From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 09:26:43 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 4.14-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v4.4.231~88 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=6dbd77fb3d2c1486bd8c27b733cef49dd0c17b09;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 4.14-stable patches added patches: cgroup-fix-cgroup_sk_alloc-for-sk_clone_lock.patch cgroup-fix-sock_cgroup_data-on-big-endian.patch genetlink-remove-genl_bind.patch ipv4-fill-fl4_icmp_-type-code-in-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch l2tp-remove-skb_dst_set-from-l2tp_xmit_skb.patch llc-make-sure-applications-use-arphrd_ether.patch net-added-pointer-check-for-dst-ops-neigh_lookup-in-dst_neigh_lookup_skb.patch net-usb-qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-eg95-lte-modem.patch net_sched-fix-a-memory-leak-in-atm_tc_init.patch tcp-make-sure-listeners-don-t-initialize-congestion-control-state.patch tcp-md5-add-missing-memory-barriers-in-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key.patch tcp-md5-allow-changing-md5-keys-in-all-socket-states.patch tcp-md5-do-not-send-silly-options-in-syncookies.patch tcp-md5-refine-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key-barriers.patch --- diff --git a/queue-4.14/cgroup-fix-cgroup_sk_alloc-for-sk_clone_lock.patch b/queue-4.14/cgroup-fix-cgroup_sk_alloc-for-sk_clone_lock.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..818dd7f96e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/cgroup-fix-cgroup_sk_alloc-for-sk_clone_lock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 09:29:01 AM CEST +From: Cong Wang +Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 11:52:56 -0700 +Subject: cgroup: fix cgroup_sk_alloc() for sk_clone_lock() + +From: Cong Wang + +[ Upstream commit ad0f75e5f57ccbceec13274e1e242f2b5a6397ed ] + +When we clone a socket in sk_clone_lock(), its sk_cgrp_data is +copied, so the cgroup refcnt must be taken too. And, unlike the +sk_alloc() path, sock_update_netprioidx() is not called here. +Therefore, it is safe and necessary to grab the cgroup refcnt +even when cgroup_sk_alloc is disabled. + +sk_clone_lock() is in BH context anyway, the in_interrupt() +would terminate this function if called there. And for sk_alloc() +skcd->val is always zero. So it's safe to factor out the code +to make it more readable. + +The global variable 'cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled' is used to determine +whether to take these reference counts. It is impossible to make +the reference counting correct unless we save this bit of information +in skcd->val. So, add a new bit there to record whether the socket +has already taken the reference counts. This obviously relies on +kmalloc() to align cgroup pointers to at least 4 bytes, +ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN is certainly larger than that. + +This bug seems to be introduced since the beginning, commit +d979a39d7242 ("cgroup: duplicate cgroup reference when cloning sockets") +tried to fix it but not compeletely. It seems not easy to trigger until +the recent commit 090e28b229af +("netprio_cgroup: Fix unlimited memory leak of v2 cgroups") was merged. + +Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") +Reported-by: Cameron Berkenpas +Reported-by: Peter Geis +Reported-by: Lu Fengqi +Reported-by: Daniël Sonck +Reported-by: Zhang Qiang +Tested-by: Cameron Berkenpas +Tested-by: Peter Geis +Tested-by: Thomas Lamprecht +Cc: Daniel Borkmann +Cc: Zefan Li +Cc: Tejun Heo +Cc: Roman Gushchin +Signed-off-by: Cong Wang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 6 ++++-- + include/linux/cgroup.h | 4 +++- + kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++----------- + net/core/sock.c | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h ++++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h +@@ -681,7 +681,8 @@ struct sock_cgroup_data { + union { + #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN + struct { +- u8 is_data; ++ u8 is_data : 1; ++ u8 no_refcnt : 1; + u8 padding; + u16 prioidx; + u32 classid; +@@ -691,7 +692,8 @@ struct sock_cgroup_data { + u32 classid; + u16 prioidx; + u8 padding; +- u8 is_data; ++ u8 no_refcnt : 1; ++ u8 is_data : 1; + } __packed; + #endif + u64 val; +--- a/include/linux/cgroup.h ++++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h +@@ -714,6 +714,7 @@ extern spinlock_t cgroup_sk_update_lock; + + void cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(void); + void cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd); ++void cgroup_sk_clone(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd); + void cgroup_sk_free(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd); + + static inline struct cgroup *sock_cgroup_ptr(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) +@@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ static inline struct cgroup *sock_cgroup + */ + v = READ_ONCE(skcd->val); + +- if (v & 1) ++ if (v & 3) + return &cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp; + + return (struct cgroup *)(unsigned long)v ?: &cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp; +@@ -739,6 +740,7 @@ static inline struct cgroup *sock_cgroup + #else /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DATA */ + + static inline void cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) {} ++static inline void cgroup_sk_clone(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) {} + static inline void cgroup_sk_free(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) {} + + #endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DATA */ +--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c ++++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +@@ -5798,17 +5798,8 @@ void cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(void) + + void cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) + { +- if (cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled) +- return; +- +- /* Socket clone path */ +- if (skcd->val) { +- /* +- * We might be cloning a socket which is left in an empty +- * cgroup and the cgroup might have already been rmdir'd. +- * Don't use cgroup_get_live(). +- */ +- cgroup_get(sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd)); ++ if (cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled) { ++ skcd->no_refcnt = 1; + return; + } + +@@ -5832,8 +5823,24 @@ void cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock_cgroup_ + rcu_read_unlock(); + } + ++void cgroup_sk_clone(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) ++{ ++ /* Socket clone path */ ++ if (skcd->val) { ++ /* ++ * We might be cloning a socket which is left in an empty ++ * cgroup and the cgroup might have already been rmdir'd. ++ * Don't use cgroup_get_live(). ++ */ ++ cgroup_get(sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd)); ++ } ++} ++ + void cgroup_sk_free(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) + { ++ if (skcd->no_refcnt) ++ return; ++ + cgroup_put(sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd)); + } + +--- a/net/core/sock.c ++++ b/net/core/sock.c +@@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct + /* sk->sk_memcg will be populated at accept() time */ + newsk->sk_memcg = NULL; + +- cgroup_sk_alloc(&newsk->sk_cgrp_data); ++ cgroup_sk_clone(&newsk->sk_cgrp_data); + + rcu_read_lock(); + filter = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_filter); diff --git a/queue-4.14/cgroup-fix-sock_cgroup_data-on-big-endian.patch b/queue-4.14/cgroup-fix-sock_cgroup_data-on-big-endian.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e08240a3fc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/cgroup-fix-sock_cgroup_data-on-big-endian.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Cong Wang +Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 16:28:44 -0700 +Subject: cgroup: Fix sock_cgroup_data on big-endian. + +From: Cong Wang + +[ Upstream commit 14b032b8f8fce03a546dcf365454bec8c4a58d7d ] + +In order for no_refcnt and is_data to be the lowest order two +bits in the 'val' we have to pad out the bitfield of the u8. + +Fixes: ad0f75e5f57c ("cgroup: fix cgroup_sk_alloc() for sk_clone_lock()") +Reported-by: Guenter Roeck +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +--- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h ++++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h +@@ -683,6 +683,7 @@ struct sock_cgroup_data { + struct { + u8 is_data : 1; + u8 no_refcnt : 1; ++ u8 unused : 6; + u8 padding; + u16 prioidx; + u32 classid; +@@ -692,6 +693,7 @@ struct sock_cgroup_data { + u32 classid; + u16 prioidx; + u8 padding; ++ u8 unused : 6; + u8 no_refcnt : 1; + u8 is_data : 1; + } __packed; diff --git a/queue-4.14/genetlink-remove-genl_bind.patch b/queue-4.14/genetlink-remove-genl_bind.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1b7d60c92f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/genetlink-remove-genl_bind.patch @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Sean Tranchetti +Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 11:50:17 -0600 +Subject: genetlink: remove genl_bind + +From: Sean Tranchetti + +[ Upstream commit 1e82a62fec613844da9e558f3493540a5b7a7b67 ] + +A potential deadlock can occur during registering or unregistering a +new generic netlink family between the main nl_table_lock and the +cb_lock where each thread wants the lock held by the other, as +demonstrated below. + +1) Thread 1 is performing a netlink_bind() operation on a socket. As part + of this call, it will call netlink_lock_table(), incrementing the + nl_table_users count to 1. +2) Thread 2 is registering (or unregistering) a genl_family via the + genl_(un)register_family() API. The cb_lock semaphore will be taken for + writing. +3) Thread 1 will call genl_bind() as part of the bind operation to handle + subscribing to GENL multicast groups at the request of the user. It will + attempt to take the cb_lock semaphore for reading, but it will fail and + be scheduled away, waiting for Thread 2 to finish the write. +4) Thread 2 will call netlink_table_grab() during the (un)registration + call. However, as Thread 1 has incremented nl_table_users, it will not + be able to proceed, and both threads will be stuck waiting for the + other. + +genl_bind() is a noop, unless a genl_family implements the mcast_bind() +function to handle setting up family-specific multicast operations. Since +no one in-tree uses this functionality as Cong pointed out, simply removing +the genl_bind() function will remove the possibility for deadlock, as there +is no attempt by Thread 1 above to take the cb_lock semaphore. + +Fixes: c380d9a7afff ("genetlink: pass multicast bind/unbind to families") +Suggested-by: Cong Wang +Acked-by: Johannes Berg +Reported-by: kernel test robot +Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/net/genetlink.h | 8 ------- + net/netlink/genetlink.c | 49 ------------------------------------------------ + 2 files changed, 57 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/net/genetlink.h ++++ b/include/net/genetlink.h +@@ -34,12 +34,6 @@ struct genl_info; + * do additional, common, filtering and return an error + * @post_doit: called after an operation's doit callback, it may + * undo operations done by pre_doit, for example release locks +- * @mcast_bind: a socket bound to the given multicast group (which +- * is given as the offset into the groups array) +- * @mcast_unbind: a socket was unbound from the given multicast group. +- * Note that unbind() will not be called symmetrically if the +- * generic netlink family is removed while there are still open +- * sockets. + * @attrbuf: buffer to store parsed attributes (private) + * @mcgrps: multicast groups used by this family + * @n_mcgrps: number of multicast groups +@@ -62,8 +56,6 @@ struct genl_family { + void (*post_doit)(const struct genl_ops *ops, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct genl_info *info); +- int (*mcast_bind)(struct net *net, int group); +- void (*mcast_unbind)(struct net *net, int group); + struct nlattr ** attrbuf; /* private */ + const struct genl_ops * ops; + const struct genl_multicast_group *mcgrps; +--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c ++++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c +@@ -959,60 +959,11 @@ static struct genl_family genl_ctrl __ro + .netnsok = true, + }; + +-static int genl_bind(struct net *net, int group) +-{ +- struct genl_family *f; +- int err = -ENOENT; +- unsigned int id; +- +- down_read(&cb_lock); +- +- idr_for_each_entry(&genl_fam_idr, f, id) { +- if (group >= f->mcgrp_offset && +- group < f->mcgrp_offset + f->n_mcgrps) { +- int fam_grp = group - f->mcgrp_offset; +- +- if (!f->netnsok && net != &init_net) +- err = -ENOENT; +- else if (f->mcast_bind) +- err = f->mcast_bind(net, fam_grp); +- else +- err = 0; +- break; +- } +- } +- up_read(&cb_lock); +- +- return err; +-} +- +-static void genl_unbind(struct net *net, int group) +-{ +- struct genl_family *f; +- unsigned int id; +- +- down_read(&cb_lock); +- +- idr_for_each_entry(&genl_fam_idr, f, id) { +- if (group >= f->mcgrp_offset && +- group < f->mcgrp_offset + f->n_mcgrps) { +- int fam_grp = group - f->mcgrp_offset; +- +- if (f->mcast_unbind) +- f->mcast_unbind(net, fam_grp); +- break; +- } +- } +- up_read(&cb_lock); +-} +- + static int __net_init genl_pernet_init(struct net *net) + { + struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = { + .input = genl_rcv, + .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, +- .bind = genl_bind, +- .unbind = genl_unbind, + }; + + /* we'll bump the group number right afterwards */ diff --git a/queue-4.14/ipv4-fill-fl4_icmp_-type-code-in-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch b/queue-4.14/ipv4-fill-fl4_icmp_-type-code-in-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f4f3aabd46b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/ipv4-fill-fl4_icmp_-type-code-in-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Sabrina Dubroca +Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 17:00:32 +0200 +Subject: ipv4: fill fl4_icmp_{type,code} in ping_v4_sendmsg + +From: Sabrina Dubroca + +[ Upstream commit 5eff06902394425c722f0a44d9545909a8800f79 ] + +IPv4 ping sockets don't set fl4.fl4_icmp_{type,code}, which leads to +incomplete IPsec ACQUIRE messages being sent to userspace. Currently, +both raw sockets and IPv6 ping sockets set those fields. + +Expected output of "ip xfrm monitor": + acquire proto esp + sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 8 code 0 dev ens4 + policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 + + +Currently with ping sockets: + acquire proto esp + sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 0 code 0 dev ens4 + policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 + + +The Libreswan test suite found this problem after Fedora changed the +value for the sysctl net.ipv4.ping_group_range. + +Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") +Reported-by: Paul Wouters +Tested-by: Paul Wouters +Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/ping.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c +@@ -801,6 +801,9 @@ static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock * + inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk), faddr, saddr, 0, 0, + sk->sk_uid); + ++ fl4.fl4_icmp_type = user_icmph.type; ++ fl4.fl4_icmp_code = user_icmph.code; ++ + security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4)); + rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk); + if (IS_ERR(rt)) { diff --git a/queue-4.14/l2tp-remove-skb_dst_set-from-l2tp_xmit_skb.patch b/queue-4.14/l2tp-remove-skb_dst_set-from-l2tp_xmit_skb.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f2dda99262a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/l2tp-remove-skb_dst_set-from-l2tp_xmit_skb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Xin Long +Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 02:02:32 +0800 +Subject: l2tp: remove skb_dst_set() from l2tp_xmit_skb() + +From: Xin Long + +[ Upstream commit 27d53323664c549b5bb2dfaaf6f7ad6e0376a64e ] + +In the tx path of l2tp, l2tp_xmit_skb() calls skb_dst_set() to set +skb's dst. However, it will eventually call inet6_csk_xmit() or +ip_queue_xmit() where skb's dst will be overwritten by: + + skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst); + +without releasing the old dst in skb. Then it causes dst/dev refcnt leak: + + unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1 + +This can be reproduced by simply running: + + # modprobe l2tp_eth && modprobe l2tp_ip + # sh ./tools/testing/selftests/net/l2tp.sh + +So before going to inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit(), skb's dst +should be dropped. This patch is to fix it by removing skb_dst_set() +from l2tp_xmit_skb() and moving skb_dst_drop() into l2tp_xmit_core(). + +Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") +Reported-by: Hangbin Liu +Signed-off-by: Xin Long +Acked-by: James Chapman +Tested-by: James Chapman +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 5 +---- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c ++++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +@@ -1141,6 +1141,7 @@ static int l2tp_xmit_core(struct l2tp_se + + /* Queue the packet to IP for output */ + skb->ignore_df = 1; ++ skb_dst_drop(skb); + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + if (l2tp_sk_is_v6(tunnel->sock)) + error = inet6_csk_xmit(tunnel->sock, skb, NULL); +@@ -1214,10 +1215,6 @@ int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *s + goto out_unlock; + } + +- /* Get routing info from the tunnel socket */ +- skb_dst_drop(skb); +- skb_dst_set(skb, sk_dst_check(sk, 0)); +- + inet = inet_sk(sk); + fl = &inet->cork.fl; + switch (tunnel->encap) { diff --git a/queue-4.14/llc-make-sure-applications-use-arphrd_ether.patch b/queue-4.14/llc-make-sure-applications-use-arphrd_ether.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e24436ca576 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/llc-make-sure-applications-use-arphrd_ether.patch @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2020 13:31:50 -0700 +Subject: llc: make sure applications use ARPHRD_ETHER + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit a9b1110162357689a34992d5c925852948e5b9fd ] + +syzbot was to trigger a bug by tricking AF_LLC with +non sensible addr->sllc_arphrd + +It seems clear LLC requires an Ethernet device. + +Back in commit abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE") +Octavian Purdila added possibility for application to use a zero +value for sllc_arphrd, convert it to ARPHRD_ETHER to not cause +regressions on existing applications. + +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813 +Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e0b4078 by task ksoftirqd/3/27 + +CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 +Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 +Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] + dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 + print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 + __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506 + kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 + __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135 + __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline] + list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline] + waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline] + wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline] + skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] + sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813 + sock_wfree+0x1e1/0x260 net/core/sock.c:1958 + skb_release_head_state+0xeb/0x260 net/core/skbuff.c:652 + skb_release_all+0x16/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:663 + __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline] + consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline] + consume_skb+0xfb/0x410 net/core/skbuff.c:832 + __dev_kfree_skb_any+0xa4/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:2967 + dev_kfree_skb_any include/linux/netdevice.h:3650 [inline] + e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource.isra.0+0x21b/0x3a0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1963 + e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3854 [inline] + e1000_clean+0x4cc/0x1d10 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3796 + napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6532 [inline] + net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6600 + __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292 + run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline] + run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595 + smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165 + kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255 + ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 + +Allocated by task 8247: + save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 + set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] + __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline] + __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486 + kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521 + slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline] + slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3320 [inline] + kmem_cache_alloc+0x121/0x710 mm/slab.c:3484 + sock_alloc_inode+0x1c/0x1d0 net/socket.c:240 + alloc_inode+0x68/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:230 + new_inode_pseudo+0x19/0xf0 fs/inode.c:919 + sock_alloc+0x41/0x270 net/socket.c:560 + __sock_create+0xc2/0x730 net/socket.c:1384 + sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline] + __sys_socket+0x103/0x220 net/socket.c:1513 + __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline] + __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1520 [inline] + __ia32_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520 + do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:337 [inline] + do_fast_syscall_32+0x27b/0xe16 arch/x86/entry/common.c:408 + entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 + +Freed by task 17: + save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72 + set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline] + kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline] + __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474 + kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483 + __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] + kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694 + sock_free_inode+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:261 + i_callback+0x44/0x80 fs/inode.c:219 + __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline] + rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2183 [inline] + rcu_core+0x570/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2408 + rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2417 + __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292 + +The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e0b4000 + which belongs to the cache sock_inode_cache of size 1152 +The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of + 1152-byte region [ffff88801e0b4000, ffff88801e0b4480) +The buggy address belongs to the page: +page:ffffea0000782d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88807aa59c40 index:0xffff88801e0b4ffd +raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00008e6c88 ffffea0000782d48 ffff88807aa59c40 +raw: ffff88801e0b4ffd ffff88801e0b4000 0000000100000003 0000000000000000 +page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + +Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff88801e0b3f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc + ffff88801e0b3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +>ffff88801e0b4000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + ^ + ffff88801e0b4080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + ffff88801e0b4100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + +Fixes: abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/llc/af_llc.c | 10 +++++++--- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c ++++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c +@@ -273,6 +273,10 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket + + if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) + goto out; ++ if (!addr->sllc_arphrd) ++ addr->sllc_arphrd = ARPHRD_ETHER; ++ if (addr->sllc_arphrd != ARPHRD_ETHER) ++ goto out; + rc = -ENODEV; + if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) { + llc->dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if); +@@ -330,15 +334,15 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *so + if (unlikely(!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || addrlen != sizeof(*addr))) + goto out; + rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT; +- if (unlikely(addr->sllc_family != AF_LLC)) ++ if (!addr->sllc_arphrd) ++ addr->sllc_arphrd = ARPHRD_ETHER; ++ if (unlikely(addr->sllc_family != AF_LLC || addr->sllc_arphrd != ARPHRD_ETHER)) + goto out; + rc = -ENODEV; + rcu_read_lock(); + if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) { + llc->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (llc->dev) { +- if (!addr->sllc_arphrd) +- addr->sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type; + if (is_zero_ether_addr(addr->sllc_mac)) + memcpy(addr->sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr, + IFHWADDRLEN); diff --git a/queue-4.14/net-added-pointer-check-for-dst-ops-neigh_lookup-in-dst_neigh_lookup_skb.patch b/queue-4.14/net-added-pointer-check-for-dst-ops-neigh_lookup-in-dst_neigh_lookup_skb.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f1df64ba7b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/net-added-pointer-check-for-dst-ops-neigh_lookup-in-dst_neigh_lookup_skb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Martin Varghese +Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2020 14:23:49 +0530 +Subject: net: Added pointer check for dst->ops->neigh_lookup in dst_neigh_lookup_skb + +From: Martin Varghese + +[ Upstream commit 394de110a73395de2ca4516b0de435e91b11b604 ] + +The packets from tunnel devices (eg bareudp) may have only +metadata in the dst pointer of skb. Hence a pointer check of +neigh_lookup is needed in dst_neigh_lookup_skb + +Kernel crashes when packets from bareudp device is processed in +the kernel neighbour subsytem. + +[ 133.384484] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 +[ 133.385240] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode +[ 133.385828] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page +[ 133.386603] PGD 0 P4D 0 +[ 133.386875] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP PTI +[ 133.387275] CPU: 0 PID: 5045 Comm: ping Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc2+ #15 +[ 133.388052] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 +[ 133.391076] RIP: 0010:0x0 +[ 133.392401] Code: Bad RIP value. +[ 133.394029] RSP: 0018:ffffb79980003d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 +[ 133.396656] RAX: 0000000080000102 RBX: ffff9de2fe0d6600 RCX: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 +[ 133.399018] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 RDI: ffff9de2fc21b400 +[ 133.399685] RBP: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 +[ 133.400350] R10: ffff9de2fbc6be22 R11: ffff9de2fe0d6600 R12: ffff9de2fc21b400 +[ 133.401010] R13: ffff9de2fe0d6628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 +[ 133.401667] FS: 00007fe014918740(0000) GS:ffff9de2fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 +[ 133.402412] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 +[ 133.402948] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000003bb72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 +[ 133.403611] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 +[ 133.404270] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 +[ 133.404933] Call Trace: +[ 133.405169] +[ 133.405367] __neigh_update+0x5a4/0x8f0 +[ 133.405734] arp_process+0x294/0x820 +[ 133.406076] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x866/0xe70 +[ 133.406557] arp_rcv+0x129/0x1c0 +[ 133.406882] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x95/0xb0 +[ 133.407340] process_backlog+0xa7/0x150 +[ 133.407705] net_rx_action+0x2af/0x420 +[ 133.408457] __do_softirq+0xda/0x2a8 +[ 133.408813] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 +[ 133.409290] +[ 133.409519] do_softirq_own_stack+0x39/0x50 +[ 133.410036] do_softirq+0x50/0x60 +[ 133.410401] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60 +[ 133.410871] ip_finish_output2+0x195/0x530 +[ 133.411288] ip_output+0x72/0xf0 +[ 133.411673] ? __ip_finish_output+0x1f0/0x1f0 +[ 133.412122] ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40 +[ 133.412471] raw_sendmsg+0x853/0xab0 +[ 133.412855] ? insert_pfn+0xfe/0x270 +[ 133.413827] ? vvar_fault+0xec/0x190 +[ 133.414772] sock_sendmsg+0x57/0x80 +[ 133.415685] __sys_sendto+0xdc/0x160 +[ 133.416605] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d4/0x2b0 +[ 133.417679] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x1d9/0x280 +[ 133.418753] ? __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x5d/0x1a0 +[ 133.419819] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 +[ 133.420848] do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90 +[ 133.421768] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 +[ 133.422833] RIP: 0033:0x7fe013689c03 +[ 133.423749] Code: Bad RIP value. +[ 133.424624] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7288f418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c +[ 133.425940] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056151fc63720 RCX: 00007fe013689c03 +[ 133.427225] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056151fc63720 RDI: 0000000000000003 +[ 133.428481] RBP: 00007ffc72890b30 R08: 000056151fc60500 R09: 0000000000000010 +[ 133.429757] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 +[ 133.431041] R13: 000056151fc636e0 R14: 000056151fc616bc R15: 0000000000000080 +[ 133.432481] Modules linked in: mpls_iptunnel act_mirred act_tunnel_key cls_flower sch_ingress veth mpls_router ip_tunnel bareudp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel macsec udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag binfmt_misc xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables overlay ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 pcspkr i2c_piix4 virtio_balloon joydev ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic qxl pata_acpi drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ata_piix libata virtio_net net_failover virtio_console failover virtio_blk i2c_core virtio_pci virtio_ring serio_raw floppy virtio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod +[ 133.444045] CR2: 0000000000000000 +[ 133.445082] ---[ end trace f4aeee1958fd1638 ]--- +[ 133.446236] RIP: 0010:0x0 +[ 133.447180] Code: Bad RIP value. +[ 133.448152] RSP: 0018:ffffb79980003d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 +[ 133.449363] RAX: 0000000080000102 RBX: ffff9de2fe0d6600 RCX: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 +[ 133.450835] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 RDI: ffff9de2fc21b400 +[ 133.452237] RBP: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 +[ 133.453722] R10: ffff9de2fbc6be22 R11: ffff9de2fe0d6600 R12: ffff9de2fc21b400 +[ 133.455149] R13: ffff9de2fe0d6628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 +[ 133.456520] FS: 00007fe014918740(0000) GS:ffff9de2fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 +[ 133.458046] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 +[ 133.459342] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000003bb72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 +[ 133.460782] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 +[ 133.462240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 +[ 133.463697] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt +[ 133.465226] Kernel Offset: 0xfa00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) +[ 133.467025] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- + +Fixes: aaa0c23cb901 ("Fix dst_neigh_lookup/dst_neigh_lookup_skb return value handling bug") +Signed-off-by: Martin Varghese +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/net/dst.h | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/include/net/dst.h ++++ b/include/net/dst.h +@@ -427,7 +427,15 @@ static inline struct neighbour *dst_neig + static inline struct neighbour *dst_neigh_lookup_skb(const struct dst_entry *dst, + struct sk_buff *skb) + { +- struct neighbour *n = dst->ops->neigh_lookup(dst, skb, NULL); ++ struct neighbour *n = NULL; ++ ++ /* The packets from tunnel devices (eg bareudp) may have only ++ * metadata in the dst pointer of skb. Hence a pointer check of ++ * neigh_lookup is needed. ++ */ ++ if (dst->ops->neigh_lookup) ++ n = dst->ops->neigh_lookup(dst, skb, NULL); ++ + return IS_ERR(n) ? NULL : n; + } + diff --git a/queue-4.14/net-usb-qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-eg95-lte-modem.patch b/queue-4.14/net-usb-qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-eg95-lte-modem.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6754d98c8a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/net-usb-qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-eg95-lte-modem.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: AceLan Kao +Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 16:14:45 +0800 +Subject: net: usb: qmi_wwan: add support for Quectel EG95 LTE modem + +From: AceLan Kao + +[ Upstream commit f815dd5cf48b905eeecf0a2b990e9b7ab048b4f1 ] + +Add support for Quectel Wireless Solutions Co., Ltd. EG95 LTE modem + +T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 5 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 +D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 +P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=0195 Rev=03.18 +S: Manufacturer=Android +S: Product=Android +C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA +I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) +I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=(none) +I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=(none) +I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=(none) +I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) + +Signed-off-by: AceLan Kao +Acked-by: Bjørn Mork +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c ++++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +@@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1e0e, 0x9001, 5)}, /* SIMCom 7100E, 7230E, 7600E ++ */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0121, 4)}, /* Quectel EC21 Mini PCIe */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0191, 4)}, /* Quectel EG91 */ ++ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0195, 4)}, /* Quectel EG95 */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2c7c, 0x0296, 4)}, /* Quectel BG96 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2cb7, 0x0104, 4)}, /* Fibocom NL678 series */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0489, 0xe0b4, 0)}, /* Foxconn T77W968 LTE */ diff --git a/queue-4.14/net_sched-fix-a-memory-leak-in-atm_tc_init.patch b/queue-4.14/net_sched-fix-a-memory-leak-in-atm_tc_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..acff1b56047 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/net_sched-fix-a-memory-leak-in-atm_tc_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Cong Wang +Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 20:13:59 -0700 +Subject: net_sched: fix a memory leak in atm_tc_init() + +From: Cong Wang + +[ Upstream commit 306381aec7c2b5a658eebca008c8a1b666536cba ] + +When tcf_block_get() fails inside atm_tc_init(), +atm_tc_put() is called to release the qdisc p->link.q. +But the flow->ref prevents it to do so, as the flow->ref +is still zero. + +Fix this by moving the p->link.ref initialization before +tcf_block_get(). + +Fixes: 6529eaba33f0 ("net: sched: introduce tcf block infractructure") +Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d411cff6ab29cc2c311b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim +Cc: Jiri Pirko +Signed-off-by: Cong Wang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/sched/sch_atm.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/sched/sch_atm.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_atm.c +@@ -545,15 +545,15 @@ static int atm_tc_init(struct Qdisc *sch + if (!p->link.q) + p->link.q = &noop_qdisc; + pr_debug("atm_tc_init: link (%p) qdisc %p\n", &p->link, p->link.q); ++ p->link.vcc = NULL; ++ p->link.sock = NULL; ++ p->link.common.classid = sch->handle; ++ p->link.ref = 1; + + err = tcf_block_get(&p->link.block, &p->link.filter_list); + if (err) + return err; + +- p->link.vcc = NULL; +- p->link.sock = NULL; +- p->link.common.classid = sch->handle; +- p->link.ref = 1; + tasklet_init(&p->task, sch_atm_dequeue, (unsigned long)sch); + return 0; + } diff --git a/queue-4.14/series b/queue-4.14/series index cf69bb32a9d..9538e25ee5b 100644 --- a/queue-4.14/series +++ b/queue-4.14/series @@ -38,3 +38,17 @@ dm-use-noio-when-sending-kobject-event.patch arc-entry-fix-potential-efa-clobber-when-tif_syscall_trace.patch arc-elf-use-right-elf_arch.patch s390-mm-fix-huge-pte-soft-dirty-copying.patch +genetlink-remove-genl_bind.patch +ipv4-fill-fl4_icmp_-type-code-in-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch +l2tp-remove-skb_dst_set-from-l2tp_xmit_skb.patch +llc-make-sure-applications-use-arphrd_ether.patch +net-added-pointer-check-for-dst-ops-neigh_lookup-in-dst_neigh_lookup_skb.patch +net-usb-qmi_wwan-add-support-for-quectel-eg95-lte-modem.patch +tcp-md5-add-missing-memory-barriers-in-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key.patch +tcp-md5-refine-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key-barriers.patch +tcp-md5-allow-changing-md5-keys-in-all-socket-states.patch +net_sched-fix-a-memory-leak-in-atm_tc_init.patch +tcp-make-sure-listeners-don-t-initialize-congestion-control-state.patch +tcp-md5-do-not-send-silly-options-in-syncookies.patch +cgroup-fix-cgroup_sk_alloc-for-sk_clone_lock.patch +cgroup-fix-sock_cgroup_data-on-big-endian.patch diff --git a/queue-4.14/tcp-make-sure-listeners-don-t-initialize-congestion-control-state.patch b/queue-4.14/tcp-make-sure-listeners-don-t-initialize-congestion-control-state.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ef61982da07 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/tcp-make-sure-listeners-don-t-initialize-congestion-control-state.patch @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Christoph Paasch +Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 16:18:34 -0700 +Subject: tcp: make sure listeners don't initialize congestion-control state + +From: Christoph Paasch + +[ Upstream commit ce69e563b325f620863830c246a8698ccea52048 ] + +syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg". +tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock +just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as +well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener. +If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control +has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we +will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular +socket, opening the door to a double-free: + +[ 11.413102] ================================================================== +[ 11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 +[ 11.415329] +[ 11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80 +[ 11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 +[ 11.418148] Call Trace: +[ 11.418534] +[ 11.418834] dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0 +[ 11.419297] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210 +[ 11.422079] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80 +[ 11.423433] __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170 +[ 11.424761] kfree+0x8c/0x230 +[ 11.425157] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 +[ 11.425872] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 +[ 11.426493] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 +[ 11.427093] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100 +[ 11.427731] tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0 +[ 11.429457] cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500 +[ 11.433189] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780 +[ 11.433727] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10 +[ 11.437143] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190 +[ 11.437810] ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350 +[ 11.439566] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0 +[ 11.441995] process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0 +[ 11.443148] net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40 +[ 11.445361] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a +[ 11.445881] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 +[ 11.446409] +[ 11.446716] do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40 +[ 11.447259] do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30 +[ 11.447827] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50 +[ 11.448406] ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0 +[ 11.450109] __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60 +[ 11.451861] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0 +[ 11.453789] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a +[ 11.456810] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780 +[ 11.457995] __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0 +[ 11.458529] release_sock+0x4a/0x170 +[ 11.459005] __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80 +[ 11.461435] inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0 +[ 11.462043] __sys_connect+0x204/0x270 +[ 11.465515] __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0 +[ 11.466088] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 +[ 11.466617] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 +[ 11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469 +[ 11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value. +[ 11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a +[ 11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469 +[ 11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 +[ 11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 +[ 11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 +[ 11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003 +[ 11.474321] +[ 11.474527] Allocated by task 4884: +[ 11.475031] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 +[ 11.475548] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 +[ 11.476182] tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150 +[ 11.476744] tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0 +[ 11.477435] tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f +[ 11.478088] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00 +[ 11.478744] __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0 +[ 11.479259] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150 +[ 11.479895] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 +[ 11.480395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 +[ 11.481097] +[ 11.481321] Freed by task 4872: +[ 11.481783] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 +[ 11.482230] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 +[ 11.482839] kfree+0x8c/0x230 +[ 11.483240] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 +[ 11.483948] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 +[ 11.484502] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 +[ 11.485144] tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0 +[ 11.485642] inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0 +[ 11.486131] __sock_release+0xc0/0x270 +[ 11.486697] sock_close+0xc/0x10 +[ 11.487145] __fput+0x277/0x780 +[ 11.487632] task_work_run+0xeb/0x180 +[ 11.488118] __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160 +[ 11.488834] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70 +[ 11.489326] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 + +Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c12014440750 +("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly"). + +This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners +setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it +(thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to +reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards. + +(The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.) + +Cc: Wei Wang +Cc: Eric Dumazet +Fixes: 2b0a8c9eee81 ("tcp: add CDG congestion control") +Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 3 +++ + net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c +@@ -2366,6 +2366,9 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int + tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0; + tp->window_clamp = 0; + tp->delivered = 0; ++ if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->release) ++ icsk->icsk_ca_ops->release(sk); ++ memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv)); + tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open); + tp->is_sack_reneg = 0; + tcp_clear_retrans(tp); +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static void tcp_reinit_congestion_contro + icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt = 1; + memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv)); + +- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) ++ if (!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN))) + tcp_init_congestion_control(sk); + } + diff --git a/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-add-missing-memory-barriers-in-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key.patch b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-add-missing-memory-barriers-in-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..90de3fde7a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-add-missing-memory-barriers-in-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 16:41:01 -0700 +Subject: tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 6a2febec338df7e7699a52d00b2e1207dcf65b28 ] + +MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add() +might update in-place a prior key. + +Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece +of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might +be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could +see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value, +since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic +anyway. + +We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen +is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use +uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was +read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt() + +Fixes: 9ea88a153001 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 7 +++++-- + net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 +++ + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c +@@ -3394,10 +3394,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_skb_data); + + int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) + { ++ u8 keylen = key->keylen; + struct scatterlist sg; + +- sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, key->keylen); +- ahash_request_set_crypt(hp->md5_req, &sg, NULL, key->keylen); ++ smp_rmb(); /* paired with smp_wmb() in tcp_md5_do_add() */ ++ ++ sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, keylen); ++ ahash_request_set_crypt(hp->md5_req, &sg, NULL, keylen); + return crypto_ahash_update(hp->md5_req); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +@@ -997,6 +997,9 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons + if (key) { + /* Pre-existing entry - just update that one. */ + memcpy(key->key, newkey, newkeylen); ++ ++ smp_wmb(); /* pairs with smp_rmb() in tcp_md5_hash_key() */ ++ + key->keylen = newkeylen; + return 0; + } diff --git a/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-allow-changing-md5-keys-in-all-socket-states.patch b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-allow-changing-md5-keys-in-all-socket-states.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..33d312ccecc --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-allow-changing-md5-keys-in-all-socket-states.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 18:39:33 -0700 +Subject: tcp: md5: allow changing MD5 keys in all socket states + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 1ca0fafd73c5268e8fc4b997094b8bb2bfe8deea ] + +This essentially reverts commit 721230326891 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG +or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets") + +Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can +actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows. + +Quoting Mathieu : + Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior + with respect to TCP MD5: + + - Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down + timer (~180 seconds). + - Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will + reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network + resets. + - Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not. + - Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until + both sides are ok with new passwords. + - Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is + attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP + connection on a change. + - Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable. + - Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected. + +We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7ad93 ("tcp: md5: fix potential +overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to +the wire that was the main reason for my patch. + +While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading +to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert : + + Commit 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()") + Commit e6ced831ef11 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers") + +Fixes: 721230326891 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets" +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 +---- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c +@@ -2759,10 +2759,7 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock + #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + case TCP_MD5SIG: + case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT: +- if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)) +- err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen); +- else +- err = -EINVAL; ++ err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen); + break; + #endif + case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT: diff --git a/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-do-not-send-silly-options-in-syncookies.patch b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-do-not-send-silly-options-in-syncookies.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..59fbbff4eac --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-do-not-send-silly-options-in-syncookies.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 12:41:23 -0700 +Subject: tcp: md5: do not send silly options in SYNCOOKIES + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit e114e1e8ac9d31f25b9dd873bab5d80c1fc482ca ] + +Whenever cookie_init_timestamp() has been used to encode +ECN,SACK,WSCALE options, we can not remove the TS option in the SYNACK. + +Otherwise, tcp_synack_options() will still advertize options like WSCALE +that we can not deduce later when receiving the packet from the client +to complete 3WHS. + +Note that modern linux TCP stacks wont use MD5+TS+SACK in a SYN packet, +but we can not know for sure that all TCP stacks have the same logic. + +Before the fix a tcpdump would exhibit this wrong exchange : + +10:12:15.464591 IP C > S: Flags [S], seq 4202415601, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 456965269 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8], length 0 +10:12:15.464602 IP S > C: Flags [S.], seq 253516766, ack 4202415602, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 8], length 0 +10:12:15.464611 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 0 +10:12:15.464678 IP C > S: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 12 +10:12:15.464685 IP S > C: Flags [.], ack 13, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 0 + +After this patch the exchange looks saner : + +11:59:59.882990 IP C > S: Flags [S], seq 517075944, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 1751508483 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8], length 0 +11:59:59.883002 IP S > C: Flags [S.], seq 1902939253, ack 517075945, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 1751508479 ecr 1751508483,nop,wscale 8], length 0 +11:59:59.883012 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508479], length 0 +11:59:59.883114 IP C > S: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508479], length 12 +11:59:59.883122 IP S > C: Flags [.], ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508483], length 0 +11:59:59.883152 IP S > C: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508484 ecr 1751508483], length 12 +11:59:59.883170 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508484 ecr 1751508484], length 0 + +Of course, no SACK block will ever be added later, but nothing should break. +Technically, we could remove the 4 nops included in MD5+TS options, +but again some stacks could break seeing not conventional alignment. + +Fixes: 4957faade11b ("TCPCT part 1g: Responder Cookie => Initiator") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Cc: Florian Westphal +Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 10 ++++++---- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +@@ -616,7 +616,8 @@ static unsigned int tcp_synack_options(s + unsigned int mss, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_out_options *opts, + const struct tcp_md5sig_key *md5, +- struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc) ++ struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc, ++ enum tcp_synack_type synack_type) + { + struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); + unsigned int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE; +@@ -631,7 +632,8 @@ static unsigned int tcp_synack_options(s + * rather than TS in order to fit in better with old, + * buggy kernels, but that was deemed to be unnecessary. + */ +- ireq->tstamp_ok &= !ireq->sack_ok; ++ if (synack_type != TCP_SYNACK_COOKIE) ++ ireq->tstamp_ok &= !ireq->sack_ok; + } + #endif + +@@ -3252,8 +3254,8 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const st + md5 = tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->req_md5_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req)); + #endif + skb_set_hash(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->txhash, PKT_HASH_TYPE_L4); +- tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(req, mss, skb, &opts, md5, foc) + +- sizeof(*th); ++ tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(req, mss, skb, &opts, md5, ++ foc, synack_type) + sizeof(*th); + + skb_push(skb, tcp_header_size); + skb_reset_transport_header(skb); diff --git a/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-refine-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key-barriers.patch b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-refine-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key-barriers.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..264badff498 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/tcp-md5-refine-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key-barriers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 10:23:31 AM CEST +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 11:43:04 -0700 +Subject: tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit e6ced831ef11a2a06e8d00aad9d4fc05b610bf38 ] + +My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu. + +Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent +keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() + +Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports, +if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path, +using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler. + +data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports, +this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is +not yet backported. + +v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add() + +Fixes: 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers +Cc: Herbert Xu +Cc: Marco Elver +Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers +Acked-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 +++--- + net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 14 ++++++++++---- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c +@@ -3394,13 +3394,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_skb_data); + + int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) + { +- u8 keylen = key->keylen; ++ u8 keylen = READ_ONCE(key->keylen); /* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */ + struct scatterlist sg; + +- smp_rmb(); /* paired with smp_wmb() in tcp_md5_do_add() */ +- + sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, keylen); + ahash_request_set_crypt(hp->md5_req, &sg, NULL, keylen); ++ ++ /* tcp_md5_do_add() might change key->key under us */ + return crypto_ahash_update(hp->md5_req); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +@@ -995,12 +995,18 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons + + key = tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact(sk, addr, family, prefixlen); + if (key) { +- /* Pre-existing entry - just update that one. */ ++ /* Pre-existing entry - just update that one. ++ * Note that the key might be used concurrently. ++ */ + memcpy(key->key, newkey, newkeylen); + +- smp_wmb(); /* pairs with smp_rmb() in tcp_md5_hash_key() */ ++ /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in tcp_md5_hash_key(). ++ * Also note that a reader could catch new key->keylen value ++ * but old key->key[], this is the reason we use __GFP_ZERO ++ * at sock_kmalloc() time below these lines. ++ */ ++ WRITE_ONCE(key->keylen, newkeylen); + +- key->keylen = newkeylen; + return 0; + } + +@@ -1016,7 +1022,7 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons + rcu_assign_pointer(tp->md5sig_info, md5sig); + } + +- key = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key), gfp); ++ key = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key), gfp | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!key) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool()) {