Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespell

diff --git a/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_kernel_ipsec.c b/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_kernel_ipsec.c
index 591b511a0dcb629595335280e815bf5d067d071c..070154f3e75d11f05c383998c3d2888473753265 100644 (file)
--- a/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_kernel_ipsec.c
+++ b/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_kernel_ipsec.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
 
        /*
         * creation of first CHILD SA:
-        * no nonce and no ke contexts because the ones from the IKE SA are re-used
+        * no nonce and no ke contexts because the ones from the IKE SA are reused
         */
        nonce_loc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map, nonce_loc);
        if (nonce_loc_id == 0 && esa.ke_ids.size == 0)

diff --git a/src/frontends/android/app/src/main/play/release-notes/en-US/default.txt b/src/frontends/android/app/src/main/play/release-notes/en-US/default.txt
index c9d90c16e8d2405de44b6b71b7e01f358cd2648e..3577d2e5abf50951643d2787c3bc8db1b7fa20e0 100644 (file)
--- a/src/frontends/android/app/src/main/play/release-notes/en-US/default.txt
+++ b/src/frontends/android/app/src/main/play/release-notes/en-US/default.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # 2.6.0 #
 
-- Allow pre-selecting a user certificate via alias in managed profiles
+- Allow preselecting a user certificate via alias in managed profiles
 - Allow selecting a user certificate for managed profiles that don't install their own certificate
 - Fix reading split-tunneling settings in managed profiles
 - Adapt to edge-to-edge display, which becomes mandatory when targeting Android 16

diff --git a/src/pki/man/pki---estca.1.in b/src/pki/man/pki---estca.1.in
index 8b2077cc768afa22f0cb747686c609a5eb472fd4..25b70c7f338b24fb933409049968fee50980d438 100644 (file)
--- a/src/pki/man/pki---estca.1.in
+++ b/src/pki/man/pki---estca.1.in
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ Sub CA cert is trusted, valid until Aug 12 15:51:34 2027, 'myca-1.crt'
 .EE
 .PP
 .B NOTE:
-The trusthworthiness of the root CA certificate is either verified automatically
+The trustworthiness of the root CA certificate is either verified automatically
 if the Root CA certificate of the TLS trust chain is the same as that of the
 Issuing CA. Otherwise trust has to be established manually by verifying the SHA256
 or SHA1 fingerprint of the DER-encoded certificate that is e.g. listed on the

diff --git a/src/pki/man/pki---scepca.1.in b/src/pki/man/pki---scepca.1.in
index ea5adac9a060311eeac6222cb1e54d7d7aa28a23..582ceef9eec2b600468ad2ac91e94766d09e0ea4 100644 (file)
--- a/src/pki/man/pki---scepca.1.in
+++ b/src/pki/man/pki---scepca.1.in
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ RA cert "C=CH, O=strongSwan Project, CN=SCEP RA"
 RA cert is trusted, valid until Aug 10 15:51:34 2023, 'myra.crt'
 .EE
 .PP
-The trusthworthiness of the root CA certificate has to be established manually by
+The trustworthiness of the root CA certificate has to be established manually by
 verifying the SHA256 or SHA1 fingerprint of the DER-encoded certificate that is
 e.g. listed on the official PKI website or by some other means.
 .P

diff --git a/src/pki/man/pki.1.in b/src/pki/man/pki.1.in
index 9dddf00614d403316f390a5abb93db78d63fa96c..ea7ba6ea9a0a1bc1cdfcf0a51b5dc7d809e36fa9 100644 (file)
--- a/src/pki/man/pki.1.in
+++ b/src/pki/man/pki.1.in
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ The latest feature is an
 .B Online Certificate Status Protocol
 (OCSP) responder as defined by RFC 6960, interoperating with an
 .B OpenXPKI
-server by directly accessing its internal certificate datebase.
+server by directly accessing its internal certificate database.
 .
 .SH "COMMANDS"
 .