From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 15:52:55 +0000 (+0200)
Subject: 5.4-stable patches
X-Git-Tag: v4.4.222~8
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=0d6e7453845bd9794e42d877f6417d7eb628968a;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git

5.4-stable patches

added patches:
	selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch
---

diff --git a/queue-5.4/selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch b/queue-5.4/selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c1e71a2417f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-5.4/selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 09:59:02 -0400
+Subject: selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
+
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+
+commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream.
+
+Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
+messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
+SELinux access control.  Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
+the first message in the sk_buff.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/hooks.c |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+@@ -5521,40 +5521,60 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *se
+ 
+ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+-	int err = 0;
+-	u32 perm;
++	int rc = 0;
++	unsigned int msg_len;
++	unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
++	unsigned char *data = skb->data;
+ 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+ 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
++	u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
++	u32 perm;
+ 
+-	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
+-		err = -EINVAL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
++	while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
++		nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
+ 
+-	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+-	if (err) {
+-		if (err == -EINVAL) {
++		/* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
++		 *       users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
++		 *       length fields; our solution is to follow what
++		 *       netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
++		 *       messages with length fields that are clearly junk
++		 */
++		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
++			return 0;
++
++		rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
++		if (rc == 0) {
++			rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
++			if (rc)
++				return rc;
++		} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
++			/* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
+ 			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
+-			       " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+-			       " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
+-			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+-			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
+-			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+-			if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
+-			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
+-				err = 0;
++				" message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
++				" pid=%d comm=%s\n",
++				sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
++				secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
++				task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
++			if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
++			    !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
++				return rc;
++			rc = 0;
++		} else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
++			/* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
++			rc = 0;
++		} else {
++			return rc;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		/* Ignore */
+-		if (err == -ENOENT)
+-			err = 0;
+-		goto out;
++		/* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
++		msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
++		if (msg_len >= data_len)
++			return 0;
++		data_len -= msg_len;
++		data += msg_len;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+-out:
+-	return err;
++	return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
diff --git a/queue-5.4/series b/queue-5.4/series
index 3ddd3588297..4ed15abf483 100644
--- a/queue-5.4/series
+++ b/queue-5.4/series
@@ -54,3 +54,4 @@ nfs-fix-potential-posix_acl-refcnt-leak-in-nfs3_set_acl.patch
 dmaengine-dmatest-fix-iteration-non-stop-logic.patch
 dmaengine-dmatest-fix-process-hang-when-reading-wait-parameter.patch
 arm64-vdso-add-fasynchronous-unwind-tables-to-cflags.patch
+selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch