as well and its default value is 100.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--security-policy=<replaceable>PATH</replaceable></option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>With <command>security</command>, allow the user to define a custom set of
+ requirements formatted as a JSON file against which to compare the specified unit file(s)
+ and determine their overall exposure level to security threats.</para>
+
+ <table>
+ <title>Accepted Assessment Test Identifiers</title>
+
+ <tgroup cols='1'>
+ <colspec colname='directive' />
+ <thead>
+ <row>
+ <entry>Assessment Test Identifier</entry>
+ </row>
+ </thead>
+ <tbody>
+ <row>
+ <entry>UserOrDynamicUser</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SupplementaryGroups</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>PrivateMounts</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>PrivateDevices</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>PrivateTmp</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>PrivateNetwork</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>PrivateUsers</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectControlGroups</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectKernelModules</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectKernelTunables</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectKernelLogs</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectClock</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectHome</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectHostname</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectSystem</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RootDirectoryOrRootImage</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>LockPersonality</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>MemoryDenyWriteExecute</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>NoNewPrivileges</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_ADMIN</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SET_UID_GID_PCAP</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PTRACE</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TIME</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_ADMIN</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_RAWIO</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_MODULE</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_AUDIT</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYSLOG</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_NICE_RESOURCE</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MKNOD</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_CHOWN_FSETID_SETFCAP</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_DAC_FOWNER_IPC_OWNER</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_KILL</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE_BROADCAST_RAW</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_BOOT</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MAC</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_IPC_LOCK</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_CHROOT</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_WAKE_ALARM</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LEASE</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>UMask</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>KeyringMode</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProtectProc</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>ProcSubset</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>NotifyAccess</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RemoveIPC</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>Delegate</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictRealtime</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictSUIDSGID</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWUSER</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWNS</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWIPC</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWPID</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWCGROUP</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWUTS</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictNamespaces_CLONE_NEWNET</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_INET_INET6</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_UNIX</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_NETLINK</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_PACKET</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>RestrictAddressFamilies_OTHER</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallArchitectures</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_swap</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_obsolete</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_clock</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_cpu_emulation</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_debug</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_mount</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_module</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_raw_io</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_reboot</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_privileged</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>SystemCallFilter_resources</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>IPAddressDeny</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>DeviceAllow</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>AmbientCapabilities</entry>
+ </row>
+ </tbody>
+ </tgroup>
+ </table>
+
+ <example>
+ <title>JSON Policy</title>
+ <para>The JSON file passed as a path parameter to <option>--security-policy=</option>
+ has a top-level JSON object, with keys being the assessment test identifiers mentioned
+ above. The values in the file should be JSON objects with one or more of the
+ following fields: description_na (string), description_good (string), description_bad
+ (string), weight (unsigned integer), and range (unsigned integer). If any of these fields
+ corresponding to a specific id of the unit file is missing from the JSON object, the
+ default built-in field value corresponding to that same id is used for security analysis
+ as default. The weight and range fields are used in determining the overall exposure level
+ of the unit files so by allowing users to manipulate these fields, 'security' gives them
+ the option to decide for themself which ids are more important and hence, should have a greater
+ effect on the exposure level. </para>
+
+ <programlisting>
+ {
+ "PrivateDevices":
+ {
+ "description_good": "Service has no access to hardware devices",
+ "description_bad": "Service potentially has access to hardware devices",
+ "weight": 1000,
+ "range": 1
+ },
+ "PrivateMounts":
+ {
+ "description_good": "Service cannot install system mounts",
+ "description_bad": "Service may install system mounts",
+ "weight": 1000,
+ "range": 1
+ },
+ "PrivateNetwork":
+ {
+ "description_good": "Service has no access to the host's network",
+ "description_bad": "Service has access to the host's network",
+ "weight": 2500,
+ "range": 1
+ },
+ "PrivateTmp":
+ {
+ "description_good": "Service has no access to other software's temporary files",
+ "description_bad": "Service has access to other software's temporary files",
+ "weight": 1000,
+ "range": 1
+ },
+ "PrivateUsers":
+ {
+ "description_good": "Service does not have access to other users",
+ "description_bad": "Service has access to other users",
+ "weight": 1000,
+ "range": 1
+ }
+ }
+ </programlisting>
+ </example>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--iterations=<replaceable>NUMBER</replaceable></option></term>
static bool arg_generators = false;
static char *arg_root = NULL;
static char *arg_image = NULL;
+static char *arg_security_policy = NULL;
static bool arg_offline = false;
static unsigned arg_threshold = 100;
static unsigned arg_iterations = 1;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_dot_to_patterns, strv_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_root, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_image, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_security_policy, freep);
typedef struct BootTimes {
usec_t firmware_time;
static int do_security(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(sd_bus_flush_close_unrefp) sd_bus *bus = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *policy = NULL;
int r;
+ unsigned line, column;
r = acquire_bus(&bus, NULL);
if (r < 0)
(void) pager_open(arg_pager_flags);
- return analyze_security(bus, strv_skip(argv, 1), arg_scope, arg_man, arg_generators, arg_offline, arg_threshold, arg_root, 0);
+ if (arg_security_policy) {
+ r = json_parse_file(/*f=*/ NULL, arg_security_policy, /*flags=*/ 0, &policy, &line, &column);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse '%s' at %u:%u: %m", arg_security_policy, line, column);
+ } else {
+ _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *pp = NULL;
+
+ r = search_and_fopen_nulstr("systemd-analyze-security.policy", "re", /*root=*/ NULL, CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("systemd"), &f, &pp);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
+ return r;
+
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ r = json_parse_file(f, pp, /*flags=*/ 0, &policy, &line, &column);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "[%s:%u:%u] Failed to parse JSON policy: %m", pp, line, column);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return analyze_security(bus,
+ strv_skip(argv, 1),
+ policy,
+ arg_scope,
+ arg_man,
+ arg_generators,
+ arg_offline,
+ arg_threshold,
+ arg_root,
+ /*flags=*/ 0);
}
static int help(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
" --threshold=N Exit with a non-zero status when overall\n"
" exposure level is over threshold value\n"
" --version Show package version\n"
+ " --security-policy=PATH Use custom JSON security policy instead\n"
+ " of built-in one\n"
" --no-pager Do not pipe output into a pager\n"
" --system Operate on system systemd instance\n"
" --user Operate on user systemd instance\n"
ARG_RECURSIVE_ERRORS,
ARG_OFFLINE,
ARG_THRESHOLD,
+ ARG_SECURITY_POLICY,
};
static const struct option options[] = {
{ "recursive-errors", required_argument, NULL, ARG_RECURSIVE_ERRORS },
{ "offline", required_argument, NULL, ARG_OFFLINE },
{ "threshold", required_argument, NULL, ARG_THRESHOLD },
+ { "security-policy", required_argument, NULL, ARG_SECURITY_POLICY },
{ "system", no_argument, NULL, ARG_SYSTEM },
{ "user", no_argument, NULL, ARG_USER },
{ "global", no_argument, NULL, ARG_GLOBAL },
break;
+ case ARG_SECURITY_POLICY:
+ r = parse_path_argument(optarg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_security_policy);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
+
case ARG_ITERATIONS:
r = safe_atou(optarg, &arg_iterations);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Option --user is not supported for cat-config right now.");
+ if (arg_security_policy && !streq_ptr(argv[optind], "security"))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Option --security-policy= is only supported for security.");
+
if ((arg_root || arg_image) && (!STRPTR_IN_SET(argv[optind], "cat-config", "verify")) &&
(!(streq_ptr(argv[optind], "security") && arg_offline)))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),