Github: OpenVPN/openvpn#1044
This has also been reported twice as a security relevant bug, but
only later than the original finding - and it isn't.
While --client-nat would modify a 32bit integer "after the packet"
(the place where an IPv4 address would be, in a well-formed packet),
the underlying buffer is always max-frame sized, and we never look
at the "modified integer" afterwards, so there are no consequences
warranting allocation of a CVE ID.
Signed-off-by: rootvector2 <dxbnaveed.k@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne-openvpn@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@mandelbit.com>
Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1789
Reported-By: 章鱼哥 (www.aipyaipy.com)
Reported-By: Yu Zhang Wong <wongyuzhang45@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I8219c6295acf28ff10ddb2fcc285f813c42fa8fe
Message-Id: <
20260715202210.9010-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg37652.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
if (proto == htons(OPENVPN_ETH_P_8021Q))
{
const struct openvpn_8021qhdr *evh;
- if (BLENZ(buf) < sizeof(struct openvpn_ethhdr) + sizeof(struct openvpn_iphdr))
+ if (BLENZ(buf) < sizeof(struct openvpn_8021qhdr) + sizeof(struct openvpn_iphdr))
{
return false;
}