dbus_signature_validate: be sure to use a literal format string

This was not a security vulnerability because
_dbus_validity_to_error_message() doesn't return anything containing
"%", but the compiler can't know that.

Found by adding more _DBUS_GNUC_PRINTF attributes.

Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>

diff --git a/dbus/dbus-signature.c b/dbus/dbus-signature.c
index 6f1521b10df62b1cc4f6e8be02697524bbf3c98d..ef9eca9146a1da7b74dc036c0d99f6c6b65401e4 100644 (file)
--- a/dbus/dbus-signature.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-signature.c
@@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ dbus_signature_validate (const char       *signature,
     return TRUE;
   else
     {
-      dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, _dbus_validity_to_error_message (reason));
+      dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, "%s",
+          _dbus_validity_to_error_message (reason));
       return FALSE;
     }
 }