From: Nathan Rebello Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 08:52:59 +0000 (-0400) Subject: usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2ab833a16a825373aad2ba7d54b572b277e95b71;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Flinux.git usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT. A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region. KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40) The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets. This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size. Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit. Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early. Fixes: 1325f85fa49f ("staging: usbip: bugfix add number of packets for isochronous frames") Cc: stable Acked-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Nathan Rebello Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402085259.234-1-nathan.c.rebello@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c index 8ebaaeaf848e..a5837c0feb05 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c @@ -470,6 +470,18 @@ static void usbip_pack_ret_submit(struct usbip_header *pdu, struct urb *urb, urb->status = rpdu->status; urb->actual_length = rpdu->actual_length; urb->start_frame = rpdu->start_frame; + /* + * The number_of_packets field determines the length of + * iso_frame_desc[], which is a flexible array allocated + * at URB creation time. A response must never claim more + * packets than originally submitted; doing so would cause + * an out-of-bounds write in usbip_recv_iso() and + * usbip_pad_iso(). Clamp to zero on violation so both + * functions safely return early. + */ + if (rpdu->number_of_packets < 0 || + rpdu->number_of_packets > urb->number_of_packets) + rpdu->number_of_packets = 0; urb->number_of_packets = rpdu->number_of_packets; urb->error_count = rpdu->error_count; }