include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq
-PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION:=2.92
+PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION:=2.93
PKG_VERSION:=$(subst test,~~test,$(subst rc,~rc,$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION)))
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION).tar.xz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/
-PKG_HASH:=4bf50c2c1018f9fbc26037df51b90ecea0cb73d46162846763b92df0d6c3a458
+PKG_HASH:=0c00d4e5c97c8306e5fb932b348b34269c9c29a0e7df0e8e82958b407092bc19
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
+++ /dev/null
-commit ec2fbfbbdaa7d7db1c707dce26ce1a37cfe09660
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Fri Apr 10 16:29:31 2026 +0100
-
- Fix buffer overflow in struct bigname. CVE-2026-2291
-
- All buffers capable of holding a domain name should be
- at least MAXDNAME*2 + 1 bytes long, where MAXDNAME is the maximum
- size of a domain name. The accounts for the trailing zero and the
- fact that some characters are escaped in the internal representation
- of a domain name in dnsmasq.
-
- The declaration of struct bigname get this wrong, with the effect
- that a remote attacker capable of asking DNS queries or answering DNS
- queries can cause a large OOB write in the heap.
-
- This was first spotted by Andrew S. Fasano.
-
---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
-+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ struct interface_name {
- };
-
- union bigname {
-- char name[MAXDNAME];
-+ char name[(2*MAXDNAME) + 1];
- union bigname *next; /* freelist */
- };
-
+++ /dev/null
-commit 4fdb707633afe8028118bcaf39b4882f634b5999
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Fri Apr 10 16:24:02 2026 +0100
-
- Fix NSEC bitmap parsing infinite loop. CVE-2026-4890
-
- Report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>.
-
- Location: dnssec.c:1290-1306, dnssec.c:1450-1463
-
- The bitmap window iteration advances by p[1] instead of p[1]+2
- (missing the 2-byte window header). With bitmap_length=0, both rdlen and p are
- unchanged, causing an infinite loop and dnsmasq stops responding to all queries.
-
- Reachable before RRSIG validation
- (confirmed by the source comment at line 2125), so no valid
- DNSSEC signatures are needed.
-
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1344,8 +1344,8 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(stru
- break; /* finished checking */
- }
-
-- rdlen -= p[1];
-- p += p[1];
-+ rdlen -= p[1] + 2;
-+ p += p[1] + 2;
- }
-
- return 0;
-@@ -1508,8 +1508,8 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct d
- break; /* finished checking */
- }
-
-- rdlen -= p[1];
-- p += p[1];
-+ rdlen -= p[1] + 2;
-+ p += p[1] + 2;
- }
-
- return 1;
+++ /dev/null
-commit 2cacea42e4d45717bd0ce3ccfe8e78960245e5da
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Wed Mar 25 23:04:08 2026 +0000
-
- Verify rdlen field in RRSIG packets. CVE-2026-4891
-
- Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
-
- This avoids crafted packets which give a value for rdlen _less_
- then the space taken up by the fixed data and the signer's name
- and engender a negative calculated length for the signature.
-
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -546,10 +546,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
-
- *ttl_out = ttl;
- }
--
-+
-+ /* Don't trust rdlen not to be too small and give us a negative sig_len
-+ It has already been checked that it doesn't run us off the end
-+ of the packet. */
-+ if ((sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav)) <= 0)
-+ return STAT_BOGUS;
-+
- sig = p;
-- sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav);
--
- nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl);
-
- hash->update(ctx, 18, psav);
+++ /dev/null
-commit 011a36c51438c986535a7248ed2e7f424f8e1078
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Wed Mar 25 23:16:35 2026 +0000
-
- Fix buffer overflow in helper.c with large CLIDs. CVE-2026-4892
-
- Bug reported bt Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
-
- Location: helper.c:265-270
- DHCPv6 CLIDs can be up to 65535 bytes. When --dhcp-script is configured,
- the helper hex-encodes raw CLID bytes via sprintf("%.2x") into daemon->packet (5131 bytes).
- A 1000-byte CLID writes ~3000 bytes. The helper process retains root privileges.
-
- Note: log6_packet() correctly caps CLID to 100 bytes for logging, but the helper code path was missed.
-
---- a/src/helper.c
-+++ b/src/helper.c
-@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ int create_helper(int event_fd, int err_
- data.hostname_len + data.ed_len + data.clid_len, RW_READ))
- continue;
-
-- /* CLID into packet */
-- for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len; i++)
-+ /* CLID into packet: limit to 100 bytes to avoid overflowing buffer. */
-+ for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len && i < 100; i++)
- {
- p += sprintf(p, "%.2x", buf[i]);
- if (i != data.clid_len - 1)
+++ /dev/null
-commit 434d68f2eb1a58744470698483a3ae09b5a9a870
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Wed Mar 25 23:22:37 2026 +0000
-
- Fix broken client subnet validation. CVE-2026-4893
-
- Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
-
- Location: forward.c:713, edns0.c:421
-
- With --add-subnet enabled, process_reply() passes the OPT record
- length (~23 bytes) instead of the packet length to check_source().
- All internal bounds checks fail, and the function always returns 1.
- ECS source validation per RFC 7871 Section 9.2 is completely bypassed.
-
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_h
- /* Get extended RCODE. */
- rcode |= sizep[2] << 4;
-
-- if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, plen, pheader, query_source))
-+ if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, n, pheader, query_source))
- {
- my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet option mismatch"));
- return 0;
+++ /dev/null
-commit fa3c8ddef6712b52f562813317e6a997e1210123
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Mon Mar 30 16:24:33 2026 +0100
-
- Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in extract_addresses() CVE-2026-5172
-
- Thanks to Hugo Martinez Ray for spotting this.
-
- The value of rdlen for an RR can be a lie, allowing the
- call to extract_name() at rfc1025.c:952 to advance the value of p1
- past the calculated end of the record. The makes the calculation
- of bytes remaining in the RR underflow to a huge number and results
- in a massive heap OOB read and certain crash.
-
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -943,7 +943,8 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header
- /* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
- int len;
-
-- if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
-+ /* rdlen may lie, and extract_name() advances p1 past where it says the record ends. */
-+ if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) || (p1 > endrr))
- {
- blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
- return 2;
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
+@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
int inotifyfd;
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK)
#elif defined(HAVE_BSD_NETWORK)
int dhcp_raw_fd, dhcp_icmp_fd, routefd;
#endif
-@@ -1519,9 +1519,6 @@ int read_write(int fd, unsigned char *pa
+@@ -1544,9 +1544,6 @@ int read_writev(int fd, struct iovec *io
void close_fds(long max_fd, int spare1, int spare2, int spare3);
int wildcard_match(const char* wildcard, const char* match);
int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard, const char* match, int num);
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to update ipset %s: %s"), setname, strerror(errno));
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
-@@ -930,22 +930,3 @@ int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard
-
+@@ -928,25 +928,6 @@ int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard
return (!num) || (*wildcard == *match);
}
--
+
-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
-int kernel_version(void)
-{
- return version * 256 + (split ? atoi(split) : 0);
-}
-#endif
+-
+ #define hash_ptr(x) (((uintptr_t)(x)) & 0xffffff)
+
+ void *whine_malloc_real(const char *func, unsigned int line, size_t size)
--- a/src/dnsmasq.c
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.c
-@@ -2123,6 +2123,10 @@ static void do_tcp_connection(struct lis
+@@ -2184,6 +2184,10 @@ static void do_tcp_connection(struct lis
daemon->pipe_to_parent = pipefd[1];
}
Reset that here. */
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -1722,14 +1722,26 @@ void emit_dbus_signal(int action, struct
+@@ -1747,14 +1747,26 @@ void emit_dbus_signal(int action, struct
/* ubus.c */
#ifdef HAVE_UBUS
/* EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT -> extract name
EXTR_NAME_COMPARE -> compare name, case insensitive
-@@ -444,10 +446,65 @@ int private_net6(struct in6_addr *a, int
+@@ -452,10 +454,65 @@ int private_net6(struct in6_addr *a, int
((u32 *)a)[0] == htonl(0x20010db8); /* RFC 6303 4.6 */
}
int done = 0;
if (!(p = skip_questions(header, qlen)))
-@@ -464,7 +521,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
+@@ -472,7 +529,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
GETSHORT(qclass, p);
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
if (qclass == C_IN && qtype == T_A)
-@@ -475,6 +532,9 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
+@@ -483,6 +540,9 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, qlen, INADDRSZ))
return done;
/* alignment */
memcpy(&addr.addr4, p, INADDRSZ);
-@@ -504,6 +564,14 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
+@@ -512,6 +572,14 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header,
break;
}
}
projects / thirdparty / openwrt.git / commitdiff
