From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 17:37:57 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 6.1-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v4.14.321~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=0c8a28074f48343246b66c67f7c375ab8a04df01;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 6.1-stable patches added patches: arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch loongarch-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch mm-move-mm_cachep-initialization-to-mm_init.patch series sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch x86-bugs-increase-the-x86-bugs-vector-size-to-two-u32s.patch x86-cpu-kvm-add-support-for-cpuid_80000021_eax.patch x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch x86-fix-backwards-merge-of-gds-srso-bit.patch x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch x86-init-initialize-signal-frame-size-late.patch x86-mem_encrypt-unbreak-the-amd_mem_encrypt-n-build.patch x86-mm-fix-poking_init-for-xen-pv-guests.patch x86-mm-initialize-text-poking-earlier.patch x86-mm-use-mm_alloc-in-poking_init.patch x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch x86-srso-add-a-forgotten-noendbr-annotation.patch x86-srso-add-a-speculative-ras-overflow-mitigation.patch x86-srso-add-ibpb-on-vmexit.patch x86-srso-add-ibpb.patch x86-srso-add-ibpb_brtype-support.patch x86-srso-add-srso_no-support.patch x86-srso-fix-return-thunks-in-generated-code.patch x86-srso-tie-sbpb-bit-setting-to-microcode-patch-detection.patch x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch xen-netback-fix-buffer-overrun-triggered-by-unusual-packet.patch --- diff --git a/queue-6.1/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7ab3863370e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From d378b84c6a240a6c69263265e13d24a207624b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: ARM: cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit ee31bb0524a2e7c99b03f50249a411cc1eaa411f upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.078124882@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 4 ---- + arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c | 3 ++- + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config ARM + select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T + select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE if HAVE_KRETPROBES && FRAME_POINTER && !ARM_UNWIND + select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER + select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_DMA_WRITE_COMBINE if !ARM_DMA_MEM_BUFFERABLE +--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ + /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + /* +- * arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +- * + * Copyright (C) 1995-2003 Russell King + */ + #ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H +@@ -10,10 +8,8 @@ + extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void); + + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU +-extern void check_bugs(void); + extern void check_other_bugs(void); + #else +-#define check_bugs() do { } while (0) + #define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0) + #endif + +--- a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ + // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ void check_other_bugs(void) + #endif + } + +-void __init check_bugs(void) ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) + { + check_writebuffer_bugs(); + check_other_bugs(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch b/queue-6.1/documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7bb1f326175 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dave Hansen +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 07:31:07 -0700 +Subject: Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support + +From: Dave Hansen + +commit 1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20 upstream + +These options clearly turn *off* XSAVE YMM support. Correct the +typo. + +Reported-by: Ben Hutchings +Fixes: 553a5c03e90a ("x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation") +Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ GDS can also be mitigated on systems tha + disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or + "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line. + +-If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning on XSAVE YMM support. ++If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support. + However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that + does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM + support will break. diff --git a/queue-6.1/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0aad349b808 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 12775ad726a0660d3dbee8689c68ca031153e127 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: ia64/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 6c38e3005621800263f117fb00d6787a76e16de7 upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.137045745@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h | 20 -------------------- + arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c | 3 +-- + 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h + +--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ menu "Processor type and features" + config IA64 + bool + select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_EXTRA_PHDRS ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + select ARCH_HAS_DMA_MARK_CLEAN + select ARCH_HAS_STRNCPY_FROM_USER + select ARCH_HAS_STRNLEN_USER +--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-/* +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * +- * Needs: +- * void check_bugs(void); +- * +- * Based on . +- * +- * Modified 1998, 1999, 2003 +- * David Mosberger-Tang , Hewlett-Packard Co. +- */ +-#ifndef _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H +-#define _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H +- +-#include +- +-extern void check_bugs (void); +- +-#endif /* _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H */ +--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c +@@ -1067,8 +1067,7 @@ cpu_init (void) + } + } + +-void __init +-check_bugs (void) ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) + { + ia64_patch_mckinley_e9((unsigned long) __start___mckinley_e9_bundles, + (unsigned long) __end___mckinley_e9_bundles); diff --git a/queue-6.1/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch b/queue-6.1/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7ee8a5da770 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 5eb48e6a3307ae73ebe2e3d30284115e1727bdeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: init: Invoke arch_cpu_finalize_init() earlier + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 9df9d2f0471b4c4702670380b8d8a45b40b23a7d upstream + +X86 is reworking the boot process so that initializations which are not +required during early boot can be moved into the late boot process and out +of the fragile and restricted initial boot phase. + +arch_cpu_finalize_init() is the obvious place to do such initializations, +but arch_cpu_finalize_init() is invoked too late in start_kernel() e.g. for +initializing the FPU completely. fork_init() requires that the FPU is +initialized as the size of task_struct on X86 depends on the size of the +required FPU register buffer. + +Fortunately none of the init calls between calibrate_delay() and +arch_cpu_finalize_init() is relevant for the functionality of +arch_cpu_finalize_init(). + +Invoke it right after calibrate_delay() where everything which is relevant +for arch_cpu_finalize_init() has been set up already. + +No functional change intended. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.612182854@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + init/main.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/init/main.c ++++ b/init/main.c +@@ -1107,6 +1107,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + late_time_init(); + sched_clock_init(); + calibrate_delay(); ++ ++ arch_cpu_finalize_init(); ++ + pid_idr_init(); + anon_vma_init(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86 +@@ -1135,8 +1138,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + + poking_init(); + +- arch_cpu_finalize_init(); +- + acpi_subsystem_init(); + arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); + kcsan_init(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..70ba111866f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From b98a320c0869773f285629d93e615673072656f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:24 +0200 +Subject: init: Provide arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 7725acaa4f0c04fbefb0e0d342635b967bb7d414 upstream + +check_bugs() has become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities to +finalize the CPU initialization before running the rest of the init code. + +Most are empty, a few do actual bug checks, some do alternative patching +and some cobble a CPU advertisement string together.... + +Aside of that the current implementation requires duplicated function +declaration and mostly empty header files for them. + +Provide a new function arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Provide a generic +declaration if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT is selected and a stub +inline otherwise. + +This requires a temporary #ifdef in start_kernel() which will be removed +along with check_bugs() once the architectures are converted over. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224544.957805717@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/Kconfig | 3 +++ + include/linux/cpu.h | 6 ++++++ + init/main.c | 5 +++++ + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+) + +--- a/arch/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/Kconfig +@@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED + config ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED + bool + ++config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT ++ bool ++ + # Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section + config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK + bool +--- a/include/linux/cpu.h ++++ b/include/linux/cpu.h +@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ void arch_cpu_idle_enter(void); + void arch_cpu_idle_exit(void); + void arch_cpu_idle_dead(void); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT ++void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void); ++#else ++static inline void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { } ++#endif ++ + int cpu_report_state(int cpu); + int cpu_check_up_prepare(int cpu); + void cpu_set_state_online(int cpu); +--- a/init/main.c ++++ b/init/main.c +@@ -1135,7 +1135,12 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + delayacct_init(); + + poking_init(); ++ ++ arch_cpu_finalize_init(); ++ /* Temporary conditional until everything has been converted */ ++#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + check_bugs(); ++#endif + + acpi_subsystem_init(); + arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch b/queue-6.1/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..20502fdcb8d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From efa70eb13025d49abbeb960312b21a142a2005c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: init: Remove check_bugs() leftovers + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 61235b24b9cb37c13fcad5b9596d59a1afdcec30 upstream + +Everything is converted over to arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Remove the +check_bugs() leftovers including the empty stubs in asm-generic, alpha, +parisc, powerpc and xtensa. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.553215951@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h | 20 -------------------- + arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h | 20 -------------------- + arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h | 15 --------------- + arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h | 18 ------------------ + include/asm-generic/bugs.h | 11 ----------- + init/main.c | 5 ----- + 6 files changed, 89 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h + delete mode 100644 arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h + delete mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h + delete mode 100644 arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h + delete mode 100644 include/asm-generic/bugs.h + +--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ +-/* +- * include/asm-alpha/bugs.h +- * +- * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds +- */ +- +-/* +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * +- * Needs: +- * void check_bugs(void); +- */ +- +-/* +- * I don't know of any alpha bugs yet.. Nice chip +- */ +- +-static void check_bugs(void) +-{ +-} +--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-/* +- * include/asm-parisc/bugs.h +- * +- * Copyright (C) 1999 Mike Shaver +- */ +- +-/* +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * +- * Needs: +- * void check_bugs(void); +- */ +- +-#include +- +-static inline void check_bugs(void) +-{ +-// identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); +-} +--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +-#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H +-#define _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H +- +-/* +- */ +- +-/* +- * This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for +- * architecture-dependent bugs. +- */ +- +-static inline void check_bugs(void) { } +- +-#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H */ +--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ +-/* +- * include/asm-xtensa/bugs.h +- * +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * +- * Xtensa processors don't have any bugs. :) +- * +- * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General +- * Public License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of +- * this archive for more details. +- */ +- +-#ifndef _XTENSA_BUGS_H +-#define _XTENSA_BUGS_H +- +-static void check_bugs(void) { } +- +-#endif /* _XTENSA_BUGS_H */ +--- a/include/asm-generic/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H +-#define __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H +-/* +- * This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for +- * architecture-dependent bugs. +- */ +- +-static inline void check_bugs(void) { } +- +-#endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H */ +--- a/init/main.c ++++ b/init/main.c +@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ + #include + + #include +-#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -1137,10 +1136,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + poking_init(); + + arch_cpu_finalize_init(); +- /* Temporary conditional until everything has been converted */ +-#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT +- check_bugs(); +-#endif + + acpi_subsystem_init(); + arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..745a04278a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From 5faa9970753fb662901c1da4e36c8411b96bcf74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 439e17576eb47f26b78c5bbc72e344d4206d2327 upstream + +Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and +remove the weak fallback from the core code. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 7 ++++--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ + init/main.c | 11 ----------- + 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_m + + void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); + ++void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); ++ + #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted") + + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ +@@ -82,13 +84,12 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned + + static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { } + ++static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { } ++ + #define __bss_decrypted + + #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ + +-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ +-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); +- + void add_encrypt_protection_map(void); + + /* +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -2421,4 +2422,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) + } else { + fpu__init_check_bugs(); + } ++ ++ /* ++ * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA ++ * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will ++ * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will ++ * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It ++ * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64 ++ * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted. ++ */ ++ mem_encrypt_init(); + } +--- a/init/main.c ++++ b/init/main.c +@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ + #include + #include + #include +-#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -780,8 +779,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_in + } + #endif + +-void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { } +- + void __init __weak poking_init(void) { } + + void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { } +@@ -1083,14 +1080,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + */ + locking_selftest(); + +- /* +- * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA +- * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will +- * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will +- * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. +- */ +- mem_encrypt_init(); +- + #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok && + page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) { diff --git a/queue-6.1/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch b/queue-6.1/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5cb3af27dd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From 3f0b3065a50cdea648c47f142ffe95cda201b78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Sneddon +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:26 +0200 +Subject: KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM + +From: Daniel Sneddon + +commit 81ac7e5d741742d650b4ed6186c4826c1a0631a7 upstream + +Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a transient execution attack using +gather instructions from the AVX2 and AVX512 extensions. This attack +allows malicious code to infer data that was previously stored in +vector registers. Systems that are not vulnerable to GDS will set the +GDS_NO bit of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. This is useful for VM +guests that may think they are on vulnerable systems that are, in +fact, not affected. Guests that are running on affected hosts where +the mitigation is enabled are protected as if they were running +on an unaffected system. + +On all hosts that are not affected or that are mitigated, set the +GDS_NO bit. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen +Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++++ + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 ++++++- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ static const char * const gds_strings[] + [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", + }; + ++bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void) ++{ ++ return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL || ++ gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated); ++ + void update_gds_msr(void) + { + u64 mcu_ctrl_after; +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0; + + static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache; + ++extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void); ++ + /* + * When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr. + * Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access. +@@ -1613,7 +1615,7 @@ static unsigned int num_msr_based_featur + ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \ + ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \ + ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \ +- ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO) ++ ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) + + static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) + { +@@ -1670,6 +1672,9 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(voi + */ + } + ++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated()) ++ data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO; ++ + return data; + } + diff --git a/queue-6.1/loongarch-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/loongarch-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..68bdf6a95cc --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/loongarch-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 0ff413fdf24f636c2c74782d2a2746757700dc47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: loongarch/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 9841c423164787feb8f1442f922b7d80a70c82f1 upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.195288218@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) + +--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ config LOONGARCH + select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG + select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE + select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE + select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL + select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST +--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c +@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ + */ + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -80,6 +81,11 @@ const char *get_system_type(void) + return "generic-loongson-machine"; + } + ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) ++{ ++ alternative_instructions(); ++} ++ + static const char *dmi_string_parse(const struct dmi_header *dm, u8 s) + { + const u8 *bp = ((u8 *) dm) + dm->length; diff --git a/queue-6.1/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2b9ac92ab15 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From f05e66b9a0e9c73c3ba9ea090a36fab17e743255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: m68k/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 9ceecc2589b9d7cef6b321339ed8de484eac4b20 upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.254342916@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/m68k/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h | 21 --------------------- + arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c | 3 ++- + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h + +--- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig +@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config M68K + default y + select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T + select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER + select ARCH_HAS_DMA_PREP_COHERENT if HAS_DMA && MMU && !COLDFIRE + select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_DEVICE if HAS_DMA +--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-/* +- * include/asm-m68k/bugs.h +- * +- * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds +- */ +- +-/* +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * +- * Needs: +- * void check_bugs(void); +- */ +- +-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +-extern void check_bugs(void); /* in arch/m68k/kernel/setup.c */ +-#else +-static void check_bugs(void) +-{ +-} +-#endif +--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c ++++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ + */ + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ static int __init proc_hardware_init(voi + module_init(proc_hardware_init); + #endif + +-void check_bugs(void) ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) + { + #if defined(CONFIG_FPU) && !defined(CONFIG_M68KFPU_EMU) + if (m68k_fputype == 0) { diff --git a/queue-6.1/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..048308a793b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 9161970dcee1e34d4d533503af046e44f67a5929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: mips/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 7f066a22fe353a827a402ee2835e81f045b1574d upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.312438573@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h | 17 ----------------- + arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig +@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config MIPS + default y + select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if !64BIT + select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE if MIPS_FP_SUPPORT ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER if !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000 + select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL if !64BIT + select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE +--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h +@@ -1,17 +1,11 @@ + /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + /* +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki +- * +- * Needs: +- * void check_bugs(void); + */ + #ifndef _ASM_BUGS_H + #define _ASM_BUGS_H + + #include +-#include + #include + + #include +@@ -30,17 +24,6 @@ static inline void check_bugs_early(void + check_bugs64_early(); + } + +-static inline void check_bugs(void) +-{ +- unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); +- +- cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; +- check_bugs32(); +- +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) +- check_bugs64(); +-} +- + static inline int r4k_daddiu_bug(void) + { + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) +--- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c +@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ + * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki + */ + #include ++#include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -840,3 +842,14 @@ static int __init setnocoherentio(char * + } + early_param("nocoherentio", setnocoherentio); + #endif ++ ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) ++{ ++ unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); ++ ++ cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; ++ check_bugs32(); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) ++ check_bugs64(); ++} diff --git a/queue-6.1/mm-move-mm_cachep-initialization-to-mm_init.patch b/queue-6.1/mm-move-mm_cachep-initialization-to-mm_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..59f0578ef8e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/mm-move-mm_cachep-initialization-to-mm_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From af80602799681c78f14fbe20b6185a56020dedee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Zijlstra +Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:38:18 +0200 +Subject: mm: Move mm_cachep initialization to mm_init() + +From: Peter Zijlstra + +commit af80602799681c78f14fbe20b6185a56020dedee upstream. + +In order to allow using mm_alloc() much earlier, move initializing +mm_cachep into mm_init(). + +Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221025201057.751153381@infradead.org +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/linux/sched/task.h | 1 + + init/main.c | 1 + + kernel/fork.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h ++++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struc + void __noreturn do_task_dead(void); + void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr); + ++extern void mm_cache_init(void); + extern void proc_caches_init(void); + + extern void fork_init(void); +--- a/init/main.c ++++ b/init/main.c +@@ -856,6 +856,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void) + /* Should be run after espfix64 is set up. */ + pti_init(); + kmsan_init_runtime(); ++ mm_cache_init(); + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET +--- a/kernel/fork.c ++++ b/kernel/fork.c +@@ -3018,10 +3018,27 @@ static void sighand_ctor(void *data) + init_waitqueue_head(&sighand->signalfd_wqh); + } + +-void __init proc_caches_init(void) ++void __init mm_cache_init(void) + { + unsigned int mm_size; + ++ /* ++ * The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is ++ * dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system ++ * can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids). ++ */ ++ mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size(); ++ ++ mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct", ++ mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN, ++ SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, ++ offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), ++ sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), ++ NULL); ++} ++ ++void __init proc_caches_init(void) ++{ + sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache", + sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0, + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU| +@@ -3039,19 +3056,6 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void) + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, + NULL); + +- /* +- * The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is +- * dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system +- * can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids). +- */ +- mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size(); +- +- mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct", +- mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN, +- SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, +- offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), +- sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), +- NULL); + vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT); + mmap_init(); + nsproxy_cache_init(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/series b/queue-6.1/series new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f2b0ebe4f5b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/series @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +loongarch-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch +init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch +init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +x86-init-initialize-signal-frame-size-late.patch +x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch +x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch +x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch +x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch +x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch +kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch +x86-mem_encrypt-unbreak-the-amd_mem_encrypt-n-build.patch +x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch +x86-mm-fix-poking_init-for-xen-pv-guests.patch +x86-mm-use-mm_alloc-in-poking_init.patch +mm-move-mm_cachep-initialization-to-mm_init.patch +x86-mm-initialize-text-poking-earlier.patch +documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch +x86-bugs-increase-the-x86-bugs-vector-size-to-two-u32s.patch +x86-cpu-kvm-add-support-for-cpuid_80000021_eax.patch +x86-srso-add-a-speculative-ras-overflow-mitigation.patch +x86-srso-add-ibpb_brtype-support.patch +x86-srso-add-srso_no-support.patch +x86-srso-add-ibpb.patch +x86-srso-add-ibpb-on-vmexit.patch +x86-srso-fix-return-thunks-in-generated-code.patch +x86-srso-add-a-forgotten-noendbr-annotation.patch +x86-srso-tie-sbpb-bit-setting-to-microcode-patch-detection.patch +xen-netback-fix-buffer-overrun-triggered-by-unusual-packet.patch +x86-fix-backwards-merge-of-gds-srso-bit.patch diff --git a/queue-6.1/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9970b0dea79 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +From 81f3b91f42ee1434b806c2386918c6eb99b5170a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: sh/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 01eb454e9bfe593f320ecbc9aaec60bf87cd453d upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.371697797@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/sh/Kconfig | 1 + arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h | 74 ---------------------------------------- + arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + + arch/sh/kernel/idle.c | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/setup.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h + +--- a/arch/sh/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig +@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config SUPERH + select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H + select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG if (GUSA_RB || CPU_SH4A) + select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT if !MMU ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER + select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE + select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL +--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-#ifndef __ASM_SH_BUGS_H +-#define __ASM_SH_BUGS_H +- +-/* +- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. +- * +- * Needs: +- * void check_bugs(void); +- */ +- +-/* +- * I don't know of any Super-H bugs yet. +- */ +- +-#include +- +-extern void select_idle_routine(void); +- +-static void __init check_bugs(void) +-{ +- extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy; +- char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */ +- +- select_idle_routine(); +- +- current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; +- +- switch (current_cpu_data.family) { +- case CPU_FAMILY_SH2: +- *p++ = '2'; +- break; +- case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A: +- *p++ = '2'; +- *p++ = 'a'; +- break; +- case CPU_FAMILY_SH3: +- *p++ = '3'; +- break; +- case CPU_FAMILY_SH4: +- *p++ = '4'; +- break; +- case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A: +- *p++ = '4'; +- *p++ = 'a'; +- break; +- case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP: +- *p++ = '4'; +- *p++ = 'a'; +- *p++ = 'l'; +- *p++ = '-'; +- *p++ = 'd'; +- *p++ = 's'; +- *p++ = 'p'; +- break; +- case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN: +- /* +- * Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than +- * default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine +- * about unhandled enumerations. +- */ +- break; +- } +- +- printk("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(¤t_cpu_data)); +- +-#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ +- /* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */ +- *p++ = 'e'; +- *p++ = 'b'; +-#endif +- *p = '\0'; +-} +-#endif /* __ASM_SH_BUGS_H */ +--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h ++++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h +@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ extern unsigned int instruction_size(uns + #define instruction_size(insn) (2) + #endif + ++void select_idle_routine(void); ++ + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + + #include +--- a/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c ++++ b/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +--- a/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -354,3 +355,57 @@ int test_mode_pin(int pin) + { + return sh_mv.mv_mode_pins() & pin; + } ++ ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) ++{ ++ char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */ ++ ++ select_idle_routine(); ++ ++ current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; ++ ++ switch (current_cpu_data.family) { ++ case CPU_FAMILY_SH2: ++ *p++ = '2'; ++ break; ++ case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A: ++ *p++ = '2'; ++ *p++ = 'a'; ++ break; ++ case CPU_FAMILY_SH3: ++ *p++ = '3'; ++ break; ++ case CPU_FAMILY_SH4: ++ *p++ = '4'; ++ break; ++ case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A: ++ *p++ = '4'; ++ *p++ = 'a'; ++ break; ++ case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP: ++ *p++ = '4'; ++ *p++ = 'a'; ++ *p++ = 'l'; ++ *p++ = '-'; ++ *p++ = 'd'; ++ *p++ = 's'; ++ *p++ = 'p'; ++ break; ++ case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN: ++ /* ++ * Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than ++ * default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine ++ * about unhandled enumerations. ++ */ ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ pr_info("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(¤t_cpu_data)); ++ ++#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ ++ /* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */ ++ *p++ = 'e'; ++ *p++ = 'b'; ++#endif ++ *p = '\0'; ++} diff --git a/queue-6.1/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e1ba6118957 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 38bce523d17b85ac4142139e2270806373075e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: sparc/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 44ade508e3bfac45ae97864587de29eb1a881ec0 upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.431995857@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/sparc/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h | 18 ------------------ + arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c | 7 +++++++ + 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h + +--- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ config SPARC + config SPARC32 + def_bool !64BIT + select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if !SMP + select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_CPU + select CLZ_TAB + select DMA_DIRECT_REMAP +--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-/* include/asm/bugs.h: Sparc probes for various bugs. +- * +- * Copyright (C) 1996, 2007 David S. Miller (davem@davemloft.net) +- */ +- +-#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC32 +-#include +-#endif +- +-extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy; +- +-static void __init check_bugs(void) +-{ +-#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP) +- cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; +-#endif +-} +--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c ++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c +@@ -412,3 +412,10 @@ static int __init topology_init(void) + } + + subsys_initcall(topology_init); ++ ++#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP) ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) ++{ ++ cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; ++} ++#endif diff --git a/queue-6.1/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e08783b3f35 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 56c96f330fe6b15e0cfb1022b2ad65c303946651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: um/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 9349b5cd0908f8afe95529fc7a8cbb1417df9b0c upstream + +check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new +arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Acked-by: Richard Weinberger +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.493148694@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/um/Kconfig | 1 + + arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h | 7 ------- + arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c | 3 ++- + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h + +--- a/arch/um/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/um/Kconfig +@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config UML + bool + default y + select ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE + select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL + select ARCH_HAS_KCOV +--- a/arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ +-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +-#ifndef __UM_BUGS_H +-#define __UM_BUGS_H +- +-void check_bugs(void); +- +-#endif +--- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c ++++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c +@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ + * Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com) + */ + ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -426,7 +427,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) + } + } + +-void __init check_bugs(void) ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) + { + arch_check_bugs(); + os_check_bugs(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-bugs-increase-the-x86-bugs-vector-size-to-two-u32s.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-bugs-increase-the-x86-bugs-vector-size-to-two-u32s.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..18158e6012e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-bugs-increase-the-x86-bugs-vector-size-to-two-u32s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 9f1e4b82d3cdbbedf38548c403c38352c9490fc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 10:21:35 +0200 +Subject: x86/bugs: Increase the x86 bugs vector size to two u32s + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: 0e52740ffd10c6c316837c6c128f460f1aaba1ea + +There was never a doubt in my mind that they would not fit into a single +u32 eventually. + +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ + * Defines x86 CPU feature bits + */ + #define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +-#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ ++#define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ + + /* + * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used +--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ + * Defines x86 CPU feature bits + */ + #define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +-#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ ++#define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ + + /* + * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-cpu-kvm-add-support-for-cpuid_80000021_eax.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-cpu-kvm-add-support-for-cpuid_80000021_eax.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..438f792a67a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-cpu-kvm-add-support-for-cpuid_80000021_eax.patch @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +From 25633de10d576ba7b91d35fc74095b90b2bb8bc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kim Phillips +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 16:46:37 -0600 +Subject: x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX + +From: Kim Phillips + +commit 8415a74852d7c24795007ee9862d25feb519007c upstream. + +Add support for CPUID leaf 80000021, EAX. The majority of the features will be +used in the kernel and thus a separate leaf is appropriate. + +Include KVM's reverse_cpuid entry because features are used by VM guests, too. + + [ bp: Massage commit message. ] + +Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Acked-by: Sean Christopherson +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-2-kim.phillips@amd.com +[bwh: Backported to 6.1: adjust context] +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- + arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ + arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 1 + + 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs + CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, + CPUID_8000_001F_EAX, ++ CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, + }; + + #define X86_CAP_FMT_NUM "%d:%d" +@@ -94,8 +95,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ ++ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ + REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ +- BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) ++ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)) + + #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ + ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ +@@ -118,8 +120,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ ++ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ + DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ +- BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) ++ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)) + + #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ + (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ + /* + * Defines x86 CPU feature bits + */ +-#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ ++#define NCAPINTS 21 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ + #define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ + + /* +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ + #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 + #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 + #define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) ++#define DISABLED_MASK20 0 ++#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) + + #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ + #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 + #define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 + #define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) ++#define REQUIRED_MASK20 0 ++#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) + + #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1076,6 +1076,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f); + ++ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021) ++ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021); ++ + init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); + init_speculation_control(c); + +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h +@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cp + [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_12_EAX] = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 0, CPUID_EAX}, ++ [CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_EAX}, + }; + + /* diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..58ed08ac301 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +From 1921352b4681469279393374365ff7ce6790c921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:24 +0200 +Subject: x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 7c7077a72674402654f3291354720cd73cdf649e upstream + +check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of +it has to do with actual CPU bugs. + +Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_init() and cpu_select_mitigations(). + +Fixup the bogus 32bit comments while at it. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.019583869@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h | 2 - + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 51 ----------------------------------------- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ config X86 + select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if X86_64 && TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE + select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI + select ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE ++ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER + select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL + select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE if !X86_PAE +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h +@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ + + #include + +-extern void check_bugs(void); +- + #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32) + int ppro_with_ram_bug(void); + #else +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ + * - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup). + */ + #include +-#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -27,8 +26,6 @@ + #include + #include + #include +-#include +-#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -124,21 +121,8 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l + DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear); + +-void __init check_bugs(void) ++void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) + { +- identify_boot_cpu(); +- +- /* +- * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the +- * core code know. +- */ +- cpu_smt_check_topology(); +- +- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { +- pr_info("CPU: "); +- print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); +- } +- + /* + * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may + * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD +@@ -175,39 +159,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) + md_clear_select_mitigation(); + srbds_select_mitigation(); + l1d_flush_select_mitigation(); +- +- arch_smt_update(); +- +-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +- /* +- * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. +- * +- * - i386 is no longer supported. +- * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be +- * compiled for a i486. +- */ +- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) +- panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); +- +- init_utsname()->machine[1] = +- '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); +- alternative_instructions(); +- +- fpu__init_check_bugs(); +-#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +- alternative_instructions(); +- +- /* +- * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages +- * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping +- * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. +- * +- * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems +- * very little benefit for that case. +- */ +- if (!direct_gbpages) +- set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); +-#endif + } + + /* +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -19,10 +19,13 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include ++#include + ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -2369,3 +2373,52 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) + /* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */ + apic_smt_update(); + } ++ ++void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) ++{ ++ identify_boot_cpu(); ++ ++ /* ++ * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the ++ * core code know. ++ */ ++ cpu_smt_check_topology(); ++ ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { ++ pr_info("CPU: "); ++ print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); ++ } ++ ++ cpu_select_mitigations(); ++ ++ arch_smt_update(); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) { ++ /* ++ * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer ++ * supported and fixup the utsname. ++ */ ++ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) ++ panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); ++ ++ init_utsname()->machine[1] = ++ '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); ++ } ++ ++ alternative_instructions(); ++ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { ++ /* ++ * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages ++ * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping ++ * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. ++ * ++ * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems ++ * very little benefit for that case. ++ */ ++ if (!direct_gbpages) ++ set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); ++ } else { ++ fpu__init_check_bugs(); ++ } ++} +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 + extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + + unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu); ++void cpu_select_mitigations(void); + + extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); + extern void update_srbds_msr(void); diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-fix-backwards-merge-of-gds-srso-bit.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-fix-backwards-merge-of-gds-srso-bit.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1e619bafe7c --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-fix-backwards-merge-of-gds-srso-bit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From foo@baz Tue Aug 8 07:20:48 PM CEST 2023 +Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2023 19:20:48 +0200 +To: Greg KH +From: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Subject: x86: fix backwards merge of GDS/SRSO bit + +Stable-tree-only change. + +Due to the way the GDS and SRSO patches flowed into the stable tree, it +was a 50% chance that the merge of the which value GDS and SRSO should +be. Of course, I lost that bet, and chose the opposite of what Linus +chose in commit 64094e7e3118 ("Merge tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of +git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip") + +Fix this up by switching the values to match what is now in Linus's tree +as that is the correct value to mirror. + +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1244,10 +1244,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ + #define RETBLEED BIT(3) + /* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ + #define SMT_RSB BIT(4) +-/* CPU is affected by GDS */ +-#define GDS BIT(5) + /* CPU is affected by SRSO */ +-#define SRSO BIT(6) ++#define SRSO BIT(5) ++/* CPU is affected by GDS */ ++#define GDS BIT(6) + + static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3b69e5dba87 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 39a3c1c6d0086cc7defc25400597d77f0dc268a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: x86/fpu: Mark init functions __init + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 1703db2b90c91b2eb2d699519fc505fe431dde0e upstream + +No point in keeping them around. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.841685728@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu(void) + fpu__init_cpu_xstate(); + } + +-static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) ++static bool __init fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) + { + unsigned long cr0; + u16 fsw, fcw; +@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(voi + return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f; + } + +-static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) ++static void __init fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) + { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) && + !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) { diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4c49ce9f1ec --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 25c5b55f6110843829c13e64165ee4542f07ca21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init() + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit b81fac906a8f9e682e513ddd95697ec7a20878d4 upstream + +Initializing the FPU during the early boot process is a pointless +exercise. Early boot is convoluted and fragile enough. + +Nothing requires that the FPU is set up early. It has to be initialized +before fork_init() because the task_struct size depends on the FPU register +buffer size. + +Move the initialization to arch_cpu_finalize_init() which is the perfect +place to do so. + +No functional change. + +This allows to remove quite some of the custom early command line parsing, +but that's subject to the next installment. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.902376621@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 12 ++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1575,8 +1575,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st + + sld_setup(c); + +- fpu__init_system(); +- + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + /* + * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says +@@ -2292,8 +2290,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) + + doublefault_init_cpu_tss(); + +- fpu__init_cpu(); +- + if (is_uv_system()) + uv_cpu_init(); + +@@ -2309,6 +2305,7 @@ void cpu_init_secondary(void) + */ + cpu_init_exception_handling(); + cpu_init(); ++ fpu__init_cpu(); + } + #endif + +@@ -2403,6 +2400,13 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) + '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); + } + ++ /* ++ * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear ++ * feature bits. ++ */ ++ fpu__init_system(); ++ fpu__init_cpu(); ++ + alternative_instructions(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ec513b6d673 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From 1330ab15399382ad20a778eaf36bc533e4b9efff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: x86/fpu: Remove cpuinfo argument from init functions + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 1f34bb2a24643e0087652d81078e4f616562738d upstream + +Nothing in the call chain requires it + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.783704297@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 2 +- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +- + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 6 +++--- + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ extern void fpu_reset_from_exception_fix + + /* Boot, hotplug and resume */ + extern void fpu__init_cpu(void); +-extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); ++extern void fpu__init_system(void); + extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); + extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1575,7 +1575,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st + + sld_setup(c); + +- fpu__init_system(c); ++ fpu__init_system(); + + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + /* +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c +@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(voi + return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f; + } + +-static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) ++static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) + { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) && + !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) { +@@ -211,10 +211,10 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_xsta + * Called on the boot CPU once per system bootup, to set up the initial + * FPU state that is later cloned into all processes: + */ +-void __init fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) ++void __init fpu__init_system(void) + { + fpstate_reset(¤t->thread.fpu); +- fpu__init_system_early_generic(c); ++ fpu__init_system_early_generic(); + + /* + * The FPU has to be operational for some of the diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-init-initialize-signal-frame-size-late.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-init-initialize-signal-frame-size-late.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e685e5d8565 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-init-initialize-signal-frame-size-late.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From a4870be656b72a1058ef4e646f2a809561cdaa35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: x86/init: Initialize signal frame size late + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 54d9a91a3d6713d1332e93be13b4eaf0fa54349d upstream + +No point in doing this during really early boot. Move it to an early +initcall so that it is set up before possible user mode helpers are started +during device initialization. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.727330699@linutronix.de +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/sigframe.h | 2 -- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 --- + arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 4 +++- + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sigframe.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sigframe.h +@@ -85,6 +85,4 @@ struct rt_sigframe_x32 { + + #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + +-void __init init_sigframe_size(void); +- + #endif /* _ASM_X86_SIGFRAME_H */ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ + #include + #include + #include +-#include + #include + #include + +@@ -1578,8 +1577,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st + + fpu__init_system(c); + +- init_sigframe_size(); +- + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + /* + * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ badframe: + static unsigned long __ro_after_init max_frame_size; + static unsigned int __ro_after_init fpu_default_state_size; + +-void __init init_sigframe_size(void) ++static int __init init_sigframe_size(void) + { + fpu_default_state_size = fpu__get_fpstate_size(); + +@@ -736,7 +736,9 @@ void __init init_sigframe_size(void) + max_frame_size = round_up(max_frame_size, FRAME_ALIGNMENT); + + pr_info("max sigframe size: %lu\n", max_frame_size); ++ return 0; + } ++early_initcall(init_sigframe_size); + + unsigned long get_sigframe_size(void) + { diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-mem_encrypt-unbreak-the-amd_mem_encrypt-n-build.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-mem_encrypt-unbreak-the-amd_mem_encrypt-n-build.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9dd415f2351 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-mem_encrypt-unbreak-the-amd_mem_encrypt-n-build.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 0a9567ac5e6a40cdd9c8cd15b19a62a15250f450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2023 22:15:31 +0200 +Subject: x86/mem_encrypt: Unbreak the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n build + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit 0a9567ac5e6a40cdd9c8cd15b19a62a15250f450 upstream. + +Moving mem_encrypt_init() broke the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n because the +declaration of that function was under #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT and +the obvious placement for the inline stub was the #else path. + +This is a leftover of commit 20f07a044a76 ("x86/sev: Move common memory +encryption code to mem_encrypt.c") which made mem_encrypt_init() depend on +X86_MEM_ENCRYPT without moving the prototype. That did not fail back then +because there was no stub inline as the core init code had a weak function. + +Move both the declaration and the stub out of the CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +section and guard it with CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT. + +Fixes: 439e17576eb4 ("init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()") +Reported-by: kernel test robot +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202306170247.eQtCJPE8-lkp@intel.com/ +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 10 ++++++---- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ + + #include + ++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT ++void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); ++#else ++static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { } ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + + extern u64 sme_me_mask; +@@ -51,8 +57,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_m + + void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); + +-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); +- + #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted") + + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ +@@ -84,8 +88,6 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned + + static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { } + +-static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { } +- + #define __bss_decrypted + + #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-mm-fix-poking_init-for-xen-pv-guests.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-mm-fix-poking_init-for-xen-pv-guests.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..184ef5fc7b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-mm-fix-poking_init-for-xen-pv-guests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 26ce6ec364f18d2915923bc05784084e54a5c4cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Juergen Gross +Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:09:22 +0100 +Subject: x86/mm: fix poking_init() for Xen PV guests + +From: Juergen Gross + +commit 26ce6ec364f18d2915923bc05784084e54a5c4cc upstream. + +Commit 3f4c8211d982 ("x86/mm: Use mm_alloc() in poking_init()") broke +the kernel for running as Xen PV guest. + +It seems as if the new address space is never activated before being +used, resulting in Xen rejecting to accept the new CR3 value (the PGD +isn't pinned). + +Fix that by adding the now missing call of paravirt_arch_dup_mmap() to +poking_init(). That call was previously done by dup_mm()->dup_mmap() and +it is a NOP for all cases but for Xen PV, where it is just doing the +pinning of the PGD. + +Fixes: 3f4c8211d982 ("x86/mm: Use mm_alloc() in poking_init()") +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross +Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230109150922.10578-1-jgross@suse.com +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/mm/init.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c ++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + /* + * We need to define the tracepoints somewhere, and tlb.c +@@ -829,6 +830,9 @@ void __init poking_init(void) + poking_mm = copy_init_mm(); + BUG_ON(!poking_mm); + ++ /* Xen PV guests need the PGD to be pinned. */ ++ paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(NULL, poking_mm); ++ + /* + * Randomize the poking address, but make sure that the following page + * will be mapped at the same PMD. We need 2 pages, so find space for 3, diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-mm-initialize-text-poking-earlier.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-mm-initialize-text-poking-earlier.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b35fa349065 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-mm-initialize-text-poking-earlier.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 5b93a83649c7cba3a15eb7e8959b250841acb1b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Zijlstra +Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:38:25 +0200 +Subject: x86/mm: Initialize text poking earlier + +From: Peter Zijlstra + +commit 5b93a83649c7cba3a15eb7e8959b250841acb1b1 upstream. + +Move poking_init() up a bunch; specifically move it right after +mm_init() which is right before ftrace_init(). + +This will allow simplifying ftrace text poking which currently has +a bunch of exceptions for early boot. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221025201057.881703081@infradead.org +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + init/main.c | 4 +--- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/init/main.c ++++ b/init/main.c +@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + sort_main_extable(); + trap_init(); + mm_init(); +- ++ poking_init(); + ftrace_init(); + + /* trace_printk can be enabled here */ +@@ -1126,8 +1126,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa + taskstats_init_early(); + delayacct_init(); + +- poking_init(); +- + acpi_subsystem_init(); + arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); + kcsan_init(); diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-mm-use-mm_alloc-in-poking_init.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-mm-use-mm_alloc-in-poking_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..49e118c1bb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-mm-use-mm_alloc-in-poking_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 3f4c8211d982099be693be9aa7d6fc4607dff290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Zijlstra +Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:38:21 +0200 +Subject: x86/mm: Use mm_alloc() in poking_init() + +From: Peter Zijlstra + +commit 3f4c8211d982099be693be9aa7d6fc4607dff290 upstream. + +Instead of duplicating init_mm, allocate a fresh mm. The advantage is +that mm_alloc() has much simpler dependencies. Additionally it makes +more conceptual sense, init_mm has no (and must not have) user state +to duplicate. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221025201057.816175235@infradead.org +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +- + include/linux/sched/task.h | 1 - + kernel/fork.c | 5 ----- + 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c ++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c +@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ void __init poking_init(void) + spinlock_t *ptl; + pte_t *ptep; + +- poking_mm = copy_init_mm(); ++ poking_mm = mm_alloc(); + BUG_ON(!poking_mm); + + /* Xen PV guests need the PGD to be pinned. */ +--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h ++++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h +@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ extern void exit_itimers(struct task_str + extern pid_t kernel_clone(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs); + struct task_struct *create_io_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, int node); + struct task_struct *fork_idle(int); +-struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void); + extern pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags); + extern pid_t user_mode_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags); + extern long kernel_wait4(pid_t, int __user *, int, struct rusage *); +--- a/kernel/fork.c ++++ b/kernel/fork.c +@@ -2600,11 +2600,6 @@ struct task_struct * __init fork_idle(in + return task; + } + +-struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void) +-{ +- return dup_mm(NULL, &init_mm); +-} +- + /* + * This is like kernel_clone(), but shaved down and tailored to just + * creating io_uring workers. It returns a created task, or an error pointer. diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2247c85d4de --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +From a618486444bfe6f235f76ff547eec914f5dda9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Sneddon +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:26 +0200 +Subject: x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation + +From: Daniel Sneddon + +commit 553a5c03e90a6087e88f8ff878335ef0621536fb upstream + +The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software +to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may +include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in +microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by +default. However, any affected system that is running with older +microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks. + +Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the +AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather +instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from +GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity +to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable +AVX2. + +Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the +microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on +affected systems. + +This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off. + +This is a *big* hammer. It is known to break buggy userspace that +uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration. Unfortunately, such userspace +does exist in the wild: + + https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html + +[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ] + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen +Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 18 +++++++++-- + Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++- + 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst +@@ -60,14 +60,21 @@ bits: + ================================ === ============================ + + GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by +-disabling AVX. This can be done by setting "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel +-command-line. ++disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or ++"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line. ++ ++If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning on XSAVE YMM support. ++However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that ++does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM ++support will break. + + Mitigation control on the kernel command line + --------------------------------------------- + The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or +-"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will +-default to the mitigation being enabled. ++"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default ++to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will ++use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems ++where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation. + + GDS System Information + ------------------------ +@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ The possible values contained in this fi + Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled. + Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation. ++ Mitigation: AVX disabled, ++ no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing ++ mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation. + Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect. + Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -1603,7 +1603,13 @@ + + This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode. + The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be +- disabled. ++ disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation ++ disabling AVX serves as a mitigation. ++ ++ force: Disable AVX to mitigate systems without ++ microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode ++ mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in ++ userspace with buggy AVX enumeration. + + off: Disable GDS mitigation. + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse + enum gds_mitigations { + GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, ++ GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE, + GDS_MITIGATION_FULL, + GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED, + GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, +@@ -662,6 +663,7 @@ static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigati + static const char * const gds_strings[] = { + [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", ++ [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)", + [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", +@@ -687,6 +689,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS; + break; ++ case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE: + case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: + case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR: + return; +@@ -721,10 +724,23 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation + + /* No microcode */ + if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { +- gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; ++ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) { ++ /* ++ * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it ++ * here rather than in update_gds_msr() ++ */ ++ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX); ++ pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n"); ++ } else { ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; ++ } + goto out; + } + ++ /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */ ++ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; ++ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) { + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF) +@@ -755,6 +771,8 @@ static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; ++ else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; + + return 0; + } diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..48e106474a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,571 @@ +From 99862be42d1c774e140c07d5da941e15059710c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Sneddon +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:25 +0200 +Subject: x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation + +From: Daniel Sneddon + +commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream + +Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows +unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in +vector registers. + +Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions +that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable +hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and +encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector +registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector +register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical +side channel techniques like cache timing attacks. + +This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons. +First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it. +This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can +be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control +bit alone. + +Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the +mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX. +It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be +mitigated against GDS. + +The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by +setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with +mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen +Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 13 - + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 99 +++++++++ + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 41 ++-- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 11 + + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 129 +++++++++++++ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 ++- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 + 10 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst + +--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu ++++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +@@ -513,17 +513,18 @@ Description: information about CPUs hete + cpu_capacity: capacity of cpuX. + + What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 +- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass +- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf +- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort +- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit +- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data +- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed + Date: January 2018 + Contact: Linux kernel mailing list + Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ ++.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++ ++GDS - Gather Data Sampling ++========================== ++ ++Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged ++speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers. ++ ++Problem ++------- ++When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements ++are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather ++instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from ++architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the ++destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to ++infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing ++attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack. ++ ++The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data. ++The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector ++registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be ++vulnerable. ++ ++Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks ++are possible. ++ ++Attack scenarios ++---------------- ++Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all ++permission boundaries: ++ ++ Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data ++ Userspace can infer kernel data ++ Guests can infer data from hosts ++ Guest can infer guest from other guests ++ Users can infer data from other users ++ ++Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in ++lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves. ++ ++The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure ++that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and ++allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an ++attack, and re-enable it. ++ ++Mitigation mechanism ++-------------------- ++This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new ++bits: ++ ++ ================================ === ============================ ++ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability ++ and mitigation support. ++ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable. ++ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation ++ 0 by default. ++ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes ++ to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored ++ Can't be cleared once set. ++ ================================ === ============================ ++ ++GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by ++disabling AVX. This can be done by setting "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel ++command-line. ++ ++Mitigation control on the kernel command line ++--------------------------------------------- ++The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or ++"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will ++default to the mitigation being enabled. ++ ++GDS System Information ++------------------------ ++The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For ++GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: ++ ++/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling ++ ++The possible values contained in this file are: ++ ++ ============================== ============================================= ++ Not affected Processor not vulnerable. ++ Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled. ++ Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing ++ mitigation. ++ Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in ++ effect. ++ Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in ++ effect and cannot be disabled. ++ Unknown: Dependent on ++ hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is ++ affected but with no way to know if host ++ processor is mitigated or vulnerable. ++ ============================== ============================================= ++ ++GDS Default mitigation ++---------------------- ++The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's ++default action is to leave the mitigation enabled. +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run + l1d_flush.rst + processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + cross-thread-rsb.rst ++ gather_data_sampling.rst +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -1593,6 +1593,20 @@ + Format: off | on + default: on + ++ gather_data_sampling= ++ [X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS) ++ mitigation. ++ ++ Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which ++ allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was ++ previously stored in vector registers. ++ ++ This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode. ++ The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be ++ disabled. ++ ++ off: Disable GDS mitigation. ++ + gcov_persist= [GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for + kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via + debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded. +@@ -3228,24 +3242,25 @@ + Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This + improves system performance, but it may also + expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. +- Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] +- if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64] +- nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] +- nobp=0 [S390] +- nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] +- spectre_v2_user=off [X86] +- spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] +- ssbd=force-off [ARM64] +- nospectre_bhb [ARM64] ++ Equivalent to: if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64] ++ gather_data_sampling=off [X86] ++ kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] + l1tf=off [X86] + mds=off [X86] +- tsx_async_abort=off [X86] +- kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] +- srbds=off [X86,INTEL] ++ mmio_stale_data=off [X86] + no_entry_flush [PPC] + no_uaccess_flush [PPC] +- mmio_stale_data=off [X86] ++ nobp=0 [S390] ++ nopti [X86,PPC] ++ nospectre_bhb [ARM64] ++ nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] ++ nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] + retbleed=off [X86] ++ spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] ++ spectre_v2_user=off [X86] ++ srbds=off [X86,INTEL] ++ ssbd=force-off [ARM64] ++ tsx_async_abort=off [X86] + + Exceptions: + This does not have any effect on +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -464,5 +464,6 @@ + #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ + #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ + #define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */ ++#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */ + + #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +@@ -158,6 +158,15 @@ + * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier + * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. + */ ++#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL BIT(25) /* ++ * CPU is vulnerable to Gather ++ * Data Sampling (GDS) and ++ * has controls for mitigation. ++ */ ++#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO BIT(26) /* ++ * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather ++ * Data Sampling (GDS). ++ */ + + #define ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE BIT(21) /* + * IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR +@@ -181,6 +190,8 @@ + #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) /* SRBDS support */ + #define RTM_ALLOW BIT(1) /* TSX development mode */ + #define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ ++#define GDS_MITG_DIS BIT(4) /* Disable GDS mitigation */ ++#define GDS_MITG_LOCKED BIT(5) /* GDS mitigation locked */ + + #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 + #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation + static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void); ++static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void); + + /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ + u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) + md_clear_select_mitigation(); + srbds_select_mitigation(); + l1d_flush_select_mitigation(); ++ gds_select_mitigation(); + } + + /* +@@ -645,6 +647,120 @@ static int __init l1d_flush_parse_cmdlin + early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline); + + #undef pr_fmt ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt ++ ++enum gds_mitigations { ++ GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, ++ GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, ++ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL, ++ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED, ++ GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, ++}; ++ ++static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; ++ ++static const char * const gds_strings[] = { ++ [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", ++ [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", ++ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", ++ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)", ++ [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", ++}; ++ ++void update_gds_msr(void) ++{ ++ u64 mcu_ctrl_after; ++ u64 mcu_ctrl; ++ ++ switch (gds_mitigation) { ++ case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF: ++ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); ++ mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS; ++ break; ++ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED: ++ /* ++ * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have ++ * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all ++ * CPUs. ++ */ ++ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL: ++ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); ++ mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS; ++ break; ++ case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: ++ case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR: ++ return; ++ }; ++ ++ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); ++ ++ /* ++ * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to ++ * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot ++ * processor was not. ++ */ ++ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after); ++ WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after); ++} ++ ++static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void) ++{ ++ u64 mcu_ctrl; ++ ++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) ++ return; ++ ++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (cpu_mitigations_off()) ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; ++ /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ ++ ++ /* No microcode */ ++ if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); ++ if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) { ++ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF) ++ pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n"); ++ ++ /* ++ * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs ++ * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked ++ * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state ++ * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will ++ * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled. ++ */ ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED; ++ } ++ ++ update_gds_msr(); ++out: ++ pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); ++} ++ ++static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str) ++{ ++ if (!str) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) ++ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline); ++ ++#undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt + + enum spectre_v1_mitigation { +@@ -2356,6 +2472,11 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); + } + ++static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) ++{ ++ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); ++} ++ + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf, unsigned int bug) + { +@@ -2405,6 +2526,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de + case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: + return retbleed_show_state(buf); + ++ case X86_BUG_GDS: ++ return gds_show_state(buf); ++ + default: + break; + } +@@ -2469,4 +2593,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device + { + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + } ++ ++ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) ++{ ++ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS); ++} + #endif +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1241,6 +1241,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ + #define RETBLEED BIT(3) + /* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ + #define SMT_RSB BIT(4) ++/* CPU is affected by GDS */ ++#define GDS BIT(5) + + static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), +@@ -1253,19 +1255,21 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_ + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), ++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), +@@ -1394,6 +1398,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB); + ++ /* ++ * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on ++ * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by ++ * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2], ++ * which means that AVX will be disabled. ++ */ ++ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) ++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); ++ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) + return; + +@@ -1957,6 +1971,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuin + validate_apic_and_package_id(c); + x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); + update_srbds_msr(); ++ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) ++ update_gds_msr(); + + tsx_ap_init(); + } +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ void cpu_select_mitigations(void); + + extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); + extern void update_srbds_msr(void); ++extern void update_gds_msr(void); + + extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); + +--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c ++++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c +@@ -577,6 +577,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); + } + ++ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, ++ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) ++{ ++ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); ++} ++ + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); +@@ -588,6 +594,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, + static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); ++static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL); + + static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, +@@ -601,6 +608,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner + &dev_attr_srbds.attr, + &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, + &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, ++ &dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr, + NULL + }; + diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ad496a2ede8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From a8198179ecaac67c0cc2b97ebc6d0e2ab7bfc82a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Sneddon +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 16:36:26 +0200 +Subject: x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS + +From: Daniel Sneddon + +commit 53cf5797f114ba2bd86d23a862302119848eff19 upstream + +Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is mitigated in microcode. However, on +systems that haven't received the updated microcode, disabling AVX +can act as a mitigation. Add a Kconfig option that uses the microcode +mitigation if available and disables AVX otherwise. Setting this +option has no effect on systems not affected by GDS. This is the +equivalent of setting gather_data_sampling=force. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen +Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) + +--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig +@@ -2522,6 +2522,25 @@ config SLS + against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly + larger. + ++config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION ++ bool "Force GDS Mitigation" ++ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL ++ default n ++ help ++ Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows ++ unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in ++ vector registers. ++ ++ This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the ++ command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise ++ AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing ++ the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will ++ break with this option set. ++ ++ Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect. ++ ++ If in doubt, say N. ++ + endif + + config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -658,7 +658,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations { + GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, + }; + ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION) ++static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; ++#else + static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; ++#endif + + static const char * const gds_strings[] = { + [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-a-forgotten-noendbr-annotation.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-a-forgotten-noendbr-annotation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f116e609665 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-a-forgotten-noendbr-annotation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 17babc32cda82eb14df1960512c995491822fc22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 23:03:22 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Add a forgotten NOENDBR annotation + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: 3bbbe97ad83db8d9df06daf027b0840188de625d + +Fix: + + vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x29e40: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_untrain_ret_alias+0x0 + +Reported-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S ++++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) + .section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain + + SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) ++ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ASM_NOP2 + lfence + jmp __x86_return_thunk diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-a-speculative-ras-overflow-mitigation.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-a-speculative-ras-overflow-mitigation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1c7c61dea8a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-a-speculative-ras-overflow-mitigation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,751 @@ +From 8eef90ff74a406942ab05d5fe47af8ef17d721c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 11:02:39 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855 + +Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow +vulnerability found on AMD processors. + +The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to +a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the +retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces +the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' +sequence. + +To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the +safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 +and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the +untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return +function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially +poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. + +In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation +technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and +srso_safe_ret(). + +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 + + arch/x86/Kconfig | 7 + + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 9 + + arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 14 ++ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 8 + + arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 32 +++++ + arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 82 ++++++++++++++ + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 + + include/linux/cpu.h | 2 + tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 5 + 16 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +@@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run + processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + cross-thread-rsb.rst + gather_data_sampling.rst ++ srso +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ ++.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++ ++Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO) ++======================================== ++ ++This is a mitigation for the speculative return stack overflow (SRSO) ++vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mechanism is by now the well ++known scenario of poisoning CPU functional units - the Branch Target ++Buffer (BTB) and Return Address Predictor (RAP) in this case - and then ++tricking the elevated privilege domain (the kernel) into leaking ++sensitive data. ++ ++AMD CPUs predict RET instructions using a Return Address Predictor (aka ++Return Address Stack/Return Stack Buffer). In some cases, a non-architectural ++CALL instruction (i.e., an instruction predicted to be a CALL but is ++not actually a CALL) can create an entry in the RAP which may be used ++to predict the target of a subsequent RET instruction. ++ ++The specific circumstances that lead to this varies by microarchitecture ++but the concern is that an attacker can mis-train the CPU BTB to predict ++non-architectural CALL instructions in kernel space and use this to ++control the speculative target of a subsequent kernel RET, potentially ++leading to information disclosure via a speculative side-channel. ++ ++The issue is tracked under CVE-2023-20569. ++ ++Affected processors ++------------------- ++ ++AMD Zen, generations 1-4. That is, all families 0x17 and 0x19. Older ++processors have not been investigated. ++ ++System information and options ++------------------------------ ++ ++First of all, it is required that the latest microcode be loaded for ++mitigations to be effective. ++ ++The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: ++ ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow ++ ++The possible values in this file are: ++ ++ - 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable ++ ++ - 'Vulnerable: no microcode' The processor is vulnerable, no ++ microcode extending IBPB functionality ++ to address the vulnerability has been ++ applied. ++ ++ - 'Mitigation: microcode' Extended IBPB functionality microcode ++ patch has been applied. It does not ++ address User->Kernel and Guest->Host ++ transitions protection but it does ++ address User->User and VM->VM attack ++ vectors. ++ ++ (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) ++ ++ - 'Mitigation: safe RET' Software-only mitigation. It complements ++ the extended IBPB microcode patch ++ functionality by addressing User->Kernel ++ and Guest->Host transitions protection. ++ ++ Selected by default or by ++ spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret ++ ++ - 'Mitigation: IBPB' Similar protection as "safe RET" above ++ but employs an IBPB barrier on privilege ++ domain crossings (User->Kernel, ++ Guest->Host). ++ ++ (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb) ++ ++ - 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT' Mitigation addressing the cloud provider ++ scenario - the Guest->Host transitions ++ only. ++ ++ (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit) ++ ++In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to: ++ ++ - gain local access on the machine ++ ++ - break kASLR ++ ++ - find gadgets in the running kernel in order to use them in the exploit ++ ++ - potentially create and pin an additional workload on the sibling ++ thread, depending on the microarchitecture (not necessary on fam 0x19) ++ ++ - run the exploit ++ ++Considering the performance implications of each mitigation type, the ++default one is 'Mitigation: safe RET' which should take care of most ++attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one. ++ ++As always, the user is advised to keep her/his system up-to-date by ++applying software updates regularly. ++ ++The default setting will be reevaluated when needed and especially when ++new attack vectors appear. ++ ++As one can surmise, 'Mitigation: safe RET' does come at the cost of some ++performance depending on the workload. If one trusts her/his userspace ++and does not want to suffer the performance impact, one can always ++disable the mitigation with spec_rstack_overflow=off. ++ ++Similarly, 'Mitigation: IBPB' is another full mitigation type employing ++an indrect branch prediction barrier after having applied the required ++microcode patch for one's system. This mitigation comes also at ++a performance cost. ++ ++Mitigation: safe RET ++-------------------- ++ ++The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to ++a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the ++retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces ++the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' ++sequence. ++ ++To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the ++safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 ++and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the ++untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return ++function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially ++poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. ++ ++In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation ++technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and ++srso_safe_ret(). +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -5785,6 +5785,17 @@ + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2_user=auto. + ++ spec_rstack_overflow= ++ [X86] Control RAS overflow mitigation on AMD Zen CPUs ++ ++ off - Disable mitigation ++ microcode - Enable microcode mitigation only ++ safe-ret - Enable sw-only safe RET mitigation (default) ++ ibpb - Enable mitigation by issuing IBPB on ++ kernel entry ++ ibpb-vmexit - Issue IBPB only on VMEXIT ++ (cloud-specific mitigation) ++ + spec_store_bypass_disable= + [HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation + (Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability) +--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig +@@ -2512,6 +2512,13 @@ config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY + This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to + performance. + ++config CPU_SRSO ++ bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD" ++ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK ++ default y ++ help ++ Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines. ++ + config SLS + bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" + depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ + + #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL (11*32+20) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */ + ++#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */ ++ + /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ + #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ +@@ -466,4 +469,6 @@ + #define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */ + #define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */ + ++/* BUG word 2 */ ++#define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ + #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ + * eventually turn into it's own annotation. + */ + .macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END +-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY ++#if (defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + nop + #endif +@@ -191,6 +191,11 @@ + CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB + #endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO ++ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \ ++ "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS ++#endif + .endm + + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +@@ -206,6 +211,8 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_ + + extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); + extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); ++extern void srso_untrain_ret(void); ++extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void); + extern void entry_ibpb(void); + + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +@@ -800,9 +800,11 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu); + #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD + extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void); + extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void); ++extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void); + #else + static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; } + static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void) { return 0; } ++static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) { return false; } + #endif + + #define for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base(function) \ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +@@ -538,7 +538,9 @@ static int patch_return(void *addr, stru + { + int i = 0; + +- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) ++ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK) || ++ cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO) || ++ cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS)) + return -1; + + bytes[i++] = RET_INSN_OPCODE; +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +@@ -1245,6 +1245,20 @@ u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_highest_perf); + ++bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) ++{ ++ u8 fam = boot_cpu_data.x86; ++ ++ if (fam == 0x17) { ++ /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */ ++ return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB); ++ } else if (fam == 0x19) { ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ return false; ++} ++ + static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) + { + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id()); +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio + static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void); ++static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void); + + /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ + u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) + srbds_select_mitigation(); + l1d_flush_select_mitigation(); + gds_select_mitigation(); ++ srso_select_mitigation(); + } + + /* +@@ -2304,6 +2306,95 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str + early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline); + + #undef pr_fmt ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Return Stack Overflow: " fmt ++ ++enum srso_mitigation { ++ SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE, ++ SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE, ++ SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET, ++}; ++ ++enum srso_mitigation_cmd { ++ SRSO_CMD_OFF, ++ SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE, ++ SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET, ++}; ++ ++static const char * const srso_strings[] = { ++ [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", ++ [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode", ++ [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET", ++}; ++ ++static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE; ++static enum srso_mitigation_cmd srso_cmd __ro_after_init = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; ++ ++static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str) ++{ ++ if (!str) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) ++ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_OFF; ++ else if (!strcmp(str, "microcode")) ++ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE; ++ else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret")) ++ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; ++ else ++ pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline); ++ ++#define SRSO_NOTICE "WARNING: See https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html for mitigation options." ++ ++static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) ++{ ++ bool has_microcode; ++ ++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off()) ++ return; ++ ++ has_microcode = cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(); ++ if (!has_microcode) { ++ pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n"); ++ pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); ++ } ++ ++ switch (srso_cmd) { ++ case SRSO_CMD_OFF: ++ return; ++ ++ case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE: ++ if (has_microcode) { ++ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE; ++ pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET: ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { ++ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS); ++ else ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO); ++ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET; ++ } else { ++ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); ++ return; ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ break; ++ ++ } ++ ++ pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode")); ++} ++ ++#undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt + + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS +@@ -2506,6 +2597,13 @@ static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); + } + ++static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf) ++{ ++ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n", ++ srso_strings[srso_mitigation], ++ (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode")); ++} ++ + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf, unsigned int bug) + { +@@ -2558,6 +2656,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de + case X86_BUG_GDS: + return gds_show_state(buf); + ++ case X86_BUG_SRSO: ++ return srso_show_state(buf); ++ + default: + break; + } +@@ -2627,4 +2728,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, + { + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS); + } ++ ++ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) ++{ ++ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO); ++} + #endif +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1246,6 +1246,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ + #define SMT_RSB BIT(4) + /* CPU is affected by GDS */ + #define GDS BIT(5) ++/* CPU is affected by SRSO */ ++#define SRSO BIT(6) + + static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), +@@ -1279,8 +1281,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_ + + VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), +- VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB), ++ VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB), ++ VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO), + {} + }; + +@@ -1411,6 +1414,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); + ++ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO)) ++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO); ++ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) + return; + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +@@ -133,7 +133,20 @@ SECTIONS + LOCK_TEXT + KPROBES_TEXT + ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN ++#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO ++ *(.text.__x86.rethunk_untrain) ++#endif ++ + ENTRY_TEXT ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO ++ /* ++ * See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s ++ * definition. ++ */ ++ . = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20); ++ *(.text.__x86.rethunk_safe) ++#endif + ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END + SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT + STATIC_CALL_TEXT +@@ -141,13 +154,15 @@ SECTIONS + + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + __indirect_thunk_start = .; +- *(.text.__x86.*) ++ *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) ++ *(.text.__x86.return_thunk) + __indirect_thunk_end = .; + #endif + } :text =0xcccc + + /* End of text section, which should occupy whole number of pages */ + _etext = .; ++ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + X86_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN +@@ -492,6 +507,21 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store); + "fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area"); + #endif + ++ #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK ++. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned"); ++. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned"); ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO ++/* ++ * GNU ld cannot do XOR so do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR ++ * of the two function addresses: ++ */ ++. = ASSERT(((srso_untrain_ret_alias | srso_safe_ret_alias) - ++ (srso_untrain_ret_alias & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)), ++ "SRSO function pair won't alias"); ++#endif ++ + #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + + #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE +--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S ++++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk + +@@ -74,6 +75,45 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) + */ + #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK + ++/* ++ * srso_untrain_ret_alias() and srso_safe_ret_alias() are placed at ++ * special addresses: ++ * ++ * - srso_untrain_ret_alias() is 2M aligned ++ * - srso_safe_ret_alias() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14 ++ * and 20 in its virtual address are set (while those bits in the ++ * srso_untrain_ret_alias() function are cleared). ++ * ++ * This guarantees that those two addresses will alias in the branch ++ * target buffer of Zen3/4 generations, leading to any potential ++ * poisoned entries at that BTB slot to get evicted. ++ * ++ * As a result, srso_safe_ret_alias() becomes a safe return. ++ */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO ++ .section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain ++ ++SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) ++ ASM_NOP2 ++ lfence ++ jmp __x86_return_thunk ++SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias) ++__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias) ++ ++ .section .text.__x86.rethunk_safe ++#endif ++ ++/* Needs a definition for the __x86_return_thunk alternative below. */ ++SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) ++#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO ++ add $8, %_ASM_SP ++ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ++#endif ++ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ++ ret ++ int3 ++SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias) ++ + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk + + /* +@@ -86,7 +126,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) + * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction. + */ + .align 64 +- .skip 63, 0xcc ++ .skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc + SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + /* +@@ -118,10 +158,10 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, + * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation + * which will be contained safely by the INT3. + */ +-SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ++SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + ret + int3 +-SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) ++SYM_CODE_END(__ret) + + /* + * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete. +@@ -132,11 +172,45 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) + * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction. + * INT3 is for SLS protection. + */ +- jmp __x86_return_thunk ++ jmp __ret + int3 + SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) + __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) + ++/* ++ * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret() ++ * above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a ++ * ++ * movabs $0xccccccc308c48348,%rax ++ * ++ * and when the return thunk executes the inner label srso_safe_ret() ++ * later, it is a stack manipulation and a RET which is mispredicted and ++ * thus a "safe" one to use. ++ */ ++ .align 64 ++ .skip 64 - (srso_safe_ret - srso_untrain_ret), 0xcc ++SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) ++ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR ++ .byte 0x48, 0xb8 ++ ++SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ++ add $8, %_ASM_SP ++ ret ++ int3 ++ int3 ++ int3 ++ lfence ++ call srso_safe_ret ++ int3 ++SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret) ++SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret) ++__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret) ++ ++SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk) ++ ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \ ++ "call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS ++ int3 ++SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) + EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) + + #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ +--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c ++++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c +@@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds(struct devic + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); + } + ++ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, ++ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) ++{ ++ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); ++} ++ + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); +@@ -595,6 +601,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show + static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); + static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL); ++static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL); + + static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, +@@ -609,6 +616,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner + &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, + &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, + &dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr, ++ &dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr, + NULL + }; + +--- a/include/linux/cpu.h ++++ b/include/linux/cpu.h +@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data( + char *buf); + extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); ++extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, ++ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); + + extern __printf(4, 5) + struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, +--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c ++++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +@@ -796,5 +796,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sy + + bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) + { +- return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk"); ++ return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk") || ++ !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_untrain_ret") || ++ !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_safe_ret") || ++ !strcmp(sym->name, "__ret"); + } diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb-on-vmexit.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb-on-vmexit.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ec04bb1ffe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb-on-vmexit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From ffbe55fe979af533ce04833ccdf8f25c598bb93f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 13:53:41 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: d893832d0e1ef41c72cdae444268c1d64a2be8ad + +Add the option to flush IBPB only on VMEXIT in order to protect from +malicious guests but one otherwise trusts the software that runs on the +hypervisor. + +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 +++- + arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 3 +++ + 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ + + #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */ + #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT (11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */ + + /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -2316,6 +2316,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation { + SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE, + SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET, + SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB, ++ SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, + }; + + enum srso_mitigation_cmd { +@@ -2323,6 +2324,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation_cmd { + SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE, + SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET, + SRSO_CMD_IBPB, ++ SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, + }; + + static const char * const srso_strings[] = { +@@ -2330,6 +2332,7 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] + [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", ++ [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only" + }; + + static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE; +@@ -2348,6 +2351,8 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(cha + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; + else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB; ++ else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit")) ++ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; + else + pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str); + +@@ -2431,6 +2436,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto pred_cmd; + } ++ break; ++ ++ case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT: ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { ++ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) { ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); ++ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; ++ } ++ } else { ++ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); ++ goto pred_cmd; ++ } ++ break; ++ + default: + break; + } +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +@@ -1485,7 +1485,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp + + if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) { + sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb; +- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); ++ ++ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT)) ++ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } + if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) + avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +@@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) + */ + UNTRAIN_RET + ++ /* SRSO */ ++ ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ++ + /* + * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent + * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dc1da03b72f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From b68e2e6932c74a8d467a494691ece4b174d71fdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:04:35 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Add IBPB + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: 233d6f68b98d480a7c42ebe78c38f79d44741ca9 + +Add the option to mitigate using IBPB on a kernel entry. Pull in the +Retbleed alternative so that the IBPB call from there can be used. Also, +if Retbleed mitigation is done using IBPB, the same mitigation can and +must be used here. + +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ++- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ + * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. + */ + .macro UNTRAIN_RET +-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) ++#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ ++ defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO) + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ + CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -2315,18 +2315,21 @@ enum srso_mitigation { + SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE, + SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE, + SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET, ++ SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB, + }; + + enum srso_mitigation_cmd { + SRSO_CMD_OFF, + SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE, + SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET, ++ SRSO_CMD_IBPB, + }; + + static const char * const srso_strings[] = { + [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET", ++ [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", + }; + + static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE; +@@ -2343,6 +2346,8 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(cha + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE; + else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; ++ else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) ++ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB; + else + pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str); + +@@ -2384,6 +2389,14 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); + } + ++ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { ++ if (has_microcode) { ++ pr_err("Retbleed IBPB mitigation enabled, using same for SRSO\n"); ++ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; ++ goto pred_cmd; ++ } ++ } ++ + switch (srso_cmd) { + case SRSO_CMD_OFF: + return; +@@ -2408,6 +2421,16 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + } + break; + ++ case SRSO_CMD_IBPB: ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { ++ if (has_microcode) { ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); ++ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; ++ } ++ } else { ++ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); ++ goto pred_cmd; ++ } + default: + break; + } diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb_brtype-support.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb_brtype-support.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fc19e90136a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-ibpb_brtype-support.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From a7ff37a3eec5020f9750360f956240baea4f0ef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 11:13:40 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: 79113e4060aba744787a81edb9014f2865193854 + +Add support for the synthetic CPUID flag which "if this bit is 1, +it indicates that MSR 49h (PRED_CMD) bit 0 (IBPB) flushes all branch +type predictions from the CPU branch predictor." + +This flag is there so that this capability in guests can be detected +easily (otherwise one would have to track microcode revisions which is +impossible for guests). + +It is also needed only for Zen3 and -4. The other two (Zen1 and -2) +always flush branch type predictions by default. + +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -426,6 +426,8 @@ + #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */ + #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ + ++#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */ ++ + /* + * BUG word(s) + */ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -2356,10 +2356,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + +- has_microcode = cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(); ++ /* ++ * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order ++ * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation. ++ */ ++ has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(); + if (!has_microcode) { + pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n"); + pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); ++ } else { ++ /* ++ * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf) ++ * flag for guests. ++ */ ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); + } + + switch (srso_cmd) { diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-srso_no-support.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-srso_no-support.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f468f8b0929 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-add-srso_no-support.patch @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +From 346ee6c88c4d2b2902a35d2b84521d88186c32ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 17:43:40 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Add SRSO_NO support + +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" + +Upstream commit: 1b5277c0ea0b247393a9c426769fde18cff5e2f6 + +Add support for the CPUID flag which denotes that the CPU is not +affected by SRSO. + +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 +++--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 12 ++++++------ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++++-- + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 +++ + 7 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -426,7 +426,9 @@ + #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */ + #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ + ++#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (20*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */ + #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (20*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */ + + /* + * BUG word(s) +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ + + #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ + #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ ++#define PRED_CMD_SBPB BIT(7) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */ + + #define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e + #define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +@@ -318,11 +318,11 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int + : "memory"); + } + ++extern u64 x86_pred_cmd; ++ + static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) + { +- u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB; +- +- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); ++ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + } + + /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +@@ -1249,14 +1249,14 @@ bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) + { + u8 fam = boot_cpu_data.x86; + +- if (fam == 0x17) { +- /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */ ++ /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */ ++ if (fam == 0x17) + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB); +- } else if (fam == 0x19) { ++ /* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */ ++ else if (fam == 0x19) ++ return !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB); ++ else + return false; +- } +- +- return false; + } + + static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + ++u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd); ++ + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); + + /* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */ +@@ -2354,7 +2357,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + bool has_microcode; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off()) +- return; ++ goto pred_cmd; + + /* + * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order +@@ -2367,9 +2370,18 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + } else { + /* + * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf) +- * flag for guests. ++ * flags for guests. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB); ++ ++ /* ++ * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right ++ * IBPB microcode has been applied. ++ */ ++ if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) && ++ (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED)) ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); + } + + switch (srso_cmd) { +@@ -2392,16 +2404,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); +- return; ++ goto pred_cmd; + } + break; + + default: + break; +- + } + + pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode")); ++ ++pred_cmd: ++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) || ++ srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) ++ x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB; + } + + #undef pr_fmt +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -1414,8 +1414,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); + +- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO)) +- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO); ++ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) { ++ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO)) ++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO); ++ } + + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) + return; +--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +@@ -736,6 +736,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) + F(PMM) | F(PMM_EN) + ); + ++ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) ++ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); ++ + /* + * Hide RDTSCP and RDPID if either feature is reported as supported but + * probing MSR_TSC_AUX failed. This is purely a sanity check and diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-fix-return-thunks-in-generated-code.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-fix-return-thunks-in-generated-code.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6638963bdaa --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-fix-return-thunks-in-generated-code.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From b07ad30ad7d510c3bc0398a8b4ee98293bca7c77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Poimboeuf +Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 17:28:43 -0500 +Subject: x86/srso: Fix return thunks in generated code + +From: Josh Poimboeuf + +Upstream commit: 238ec850b95a02dcdff3edc86781aa913549282f + +Set X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK when enabling the SRSO mitigation so that +generated code (e.g., ftrace, static call, eBPF) generates "jmp +__x86_return_thunk" instead of RET. + + [ bp: Add a comment. ] + +Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation") +Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 4 +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +@@ -538,9 +538,7 @@ static int patch_return(void *addr, stru + { + int i = 0; + +- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK) || +- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO) || +- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS)) ++ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + return -1; + + bytes[i++] = RET_INSN_OPCODE; +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -2415,6 +2415,12 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + + case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { ++ /* ++ * Enable the return thunk for generated code ++ * like ftrace, static_call, etc. ++ */ ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); ++ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS); + else diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-srso-tie-sbpb-bit-setting-to-microcode-patch-detection.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-tie-sbpb-bit-setting-to-microcode-patch-detection.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ade894d967b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-srso-tie-sbpb-bit-setting-to-microcode-patch-detection.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From 5a15d8348881e9371afdf9f5357a135489496955 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" +Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 10:46:04 +0200 +Subject: x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection + +From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) + +commit 5a15d8348881e9371afdf9f5357a135489496955 upstream. + +The SBPB bit in MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is supported only after a microcode +patch has been applied so set X86_FEATURE_SBPB only then. Otherwise, +guests would attempt to set that bit and #GP on the MSR write. + +While at it, make SMT detection more robust as some guests - depending +on how and what CPUID leafs their report - lead to cpu_smt_control +getting set to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED but SRSO_NO should be set for any +guest incarnation where one simply cannot do SMT, for whatever reason. + +Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation") +Reported-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk +Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++---- + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +@@ -1247,16 +1247,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_highest_perf); + + bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) + { +- u8 fam = boot_cpu_data.x86; +- ++ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) { + /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */ +- if (fam == 0x17) ++ case 0x17: + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB); +- /* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */ +- else if (fam == 0x19) +- return !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB); +- else ++ case 0x19: ++ /* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */ ++ if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) { ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB); ++ return true; ++ } else { ++ return false; ++ } ++ default: + return false; ++ } + } + + static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -2383,14 +2383,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + * flags for guests. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); +- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB); + + /* + * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right + * IBPB microcode has been applied. + */ + if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) && +- (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED)) ++ (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); + } + +@@ -2463,8 +2462,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio + pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode")); + + pred_cmd: +- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) || +- srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) ++ if ((boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) && ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB)) + x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB; + } + diff --git a/queue-6.1/x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch b/queue-6.1/x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..073982cb618 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From fe3e0a13e597c1c8617814bf9b42ab732db5c26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Juergen Gross +Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 15:00:32 +0200 +Subject: x86/xen: Fix secondary processors' FPU initialization + +From: Juergen Gross + +commit fe3e0a13e597c1c8617814bf9b42ab732db5c26e upstream. + +Moving the call of fpu__init_cpu() from cpu_init() to start_secondary() +broke Xen PV guests, as those don't call start_secondary() for APs. + +Call fpu__init_cpu() in Xen's cpu_bringup(), which is the Xen PV +replacement of start_secondary(). + +Fixes: b81fac906a8f ("x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init()") +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross +Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) +Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky +Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230703130032.22916-1-jgross@suse.com +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c ++++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c +@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static void cpu_bringup(void) + + cr4_init(); + cpu_init(); ++ fpu__init_cpu(); + touch_softlockup_watchdog(); + + /* PVH runs in ring 0 and allows us to do native syscalls. Yay! */ diff --git a/queue-6.1/xen-netback-fix-buffer-overrun-triggered-by-unusual-packet.patch b/queue-6.1/xen-netback-fix-buffer-overrun-triggered-by-unusual-packet.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..242f0481590 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/xen-netback-fix-buffer-overrun-triggered-by-unusual-packet.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ross Lagerwall +Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 08:41:22 +0200 +Subject: xen/netback: Fix buffer overrun triggered by unusual packet + +From: Ross Lagerwall + +commit 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 upstream. + +It is possible that a guest can send a packet that contains a head + 18 +slots and yet has a len <= XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN. This causes nr_slots +to underflow in xenvif_get_requests() which then causes the subsequent +loop's termination condition to be wrong, causing a buffer overrun of +queue->tx_map_ops. + +Rework the code to account for the extra frag_overflow slots. + +This is CVE-2023-34319 / XSA-432. + +Fixes: ad7f402ae4f4 ("xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area") +Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall +Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant +Reviewed-by: Wei Liu +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 15 ++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c ++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct x + struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops; + struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first; + +- nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1; ++ nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + frag_overflow + 1; + + copy_count(skb) = 0; + XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->split_mask = 0; +@@ -462,8 +462,8 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct x + } + } + +- for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; +- shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) { ++ for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS; ++ shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) { + index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); + pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; + xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, +@@ -476,12 +476,12 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct x + txp++; + } + +- if (frag_overflow) { ++ if (nr_slots > 0) { + + shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb); + frags = shinfo->frags; + +- for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < frag_overflow; ++ for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; + shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { + index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); + pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; +@@ -492,6 +492,11 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct x + } + + skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; ++ } else if (nskb) { ++ /* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed ++ * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above. ++ */ ++ kfree_skb(nskb); + } + + (*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops;