From: Niels Möller Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2004 07:25:36 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Fixed MAC typos noticed by Linus Nordberg. X-Git-Tag: nettle_1.11_release_20041026~49 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=37540091c95d4ce8b8aa3379e8e5fe6dda7ac502;p=thirdparty%2Fnettle.git Fixed MAC typos noticed by Linus Nordberg. Rev: src/nettle/nettle.texinfo:1.27 --- diff --git a/nettle.texinfo b/nettle.texinfo index e6c00c22..c33765cb 100644 --- a/nettle.texinfo +++ b/nettle.texinfo @@ -1190,11 +1190,11 @@ should also be hard to compute the key given only messages and corresponding @acronym{MAC}s. Keyed hash functions are useful primarily for message authentication, -when the Alice and Bob shares a secret: The sender, Alice, computes the +when Alice and Bob shares a secret: The sender, Alice, computes the @acronym{MAC} and attaches it to the message. The receiver, Bob, also computes the @acronym{MAC} of the message, using the same key, and compares that to Alice's value. If they match, Bob can be assured that -the message has not been modified on it's way from Alice. +the message has not been modified on its way from Alice. However, unlike digital signatures, this assurance is not transferable. Bob can't show the message and the @acronym{MAC} to a third party and @@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ sides, and anyone knowing the key can create a correct @acronym{MAC} for any message. If Bob believes that only he and Alice knows the key, and he knows that he didn't attach a @acronym{MAC} to a particular message, he knows it must be Alice who did it. However, the third party can't -distinguish between @acronym{MAC} created by Alice and one created by +distinguish between a @acronym{MAC} created by Alice and one created by Bob. Keyed hash functions are typically a lot faster than digital signatures