]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random
authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Wed, 6 Apr 2022 00:36:16 +0000 (02:36 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sat, 25 Jun 2022 09:49:09 +0000 (11:49 +0200)
commit e3c1c4fd9e6d14059ed93ebfe15e1c57793b1a05 upstream.

In 1448769c9cdb ("random: check for signal_pending() outside of
need_resched() check"), Jann pointed out that we previously were only
checking the TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and TIF_SIGPENDING flags if the process
had TIF_NEED_RESCHED set, which meant in practice, super long reads to
/dev/[u]random would delay signal handling by a long time. I tried this
using the below program, and indeed I wasn't able to interrupt a
/dev/urandom read until after several megabytes had been read. The bug
he fixed has always been there, and so code that reads from /dev/urandom
without checking the return value of read() has mostly worked for a long
time, for most sizes, not just for <= 256.

Maybe it makes sense to keep that code working. The reason it was so
small prior, ignoring the fact that it didn't work anyway, was likely
because /dev/random used to block, and that could happen for pretty
large lengths of time while entropy was gathered. But now, it's just a
chacha20 call, which is extremely fast and is just operating on pure
data, without having to wait for some external event. In that sense,
/dev/[u]random is a lot more like /dev/zero.

Taking a page out of /dev/zero's read_zero() function, it always returns
at least one chunk, and then checks for signals after each chunk. Chunk
sizes there are of length PAGE_SIZE. Let's just copy the same thing for
/dev/[u]random, and check for signals and cond_resched() for every
PAGE_SIZE amount of data. This makes the behavior more consistent with
expectations, and should mitigate the impact of Jann's fix for the
age-old signal check bug.

---- test program ----

  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <signal.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <sys/random.h>

  static unsigned char x[~0U];

  static void handle(int) { }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
    pid_t pid = getpid(), child;
    signal(SIGUSR1, handle);
    if (!(child = fork())) {
      for (;;)
        kill(pid, SIGUSR1);
    }
    pause();
    printf("interrupted after reading %zd bytes\n", getrandom(x, sizeof(x), 0));
    kill(child, SIGTERM);
    return 0;
  }

Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/char/random.c

index 17991603ccf88c2c7da852f1c6da594fdb7ade4c..7512caaa70e91b6c20186d1e75013018ea6c3550 100644 (file)
@@ -523,9 +523,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
 static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-       bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
-       ssize_t ret = 0;
-       size_t len;
+       size_t len, left, ret = 0;
        u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
        u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
@@ -537,46 +535,47 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
         * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
         * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
         */
-       crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+       crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
        /*
         * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
         * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
         * the user directly.
         */
-       if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
-               ret = copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes) ? -EFAULT : nbytes;
+       if (nbytes <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
+               ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes);
                goto out_zero_chacha;
        }
 
-       do {
-               if (large_request) {
-                       if (signal_pending(current)) {
-                               if (!ret)
-                                       ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
-                               break;
-                       }
-                       cond_resched();
-               }
-
+       for (;;) {
                chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
                if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
                        ++chacha_state[13];
 
                len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
-               if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) {
-                       ret = -EFAULT;
+               left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len);
+               if (left) {
+                       ret += len - left;
                        break;
                }
 
-               nbytes -= len;
                buf += len;
                ret += len;
-       } while (nbytes);
+               nbytes -= len;
+               if (!nbytes)
+                       break;
+
+               BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
+               if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+                       if (signal_pending(current))
+                               break;
+                       cond_resched();
+               }
+       }
 
        memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
 out_zero_chacha:
        memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
-       return ret;
+       return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
 }
 
 /*