/*
* We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data
- * point to the same area
+ * points to the same area
*/
if (!mem_equal_const_time(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv2.hash, hash_size)) {
/*
* We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data
- * point to the same area
+ * points to the same area
*/
if (!mem_equal_const_time(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv3.hash, hash_size)) {
* will be stored. There is only one active encryption key per domain,
* it is pointed at with G$BCKUPKEY_P in the LSA secrets store.
*
- * The potentially multiple valid decryptiong keys (and the encryption
+ * The potentially multiple valid decryption keys (and the encryption
* key) are in turn stored in the LSA secrets store as
* G$BCKUPKEY_keyGuidString.
*
bool is_schema_nc = getnc_state->is_schema_nc;
uint64_t highest_usn = getnc_state->min_usn;
- /* make dsdb sytanx context for conversions */
+ /* make dsdb syntax context for conversions */
dsdb_syntax_ctx_init(&syntax_ctx, sam_ctx, schema);
syntax_ctx.is_schema_nc = is_schema_nc;
}
if (req10->replica_flags & DRSUAPI_DRS_FULL_SYNC_PACKET) {
- /* Ignore the _in_ uptpdateness vector*/
+ /* Ignore the _in_ uptodateness vector*/
req10->uptodateness_vector = NULL;
}
* We need to make sure that we never return the
* same highwatermark within the same replication
* cycle more than once. Otherwise we cannot detect
- * when the client uses an unexptected highwatermark.
+ * when the client uses an unexpected highwatermark.
*
* This is a HACK which is needed because our
* object ordering is wrong and set tmp_highest_usn