From: Sasha Levin Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2024 12:55:11 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Fixes for 5.4 X-Git-Tag: v6.1.105~116 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=25317ed7cb5232b36b9b8ae5f64534c5a45005bc;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git Fixes for 5.4 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- diff --git a/queue-5.4/acpi-battery-create-alarm-sysfs-attribute-atomically.patch b/queue-5.4/acpi-battery-create-alarm-sysfs-attribute-atomically.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dc7b3d48a04 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/acpi-battery-create-alarm-sysfs-attribute-atomically.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 7529542d0c4292ba884d384e7d43ffc32bc74db6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 09:27:16 +0200 +Subject: ACPI: battery: create alarm sysfs attribute atomically +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Thomas Weißschuh + +[ Upstream commit a231eed10ed5a290129fda36ad7bcc263c53ff7d ] + +Let the power supply core register the attribute. +This ensures that the attribute is created before the device is +announced to userspace, avoid a race condition. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh +Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/acpi/battery.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/battery.c b/drivers/acpi/battery.c +index a49a09e3de1b3..af78f76a28729 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/battery.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/battery.c +@@ -681,12 +681,18 @@ static ssize_t acpi_battery_alarm_store(struct device *dev, + return count; + } + +-static const struct device_attribute alarm_attr = { ++static struct device_attribute alarm_attr = { + .attr = {.name = "alarm", .mode = 0644}, + .show = acpi_battery_alarm_show, + .store = acpi_battery_alarm_store, + }; + ++static struct attribute *acpi_battery_attrs[] = { ++ &alarm_attr.attr, ++ NULL ++}; ++ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(acpi_battery); ++ + /* + * The Battery Hooking API + * +@@ -823,7 +829,10 @@ static void __exit battery_hook_exit(void) + + static int sysfs_add_battery(struct acpi_battery *battery) + { +- struct power_supply_config psy_cfg = { .drv_data = battery, }; ++ struct power_supply_config psy_cfg = { ++ .drv_data = battery, ++ .attr_grp = acpi_battery_groups, ++ }; + bool full_cap_broken = false; + + if (!ACPI_BATTERY_CAPACITY_VALID(battery->full_charge_capacity) && +@@ -868,7 +877,7 @@ static int sysfs_add_battery(struct acpi_battery *battery) + return result; + } + battery_hook_add_battery(battery); +- return device_create_file(&battery->bat->dev, &alarm_attr); ++ return 0; + } + + static void sysfs_remove_battery(struct acpi_battery *battery) +@@ -879,7 +888,6 @@ static void sysfs_remove_battery(struct acpi_battery *battery) + return; + } + battery_hook_remove_battery(battery); +- device_remove_file(&battery->bat->dev, &alarm_attr); + power_supply_unregister(battery->bat); + battery->bat = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&battery->sysfs_lock); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/acpi-sbs-manage-alarm-sysfs-attribute-through-psy-co.patch b/queue-5.4/acpi-sbs-manage-alarm-sysfs-attribute-through-psy-co.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..57b6bc4d396 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/acpi-sbs-manage-alarm-sysfs-attribute-through-psy-co.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From 630db6d885aa6d7906caddcc5fc11b309edccd19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 13:13:28 +0200 +Subject: ACPI: SBS: manage alarm sysfs attribute through psy core +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Thomas Weißschuh + +[ Upstream commit 6bad28cfc30988a845fb3f59a99f4b8a4ce8fe95 ] + +Let the power supply core register the attribute. + +This ensures that the attribute is created before the device is +announced to userspace, avoiding a race condition. + +Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh +Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/acpi/sbs.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sbs.c b/drivers/acpi/sbs.c +index 6e88224f60f09..4aa55d8d43859 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/sbs.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/sbs.c +@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ struct acpi_battery { + u16 spec; + u8 id; + u8 present:1; +- u8 have_sysfs_alarm:1; + }; + + #define to_acpi_battery(x) power_supply_get_drvdata(x) +@@ -465,12 +464,18 @@ static ssize_t acpi_battery_alarm_store(struct device *dev, + return count; + } + +-static const struct device_attribute alarm_attr = { ++static struct device_attribute alarm_attr = { + .attr = {.name = "alarm", .mode = 0644}, + .show = acpi_battery_alarm_show, + .store = acpi_battery_alarm_store, + }; + ++static struct attribute *acpi_battery_attrs[] = { ++ &alarm_attr.attr, ++ NULL ++}; ++ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(acpi_battery); ++ + /* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Driver Interface + -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +@@ -512,7 +517,10 @@ static int acpi_battery_read(struct acpi_battery *battery) + static int acpi_battery_add(struct acpi_sbs *sbs, int id) + { + struct acpi_battery *battery = &sbs->battery[id]; +- struct power_supply_config psy_cfg = { .drv_data = battery, }; ++ struct power_supply_config psy_cfg = { ++ .drv_data = battery, ++ .attr_grp = acpi_battery_groups, ++ }; + int result; + + battery->id = id; +@@ -542,10 +550,6 @@ static int acpi_battery_add(struct acpi_sbs *sbs, int id) + goto end; + } + +- result = device_create_file(&battery->bat->dev, &alarm_attr); +- if (result) +- goto end; +- battery->have_sysfs_alarm = 1; + end: + printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "%s [%s]: Battery Slot [%s] (battery %s)\n", + ACPI_SBS_DEVICE_NAME, acpi_device_bid(sbs->device), +@@ -557,11 +561,8 @@ static void acpi_battery_remove(struct acpi_sbs *sbs, int id) + { + struct acpi_battery *battery = &sbs->battery[id]; + +- if (battery->bat) { +- if (battery->have_sysfs_alarm) +- device_remove_file(&battery->bat->dev, &alarm_attr); ++ if (battery->bat) + power_supply_unregister(battery->bat); +- } + } + + static int acpi_charger_add(struct acpi_sbs *sbs) +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/bluetooth-l2cap-always-unlock-channel-in-l2cap_conle.patch b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-l2cap-always-unlock-channel-in-l2cap_conle.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..592156b15e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-l2cap-always-unlock-channel-in-l2cap_conle.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From c8fc98d9537d61aff03150117fa260deb1809ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 12:19:36 +0300 +Subject: Bluetooth: l2cap: always unlock channel in l2cap_conless_channel() + +From: Dmitry Antipov + +[ Upstream commit c531e63871c0b50c8c4e62c048535a08886fba3e ] + +Add missing call to 'l2cap_chan_unlock()' on receive error handling +path in 'l2cap_conless_channel()'. + +Fixes: a24cce144b98 ("Bluetooth: Fix reference counting of global L2CAP channels") +Reported-by: syzbot+45ac74737e866894acb0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=45ac74737e866894acb0 +Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov +Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +index 2eea802a9cb2f..874f12d93bfa2 100644 +--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c ++++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +@@ -7089,6 +7089,7 @@ static void l2cap_conless_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __le16 psm, + bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.psm = psm; + + if (!chan->ops->recv(chan, skb)) { ++ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); + return; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/btrfs-fix-bitmap-leak-when-loading-free-space-cache-.patch b/queue-5.4/btrfs-fix-bitmap-leak-when-loading-free-space-cache-.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..21053230c8f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/btrfs-fix-bitmap-leak-when-loading-free-space-cache-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 42d6c0f6df45296ace55dabcba0a85c0ac62f3f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 15:40:59 +0100 +Subject: btrfs: fix bitmap leak when loading free space cache on duplicate + entry + +From: Filipe Manana + +[ Upstream commit 320d8dc612660da84c3b70a28658bb38069e5a9a ] + +If we failed to link a free space entry because there's already a +conflicting entry for the same offset, we free the free space entry but +we don't free the associated bitmap that we had just allocated before. +Fix that by freeing the bitmap before freeing the entry. + +Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn +Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana +Reviewed-by: David Sterba +Signed-off-by: David Sterba +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c b/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c +index 0cb93f73acb2d..af89fce57ff75 100644 +--- a/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c ++++ b/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c +@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static int __load_free_space_cache(struct btrfs_root *root, struct inode *inode, + spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock); + btrfs_err(fs_info, + "Duplicate entries in free space cache, dumping"); ++ kmem_cache_free(btrfs_free_space_bitmap_cachep, e->bitmap); + kmem_cache_free(btrfs_free_space_cachep, e); + goto free_cache; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/clocksource-drivers-sh_cmt-address-race-condition-fo.patch b/queue-5.4/clocksource-drivers-sh_cmt-address-race-condition-fo.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d8ef48f1bb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/clocksource-drivers-sh_cmt-address-race-condition-fo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +From ed4bd3c4c5e19b03947fe0f9625820b4b3998af6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 21:02:30 +0200 +Subject: clocksource/drivers/sh_cmt: Address race condition for clock events +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Niklas Söderlund + +[ Upstream commit db19d3aa77612983a02bd223b3f273f896b243cf ] + +There is a race condition in the CMT interrupt handler. In the interrupt +handler the driver sets a driver private flag, FLAG_IRQCONTEXT. This +flag is used to indicate any call to set_next_event() should not be +directly propagated to the device, but instead cached. This is done as +the interrupt handler itself reprograms the device when needed before it +completes and this avoids this operation to take place twice. + +It is unclear why this design was chosen, my suspicion is to allow the +struct clock_event_device.event_handler callback, which is called while +the FLAG_IRQCONTEXT is set, can update the next event without having to +write to the device twice. + +Unfortunately there is a race between when the FLAG_IRQCONTEXT flag is +set and later cleared where the interrupt handler have already started to +write the next event to the device. If set_next_event() is called in +this window the value is only cached in the driver but not written. This +leads to the board to misbehave, or worse lockup and produce a splat. + + rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: + rcu: 0-...!: (0 ticks this GP) idle=f5e0/0/0x0 softirq=519/519 fqs=0 (false positive?) + rcu: (detected by 1, t=6502 jiffies, g=-595, q=77 ncpus=2) + Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0: + NMI backtrace for cpu 0 + CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-arm64-renesas-00019-g74a6f86eaf1c-dirty #20 + Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) + pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) + pc : tick_check_broadcast_expired+0xc/0x40 + lr : cpu_idle_poll.isra.0+0x8c/0x168 + sp : ffff800081c63d70 + x29: ffff800081c63d70 x28: 00000000580000c8 x27: 00000000bfee5610 + x26: 0000000000000027 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 + x23: ffff00007fbb9100 x22: ffff8000818f1008 x21: ffff8000800ef07c + x20: ffff800081c79ec0 x19: ffff800081c70c28 x18: 0000000000000000 + x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffc2c717d8 + x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff000009c18080 x12: ffff8000825f7fc0 + x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000818f3cd4 x9 : 0000000000000028 + x8 : ffff800081c79ec0 x7 : ffff800081c73000 x6 : 0000000000000000 + x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff7ffffe286000 x3 : 0000000000000000 + x2 : ffff7ffffe286000 x1 : ffff800082972900 x0 : ffff8000818f1008 + Call trace: + tick_check_broadcast_expired+0xc/0x40 + do_idle+0x9c/0x280 + cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x40 + kernel_init+0x0/0x11c + do_one_initcall+0x0/0x260 + __primary_switched+0x80/0x88 + rcu: rcu_preempt kthread timer wakeup didn't happen for 6501 jiffies! g-595 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x402 + rcu: Possible timer handling issue on cpu=0 timer-softirq=262 + rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 6502 jiffies! g-595 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x402 ->cpu=0 + rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. + rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump: + task:rcu_preempt state:I stack:0 pid:15 tgid:15 ppid:2 flags:0x00000008 + Call trace: + __switch_to+0xbc/0x100 + __schedule+0x358/0xbe0 + schedule+0x48/0x148 + schedule_timeout+0xc4/0x138 + rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x12c/0x764 + rcu_gp_kthread+0x208/0x298 + kthread+0x10c/0x110 + ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 + +The design have been part of the driver since it was first merged in +early 2009. It becomes increasingly harder to trigger the issue the +older kernel version one tries. It only takes a few boots on v6.10-rc5, +while hundreds of boots are needed to trigger it on v5.10. + +Close the race condition by using the CMT channel lock for the two +competing sections. The channel lock was added to the driver after its +initial design. + +Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240702190230.3825292-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se +Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/clocksource/sh_cmt.c | 13 ++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/sh_cmt.c b/drivers/clocksource/sh_cmt.c +index b1ec79ddb7f2a..66789b3838d05 100644 +--- a/drivers/clocksource/sh_cmt.c ++++ b/drivers/clocksource/sh_cmt.c +@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ static void sh_cmt_set_next(struct sh_cmt_channel *ch, unsigned long delta) + static irqreturn_t sh_cmt_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) + { + struct sh_cmt_channel *ch = dev_id; ++ unsigned long flags; + + /* clear flags */ + sh_cmt_write_cmcsr(ch, sh_cmt_read_cmcsr(ch) & +@@ -540,6 +541,8 @@ static irqreturn_t sh_cmt_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) + + ch->flags &= ~FLAG_SKIPEVENT; + ++ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ch->lock, flags); ++ + if (ch->flags & FLAG_REPROGRAM) { + ch->flags &= ~FLAG_REPROGRAM; + sh_cmt_clock_event_program_verify(ch, 1); +@@ -552,6 +555,8 @@ static irqreturn_t sh_cmt_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) + + ch->flags &= ~FLAG_IRQCONTEXT; + ++ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ch->lock, flags); ++ + return IRQ_HANDLED; + } + +@@ -750,12 +755,18 @@ static int sh_cmt_clock_event_next(unsigned long delta, + struct clock_event_device *ced) + { + struct sh_cmt_channel *ch = ced_to_sh_cmt(ced); ++ unsigned long flags; + + BUG_ON(!clockevent_state_oneshot(ced)); ++ ++ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ch->lock, flags); ++ + if (likely(ch->flags & FLAG_IRQCONTEXT)) + ch->next_match_value = delta - 1; + else +- sh_cmt_set_next(ch, delta - 1); ++ __sh_cmt_set_next(ch, delta - 1); ++ ++ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ch->lock, flags); + + return 0; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/drm-amdgpu-fix-the-null-pointer-dereference-to-ras_m.patch b/queue-5.4/drm-amdgpu-fix-the-null-pointer-dereference-to-ras_m.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c8d6af44365 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/drm-amdgpu-fix-the-null-pointer-dereference-to-ras_m.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From f8ecfb611eb3b9ebd6e5c9008f82100fd664134c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Sat, 11 May 2024 15:48:02 +0800 +Subject: drm/amdgpu: Fix the null pointer dereference to ras_manager + +From: Ma Jun + +[ Upstream commit 4c11d30c95576937c6c35e6f29884761f2dddb43 ] + +Check ras_manager before using it + +Signed-off-by: Ma Jun +Reviewed-by: Lijo Lazar +Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras.c | 7 +++++-- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras.c +index b6fc191c353a7..96aad6cc83b1e 100644 +--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras.c ++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras.c +@@ -1053,12 +1053,15 @@ static void amdgpu_ras_interrupt_process_handler(struct work_struct *work) + int amdgpu_ras_interrupt_dispatch(struct amdgpu_device *adev, + struct ras_dispatch_if *info) + { +- struct ras_manager *obj = amdgpu_ras_find_obj(adev, &info->head); +- struct ras_ih_data *data = &obj->ih_data; ++ struct ras_manager *obj; ++ struct ras_ih_data *data; + ++ obj = amdgpu_ras_find_obj(adev, &info->head); + if (!obj) + return -EINVAL; + ++ data = &obj->ih_data; ++ + if (data->inuse == 0) + return 0; + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/irqchip-mbigen-fix-mbigen-node-address-layout.patch b/queue-5.4/irqchip-mbigen-fix-mbigen-node-address-layout.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1adae1d28c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/irqchip-mbigen-fix-mbigen-node-address-layout.patch @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From 0c92edbffbd1c0f42efcc279bcb32d54d33fe5cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 09:44:00 +0800 +Subject: irqchip/mbigen: Fix mbigen node address layout + +From: Yipeng Zou + +[ Upstream commit 6be6cba9c4371d27f78d900ccfe34bb880d9ee20 ] + +The mbigen interrupt chip has its per node registers located in a +contiguous region of page sized chunks. The code maps them into virtual +address space as a contiguous region and determines the address of a node +by using the node ID as index. + + mbigen chip + |-----------------|------------|--------------| + mgn_node_0 mgn_node_1 ... mgn_node_i +|--------------| |--------------| |----------------------| +[0x0000, 0x0x0FFF] [0x1000, 0x1FFF] [i*0x1000, (i+1)*0x1000 - 1] + +This works correctly up to 10 nodes, but then fails because the 11th's +array slot is used for the MGN_CLEAR registers. + + mbigen chip + |-----------|--------|--------|---------------|--------| +mgn_node_0 mgn_node_1 ... mgn_clear_register ... mgn_node_i + |-----------------| + [0xA000, 0xAFFF] + +Skip the MGN_CLEAR register space when calculating the offset for node IDs +greater than or equal to ten. + +Fixes: a6c2f87b8820 ("irqchip/mbigen: Implement the mbigen irq chip operation functions") +Signed-off-by: Yipeng Zou +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240730014400.1751530-1-zouyipeng@huawei.com +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c +index ff7627b577726..192950e9909b9 100644 +--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c ++++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c +@@ -64,6 +64,20 @@ struct mbigen_device { + void __iomem *base; + }; + ++static inline unsigned int get_mbigen_node_offset(unsigned int nid) ++{ ++ unsigned int offset = nid * MBIGEN_NODE_OFFSET; ++ ++ /* ++ * To avoid touched clear register in unexpected way, we need to directly ++ * skip clear register when access to more than 10 mbigen nodes. ++ */ ++ if (nid >= (REG_MBIGEN_CLEAR_OFFSET / MBIGEN_NODE_OFFSET)) ++ offset += MBIGEN_NODE_OFFSET; ++ ++ return offset; ++} ++ + static inline unsigned int get_mbigen_vec_reg(irq_hw_number_t hwirq) + { + unsigned int nid, pin; +@@ -72,8 +86,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_mbigen_vec_reg(irq_hw_number_t hwirq) + nid = hwirq / IRQS_PER_MBIGEN_NODE + 1; + pin = hwirq % IRQS_PER_MBIGEN_NODE; + +- return pin * 4 + nid * MBIGEN_NODE_OFFSET +- + REG_MBIGEN_VEC_OFFSET; ++ return pin * 4 + get_mbigen_node_offset(nid) + REG_MBIGEN_VEC_OFFSET; + } + + static inline void get_mbigen_type_reg(irq_hw_number_t hwirq, +@@ -88,8 +101,7 @@ static inline void get_mbigen_type_reg(irq_hw_number_t hwirq, + *mask = 1 << (irq_ofst % 32); + ofst = irq_ofst / 32 * 4; + +- *addr = ofst + nid * MBIGEN_NODE_OFFSET +- + REG_MBIGEN_TYPE_OFFSET; ++ *addr = ofst + get_mbigen_node_offset(nid) + REG_MBIGEN_TYPE_OFFSET; + } + + static inline void get_mbigen_clear_reg(irq_hw_number_t hwirq, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/jbd2-avoid-memleak-in-jbd2_journal_write_metadata_bu.patch b/queue-5.4/jbd2-avoid-memleak-in-jbd2_journal_write_metadata_bu.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a1ed787435b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/jbd2-avoid-memleak-in-jbd2_journal_write_metadata_bu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From d0a79948c1bef7a708aa94d79745092a9ca49234 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 19:24:30 +0800 +Subject: jbd2: avoid memleak in jbd2_journal_write_metadata_buffer + +From: Kemeng Shi + +[ Upstream commit cc102aa24638b90e04364d64e4f58a1fa91a1976 ] + +The new_bh is from alloc_buffer_head, we should call free_buffer_head to +free it in error case. + +Signed-off-by: Kemeng Shi +Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi +Reviewed-by: Jan Kara +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240514112438.1269037-2-shikemeng@huaweicloud.com +Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/jbd2/journal.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c +index 81bd7b29a10b6..cfa21c29f3123 100644 +--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c ++++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c +@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ int jbd2_journal_write_metadata_buffer(transaction_t *transaction, + tmp = jbd2_alloc(bh_in->b_size, GFP_NOFS); + if (!tmp) { + brelse(new_bh); ++ free_buffer_head(new_bh); + return -ENOMEM; + } + jbd_lock_bh_state(bh_in); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/md-raid5-avoid-bug_on-while-continue-reshape-after-r.patch b/queue-5.4/md-raid5-avoid-bug_on-while-continue-reshape-after-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4e6452f5d4d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/md-raid5-avoid-bug_on-while-continue-reshape-after-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 93edbb56f45b455e56f967ea0a354d18d2067203 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2024 21:22:51 +0800 +Subject: md/raid5: avoid BUG_ON() while continue reshape after reassembling + +From: Yu Kuai + +[ Upstream commit 305a5170dc5cf3d395bb4c4e9239bca6d0b54b49 ] + +Currently, mdadm support --revert-reshape to abort the reshape while +reassembling, as the test 07revert-grow. However, following BUG_ON() +can be triggerred by the test: + +kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:6278! +invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI +irq event stamp: 158985 +CPU: 6 PID: 891 Comm: md0_reshape Not tainted 6.9.0-03335-g7592a0b0049a #94 +RIP: 0010:reshape_request+0x3f1/0xe60 +Call Trace: + + raid5_sync_request+0x43d/0x550 + md_do_sync+0xb7a/0x2110 + md_thread+0x294/0x2b0 + kthread+0x147/0x1c0 + ret_from_fork+0x59/0x70 + ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 + + +Root cause is that --revert-reshape update the raid_disks from 5 to 4, +while reshape position is still set, and after reassembling the array, +reshape position will be read from super block, then during reshape the +checking of 'writepos' that is caculated by old reshape position will +fail. + +Fix this panic the easy way first, by converting the BUG_ON() to +WARN_ON(), and stop the reshape if checkings fail. + +Noted that mdadm must fix --revert-shape as well, and probably md/raid +should enhance metadata validation as well, however this means +reassemble will fail and there must be user tools to fix the wrong +metadata. + +Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai +Signed-off-by: Song Liu +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240611132251.1967786-13-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/md/raid5.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c +index bba5e61cc1456..41556f5d4dcba 100644 +--- a/drivers/md/raid5.c ++++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c +@@ -5821,7 +5821,9 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, int *sk + safepos = conf->reshape_safe; + sector_div(safepos, data_disks); + if (mddev->reshape_backwards) { +- BUG_ON(writepos < reshape_sectors); ++ if (WARN_ON(writepos < reshape_sectors)) ++ return MaxSector; ++ + writepos -= reshape_sectors; + readpos += reshape_sectors; + safepos += reshape_sectors; +@@ -5839,14 +5841,18 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, int *sk + * to set 'stripe_addr' which is where we will write to. + */ + if (mddev->reshape_backwards) { +- BUG_ON(conf->reshape_progress == 0); ++ if (WARN_ON(conf->reshape_progress == 0)) ++ return MaxSector; ++ + stripe_addr = writepos; +- BUG_ON((mddev->dev_sectors & +- ~((sector_t)reshape_sectors - 1)) +- - reshape_sectors - stripe_addr +- != sector_nr); ++ if (WARN_ON((mddev->dev_sectors & ++ ~((sector_t)reshape_sectors - 1)) - ++ reshape_sectors - stripe_addr != sector_nr)) ++ return MaxSector; + } else { +- BUG_ON(writepos != sector_nr + reshape_sectors); ++ if (WARN_ON(writepos != sector_nr + reshape_sectors)) ++ return MaxSector; ++ + stripe_addr = sector_nr; + } + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/media-uvcvideo-fix-the-bandwdith-quirk-on-usb-3.x.patch b/queue-5.4/media-uvcvideo-fix-the-bandwdith-quirk-on-usb-3.x.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..07ddd3f1a01 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/media-uvcvideo-fix-the-bandwdith-quirk-on-usb-3.x.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 88cd9dbd85aadd3fc032c136de4a92ac80fd5b5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2024 19:00:40 +0200 +Subject: media: uvcvideo: Fix the bandwdith quirk on USB 3.x + +From: Michal Pecio + +[ Upstream commit 9e3d55fbd160b3ca376599a68b4cddfdc67d4153 ] + +The bandwidth fixup quirk doesn't know that SuperSpeed exists and has +the same 8 service intervals per millisecond as High Speed, hence its +calculations are wrong. + +Assume that all speeds from HS up use 8 intervals per millisecond. + +No further changes are needed, updated code has been confirmed to work +with all speeds from FS to SS. + +Signed-off-by: Michal Pecio +Reviewed-by: Ricardo Ribalda +Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240414190040.2255a0bc@foxbook +Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +index 43c9660b729e0..8a8271e23c63f 100644 +--- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c ++++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +@@ -207,13 +207,13 @@ static void uvc_fixup_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, + /* Compute a bandwidth estimation by multiplying the frame + * size by the number of video frames per second, divide the + * result by the number of USB frames (or micro-frames for +- * high-speed devices) per second and add the UVC header size +- * (assumed to be 12 bytes long). ++ * high- and super-speed devices) per second and add the UVC ++ * header size (assumed to be 12 bytes long). + */ + bandwidth = frame->wWidth * frame->wHeight / 8 * format->bpp; + bandwidth *= 10000000 / interval + 1; + bandwidth /= 1000; +- if (stream->dev->udev->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH) ++ if (stream->dev->udev->speed >= USB_SPEED_HIGH) + bandwidth /= 8; + bandwidth += 12; + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/media-uvcvideo-ignore-empty-ts-packets.patch b/queue-5.4/media-uvcvideo-ignore-empty-ts-packets.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1cd5c4b1009 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/media-uvcvideo-ignore-empty-ts-packets.patch @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +From 5eecce6f1d03308bd7df2e52f07bedcfea90f5f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2024 10:48:03 +0000 +Subject: media: uvcvideo: Ignore empty TS packets + +From: Ricardo Ribalda + +[ Upstream commit 5cd7c25f6f0576073b3d03bc4cfb1e8ca63a1195 ] + +Some SunplusIT cameras took a borderline interpretation of the UVC 1.5 +standard, and fill the PTS and SCR fields with invalid data if the +package does not contain data. + +"STC must be captured when the first video data of a video frame is put +on the USB bus." + +Some SunplusIT devices send, e.g., + +buffer: 0xa7755c00 len 000012 header:0x8c stc 00000000 sof 0000 pts 00000000 +buffer: 0xa7755c00 len 000012 header:0x8c stc 00000000 sof 0000 pts 00000000 +buffer: 0xa7755c00 len 000668 header:0x8c stc 73779dba sof 070c pts 7376d37a + +While the UVC specification meant that the first two packets shouldn't +have had the SCR bit set in the header. + +This borderline/buggy interpretation has been implemented in a variety +of devices, from directly SunplusIT and from other OEMs that rebrand +SunplusIT products. So quirking based on VID:PID will be problematic. + +All the affected modules have the following extension unit: +VideoControl Interface Descriptor: + guidExtensionCode {82066163-7050-ab49-b8cc-b3855e8d221d} + +But the vendor plans to use that GUID in the future and fix the bug, +this means that we should use heuristic to figure out the broken +packets. + +This patch takes care of this. + +lsusb of one of the affected cameras: + +Bus 001 Device 003: ID 1bcf:2a01 Sunplus Innovation Technology Inc. +Device Descriptor: + bLength 18 + bDescriptorType 1 + bcdUSB 2.01 + bDeviceClass 239 Miscellaneous Device + bDeviceSubClass 2 ? + bDeviceProtocol 1 Interface Association + bMaxPacketSize0 64 + idVendor 0x1bcf Sunplus Innovation Technology Inc. + idProduct 0x2a01 + bcdDevice 0.02 + iManufacturer 1 SunplusIT Inc + iProduct 2 HanChen Wise Camera + iSerial 3 01.00.00 + bNumConfigurations 1 + +Tested-by: HungNien Chen +Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky +Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart +Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda +Reviewed-by: Tomasz Figa +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240323-resend-hwtimestamp-v10-2-b08e590d97c7@chromium.org +Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +index 6dff8e2fadbac..43c9660b729e0 100644 +--- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c ++++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ uvc_video_clock_decode(struct uvc_streaming *stream, struct uvc_buffer *buf, + ktime_t time; + u16 host_sof; + u16 dev_sof; ++ u32 dev_stc; + + switch (data[1] & (UVC_STREAM_PTS | UVC_STREAM_SCR)) { + case UVC_STREAM_PTS | UVC_STREAM_SCR: +@@ -512,6 +513,34 @@ uvc_video_clock_decode(struct uvc_streaming *stream, struct uvc_buffer *buf, + if (dev_sof == stream->clock.last_sof) + return; + ++ dev_stc = get_unaligned_le32(&data[header_size - 6]); ++ ++ /* ++ * STC (Source Time Clock) is the clock used by the camera. The UVC 1.5 ++ * standard states that it "must be captured when the first video data ++ * of a video frame is put on the USB bus". This is generally understood ++ * as requiring devices to clear the payload header's SCR bit before ++ * the first packet containing video data. ++ * ++ * Most vendors follow that interpretation, but some (namely SunplusIT ++ * on some devices) always set the `UVC_STREAM_SCR` bit, fill the SCR ++ * field with 0's,and expect that the driver only processes the SCR if ++ * there is data in the packet. ++ * ++ * Ignore all the hardware timestamp information if we haven't received ++ * any data for this frame yet, the packet contains no data, and both ++ * STC and SOF are zero. This heuristics should be safe on compliant ++ * devices. This should be safe with compliant devices, as in the very ++ * unlikely case where a UVC 1.1 device would send timing information ++ * only before the first packet containing data, and both STC and SOF ++ * happen to be zero for a particular frame, we would only miss one ++ * clock sample from many and the clock recovery algorithm wouldn't ++ * suffer from this condition. ++ */ ++ if (buf && buf->bytesused == 0 && len == header_size && ++ dev_stc == 0 && dev_sof == 0) ++ return; ++ + stream->clock.last_sof = dev_sof; + + host_sof = usb_get_current_frame_number(stream->dev->udev); +@@ -549,7 +578,7 @@ uvc_video_clock_decode(struct uvc_streaming *stream, struct uvc_buffer *buf, + spin_lock_irqsave(&stream->clock.lock, flags); + + sample = &stream->clock.samples[stream->clock.head]; +- sample->dev_stc = get_unaligned_le32(&data[header_size - 6]); ++ sample->dev_stc = dev_stc; + sample->dev_sof = dev_sof; + sample->host_sof = host_sof; + sample->host_time = time; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-fec-stop-pps-on-driver-remove.patch b/queue-5.4/net-fec-stop-pps-on-driver-remove.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..80c5a828d8b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-fec-stop-pps-on-driver-remove.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From f92d674e49b0b724dd1f0d5c52c29c70ea816d6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 10:09:56 +0200 +Subject: net: fec: Stop PPS on driver remove +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Csókás, Bence + +[ Upstream commit 8fee6d5ad5fa18c270eedb2a2cdf58dbadefb94b ] + +PPS was not stopped in `fec_ptp_stop()`, called when +the adapter was removed. Consequentially, you couldn't +safely reload the driver with the PPS signal on. + +Fixes: 32cba57ba74b ("net: fec: introduce fec_ptp_stop and use in probe fail path") +Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAOMZO5BzcZR8PwKKwBssQq_wAGzVgf1ffwe_nhpQJjviTdxy-w@mail.gmail.com/T/#m01dcb810bfc451a492140f6797ca77443d0cb79f +Signed-off-by: Csókás, Bence +Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn +Reviewed-by: Frank Li +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240807080956.2556602-1-csokas.bence@prolan.hu +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c +index 37b8ad29b5b30..c5af845b1b253 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c +@@ -635,6 +635,9 @@ void fec_ptp_stop(struct platform_device *pdev) + struct net_device *ndev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + struct fec_enet_private *fep = netdev_priv(ndev); + ++ if (fep->pps_enable) ++ fec_ptp_enable_pps(fep, 0); ++ + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&fep->time_keep); + if (fep->ptp_clock) + ptp_clock_unregister(fep->ptp_clock); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-linkwatch-use-system_unbound_wq.patch b/queue-5.4/net-linkwatch-use-system_unbound_wq.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dfdd7ac9530 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-linkwatch-use-system_unbound_wq.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From a7d3abde1a50db7b75376b4ded46ca86318dbb26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 08:58:21 +0000 +Subject: net: linkwatch: use system_unbound_wq + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 3e7917c0cdad835a5121520fc5686d954b7a61ab ] + +linkwatch_event() grabs possibly very contended RTNL mutex. + +system_wq is not suitable for such work. + +Inspired by many noisy syzbot reports. + +3 locks held by kworker/0:7/5266: + #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3206 [inline] + #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x90a/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 + #1: ffffc90003f6fd00 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3207 [inline] + , at: process_scheduled_works+0x945/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 + #2: ffffffff8fa6f208 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: linkwatch_event+0xe/0x60 net/core/link_watch.c:276 + +Reported-by: syzbot +Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240805085821.1616528-1-edumazet@google.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/core/link_watch.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/core/link_watch.c b/net/core/link_watch.c +index 35b0e39030daf..a70b2adc47a16 100644 +--- a/net/core/link_watch.c ++++ b/net/core/link_watch.c +@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ static void linkwatch_schedule_work(int urgent) + * override the existing timer. + */ + if (test_bit(LW_URGENT, &linkwatch_flags)) +- mod_delayed_work(system_wq, &linkwatch_work, 0); ++ mod_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &linkwatch_work, 0); + else +- schedule_delayed_work(&linkwatch_work, delay); ++ queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &linkwatch_work, delay); + } + + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-usb-qmi_wwan-fix-memory-leak-for-not-ip-packets.patch b/queue-5.4/net-usb-qmi_wwan-fix-memory-leak-for-not-ip-packets.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b016b065e97 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-usb-qmi_wwan-fix-memory-leak-for-not-ip-packets.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From e507b12898c9ae49e96fe2cd4ced853cd4c8a6e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 15:55:12 +0200 +Subject: net: usb: qmi_wwan: fix memory leak for not ip packets +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Daniele Palmas + +[ Upstream commit 7ab107544b777c3bd7feb9fe447367d8edd5b202 ] + +Free the unused skb when not ip packets arrive. + +Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") +Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas +Acked-by: Bjørn Mork +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +index 17aa52ed892b5..3e219cf4dd851 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c ++++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) + break; + default: + /* not ip - do not know what to do */ ++ kfree_skb(skbn); + goto skip; + } + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/pci-add-edimax-vendor-id-to-pci_ids.h.patch b/queue-5.4/pci-add-edimax-vendor-id-to-pci_ids.h.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..95dd6beab41 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/pci-add-edimax-vendor-id-to-pci_ids.h.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From d8d6610de04e8cdbed88f2ec166e075fe583d010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 08:55:01 +0900 +Subject: PCI: Add Edimax Vendor ID to pci_ids.h + +From: FUJITA Tomonori + +[ Upstream commit eee5528890d54b22b46f833002355a5ee94c3bb4 ] + +Add the Edimax Vendor ID (0x1432) for an ethernet driver for Tehuti +Networks TN40xx chips. This ID can be used for Realtek 8180 and Ralink +rt28xx wireless drivers. + +Signed-off-by: FUJITA Tomonori +Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240623235507.108147-2-fujita.tomonori@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/linux/pci_ids.h | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/linux/pci_ids.h b/include/linux/pci_ids.h +index d8b188643a875..bf8548fbdf558 100644 +--- a/include/linux/pci_ids.h ++++ b/include/linux/pci_ids.h +@@ -2136,6 +2136,8 @@ + + #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_CHELSIO 0x1425 + ++#define PCI_VENDOR_ID_EDIMAX 0x1432 ++ + #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_ADLINK 0x144a + + #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_SAMSUNG 0x144d +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/r8169-remove-detection-of-chip-version-11-early-rtl8.patch b/queue-5.4/r8169-remove-detection-of-chip-version-11-early-rtl8.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e85da62f434 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/r8169-remove-detection-of-chip-version-11-early-rtl8.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 757b6878c7ecca73a234070ac7643d1211ca55c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 27 May 2024 21:20:16 +0200 +Subject: r8169: remove detection of chip version 11 (early RTL8168b) + +From: Heiner Kallweit + +[ Upstream commit 982300c115d229565d7af8e8b38aa1ee7bb1f5bd ] + +This early RTL8168b version was the first PCIe chip version, and it's +quite quirky. Last sign of life is from more than 15 yrs ago. +Let's remove detection of this chip version, we'll see whether anybody +complains. If not, support for this chip version can be removed a few +kernel versions later. + +Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/875cdcf4-843c-420a-ad5d-417447b68572@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +index 319f8d7a502da..32ea1d902a173 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c +@@ -2185,7 +2185,9 @@ static void rtl8169_get_mac_version(struct rtl8169_private *tp) + /* 8168B family. */ + { 0x7cf, 0x380, RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_12 }, + { 0x7c8, 0x380, RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_17 }, +- { 0x7c8, 0x300, RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_11 }, ++ /* This one is very old and rare, let's see if anybody complains. ++ * { 0x7c8, 0x300, RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_11 }, ++ */ + + /* 8101 family. */ + { 0x7c8, 0x448, RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_39 }, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/s390-sclp-prevent-release-of-buffer-in-i-o.patch b/queue-5.4/s390-sclp-prevent-release-of-buffer-in-i-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c9ede79c236 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/s390-sclp-prevent-release-of-buffer-in-i-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 5927cb656c6d4596c33f66d45558be27285f1074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 14:20:27 +0200 +Subject: s390/sclp: Prevent release of buffer in I/O + +From: Peter Oberparleiter + +[ Upstream commit bf365071ea92b9579d5a272679b74052a5643e35 ] + +When a task waiting for completion of a Store Data operation is +interrupted, an attempt is made to halt this operation. If this attempt +fails due to a hardware or firmware problem, there is a chance that the +SCLP facility might store data into buffers referenced by the original +operation at a later time. + +Handle this situation by not releasing the referenced data buffers if +the halt attempt fails. For current use cases, this might result in a +leak of few pages of memory in case of a rare hardware/firmware +malfunction. + +Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens +Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter +Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/s390/char/sclp_sd.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/s390/char/sclp_sd.c b/drivers/s390/char/sclp_sd.c +index 1e244f78f1929..64581433c3349 100644 +--- a/drivers/s390/char/sclp_sd.c ++++ b/drivers/s390/char/sclp_sd.c +@@ -319,8 +319,14 @@ static int sclp_sd_store_data(struct sclp_sd_data *result, u8 di) + &esize); + if (rc) { + /* Cancel running request if interrupted */ +- if (rc == -ERESTARTSYS) +- sclp_sd_sync(page, SD_EQ_HALT, di, 0, 0, NULL, NULL); ++ if (rc == -ERESTARTSYS) { ++ if (sclp_sd_sync(page, SD_EQ_HALT, di, 0, 0, NULL, NULL)) { ++ pr_warn("Could not stop Store Data request - leaking at least %zu bytes\n", ++ (size_t)dsize * PAGE_SIZE); ++ data = NULL; ++ asce = 0; ++ } ++ } + vfree(data); + goto out; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/sctp-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch b/queue-5.4/sctp-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0ab2f3ff986 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/sctp-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +From f9ec8cd589cdc1b8df80f4ef97337f0092ad232d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 16:46:24 -0700 +Subject: sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseport_add_sock(). + +From: Kuniyuki Iwashima + +[ Upstream commit 9ab0faa7f9ffe31296dbb9bbe6f76c72c14eea18 ] + +syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb in +reuseport_add_sock(). [0] + +The repro first creates a listener with SO_REUSEPORT. Then, it creates +another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first +listener. + +The second listen() calls reuseport_add_sock() with the first listener as +sk2, where sk2->sk_reuseport_cb is not expected to be cleared concurrently, +but the close() does clear it by reuseport_detach_sock(). + +The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseport_alloc(), +reuseport_add_sock(), and reuseport_detach_sock(). + +The caller of reuseport_alloc() and reuseport_{add,detach}_sock() must +provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same +reuseport group. + +Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and +all groups except one would be silently dead. + + 1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently + 2. No socket in the same group found in sctp_ep_hashtable[] + 3. Two sockets call reuseport_alloc() and form two reuseport groups + 4. Only one group hit first in __sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint() receives + incoming packets + +Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur. + +TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock. + +Let's apply the locking strategy to __sctp_hash_endpoint() and +__sctp_unhash_endpoint(). + +[0]: +Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI +KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] +CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 +RIP: 0010:reuseport_add_sock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:350 +Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14 +RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202 +RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000 +RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012 +RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385 +R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0 +R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 +FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 +CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 +CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 +DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 + DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 +Call Trace: + + __sctp_hash_endpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline] + sctp_hash_endpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790 + sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline] + sctp_inet_listen+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625 + __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1883 [inline] + __sys_listen+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894 + __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1902 [inline] + __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1900 [inline] + __x64_sys_listen+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900 + do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] + do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f +RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9 +Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 +RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000032 +RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9 +RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004 +RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0 +R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c +R13: 00007f24e465a5dc R14: 0020000000000001 R15: 00007ffcced5f7d8 + +Modules linked in: + +Fixes: 6ba845740267 ("sctp: process sk_reuseport in sctp_get_port_local") +Reported-by: syzbot+e6979a5d2f10ecb700e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e6979a5d2f10ecb700e4 +Tested-by: syzbot+e6979a5d2f10ecb700e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima +Acked-by: Xin Long +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240731234624.94055-1-kuniyu@amazon.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/sctp/input.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c +index 87a69335e5521..b1d3e342ac830 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/input.c ++++ b/net/sctp/input.c +@@ -722,15 +722,19 @@ static int __sctp_hash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) + struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk; + struct net *net = sock_net(sk); + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; ++ int err = 0; + + ep->hashent = sctp_ep_hashfn(net, ep->base.bind_addr.port); + head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[ep->hashent]; + ++ write_lock(&head->lock); + if (sk->sk_reuseport) { + bool any = sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk); + struct sctp_endpoint *ep2; + struct list_head *list; +- int cnt = 0, err = 1; ++ int cnt = 0; ++ ++ err = 1; + + list_for_each(list, &ep->base.bind_addr.address_list) + cnt++; +@@ -748,24 +752,24 @@ static int __sctp_hash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) + if (!err) { + err = reuseport_add_sock(sk, sk2, any); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto out; + break; + } else if (err < 0) { +- return err; ++ goto out; + } + } + + if (err) { + err = reuseport_alloc(sk, any); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto out; + } + } + +- write_lock(&head->lock); + hlist_add_head(&ep->node, &head->chain); ++out: + write_unlock(&head->lock); +- return 0; ++ return err; + } + + /* Add an endpoint to the hash. Local BH-safe. */ +@@ -790,10 +794,9 @@ static void __sctp_unhash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) + + head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[ep->hashent]; + ++ write_lock(&head->lock); + if (rcu_access_pointer(sk->sk_reuseport_cb)) + reuseport_detach_sock(sk); +- +- write_lock(&head->lock); + hlist_del_init(&ep->node); + write_unlock(&head->lock); + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/sctp-move-hlist_node-and-hashent-out-of-sctp_ep_comm.patch b/queue-5.4/sctp-move-hlist_node-and-hashent-out-of-sctp_ep_comm.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..790f1c8236c --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/sctp-move-hlist_node-and-hashent-out-of-sctp_ep_comm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +From 4c43be7aea5317e6912fb617fbff13d842f5d2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2021 16:40:30 -0500 +Subject: sctp: move hlist_node and hashent out of sctp_ep_common + +From: Xin Long + +[ Upstream commit 3d3b2f57d4447e6e9f4096ad01d0e4129f7bc7e9 ] + +Struct sctp_ep_common is included in both asoc and ep, but hlist_node +and hashent are only needed by ep after asoc_hashtable was dropped by +Commit b5eff7128366 ("sctp: drop the old assoc hashtable of sctp"). + +So it is better to move hlist_node and hashent from sctp_ep_common to +sctp_endpoint, and it saves some space for each asoc. + +Signed-off-by: Xin Long +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Stable-dep-of: 9ab0faa7f9ff ("sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseport_add_sock().") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 4 ++-- + include/net/sctp/structs.h | 8 ++++---- + net/sctp/input.c | 27 ++++++++++----------------- + net/sctp/proc.c | 10 ++++------ + net/sctp/socket.c | 6 +++--- + 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h +index 35c108a6b8720..aa29695f4bd79 100644 +--- a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h ++++ b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h +@@ -506,8 +506,8 @@ static inline int sctp_ep_hashfn(struct net *net, __u16 lport) + return (net_hash_mix(net) + lport) & (sctp_ep_hashsize - 1); + } + +-#define sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, head) \ +- hlist_for_each_entry(epb, head, node) ++#define sctp_for_each_hentry(ep, head) \ ++ hlist_for_each_entry(ep, head, node) + + /* Is a socket of this style? */ + #define sctp_style(sk, style) __sctp_style((sk), (SCTP_SOCKET_##style)) +diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h +index 48cbf3352042f..146d46a44b439 100644 +--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h ++++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h +@@ -1224,10 +1224,6 @@ enum sctp_endpoint_type { + */ + + struct sctp_ep_common { +- /* Fields to help us manage our entries in the hash tables. */ +- struct hlist_node node; +- int hashent; +- + /* Runtime type information. What kind of endpoint is this? */ + enum sctp_endpoint_type type; + +@@ -1279,6 +1275,10 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { + /* Common substructure for endpoint and association. */ + struct sctp_ep_common base; + ++ /* Fields to help us manage our entries in the hash tables. */ ++ struct hlist_node node; ++ int hashent; ++ + /* Associations: A list of current associations and mappings + * to the data consumers for each association. This + * may be in the form of a hash table or other +diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c +index c306cb25f5246..87a69335e5521 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/input.c ++++ b/net/sctp/input.c +@@ -722,23 +722,21 @@ static int __sctp_hash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) + struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk; + struct net *net = sock_net(sk); + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; +- struct sctp_ep_common *epb; + +- epb = &ep->base; +- epb->hashent = sctp_ep_hashfn(net, epb->bind_addr.port); +- head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[epb->hashent]; ++ ep->hashent = sctp_ep_hashfn(net, ep->base.bind_addr.port); ++ head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[ep->hashent]; + + if (sk->sk_reuseport) { + bool any = sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk); +- struct sctp_ep_common *epb2; ++ struct sctp_endpoint *ep2; + struct list_head *list; + int cnt = 0, err = 1; + + list_for_each(list, &ep->base.bind_addr.address_list) + cnt++; + +- sctp_for_each_hentry(epb2, &head->chain) { +- struct sock *sk2 = epb2->sk; ++ sctp_for_each_hentry(ep2, &head->chain) { ++ struct sock *sk2 = ep2->base.sk; + + if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) || sk2 == sk || + !uid_eq(sock_i_uid(sk2), sock_i_uid(sk)) || +@@ -765,7 +763,7 @@ static int __sctp_hash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) + } + + write_lock(&head->lock); +- hlist_add_head(&epb->node, &head->chain); ++ hlist_add_head(&ep->node, &head->chain); + write_unlock(&head->lock); + return 0; + } +@@ -787,19 +785,16 @@ static void __sctp_unhash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) + { + struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk; + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; +- struct sctp_ep_common *epb; + +- epb = &ep->base; ++ ep->hashent = sctp_ep_hashfn(sock_net(sk), ep->base.bind_addr.port); + +- epb->hashent = sctp_ep_hashfn(sock_net(sk), epb->bind_addr.port); +- +- head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[epb->hashent]; ++ head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[ep->hashent]; + + if (rcu_access_pointer(sk->sk_reuseport_cb)) + reuseport_detach_sock(sk); + + write_lock(&head->lock); +- hlist_del_init(&epb->node); ++ hlist_del_init(&ep->node); + write_unlock(&head->lock); + } + +@@ -832,7 +827,6 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *__sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint( + const union sctp_addr *paddr) + { + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; +- struct sctp_ep_common *epb; + struct sctp_endpoint *ep; + struct sock *sk; + __be16 lport; +@@ -842,8 +836,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *__sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint( + hash = sctp_ep_hashfn(net, ntohs(lport)); + head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[hash]; + read_lock(&head->lock); +- sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, &head->chain) { +- ep = sctp_ep(epb); ++ sctp_for_each_hentry(ep, &head->chain) { + if (sctp_endpoint_is_match(ep, net, laddr)) + goto hit; + } +diff --git a/net/sctp/proc.c b/net/sctp/proc.c +index 963b94517ec20..ec00ee75d59a6 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/proc.c ++++ b/net/sctp/proc.c +@@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ static void *sctp_eps_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) + static int sctp_eps_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + { + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; +- struct sctp_ep_common *epb; + struct sctp_endpoint *ep; + struct sock *sk; + int hash = *(loff_t *)v; +@@ -171,18 +170,17 @@ static int sctp_eps_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + + head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[hash]; + read_lock_bh(&head->lock); +- sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, &head->chain) { +- ep = sctp_ep(epb); +- sk = epb->sk; ++ sctp_for_each_hentry(ep, &head->chain) { ++ sk = ep->base.sk; + if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), seq_file_net(seq))) + continue; + seq_printf(seq, "%8pK %8pK %-3d %-3d %-4d %-5d %5u %5lu ", ep, sk, + sctp_sk(sk)->type, sk->sk_state, hash, +- epb->bind_addr.port, ++ ep->base.bind_addr.port, + from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(sk)), + sock_i_ino(sk)); + +- sctp_seq_dump_local_addrs(seq, epb); ++ sctp_seq_dump_local_addrs(seq, &ep->base); + seq_printf(seq, "\n"); + } + read_unlock_bh(&head->lock); +diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c +index c188a0acfa594..614130ff6ba06 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/socket.c ++++ b/net/sctp/socket.c +@@ -5365,14 +5365,14 @@ int sctp_for_each_endpoint(int (*cb)(struct sctp_endpoint *, void *), + void *p) { + int err = 0; + int hash = 0; +- struct sctp_ep_common *epb; ++ struct sctp_endpoint *ep; + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; + + for (head = sctp_ep_hashtable; hash < sctp_ep_hashsize; + hash++, head++) { + read_lock_bh(&head->lock); +- sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, &head->chain) { +- err = cb(sctp_ep(epb), p); ++ sctp_for_each_hentry(ep, &head->chain) { ++ err = cb(ep, p); + if (err) + break; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/selftests-bpf-fix-send_signal-test-with-nested-confi.patch b/queue-5.4/selftests-bpf-fix-send_signal-test-with-nested-confi.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f939ad9b9aa --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/selftests-bpf-fix-send_signal-test-with-nested-confi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +From 7f8fa90142c79f17dc2955b27da899c110ceb183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2024 13:12:03 -0700 +Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix send_signal test with nested CONFIG_PARAVIRT + +From: Yonghong Song + +[ Upstream commit 7015843afcaf68c132784c89528dfddc0005e483 ] + +Alexei reported that send_signal test may fail with nested CONFIG_PARAVIRT +configs. In this particular case, the base VM is AMD with 166 cpus, and I +run selftests with regular qemu on top of that and indeed send_signal test +failed. I also tried with an Intel box with 80 cpus and there is no issue. + +The main qemu command line includes: + + -enable-kvm -smp 16 -cpu host + +The failure log looks like: + + $ ./test_progs -t send_signal + [ 48.501588] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 26s! [test_progs:2225] + [ 48.503622] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O) + [ 48.503622] CPU: 9 PID: 2225 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O 6.9.0-08561-g2c1713a8f1c9-dirty #69 + [ 48.507629] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 + [ 48.511635] RIP: 0010:handle_softirqs+0x71/0x290 + [ 48.511635] Code: [...] 10 0a 00 00 00 31 c0 65 66 89 05 d5 f4 fa 7e fb bb ff ff ff ff <49> c7 c2 cb + [ 48.518527] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000310fa0 EFLAGS: 00000246 + [ 48.519579] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: 00000000000006e0 + [ 48.522526] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88810791ae80 RDI: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.523587] RBP: ffffc90000fabc88 R08: 00000005a0af4f7f R09: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.525525] R10: 0000000561d2f29c R11: 0000000000006534 R12: 0000000000000280 + [ 48.528525] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.528525] FS: 00007f2f2885cd00(0000) GS:ffff888237c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 + [ 48.531600] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 + [ 48.535520] CR2: 00007f2f287059f0 CR3: 0000000106a28002 CR4: 00000000003706f0 + [ 48.537538] Call Trace: + [ 48.537538] + [ 48.537538] ? watchdog_timer_fn+0x1cd/0x250 + [ 48.539590] ? lockup_detector_update_enable+0x50/0x50 + [ 48.539590] ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0xff/0x280 + [ 48.542520] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x103/0x230 + [ 48.544524] ? __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4f/0x140 + [ 48.545522] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x3a/0x90 + [ 48.547612] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 + [ 48.547612] ? handle_softirqs+0x71/0x290 + [ 48.547612] irq_exit_rcu+0x63/0x80 + [ 48.551585] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x75/0x90 + [ 48.552521] + [ 48.553529] + [ 48.553529] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 + [ 48.555609] RIP: 0010:finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x90/0x260 + [ 48.556526] Code: [...] 9f 58 0a 00 00 48 85 db 0f 85 89 01 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 53 d9 bd 00 fb 66 90 <4d> 85 ed 74 + [ 48.562524] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fabd38 EFLAGS: 00000282 + [ 48.563589] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83385620 + [ 48.563589] RDX: ffff888237c73ae4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888237c6fd00 + [ 48.568521] RBP: ffffc90000fabd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.569528] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881009d0000 + [ 48.573525] R13: ffff8881024e5400 R14: ffff88810791ae80 R15: ffff888237c6fd00 + [ 48.575614] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x8d/0x260 + [ 48.576523] __schedule+0x364/0xac0 + [ 48.577535] schedule+0x2e/0x110 + [ 48.578555] pipe_read+0x301/0x400 + [ 48.579589] ? destroy_sched_domains_rcu+0x30/0x30 + [ 48.579589] vfs_read+0x2b3/0x2f0 + [ 48.579589] ksys_read+0x8b/0xc0 + [ 48.583590] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xc0 + [ 48.583590] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 + [ 48.586525] RIP: 0033:0x7f2f28703fa1 + [ 48.587592] Code: [...] 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 23 14 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 + [ 48.593534] RSP: 002b:00007ffd90f8cf88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.595589] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd90f8d5e8 RCX: 00007f2f28703fa1 + [ 48.595589] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffd90f8cfb0 RDI: 0000000000000006 + [ 48.599592] RBP: 00007ffd90f8d2f0 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.602527] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 + [ 48.603589] R13: 00007ffd90f8d608 R14: 00007f2f288d8000 R15: 0000000000f6bdb0 + [ 48.605527] + +In the test, two processes are communicating through pipe. Further debugging +with strace found that the above splat is triggered as read() syscall could +not receive the data even if the corresponding write() syscall in another +process successfully wrote data into the pipe. + +The failed subtest is "send_signal_perf". The corresponding perf event has +sample_period 1 and config PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK. sample_period 1 means every +overflow event will trigger a call to the BPF program. So I suspect this may +overwhelm the system. So I increased the sample_period to 100,000 and the test +passed. The sample_period 10,000 still has the test failed. + +In other parts of selftest, e.g., [1], sample_freq is used instead. So I +decided to use sample_freq = 1,000 since the test can pass as well. + + [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240604070700.3032142-1-song@kernel.org/ + +Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov +Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240605201203.2603846-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/send_signal.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/send_signal.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/send_signal.c +index b607112c64e7a..281d097b4b76a 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/send_signal.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/send_signal.c +@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static void test_send_signal_tracepoint(void) + static void test_send_signal_perf(void) + { + struct perf_event_attr attr = { +- .sample_period = 1, ++ .freq = 1, ++ .sample_freq = 1000, + .type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE, + .config = PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK, + }; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/series b/queue-5.4/series index 2ebd43d50b0..95745dcd3e0 100644 --- a/queue-5.4/series +++ b/queue-5.4/series @@ -182,3 +182,27 @@ alsa-usb-audio-correct-surround-channels-in-uac1-channel-map.patch net-usb-sr9700-fix-uninitialized-variable-use-in-sr_mdio_read.patch netfilter-ipset-add-list-flush-to-cancel_gc.patch genirq-allow-irq_chip-registration-functions-to-take.patch +irqchip-mbigen-fix-mbigen-node-address-layout.patch +x86-mm-fix-pti_clone_pgtable-alignment-assumption.patch +sctp-move-hlist_node-and-hashent-out-of-sctp_ep_comm.patch +sctp-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-reuseport_add_sock.patch +net-usb-qmi_wwan-fix-memory-leak-for-not-ip-packets.patch +net-linkwatch-use-system_unbound_wq.patch +bluetooth-l2cap-always-unlock-channel-in-l2cap_conle.patch +net-fec-stop-pps-on-driver-remove.patch +md-raid5-avoid-bug_on-while-continue-reshape-after-r.patch +clocksource-drivers-sh_cmt-address-race-condition-fo.patch +acpi-battery-create-alarm-sysfs-attribute-atomically.patch +acpi-sbs-manage-alarm-sysfs-attribute-through-psy-co.patch +r8169-remove-detection-of-chip-version-11-early-rtl8.patch +selftests-bpf-fix-send_signal-test-with-nested-confi.patch +pci-add-edimax-vendor-id-to-pci_ids.h.patch +udf-prevent-integer-overflow-in-udf_bitmap_free_bloc.patch +wifi-nl80211-don-t-give-key-data-to-userspace.patch +btrfs-fix-bitmap-leak-when-loading-free-space-cache-.patch +drm-amdgpu-fix-the-null-pointer-dereference-to-ras_m.patch +media-uvcvideo-ignore-empty-ts-packets.patch +media-uvcvideo-fix-the-bandwdith-quirk-on-usb-3.x.patch +jbd2-avoid-memleak-in-jbd2_journal_write_metadata_bu.patch +s390-sclp-prevent-release-of-buffer-in-i-o.patch +sunrpc-fix-a-race-to-wake-a-sync-task.patch diff --git a/queue-5.4/sunrpc-fix-a-race-to-wake-a-sync-task.patch b/queue-5.4/sunrpc-fix-a-race-to-wake-a-sync-task.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..67ec7a644df --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/sunrpc-fix-a-race-to-wake-a-sync-task.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 784c35ff0912f99e86a0ba006c469dfe10f6423e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 10:49:33 -0400 +Subject: SUNRPC: Fix a race to wake a sync task + +From: Benjamin Coddington + +[ Upstream commit ed0172af5d6fc07d1b40ca82f5ca3979300369f7 ] + +We've observed NFS clients with sync tasks sleeping in __rpc_execute +waiting on RPC_TASK_QUEUED that have not responded to a wake-up from +rpc_make_runnable(). I suspect this problem usually goes unnoticed, +because on a busy client the task will eventually be re-awoken by another +task completion or xprt event. However, if the state manager is draining +the slot table, a sync task missing a wake-up can result in a hung client. + +We've been able to prove that the waker in rpc_make_runnable() successfully +calls wake_up_bit() (ie- there's no race to tk_runstate), but the +wake_up_bit() call fails to wake the waiter. I suspect the waker is +missing the load of the bit's wait_queue_head, so waitqueue_active() is +false. There are some very helpful comments about this problem above +wake_up_bit(), prepare_to_wait(), and waitqueue_active(). + +Fix this by inserting smp_mb__after_atomic() before the wake_up_bit(), +which pairs with prepare_to_wait() calling set_current_state(). + +Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington +Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton +Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/sunrpc/sched.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sched.c b/net/sunrpc/sched.c +index a5c6a3d05741a..df83c59cde7fe 100644 +--- a/net/sunrpc/sched.c ++++ b/net/sunrpc/sched.c +@@ -368,8 +368,10 @@ static void rpc_make_runnable(struct workqueue_struct *wq, + if (RPC_IS_ASYNC(task)) { + INIT_WORK(&task->u.tk_work, rpc_async_schedule); + queue_work(wq, &task->u.tk_work); +- } else ++ } else { ++ smp_mb__after_atomic(); + wake_up_bit(&task->tk_runstate, RPC_TASK_QUEUED); ++ } + } + + /* +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/udf-prevent-integer-overflow-in-udf_bitmap_free_bloc.patch b/queue-5.4/udf-prevent-integer-overflow-in-udf_bitmap_free_bloc.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9801ab1109e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/udf-prevent-integer-overflow-in-udf_bitmap_free_bloc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From f8b488e244c7b68620228bbe7ed04e63087f90d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 10:24:13 +0300 +Subject: udf: prevent integer overflow in udf_bitmap_free_blocks() + +From: Roman Smirnov + +[ Upstream commit 56e69e59751d20993f243fb7dd6991c4e522424c ] + +An overflow may occur if the function is called with the last +block and an offset greater than zero. It is necessary to add +a check to avoid this. + +Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace. + +[JK: Make test cover also unalloc table freeing] + +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240620072413.7448-1-r.smirnov@omp.ru +Suggested-by: Jan Kara +Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov +Signed-off-by: Jan Kara +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/udf/balloc.c | 36 +++++++++++++----------------------- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/udf/balloc.c b/fs/udf/balloc.c +index c4c18eeacb60c..aa73ab1b50a52 100644 +--- a/fs/udf/balloc.c ++++ b/fs/udf/balloc.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include "udfdecl.h" + + #include ++#include + + #include "udf_i.h" + #include "udf_sb.h" +@@ -144,7 +145,6 @@ static void udf_bitmap_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, + { + struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb); + struct buffer_head *bh = NULL; +- struct udf_part_map *partmap; + unsigned long block; + unsigned long block_group; + unsigned long bit; +@@ -153,19 +153,9 @@ static void udf_bitmap_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, + unsigned long overflow; + + mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex); +- partmap = &sbi->s_partmaps[bloc->partitionReferenceNum]; +- if (bloc->logicalBlockNum + count < count || +- (bloc->logicalBlockNum + count) > partmap->s_partition_len) { +- udf_debug("%u < %d || %u + %u > %u\n", +- bloc->logicalBlockNum, 0, +- bloc->logicalBlockNum, count, +- partmap->s_partition_len); +- goto error_return; +- } +- ++ /* We make sure this cannot overflow when mounting the filesystem */ + block = bloc->logicalBlockNum + offset + + (sizeof(struct spaceBitmapDesc) << 3); +- + do { + overflow = 0; + block_group = block >> (sb->s_blocksize_bits + 3); +@@ -395,7 +385,6 @@ static void udf_table_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, + uint32_t count) + { + struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb); +- struct udf_part_map *partmap; + uint32_t start, end; + uint32_t elen; + struct kernel_lb_addr eloc; +@@ -404,16 +393,6 @@ static void udf_table_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, + struct udf_inode_info *iinfo; + + mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex); +- partmap = &sbi->s_partmaps[bloc->partitionReferenceNum]; +- if (bloc->logicalBlockNum + count < count || +- (bloc->logicalBlockNum + count) > partmap->s_partition_len) { +- udf_debug("%u < %d || %u + %u > %u\n", +- bloc->logicalBlockNum, 0, +- bloc->logicalBlockNum, count, +- partmap->s_partition_len); +- goto error_return; +- } +- + iinfo = UDF_I(table); + udf_add_free_space(sb, sbi->s_partition, count); + +@@ -688,6 +667,17 @@ void udf_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, + { + uint16_t partition = bloc->partitionReferenceNum; + struct udf_part_map *map = &UDF_SB(sb)->s_partmaps[partition]; ++ uint32_t blk; ++ ++ if (check_add_overflow(bloc->logicalBlockNum, offset, &blk) || ++ check_add_overflow(blk, count, &blk) || ++ bloc->logicalBlockNum + count > map->s_partition_len) { ++ udf_debug("Invalid request to free blocks: (%d, %u), off %u, " ++ "len %u, partition len %u\n", ++ partition, bloc->logicalBlockNum, offset, count, ++ map->s_partition_len); ++ return; ++ } + + if (map->s_partition_flags & UDF_PART_FLAG_UNALLOC_BITMAP) { + udf_bitmap_free_blocks(sb, map->s_uspace.s_bitmap, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/wifi-nl80211-don-t-give-key-data-to-userspace.patch b/queue-5.4/wifi-nl80211-don-t-give-key-data-to-userspace.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a884f74d05b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/wifi-nl80211-don-t-give-key-data-to-userspace.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 57f5178ba602e1b3c13cd92cdc6f8774d369caeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 10:44:11 +0200 +Subject: wifi: nl80211: don't give key data to userspace + +From: Johannes Berg + +[ Upstream commit a7e5793035792cc46a1a4b0a783655ffa897dfe9 ] + +When a key is requested by userspace, there's really no need +to include the key data, the sequence counter is really what +userspace needs in this case. The fact that it's included is +just a historic quirk. + +Remove the key data. + +Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240627104411.b6a4f097e4ea.I7e6cc976cb9e8a80ef25a3351330f313373b4578@changeid +Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/wireless/nl80211.c | 10 ++-------- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c +index 0d15dd68565cb..e85e8f7b48f92 100644 +--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c ++++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c +@@ -3723,10 +3723,7 @@ static void get_key_callback(void *c, struct key_params *params) + struct nlattr *key; + struct get_key_cookie *cookie = c; + +- if ((params->key && +- nla_put(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DATA, +- params->key_len, params->key)) || +- (params->seq && ++ if ((params->seq && + nla_put(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ, + params->seq_len, params->seq)) || + (params->cipher && +@@ -3738,10 +3735,7 @@ static void get_key_callback(void *c, struct key_params *params) + if (!key) + goto nla_put_failure; + +- if ((params->key && +- nla_put(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_DATA, +- params->key_len, params->key)) || +- (params->seq && ++ if ((params->seq && + nla_put(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_SEQ, + params->seq_len, params->seq)) || + (params->cipher && +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/x86-mm-fix-pti_clone_pgtable-alignment-assumption.patch b/queue-5.4/x86-mm-fix-pti_clone_pgtable-alignment-assumption.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2b3870c641e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/x86-mm-fix-pti_clone_pgtable-alignment-assumption.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From c45e8f43bfa20bd6371f0a1aa60b5782da859b13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 18:31:05 +0200 +Subject: x86/mm: Fix pti_clone_pgtable() alignment assumption + +From: Peter Zijlstra + +[ Upstream commit 41e71dbb0e0a0fe214545fe64af031303a08524c ] + +Guenter reported dodgy crashes on an i386-nosmp build using GCC-11 +that had the form of endless traps until entry stack exhaust and then +#DF from the stack guard. + +It turned out that pti_clone_pgtable() had alignment assumptions on +the start address, notably it hard assumes start is PMD aligned. This +is true on x86_64, but very much not true on i386. + +These assumptions can cause the end condition to malfunction, leading +to a 'short' clone. Guess what happens when the user mapping has a +short copy of the entry text? + +Use the correct increment form for addr to avoid alignment +assumptions. + +Fixes: 16a3fe634f6a ("x86/mm/pti: Clone kernel-image on PTE level for 32 bit") +Reported-by: Guenter Roeck +Tested-by: Guenter Roeck +Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner +Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240731163105.GG33588@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +index 7f2140414440d..29eaf3cd9bbdb 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c ++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +@@ -375,14 +375,14 @@ pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, + */ + *target_pmd = *pmd; + +- addr += PMD_SIZE; ++ addr = round_up(addr + 1, PMD_SIZE); + + } else if (level == PTI_CLONE_PTE) { + + /* Walk the page-table down to the pte level */ + pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr); + if (pte_none(*pte)) { +- addr += PAGE_SIZE; ++ addr = round_up(addr + 1, PAGE_SIZE); + continue; + } + +@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, + /* Clone the PTE */ + *target_pte = *pte; + +- addr += PAGE_SIZE; ++ addr = round_up(addr + 1, PAGE_SIZE); + + } else { + BUG(); +-- +2.43.0 +