Document remaining configuration options; add a ccheck for redundant authentication...

svn:r2833

diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO
index 6e07c53047d98d6d748591c4a6b6cdd22e8074b4..9b5e34a8bd463f7dc6239f51337cb9890a41dda1 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/TODO
+++ b/doc/TODO
@@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ N  - clients now have certs, which means we warn when their certs have
 R  - fix print_usage()
    - Download and use running-routers
 R  - document signals in man page
-N  - Document all undocumented configuration options.
-     - Accounting
-     - Control interface authentication
-     - ... ?
+N  - Check for hibernation on startup, hup, etc.
+     - Test hibernation a lot.
+   o Document all undocumented configuration options.
+     o Accounting
+     o Control interface authentication
 N  - RPMs
      o Merge changes from jbash
      - Figure out versioning
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ Beyond 0.0.9:
    - controller should have 'getinfo' command to query about rephist,
      about rendezvous status, etc.
    - weasel wants to say 50GB rather than 50000000 in config ints.
+   - Better hibernation flexibility
+     - Add hibernation intervals for weeks, days.
+     - Start at a time other than 0:00 GMT.
    - allow transition from ORPort to !ORPort, and back
 R  . bandwidth buckets for write as well as read.
    - Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.

diff --git a/doc/tor.1.in b/doc/tor.1.in
index a086948df13d8562a12914c95bfb778f8fdef251..cc827588d805bd6a57678cb800a42e7e94bf12d2 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/tor.1.in
+++ b/doc/tor.1.in
@@ -85,6 +85,27 @@ If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. (Default: 0)
 .TP
 \fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
 On startup, setuid to this user.
+.TP
+\fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
+If set, Tor will accept connections from the same machine (localhost only) on
+this port, and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the
+Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt).  Note: unless you also
+specify one of \fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP,
+setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
+control it.
+.TP
+\fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
+Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
+knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP.  You can
+compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
+\fIpassword\fP".
+.TP
+\fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
+If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
+except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
+"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory.  This
+authentication methods should only be used on systems with good filesystem
+security.
 
 .SH CLIENT OPTIONS
 .PP
@@ -223,7 +244,8 @@ If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new o
 Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
 or organization identical or similar to that of the other named servers.
 When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
-will not use them in the same circuit.
+will not use them in the same circuit.  (Each server only need to list the
+other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself.)
 .TP
 \fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
 Set the server's nickname to 'name'.

diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 133dd851834004a21cb57a5148cabdddbbe7af0d..4fa9eae6a1a0b32306e47b9069d3ea6444dcc317 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -1317,6 +1317,11 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *options)
       result = -1;
     }
   }
+  if (options->HashedControlPassword && options->CookieAuthentication) {
+    log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Cannot enable both HashedControlPassword and CookieAuthentication");
+    result = -1;
+  }
+
   if (check_nickname_list(options->ExitNodes, "ExitNodes"))
     result = -1;
   if (check_nickname_list(options->EntryNodes, "EntryNodes"))