
+ on the same CPU.
+
+Revert note that commit 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
+removed init_frag_mem_limit() and instead use inet_frags_init_net().
+After this revert, inet_frags_uninit_net() becomes empty.
+
+Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
+Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
+Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/inet_frag.h | 36 +++++++++---------------------------
+ net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 4 +---
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/inet_frag.h
++++ b/include/net/inet_frag.h
+@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
+ #ifndef __NET_FRAG_H__
+ #define __NET_FRAG_H__
+
+-#include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
+-
+ struct netns_frags {
+- /* The percpu_counter "mem" need to be cacheline aligned.
+- * mem.count must not share cacheline with other writers
+- */
+- struct percpu_counter mem ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
+-
++ /* Keep atomic mem on separate cachelines in structs that include it */
++ atomic_t mem ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
+ /* sysctls */
+ int timeout;
+ int high_thresh;
+@@ -110,11 +105,11 @@ void inet_frags_fini(struct inet_frags *
+
+ static inline int inet_frags_init_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
+ {
+- return percpu_counter_init(&nf->mem, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
++ atomic_set(&nf->mem, 0);
++ return 0;
+ }
+ static inline void inet_frags_uninit_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
+ {
+- percpu_counter_destroy(&nf->mem);
+ }
+
+ void inet_frags_exit_net(struct netns_frags *nf, struct inet_frags *f);
+@@ -140,37 +135,24 @@ static inline bool inet_frag_evicting(st
+
+ /* Memory Tracking Functions. */
+
+-/* The default percpu_counter batch size is not big enough to scale to
+- * fragmentation mem acct sizes.
+- * The mem size of a 64K fragment is approx:
+- * (44 fragments * 2944 truesize) + frag_queue struct(200) = 129736 bytes
+- */
+-static unsigned int frag_percpu_counter_batch = 130000;
+-
+ static inline int frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf)
+ {
+- return percpu_counter_read(&nf->mem);
++ return atomic_read(&nf->mem);
+ }
+
+ static inline void sub_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf, int i)
+ {
+- __percpu_counter_add(&nf->mem, -i, frag_percpu_counter_batch);
++ atomic_sub(i, &nf->mem);
+ }
+
+ static inline void add_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf, int i)
+ {
+- __percpu_counter_add(&nf->mem, i, frag_percpu_counter_batch);
++ atomic_add(i, &nf->mem);
+ }
+
+-static inline unsigned int sum_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf)
++static inline int sum_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf)
+ {
+- unsigned int res;
+-
+- local_bh_disable();
+- res = percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nf->mem);
+- local_bh_enable();
+-
+- return res;
++ return atomic_read(&nf->mem);
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 3168 support :
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
+@@ -234,10 +234,8 @@ evict_again:
+ cond_resched();
+
+ if (read_seqretry(&f->rnd_seqlock, seq) ||
+- percpu_counter_sum(&nf->mem))
++ sum_frag_mem_limit(nf))
+ goto evict_again;
+-
+- percpu_counter_destroy(&nf->mem);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frags_exit_net);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 13:27:13 +0200
+Subject: sctp: Avoid out-of-bounds reads from address storage
+
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit ee6c88bb754e3d363e568da78086adfedb692447 ]
+
+inet_diag_msg_sctp{,l}addr_fill() and sctp_get_sctp_info() copy
+sizeof(sockaddr_storage) bytes to fill in sockaddr structs used
+to export diagnostic information to userspace.
+
+However, the memory allocated to store sockaddr information is
+smaller than that and depends on the address family, so we leak
+up to 100 uninitialized bytes to userspace. Just use the size of
+the source structs instead, in all the three cases this is what
+userspace expects. Zero out the remaining memory.
+
+Unused bytes (i.e. when IPv4 addresses are used) in source
+structs sctp_sockaddr_entry and sctp_transport are already
+cleared by sctp_add_bind_addr() and sctp_transport_new(),
+respectively.
+
+Noticed while testing KASAN-enabled kernel with 'ss':
+
+[ 2326.885243] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] at addr ffff881be8779800
+[ 2326.896800] Read of size 128 by task ss/9527
+[ 2326.901564] CPU: 0 PID: 9527 Comm: ss Not tainted 4.11.0-22.el7a.x86_64 #1
+[ 2326.909236] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
+[ 2326.917585] Call Trace:
+[ 2326.920312] dump_stack+0x63/0x8d
+[ 2326.924014] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70
+[ 2326.928295] kasan_report+0x288/0x540
+[ 2326.932380] ? inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
+[ 2326.938500] ? skb_put+0x8b/0xd0
+[ 2326.942098] ? memset+0x31/0x40
+[ 2326.945599] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
+[ 2326.950362] memcpy+0x23/0x50
+[ 2326.953669] inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
+[ 2326.959596] ? inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill+0x460/0x460 [sctp_diag]
+[ 2326.966495] ? __lock_sock+0x102/0x150
+[ 2326.970671] ? sock_def_wakeup+0x60/0x60
+[ 2326.975048] ? remove_wait_queue+0xc0/0xc0
+[ 2326.979619] sctp_diag_dump+0x44a/0x760 [sctp_diag]
+[ 2326.985063] ? sctp_ep_dump+0x280/0x280 [sctp_diag]
+[ 2326.990504] ? memset+0x31/0x40
+[ 2326.994007] ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40
+[ 2326.997900] __inet_diag_dump+0x57/0xb0 [inet_diag]
+[ 2327.003340] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
+[ 2327.007715] inet_diag_dump+0x4d/0x80 [inet_diag]
+[ 2327.012979] netlink_dump+0x1e6/0x490
+[ 2327.017064] __netlink_dump_start+0x28e/0x2c0
+[ 2327.021924] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x189/0x1a0 [inet_diag]
+[ 2327.028045] ? inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x1b0/0x1b0 [inet_diag]
+[ 2327.034651] ? inet_diag_dump_compat+0x190/0x190 [inet_diag]
+[ 2327.040965] ? __netlink_lookup+0x1b9/0x260
+[ 2327.045631] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x1e0
+[ 2327.050199] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x180
+[ 2327.054574] ? sock_diag_bind+0x60/0x60
+[ 2327.058850] sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
+[ 2327.062837] netlink_unicast+0x2e7/0x3b0
+[ 2327.067212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x330/0x330
+[ 2327.071975] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
+[ 2327.076544] netlink_sendmsg+0x5be/0x730
+[ 2327.080918] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
+[ 2327.085486] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
+[ 2327.090057] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x24/0x30
+[ 2327.095109] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
+[ 2327.099678] sock_sendmsg+0x74/0x80
+[ 2327.103567] ___sys_sendmsg+0x520/0x530
+[ 2327.107844] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x200
+[ 2327.112510] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x270/0x270
+[ 2327.117660] ? vm_insert_page+0x360/0x360
+[ 2327.122133] ? vm_insert_pfn_prot+0xb4/0x150
+[ 2327.126895] ? vm_insert_pfn+0x32/0x40
+[ 2327.131077] ? vvar_fault+0x71/0xd0
+[ 2327.134968] ? special_mapping_fault+0x69/0x110
+[ 2327.140022] ? __do_fault+0x42/0x120
+[ 2327.144008] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x17a0
+[ 2327.148965] ? __fget_light+0xa7/0xc0
+[ 2327.153049] __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
+[ 2327.157133] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
+[ 2327.161409] ? SyS_shutdown+0x140/0x140
+[ 2327.165688] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd0/0xd0
+[ 2327.170646] ? __do_page_fault+0x55d/0x620
+[ 2327.175216] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
+[ 2327.179591] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
+[ 2327.183384] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
+[ 2327.187471] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
+[ 2327.192622] RIP: 0033:0x7f41d18fa3b0
+[ 2327.196608] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3b731218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+[ 2327.205055] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3b731380 RCX: 00007f41d18fa3b0
+[ 2327.213017] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc3b731340 RDI: 0000000000000003
+[ 2327.220978] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000040
+[ 2327.228939] R10: 00007ffc3b730f30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
+[ 2327.236901] R13: 00007ffc3b731340 R14: 00007ffc3b7313d0 R15: 0000000000000084
+[ 2327.244865] Object at ffff881be87797e0, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
+[ 2327.251953] Allocated:
+[ 2327.254581] PID = 9484
+[ 2327.257215] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
+[ 2327.261485] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
+[ 2327.265179] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
+[ 2327.269165] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe6/0x1d0
+[ 2327.274138] sctp_add_bind_addr+0x58/0x180 [sctp]
+[ 2327.279400] sctp_do_bind+0x208/0x310 [sctp]
+[ 2327.284176] sctp_bind+0x61/0xa0 [sctp]
+[ 2327.288455] inet_bind+0x5f/0x3a0
+[ 2327.292151] SYSC_bind+0x1a4/0x1e0
+[ 2327.295944] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
+[ 2327.299349] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
+[ 2327.303433] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
+[ 2327.308194] Freed:
+[ 2327.310434] PID = 4131
+[ 2327.313065] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
+[ 2327.317344] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
+[ 2327.321040] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
+[ 2327.325220] kfree+0x96/0x1a0
+[ 2327.328530] dynamic_kobj_release+0x15/0x40
+[ 2327.333195] kobject_release+0x99/0x1e0
+[ 2327.337472] kobject_put+0x38/0x70
+[ 2327.341266] free_notes_attrs+0x66/0x80
+[ 2327.345545] mod_sysfs_teardown+0x1a5/0x270
+[ 2327.350211] free_module+0x20/0x2a0
+[ 2327.354099] SyS_delete_module+0x2cb/0x2f0
+[ 2327.358667] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
+[ 2327.362750] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
+[ 2327.367510] Memory state around the buggy address:
+[ 2327.372855] ffff881be8779700: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
+[ 2327.380914] ffff881be8779780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
+[ 2327.388972] >ffff881be8779800: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+[ 2327.397031] ^
+[ 2327.401792] ffff881be8779880: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
+[ 2327.409850] ffff881be8779900: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
+[ 2327.417907] ==================================================================
+
+This fixes CVE-2017-7558.
+
+References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1480266
+Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
+Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
+Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/sctp_diag.c | 7 +++++--
+ net/sctp/socket.c | 3 +--
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c
+@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpladdrs_fill
+
+ info = nla_data(attr);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, address_list, list) {
+- memcpy(info, &laddr->a, addrlen);
++ memcpy(info, &laddr->a, sizeof(laddr->a));
++ memset(info + sizeof(laddr->a), 0, addrlen - sizeof(laddr->a));
+ info += addrlen;
+ }
+
+@@ -93,7 +94,9 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpaddrs_fill(
+ info = nla_data(attr);
+ list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
+ transports) {
+- memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, addrlen);
++ memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(from->ipaddr));
++ memset(info + sizeof(from->ipaddr), 0,
++ addrlen - sizeof(from->ipaddr));
+ info += addrlen;
+ }
+
+--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
++++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
+@@ -4373,8 +4373,7 @@ int sctp_get_sctp_info(struct sock *sk,
+ info->sctpi_ictrlchunks = asoc->stats.ictrlchunks;
+
+ prim = asoc->peer.primary_path;
+- memcpy(&info->sctpi_p_address, &prim->ipaddr,
+- sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
++ memcpy(&info->sctpi_p_address, &prim->ipaddr, sizeof(prim->ipaddr));
+ info->sctpi_p_state = prim->state;
+ info->sctpi_p_cwnd = prim->cwnd;
+ info->sctpi_p_srtt = prim->srtt;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 11:35:21 -0300
+Subject: sctp: fix missing wake ups in some situations
+
+From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 7906b00f5cd1cd484fced7fcda892176e3202c8a ]
+
+Commit fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as
+possible") minimized the number of wake ups that are triggered in case
+the association receives a packet with multiple data chunks on it and/or
+when io_events are enabled and then commit 0970f5b36659 ("sctp: signal
+sk_data_ready earlier on data chunks reception") moved the wake up to as
+soon as possible. It thus relies on the state machine running later to
+clean the flag that the event was already generated.
+
+The issue is that there are 2 call paths that calls
+sctp_ulpq_tail_event() outside of the state machine, causing the flag to
+linger and possibly omitting a needed wake up in the sequence.
+
+One of the call paths is when enabling SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENTS via
+setsockopt(SCTP_EVENTS), as noticed by Harald Welte. The other is when
+partial reliability triggers removal of chunks from the send queue when
+the application calls sendmsg().
+
+This commit fixes it by not setting the flag in case the socket is not
+owned by the user, as it won't be cleaned later. This works for
+user-initiated calls and also for rx path processing.
+
+Fixes: fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible")
+Reported-by: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/ulpqueue.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
++++ b/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
+@@ -265,7 +265,8 @@ int sctp_ulpq_tail_event(struct sctp_ulp
+ sctp_ulpq_clear_pd(ulpq);
+
+ if (queue == &sk->sk_receive_queue && !sp->data_ready_signalled) {
+- sp->data_ready_signalled = 1;
++ if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
++ sp->data_ready_signalled = 1;
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
+ }
+ return 1;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 11:22:33 -0700
+Subject: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
+
+From: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 499350a5a6e7512d9ed369ed63a4244b6536f4f8 ]
+
+When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
+icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
+This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
+__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
+So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
+
+Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -2297,6 +2297,10 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
+ tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
+ tcp_clear_retrans(tp);
+ inet_csk_delack_init(sk);
++ /* Initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS to avoid division by 0
++ * issue in __tcp_select_window()
++ */
++ icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss = TCP_MIN_MSS;
+ tcp_init_send_head(sk);
+ memset(&tp->rx_opt, 0, sizeof(tp->rx_opt));
+ __sk_dst_reset(sk);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 09:39:28 -0700
+Subject: udp: on peeking bad csum, drop packets even if not at head
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit fd6055a806edc4019be1b9fb7d25262599bca5b1 ]
+
+When peeking, if a bad csum is discovered, the skb is unlinked from
+the queue with __sk_queue_drop_skb and the peek operation restarted.
+
+__sk_queue_drop_skb only drops packets that match the queue head.
+
+This fails if the skb was found after the head, using SO_PEEK_OFF
+socket option. This causes an infinite loop.
+
+We MUST drop this problematic skb, and we can simply check if skb was
+already removed by another thread, by looking at skb->next :
+
+This pointer is set to NULL by the __skb_unlink() operation, that might
+have happened only under the spinlock protection.
+
+Many thanks to syzkaller team (and particularly Dmitry Vyukov who
+provided us nice C reproducers exhibiting the lockup) and Willem de
+Bruijn who provided first version for this patch and a test program.
+
+Fixes: 627d2d6b5500 ("udp: enable MSG_PEEK at non-zero offset")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/datagram.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/datagram.c
++++ b/net/core/datagram.c
+@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ int skb_kill_datagram(struct sock *sk, s
+ if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
+ err = -ENOENT;
+ spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+- if (skb == skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
++ if (skb->next) {
+ __skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ atomic_dec(&skb->users);
+ err = 0;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Thu Sep 14 23:20:08 PDT 2017
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 09:22:05 +0800
+Subject: vhost_net: correctly check tx avail during rx busy polling
+
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+
+[ Upstream commit 8b949bef9172ca69d918e93509a4ecb03d0355e0 ]
+
+We check tx avail through vhost_enable_notify() in the past which is
+wrong since it only checks whether or not guest has filled more
+available buffer since last avail idx synchronization which was just
+done by vhost_vq_avail_empty() before. What we really want is checking
+pending buffers in the avail ring. Fix this by calling
+vhost_vq_avail_empty() instead.
+
+This issue could be noticed by doing netperf TCP_RR benchmark as
+client from guest (but not host). With this fix, TCP_RR from guest to
+localhost restores from 1375.91 trans per sec to 55235.28 trans per
+sec on my laptop (Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-5600U CPU @ 2.60GHz).
+
+Fixes: 030881372460 ("vhost_net: basic polling support")
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/vhost/net.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
++++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
+@@ -537,8 +537,13 @@ static int vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(st
+
+ preempt_enable();
+
+- if (vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))
++ if (!vhost_vq_avail_empty(&net->dev, vq))
+ vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
++ else if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
++ vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
++ vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
++ }
++
+ mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
+
+ len = peek_head_len(sk);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
