Add a couple of sanity-checks for return values that coverity thinks we ought to...

svn:r17485

diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c
index 701012043dc346f7a03f9cb055772bfa869da3d5..7c061d3b4057babf28e0a081164eb2d5a7032cda 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/routerparse.c
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.c
@@ -2552,6 +2552,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_detached_signatures(const char *s, const char *eos)
   }
 
   tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_CONSENSUS_DIGEST);
+  tor_assert(tok);
   if (strlen(tok->args[0]) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
     log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong length on consensus-digest in detached "
              "networkstatus signatures");

diff --git a/src/or/test.c b/src/or/test.c
index c73cf008231ff268fff8b5ae6733671d6c9dfb43..9b05242c408a22b9d2af3038d68c6cbcb3495b7e 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/test.c
+++ b/src/or/test.c
@@ -763,6 +763,7 @@ test_crypto(void)
   memset(data1, 6, 1024);
   for (idx = 0; idx < 10; ++idx) {
     i = base64_encode(data2, 1024, data1, idx);
+    test_assert(i >= 0);
     j = base64_decode(data3, 1024, data2, i);
     test_eq(j,idx);
     test_memeq(data3, data1, idx);