[commit message by YiFei Zhu]
A malicious kernel may control the instruction pointer in SMM in a
multi-processor VM by sending a sequence of IPIs via APIC:
CPU0 CPU1
IPI(CPU1, MODE_INIT)
x86_cpu_exec_reset()
apic_init_reset()
s->wait_for_sipi = true
IPI(CPU1, MODE_SMI)
do_smm_enter()
env->hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
IPI(CPU1, MODE_STARTUP, vector)
do_cpu_sipi()
apic_sipi()
/* s->wait_for_sipi check passes */
cpu_x86_load_seg_cache_sipi(vector)
A different sequence, SMI INIT SIPI, is also buggy in TCG because
INIT is not blocked or latched during SMM. However, it is not
vulnerable to an instruction pointer control in the same way because
x86_cpu_exec_reset clears env->hflags, exiting SMM.
Fixes: a9bad65d2c1f ("target-i386: wake up processors that receive an SMI")
Analyzed-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit
df32e5c568c9cf68c15a9bbd98d0c3aff19eab63)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
{
APICCommonState *s = APIC(dev);
- cpu_reset_interrupt(CPU(s->cpu), CPU_INTERRUPT_SIPI);
-
if (!s->wait_for_sipi)
return;
cpu_x86_load_seg_cache_sipi(s->cpu, s->sipi_vector);
void do_cpu_sipi(X86CPU *cpu)
{
+ CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
+ if (env->hflags & HF_SMM_MASK) {
+ return;
+ }
apic_sipi(cpu->apic_state);
}
apic_poll_irq(cpu->apic_state);
break;
case CPU_INTERRUPT_SIPI:
+ cpu_reset_interrupt(cs, CPU_INTERRUPT_SIPI);
do_cpu_sipi(cpu);
break;
case CPU_INTERRUPT_SMI: