From: Nick Mathewson Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 15:14:45 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Avoid a crash if our "current" and "old" ntor onion keys are equal X-Git-Tag: tor-0.3.5.9~11^2~3^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2da4d64a64a803f4b0a6d56e517b4288bef6c4f8;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git Avoid a crash if our "current" and "old" ntor onion keys are equal Our dimap code asserts if you try to add the same key twice; this can't happen if everything is running smoothly, but it's possible if you try to start a relay where secret_onion_key_ntor is the same as secret_onion_key_ntor.old. Fixes bug 30916; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha when ntor keys were introduced. --- diff --git a/changes/bug30916 b/changes/bug30916 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b006bfc75d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug30916 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (relay): + - Avoid crashing when starting with a corrupt keys directory where + the old ntor key and the new ntor key are identical. Fixes bug 30916; + bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/relay/router.c b/src/feature/relay/router.c index 88a30cef08..1dbaf2ed66 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/router.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c @@ -286,7 +286,8 @@ construct_ntor_key_map(void) tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t))); } - if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) && + tor_memneq(cur_pk, last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { dimap_add_entry(&m, last_pk, tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));