[ Upstream commit
5fe71fda89745fc3cd95f70d06e9162b595c3702 ]
On a 32bit system the "keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key)" math could
have an integer wrapping issue. It doesn't matter because the "keylen"
is checked on the next line, but just to make life easier for static
analysis tools, let's re-order these conditions and avoid the integer
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME)));
/* Verify the supplied size values */
- if (unlikely(size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) ||
- keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) {
+ if (unlikely(keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX ||
+ size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key))) {
pr_debug("%s: invalid MSG_CRYPTO key size\n", rx->name);
goto exit;
}