--- /dev/null
+From e4ced82deb5fb17222fb82e092c3f8311955b585 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
+Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:55:45 +0100
+Subject: ARM: 9213/1: Print message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once
+
+From: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
+
+commit e4ced82deb5fb17222fb82e092c3f8311955b585 upstream.
+
+Print the message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once. The
+message is printed each time CPU goes out from idling state on NVIDIA
+Tegra boards, causing storm in KMSG that makes system unusable.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
+Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
++++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+@@ -110,8 +110,7 @@ static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_w
+ #else
+ static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
+ {
+- pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n",
+- smp_processor_id());
++ pr_info_once("Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n");
+
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 820b8963adaea34a87abbecb906d1f54c0aabfb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 10:50:40 -0400
+Subject: net: sock: tracing: Fix sock_exceed_buf_limit not to dereference stale pointer
+
+From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+
+commit 820b8963adaea34a87abbecb906d1f54c0aabfb7 upstream.
+
+The trace event sock_exceed_buf_limit saves the prot->sysctl_mem pointer
+and then dereferences it in the TP_printk() portion. This is unsafe as the
+TP_printk() portion is executed at the time the buffer is read. That is,
+it can be seconds, minutes, days, months, even years later. If the proto
+is freed, then this dereference will can also lead to a kernel crash.
+
+Instead, save the sysctl_mem array into the ring buffer and have the
+TP_printk() reference that instead. This is the proper and safe way to
+read pointers in trace events.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220706052130.16368-12-kuniyu@amazon.com/
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 3847ce32aea9f ("core: add tracepoints for queueing skb to rcvbuf")
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/trace/events/sock.h | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/trace/events/sock.h
++++ b/include/trace/events/sock.h
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit,
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __array(char, name, 32)
+- __field(long *, sysctl_mem)
++ __array(long, sysctl_mem, 3)
+ __field(long, allocated)
+ __field(int, sysctl_rmem)
+ __field(int, rmem_alloc)
+@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit,
+
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ strncpy(__entry->name, prot->name, 32);
+- __entry->sysctl_mem = prot->sysctl_mem;
++ __entry->sysctl_mem[0] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[0]);
++ __entry->sysctl_mem[1] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[1]);
++ __entry->sysctl_mem[2] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[2]);
+ __entry->allocated = allocated;
+ __entry->sysctl_rmem = prot->sysctl_rmem[0];
+ __entry->rmem_alloc = atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
--- /dev/null
+From 5924e6ec1585445f251ea92713eb15beb732622a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:54:01 +0900
+Subject: nilfs2: fix incorrect masking of permission flags for symlinks
+
+From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+
+commit 5924e6ec1585445f251ea92713eb15beb732622a upstream.
+
+The permission flags of newly created symlinks are wrongly dropped on
+nilfs2 with the current umask value even though symlinks should have 777
+(rwxrwxrwx) permissions:
+
+ $ umask
+ 0022
+ $ touch file && ln -s file symlink; ls -l file symlink
+ -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 0 Jun 23 16:29 file
+ lrwxr-xr-x. 1 root root 4 Jun 23 16:29 symlink -> file
+
+This fixes the bug by inserting a missing check that excludes
+symlinks.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1655974441-5612-1-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Tommy Pettersson <ptp@lysator.liu.se>
+Reported-by: Ciprian Craciun <ciprian.craciun@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h
++++ b/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h
+@@ -212,6 +212,9 @@ static inline int nilfs_acl_chmod(struct
+
+ static inline int nilfs_init_acl(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+ {
++ if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
++ return 0;
++
+ inode->i_mode &= ~current_umask();
+ return 0;
+ }
arm64-entry-restore-tramp_map_kernel-isb.patch
alsa-hda-add-fixup-for-dell-latitidue-e5430.patch
+xen-netback-avoid-entering-xenvif_rx_next_skb-with-an-empty-rx-queue.patch
+net-sock-tracing-fix-sock_exceed_buf_limit-not-to-dereference-stale-pointer.patch
+arm-9213-1-print-message-about-disabled-spectre-workarounds-only-once.patch
+nilfs2-fix-incorrect-masking-of-permission-flags-for-symlinks.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 94e8100678889ab428e68acadf042de723f094b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 15:53:22 +0200
+Subject: xen/netback: avoid entering xenvif_rx_next_skb() with an empty rx queue
+
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+commit 94e8100678889ab428e68acadf042de723f094b9 upstream.
+
+xenvif_rx_next_skb() is expecting the rx queue not being empty, but
+in case the loop in xenvif_rx_action() is doing multiple iterations,
+the availability of another skb in the rx queue is not being checked.
+
+This can lead to crashes:
+
+[40072.537261] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
+[40072.537407] IP: xenvif_rx_skb+0x23/0x590 [xen_netback]
+[40072.537534] PGD 0 P4D 0
+[40072.537644] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
+[40072.537749] CPU: 0 PID: 12505 Comm: v1-c40247-q2-gu Not tainted 4.12.14-122.121-default #1 SLE12-SP5
+[40072.537867] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 11/23/2021
+[40072.537999] task: ffff880433b38100 task.stack: ffffc90043d40000
+[40072.538112] RIP: e030:xenvif_rx_skb+0x23/0x590 [xen_netback]
+[40072.538217] RSP: e02b:ffffc90043d43de0 EFLAGS: 00010246
+[40072.538319] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90043cd7cd0 RCX: 00000000000000f7
+[40072.538430] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffc90043d43df8
+[40072.538531] RBP: 000000000000003f R08: 000077ff80000000 R09: 0000000000000008
+[40072.538644] R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 00000000000008f6 R12: ffffc90043ce2708
+[40072.538745] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90043d43ed0 R15: ffff88043ea748c0
+[40072.538861] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880484600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+[40072.538988] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+[40072.539088] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 0000000407ac8000 CR4: 0000000000040660
+[40072.539211] Call Trace:
+[40072.539319] xenvif_rx_action+0x71/0x90 [xen_netback]
+[40072.539429] xenvif_kthread_guest_rx+0x14a/0x29c [xen_netback]
+
+Fix that by stopping the loop in case the rx queue becomes empty.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 98f6d57ced73 ("xen-netback: process guest rx packets in batches")
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713135322.19616-1-jgross@suse.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
+@@ -482,6 +482,7 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif_queu
+ queue->rx_copy.completed = &completed_skbs;
+
+ while (xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available(queue) &&
++ !skb_queue_empty(&queue->rx_queue) &&
+ work_done < RX_BATCH_SIZE) {
+ xenvif_rx_skb(queue);
+ work_done++;
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
