--- /dev/null
+From 977ad86c2a1bcaf58f01ab98df5cc145083c489c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 15:32:41 +0200
+Subject: dccp: Fix out of bounds access in DCCP error handler
+
+From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+
+commit 977ad86c2a1bcaf58f01ab98df5cc145083c489c upstream.
+
+There was a previous attempt to fix an out-of-bounds access in the DCCP
+error handlers, but that fix assumed that the error handlers only want
+to access the first 8 bytes of the DCCP header. Actually, they also look
+at the DCCP sequence number, which is stored beyond 8 bytes, so an
+explicit pskb_may_pull() is required.
+
+Fixes: 6706a97fec96 ("dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v4_err()")
+Fixes: 1aa9d1a0e7ee ("ipv6: dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v6_err()")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/dccp/ipv4.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ net/dccp/ipv6.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+@@ -243,12 +243,17 @@ static int dccp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *s
+ int err;
+ struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
+
+- /* Only need dccph_dport & dccph_sport which are the first
+- * 4 bytes in dccp header.
++ /* For the first __dccp_basic_hdr_len() check, we only need dh->dccph_x,
++ * which is in byte 7 of the dccp header.
+ * Our caller (icmp_socket_deliver()) already pulled 8 bytes for us.
++ *
++ * Later on, we want to access the sequence number fields, which are
++ * beyond 8 bytes, so we have to pskb_may_pull() ourselves.
+ */
+- BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct dccp_hdr, dccph_sport) > 8);
+- BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct dccp_hdr, dccph_dport) > 8);
++ dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
++ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + __dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh)))
++ return -EINVAL;
++ iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
+ dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
+
+ sk = __inet_lookup_established(net, &dccp_hashinfo,
+--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequenc
+ static int dccp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
+ u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
+ {
+- const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
++ const struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
+ const struct dccp_hdr *dh;
+ struct dccp_sock *dp;
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
+@@ -76,12 +76,17 @@ static int dccp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *s
+ __u64 seq;
+ struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
+
+- /* Only need dccph_dport & dccph_sport which are the first
+- * 4 bytes in dccp header.
++ /* For the first __dccp_basic_hdr_len() check, we only need dh->dccph_x,
++ * which is in byte 7 of the dccp header.
+ * Our caller (icmpv6_notify()) already pulled 8 bytes for us.
++ *
++ * Later on, we want to access the sequence number fields, which are
++ * beyond 8 bytes, so we have to pskb_may_pull() ourselves.
+ */
+- BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct dccp_hdr, dccph_sport) > 8);
+- BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct dccp_hdr, dccph_dport) > 8);
++ dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
++ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + __dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh)))
++ return -EINVAL;
++ hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
+ dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
+
+ sk = __inet6_lookup_established(net, &dccp_hashinfo,
--- /dev/null
+From 7c53e847ff5e97f033fdd31f71949807633d506b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 16:51:42 -0400
+Subject: dlm: fix plock lookup when using multiple lockspaces
+
+From: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
+
+commit 7c53e847ff5e97f033fdd31f71949807633d506b upstream.
+
+All posix lock ops, for all lockspaces (gfs2 file systems) are
+sent to userspace (dlm_controld) through a single misc device.
+The dlm_controld daemon reads the ops from the misc device
+and sends them to other cluster nodes using separate, per-lockspace
+cluster api communication channels. The ops for a single lockspace
+are ordered at this level, so that the results are received in
+the same sequence that the requests were sent. When the results
+are sent back to the kernel via the misc device, they are again
+funneled through the single misc device for all lockspaces. When
+the dlm code in the kernel processes the results from the misc
+device, these results will be returned in the same sequence that
+the requests were sent, on a per-lockspace basis. A recent change
+in this request/reply matching code missed the "per-lockspace"
+check (fsid comparison) when matching request and reply, so replies
+could be incorrectly matched to requests from other lockspaces.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Barry Marson <bmarson@redhat.com>
+Fixes: 57e2c2f2d94c ("fs: dlm: fix mismatch of plock results from userspace")
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/dlm/plock.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/dlm/plock.c
++++ b/fs/dlm/plock.c
+@@ -466,7 +466,8 @@ static ssize_t dev_write(struct file *fi
+ }
+ } else {
+ list_for_each_entry(iter, &recv_list, list) {
+- if (!iter->info.wait) {
++ if (!iter->info.wait &&
++ iter->info.fsid == info.fsid) {
+ op = iter;
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -478,8 +479,7 @@ static ssize_t dev_write(struct file *fi
+ if (info.wait)
+ WARN_ON(op->info.optype != DLM_PLOCK_OP_LOCK);
+ else
+- WARN_ON(op->info.fsid != info.fsid ||
+- op->info.number != info.number ||
++ WARN_ON(op->info.number != info.number ||
+ op->info.owner != info.owner ||
+ op->info.optype != info.optype);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 919dc320956ea353a7fb2d84265195ad5ef525ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 21:03:53 -0700
+Subject: fsverity: skip PKCS#7 parser when keyring is empty
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit 919dc320956ea353a7fb2d84265195ad5ef525ac upstream.
+
+If an fsverity builtin signature is given for a file but the
+".fs-verity" keyring is empty, there's no real reason to run the PKCS#7
+parser. Skip this to avoid the PKCS#7 attack surface when builtin
+signature support is configured into the kernel but is not being used.
+
+This is a hardening improvement, not a fix per se, but I've added
+Fixes and Cc stable to get it out to more users.
+
+Fixes: 432434c9f8e1 ("fs-verity: support builtin file signatures")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230820173237.2579-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/verity/signature.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/verity/signature.c
++++ b/fs/verity/signature.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,22 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const stru
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
++ if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree == 0) {
++ /*
++ * The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures
++ * being supported by the kernel but not actually being used.
++ * In this case, verify_pkcs7_signature() would always return an
++ * error, usually ENOKEY. It could also be EBADMSG if the
++ * PKCS#7 is malformed, but that isn't very important to
++ * distinguish. So, just skip to ENOKEY to avoid the attack
++ * surface of the PKCS#7 parser, which would otherwise be
++ * reachable by any task able to execute FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
++ */
++ fsverity_err(inode,
++ "fs-verity keyring is empty, rejecting signed file!");
++ return -ENOKEY;
++ }
++
+ d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!d)
+ return -ENOMEM;
--- /dev/null
+From a4f39c9f14a634e4cd35fcd338c239d11fcc73fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 15:41:02 +0200
+Subject: net: handle ARPHRD_PPP in dev_is_mac_header_xmit()
+
+From: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+
+commit a4f39c9f14a634e4cd35fcd338c239d11fcc73fc upstream.
+
+The goal is to support a bpf_redirect() from an ethernet device (ingress)
+to a ppp device (egress).
+The l2 header is added automatically by the ppp driver, thus the ethernet
+header should be removed.
+
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 27b29f63058d ("bpf: add bpf_redirect() helper")
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+Tested-by: Siwar Zitouni <siwar.zitouni@6wind.com>
+Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/if_arp.h | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/include/linux/if_arp.h
++++ b/include/linux/if_arp.h
+@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ static inline bool dev_is_mac_header_xmi
+ case ARPHRD_NONE:
+ case ARPHRD_RAWIP:
+ case ARPHRD_PIMREG:
++ /* PPP adds its l2 header automatically in ppp_start_xmit().
++ * This makes it look like an l3 device to __bpf_redirect() and tcf_mirred_init().
++ */
++ case ARPHRD_PPP:
+ return false;
+ default:
+ return true;
--- /dev/null
+From fe8c3623ab06603eb760444a032d426542212021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Enlin Mu <enlin.mu@unisoc.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 14:04:32 +0800
+Subject: pstore/ram: Check start of empty przs during init
+
+From: Enlin Mu <enlin.mu@unisoc.com>
+
+commit fe8c3623ab06603eb760444a032d426542212021 upstream.
+
+After commit 30696378f68a ("pstore/ram: Do not treat empty buffers as
+valid"), initialization would assume a prz was valid after seeing that
+the buffer_size is zero (regardless of the buffer start position). This
+unchecked start value means it could be outside the bounds of the buffer,
+leading to future access panics when written to:
+
+ sysdump_panic_event+0x3b4/0x5b8
+ atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x54/0x90
+ panic+0x1c8/0x42c
+ die+0x29c/0x2a8
+ die_kernel_fault+0x68/0x78
+ __do_kernel_fault+0x1c4/0x1e0
+ do_bad_area+0x40/0x100
+ do_translation_fault+0x68/0x80
+ do_mem_abort+0x68/0xf8
+ el1_da+0x1c/0xc0
+ __raw_writeb+0x38/0x174
+ __memcpy_toio+0x40/0xac
+ persistent_ram_update+0x44/0x12c
+ persistent_ram_write+0x1a8/0x1b8
+ ramoops_pstore_write+0x198/0x1e8
+ pstore_console_write+0x94/0xe0
+ ...
+
+To avoid this, also check if the prz start is 0 during the initialization
+phase. If not, the next prz sanity check case will discover it (start >
+size) and zap the buffer back to a sane state.
+
+Fixes: 30696378f68a ("pstore/ram: Do not treat empty buffers as valid")
+Cc: Yunlong Xing <yunlong.xing@unisoc.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Enlin Mu <enlin.mu@unisoc.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230801060432.1307717-1-yunlong.xing@unisoc.com
+[kees: update commit log with backtrace and clarifications]
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/pstore/ram_core.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c
++++ b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c
+@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static int persistent_ram_post_init(stru
+ sig ^= PERSISTENT_RAM_SIG;
+
+ if (prz->buffer->sig == sig) {
+- if (buffer_size(prz) == 0) {
++ if (buffer_size(prz) == 0 && buffer_start(prz) == 0) {
+ pr_debug("found existing empty buffer\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
procfs-block-chmod-on-proc-thread-self-comm.patch
parisc-fix-proc-cpuinfo-output-for-lscpu.patch
bpf-fix-issue-in-verifying-allow_ptr_leaks.patch
+dlm-fix-plock-lookup-when-using-multiple-lockspaces.patch
+dccp-fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-dccp-error-handler.patch
+x.509-if-signature-is-unsupported-skip-validation.patch
+net-handle-arphrd_ppp-in-dev_is_mac_header_xmit.patch
+fsverity-skip-pkcs-7-parser-when-keyring-is-empty.patch
+pstore-ram-check-start-of-empty-przs-during-init.patch
--- /dev/null
+From ef5b52a631f8c18353e80ccab8408b963305510c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thore Sommer <public@thson.de>
+Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 14:29:42 +0300
+Subject: X.509: if signature is unsupported skip validation
+
+From: Thore Sommer <public@thson.de>
+
+commit ef5b52a631f8c18353e80ccab8408b963305510c upstream.
+
+When the hash algorithm for the signature is not available the digest size
+is 0 and the signature in the certificate is marked as unsupported.
+
+When validating a self-signed certificate, this needs to be checked,
+because otherwise trying to validate the signature will fail with an
+warning:
+
+Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
+WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:537 \
+pkcs1pad_verify+0x46/0x12c
+...
+Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-22)
+
+Signed-off-by: Thore Sommer <public@thson.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
+Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4ab7 ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier")
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x5
+ if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
++ if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
++ ret = 0;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
