From: Pasha Tatashin Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2026 03:33:25 +0000 (+0000) Subject: liveupdate: safely print untrusted strings X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=277f4e5e398b8c59148ebc33dbee8f9821f087eb;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Flinux.git liveupdate: safely print untrusted strings Patch series "liveupdate: Fix module unloading and unregister API", v3. This patch series addresses an issue with how LUO handles module reference counting and unregistration during a module unload (e.g., via rmmod). Currently, modules that register live update file handlers are pinned for the entire duration they are registered. This prevents the modules from being unloaded gracefully, even when no live update session is in progress. Furthermore, if a module is forcefully unloaded, the unregistration functions return an error (e.g. -EBUSY) if a session is active, which is ignored by the kernel's module unload path, leaving dangling pointers in the LUO global lists. To resolve these issues, this series introduces the following changes: 1. Adds a global read-write semaphore (luo_register_rwlock) to protect the registration lists for both file handlers and FLBs. 2. Reduces the scope of module reference counting for file handlers and FLBs. Instead of pinning modules indefinitely upon registration, references are now taken only when they are actively used in a live update session (e.g., during preservation, retrieval, or deserialization). 3. Removes the global luo_session_quiesce() mechanism since module unload behavior now handles active sessions implicitly. 4. Introduces auto-unregistration of FLBs during file handler unregistration to prevent leaving dangling resources. 5. Changes the unregistration functions to return void instead of an error code. 6. Fixes a data race in luo_flb_get_private() by introducing a spinlock for thread-safe lazy initialization. 7. Strengthens security by using %.*s when printing untrusted deserialized compatible strings and session names to prevent out-of-bounds reads. This patch (of 10): Deserialized strings from KHO data (such as file handler compatible strings and session names) are provided by the previous kernel and might not be null-terminated if the data is corrupted or maliciously crafted. When printing these strings in error messages, use the %.*s format specifier with the maximum buffer size to prevent out-of-bounds reads into adjacent kernel memory. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327033335.696621-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327033335.696621-2-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav (Google) Cc: David Matlack Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Samiullah Khawaja Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- diff --git a/kernel/liveupdate/luo_file.c b/kernel/liveupdate/luo_file.c index 09103cf81107..8fcf302c73b6 100644 --- a/kernel/liveupdate/luo_file.c +++ b/kernel/liveupdate/luo_file.c @@ -813,7 +813,8 @@ int luo_file_deserialize(struct luo_file_set *file_set, } if (!handler_found) { - pr_warn("No registered handler for compatible '%s'\n", + pr_warn("No registered handler for compatible '%.*s'\n", + (int)sizeof(file_ser[i].compatible), file_ser[i].compatible); return -ENOENT; } diff --git a/kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c b/kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c index 783677295640..c68a0041bcf2 100644 --- a/kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c +++ b/kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c @@ -544,7 +544,8 @@ int luo_session_deserialize(void) session = luo_session_alloc(sh->ser[i].name); if (IS_ERR(session)) { - pr_warn("Failed to allocate session [%s] during deserialization %pe\n", + pr_warn("Failed to allocate session [%.*s] during deserialization %pe\n", + (int)sizeof(sh->ser[i].name), sh->ser[i].name, session); return PTR_ERR(session); }