fix the latest bug: don't explode when some router declares a

bandwidthburst of 500 gigabytes.

this bug seems to have taken down most of the network. oops.

svn:r3523

diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 41f8c3f1ec96244b0b67edb3e4d51e0b7b179bd3..a7d29a49dc4353db345a0b69f653d46890a0238a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static config_var_t config_vars[] = {
   VAR("AllowUnverifiedNodes",CSV,      AllowUnverifiedNodes, "middle,rendezvous"),
   VAR("AuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL,   AuthoritativeDir,     "0"),
   VAR("BandwidthRate",       MEMUNIT,  BandwidthRate,        "1 MB"),
-  VAR("BandwidthBurst",      MEMUNIT,  BandwidthBurst,       "48 MB"),
+  VAR("BandwidthBurst",      MEMUNIT,  BandwidthBurst,       "5 MB"),
   VAR("ClientOnly",          BOOL,     ClientOnly,           "0"),
   VAR("ContactInfo",         STRING,   ContactInfo,          NULL),
   VAR("ControlPort",         UINT,     ControlPort,          "0"),
@@ -1414,11 +1414,11 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *options)
     log(LOG_WARN,"BandwidthBurst must be at least equal to BandwidthRate.");
     result = -1;
   }
+#if 0
   if (2*options->BandwidthRate > options->BandwidthBurst) {
     log(LOG_NOTICE,"You have chosen a BandwidthBurst less than twice BandwidthRate. Please consider setting your BandwidthBurst higher (at least %d), to provide better service to the Tor network.", (int)(2*options->BandwidthRate));
-    result = -1;
   }
-
+#endif
 
   if (options->_MonthlyAccountingStart) {
     if (options->AccountingStart) {

diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c
index fb71291ca1c57ac606fe9aea1f3113c212f9c0cb..cf42edba81c8a8f3ec884dfb8ebd8f07fa107a76 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/connection.c
+++ b/src/or/connection.c
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ void connection_bucket_refill(struct timeval *now) {
     conn = carray[i];
 
     if (connection_receiver_bucket_should_increase(conn)) {
-      conn->receiver_bucket += conn->bandwidth;
+      conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth;
       //log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Receiver bucket %d now %d.", i, conn->receiver_bucket);
     }
 
@@ -848,8 +848,7 @@ static int connection_receiver_bucket_should_increase(connection_t *conn) {
   if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
     return 0; /* only open connections play the rate limiting game */
 
-  tor_assert(conn->bandwidth > 0);
-  if (conn->receiver_bucket > 9*conn->bandwidth)
+  if (conn->receiver_bucket >= conn->bandwidth)
     return 0;
 
   return 1;

diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index 98c1f3bcb8516741b7cafe60956fd3b91b5c4f74..aa0e624efc1ee6f9d8df3c0740823d8f251077fc 100644 (file)
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -114,9 +114,11 @@ int connection_or_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn)
  */
 static void
 connection_or_init_conn_from_router(connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *router) {
+  or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
   conn->addr = router->addr;
   conn->port = router->or_port;
-  conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = router->bandwidthburst;
+  conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
   conn->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(router->identity_pkey);
   crypto_pk_get_digest(conn->identity_pkey, conn->identity_digest);
   conn->nickname = tor_strdup(router->nickname);