CLEAR_CACHE=1
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Oldest supported APR/APR-util branches:
- - name: APR 1.4.8, APR-util 1.6.3
+ - name: APR 1.4.8, APR-util 1.3.12
config: --enable-mods-shared=reallyall
env: |
TEST_APR_TARBALL=yes
APR_VERSION=1.4.8
- APU_VERSION=1.6.3
+ APU_VERSION=1.3.12
APU_CONFIG="--with-crypto --with-ldap"
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: Pool-debug
# we need to add the APR includes to CPPFLAGS
apu_ckver_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$apr_config --includes`"
- APACHE_CHECK_APxVER([apu], 1, 6)
+ APACHE_CHECK_APxVER([apu], 1, 3)
CPPFLAGS="$apu_ckver_CPPFLAGS"
else
- APACHE_CHECK_APxVER([apu], 1, 6)
+ APACHE_CHECK_APxVER([apu], 1, 3)
fi
fi
* 20120211.139 (2.4.63-dev) Add dav_get_base_path() to mod_dav
* 20120211.140 (2.4.64-dev) Add ap_set_time_process_request() to scoreboard.h
* 20120211.141 (2.4.64-dev) add ap_stat_check() to httpd.h
+ * 20120211.142 (2.4.64-dev) Add ap_*_timingsafe() to httpd.h
*/
#define MODULE_MAGIC_COOKIE 0x41503234UL /* "AP24" */
#ifndef MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MAJOR
#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MAJOR 20120211
#endif
-#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MINOR 141 /* 0...n */
+#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MINOR 142 /* 0...n */
/**
* Determine if the server's current MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER is at least a
*/
AP_DECLARE(int) ap_rind(const char *str, char c);
+/**
+ * Check whether two buffers of equal size have the same content, using a
+ * constant time algorithm (branch-less with regard to the content of the
+ * buffers and an execution time solely dependent on the number of bytes
+ * compared, not the bytes themselves).
+ *
+ * @param buf1 first buffer to compare
+ * @param buf2 second buffer to compare
+ * @param n number of bytes to compare
+ * @return 1 if equal, 0 otherwise
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_memeq_timingsafe(const void *buf1, const void *buf2,
+ apr_size_t n);
+
+/**
+ * Check whether two NUL-terminated strings have the same content, using a
+ * constant time algorithm (branch-less with regard to the content of the
+ * secret string and an execution time solely dependent on the length of
+ * the non-secret string). The secret string of the two should be set in
+ * the first parameter \c sec1 to avoid leaking its length.
+ *
+ * @param sec1 first string to compare (the secret one)
+ * @param str2 second string to compare
+ * @return 1 if equal, 0 otherwise
+ * @remark The function will compare as much characters as there are in
+ * \c str2, so the length of \c str2 might leak through side channel,
+ * while the length of \c sec1 does not.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_streq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2);
+
+/**
+ * Check whether two NUL-terminated strings have the same content, up to \c n
+ * characters, using a constant time algorithm (branch-less with regard to the
+ * content of the secret string and an execution time solely dependent on the
+ * length of the non-secret string or \c n). The secret string of the two
+ * should be set in the first parameter \c sec1 to avoid leaking its length.
+ *
+ * @param sec1 secret string to compare
+ * @param str2 string to compare with
+ * @param n max number of characters to compare
+ * @return 1 if equal, 0 otherwise
+ * @remark The function will compare as much characters as there are in
+ * \c str2 if it's less than \c n, so the length of \c str2 might
+ * leak through side channel, while the length of \c sec1 does not.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_strneq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2,
+ apr_size_t n);
+
/**
* Given a string, replace any bare " with \\" .
* @param p The pool to allocate memory from
#include "apr_shm.h"
#include "apr_rmm.h"
#include "ap_provider.h"
-#include "apr_crypto.h" /* for apr_crypto_equals */
#include "mod_auth.h"
resp->nonce[NONCE_TIME_LEN] = tmp;
resp->nonce_time = nonce_time.time;
- if (!apr_crypto_equals(hash, resp->nonce+NONCE_TIME_LEN, NONCE_HASH_LEN)) {
+ if (!ap_memeq_timingsafe(hash, resp->nonce+NONCE_TIME_LEN, NONCE_HASH_LEN)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01776)
"invalid nonce %s received - hash is not %s",
resp->nonce, hash);
if (resp->message_qop == NULL) {
/* old (rfc-2069) style digest */
- if (!apr_crypto_equals(resp->digest, old_digest(r, resp), MD5_DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ if (!ap_memeq_timingsafe(old_digest(r, resp), resp->digest, MD5_DIGEST_LEN)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01792)
"user %s: password mismatch: %s", r->user,
r->uri);
/* we failed to allocate a client struct */
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
- if (!apr_crypto_equals(resp->digest, exp_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ if (!ap_memeq_timingsafe(exp_digest, resp->digest, MD5_DIGEST_LEN)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(01794)
"user %s: password mismatch: %s", r->user,
r->uri);
#define AP_SIPHASH_KSIZE APR_SIPHASH_KSIZE
#define ap_siphash24_auth apr_siphash24_auth
-#define ap_crypto_equals apr_crypto_equals
-
#else
#define AP_SIPHASH_DSIZE 8
U64TO8_LE(out, h);
}
-static int ap_crypto_equals(const void *buf1, const void *buf2,
- apr_size_t size)
-{
- const unsigned char *p1 = buf1;
- const unsigned char *p2 = buf2;
- unsigned char diff = 0;
- apr_size_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
- diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i];
- }
-
- return 1 & ((diff - 1) >> 8);
-}
-
#endif
static void compute_auth(const void *src, apr_size_t len,
* the MAC and comparing it (timing safe) with the one in the payload.
*/
compute_auth(slider, len, passphrase, passlen, auth);
- if (!ap_crypto_equals(auth, decoded, AP_SIPHASH_DSIZE)) {
+ if (!ap_memeq_timingsafe(auth, decoded, AP_SIPHASH_DSIZE)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, res, r, APLOGNO(10006)
"auth does not match, skipping");
continue;
return NULL;
}
+
+
+#if APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0)
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_memeq_timingsafe(const void *buf1, const void *buf2,
+ apr_size_t n)
+{
+ return apr_memeq_timingsafe(buf1, buf2, n);
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_streq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2)
+{
+ return apr_streq_timingsafe(sec1, str2);
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_strneq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2,
+ apr_size_t n)
+{
+ return apr_strneq_timingsafe(sec1, str2, n);
+}
+
+#else /* !APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) */
+
+/* A volatile variable which is always zero but allows to block the compiler
+ * from optimizing or eliding code using it. Volatile forces the compiler to
+ * emit a memory load for which no value can be assumed, so for instance an
+ * add/sub/xor/or with "optblocker" is a noop that will hide the result to
+ * the optimizer.
+ */
+static volatile const apr_uint32_t optblocker;
+
+/* Return whether x is not zero, with no branching controlled by x.
+ *
+ * Taken from the cryptoint library (public domain) by D. J. Bernstein,
+ * which provides timing attacks safe integer operations/primitives.
+ * Code:
+ * https://lib.mceliece.org/libmceliece-20250507/cryptoint/crypto_uint32.h
+ * Paper:
+ * https://cr.yp.to/papers/cryptoint-20250424.pdf
+ */
+#if __has_attribute(always_inline)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static APR_INLINE int test_nonzero_timingsafe(apr_uint32_t x)
+{
+ x |= -x; /* sets the most significant bit unless x == 0 */
+
+ /* shift bit 31 (MSB) to bit 0 */
+ x >>= 32-6; /* keep 6 bits */
+ x += optblocker; /* lose the optimizer */
+ x >>= 5; /* keep the (original) MSB only */
+
+ /* x is now 0 or 1 */
+ return x & INT_MAX;
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_memeq_timingsafe(const void *buf1, const void *buf2,
+ apr_size_t n)
+{
+ apr_uint32_t diff = 0;
+ volatile apr_size_t count = n; /* prevent loop unrolling */
+ apr_size_t i = 0;
+
+ for (; i < count; ++i) {
+ const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)buf1)[i];
+ const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)buf2)[i];
+
+ diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */
+ }
+
+ /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */
+ return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1;
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_streq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2)
+{
+ apr_uint32_t diff = 0;
+ apr_size_t i1 = 0, i2 = 0;
+
+ for (;; ++i2) {
+ const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)sec1)[i1];
+ const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)str2)[i2];
+
+ diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */
+
+ /* Not a shortest/longest match because an attacker would usually know
+ * one of the strings and could then determine the length of the other.
+ * So assume only sec1 and its length are secret and stop the loop at
+ * the end of str2. If sec1 is shorter than str2 the loop will continue
+ * by comparing the rest of str2 with the trailing NUL byte of sec1.
+ * In any case since the diff above is computed up to and including a
+ * NUL byte, only the same content and length will raise match.
+ */
+ if (!c2) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't go above sec1's NUL byte */
+ i1 += test_nonzero_timingsafe(c1);
+ }
+
+ /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */
+ return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1;
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_strneq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2,
+ apr_size_t n)
+{
+ apr_uint32_t diff = 0;
+ volatile apr_size_t count = n; /* prevent loop unrolling */
+ apr_size_t i1 = 0, i2 = 0;
+
+ for (; i2 < count; ++i2) {
+ const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)sec1)[i1];
+ const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)str2)[i2];
+
+ diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */
+
+ /* Not a shortest/longest match because an attacker would usually know
+ * one of the strings and could then determine the length of the other.
+ * So assume only sec1 and its length are secret and stop the loop at
+ * the end of str2. If sec1 is shorter than str2 the loop will continue
+ * by comparing the rest of str2 with the trailing NUL byte of sec1.
+ * In any case since the diff above is computed up to and including a
+ * NUL byte, only the same content and length will raise match.
+ */
+ if (!c2) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't go above sec1's NUL byte */
+ i1 += test_nonzero_timingsafe(c1);
+ }
+
+ /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */
+ return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* !APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) */
projects / thirdparty / apache / httpd.git / commitdiff
