x86/bugs: Get rid of the forward declarations

Get rid of the forward declarations of the mitigation functions by
moving their single caller below them.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251105200447.GBaQut3w4dLilZrX-z@fat_crate.local

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6a526ae1fe9933229947db5b7676a18328fe2204..27f68601c94c031baaa75368edd28a2cf7032e63 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -53,53 +53,6 @@
  * mitigation option.
  */
 
-static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init ssb_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mmio_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init bhi_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init its_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init its_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void);
-static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void);
-static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void);
-
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
@@ -233,99 +186,6 @@ static void __init cpu_print_attack_vectors(void)
        }
 }
 
-void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
-{
-       /*
-        * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
-        * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
-        * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
-        */
-       if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
-               rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-
-               /*
-                * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
-                * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
-                * rediscover them based on configuration.
-                */
-               x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
-       }
-
-       x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
-
-       cpu_print_attack_vectors();
-
-       /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
-       spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
-       spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
-       retbleed_select_mitigation();
-       spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
-       ssb_select_mitigation();
-       l1tf_select_mitigation();
-       mds_select_mitigation();
-       taa_select_mitigation();
-       mmio_select_mitigation();
-       rfds_select_mitigation();
-       srbds_select_mitigation();
-       l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
-       srso_select_mitigation();
-       gds_select_mitigation();
-       its_select_mitigation();
-       bhi_select_mitigation();
-       tsa_select_mitigation();
-       vmscape_select_mitigation();
-
-       /*
-        * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
-        * choices.
-        */
-       spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
-       /*
-        * retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
-        * spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
-        * spectre_v2=ibrs.
-        */
-       retbleed_update_mitigation();
-       /*
-        * its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()
-        * and retbleed_update_mitigation().
-        */
-       its_update_mitigation();
-
-       /*
-        * spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on
-        * retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP
-        * selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.
-        */
-       spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
-       mds_update_mitigation();
-       taa_update_mitigation();
-       mmio_update_mitigation();
-       rfds_update_mitigation();
-       bhi_update_mitigation();
-       /* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
-       srso_update_mitigation();
-       vmscape_update_mitigation();
-
-       spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
-       spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
-       retbleed_apply_mitigation();
-       spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
-       ssb_apply_mitigation();
-       l1tf_apply_mitigation();
-       mds_apply_mitigation();
-       taa_apply_mitigation();
-       mmio_apply_mitigation();
-       rfds_apply_mitigation();
-       srbds_apply_mitigation();
-       srso_apply_mitigation();
-       gds_apply_mitigation();
-       its_apply_mitigation();
-       bhi_apply_mitigation();
-       tsa_apply_mitigation();
-       vmscape_apply_mitigation();
-}
-
 /*
  * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM, since Intel uses
  * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for SSBD.
@@ -3376,6 +3236,99 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
        mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
+void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
+{
+       /*
+        * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
+        * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+        * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
+        */
+       if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+               rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+               /*
+                * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
+                * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
+                * rediscover them based on configuration.
+                */
+               x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
+       }
+
+       x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+       cpu_print_attack_vectors();
+
+       /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+       spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+       spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+       retbleed_select_mitigation();
+       spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
+       ssb_select_mitigation();
+       l1tf_select_mitigation();
+       mds_select_mitigation();
+       taa_select_mitigation();
+       mmio_select_mitigation();
+       rfds_select_mitigation();
+       srbds_select_mitigation();
+       l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
+       srso_select_mitigation();
+       gds_select_mitigation();
+       its_select_mitigation();
+       bhi_select_mitigation();
+       tsa_select_mitigation();
+       vmscape_select_mitigation();
+
+       /*
+        * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
+        * choices.
+        */
+       spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
+       /*
+        * retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+        * spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+        * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+        */
+       retbleed_update_mitigation();
+       /*
+        * its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()
+        * and retbleed_update_mitigation().
+        */
+       its_update_mitigation();
+
+       /*
+        * spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on
+        * retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP
+        * selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.
+        */
+       spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
+       mds_update_mitigation();
+       taa_update_mitigation();
+       mmio_update_mitigation();
+       rfds_update_mitigation();
+       bhi_update_mitigation();
+       /* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
+       srso_update_mitigation();
+       vmscape_update_mitigation();
+
+       spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
+       spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
+       retbleed_apply_mitigation();
+       spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
+       ssb_apply_mitigation();
+       l1tf_apply_mitigation();
+       mds_apply_mitigation();
+       taa_apply_mitigation();
+       mmio_apply_mitigation();
+       rfds_apply_mitigation();
+       srbds_apply_mitigation();
+       srso_apply_mitigation();
+       gds_apply_mitigation();
+       its_apply_mitigation();
+       bhi_apply_mitigation();
+       tsa_apply_mitigation();
+       vmscape_apply_mitigation();
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
 #define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"