From: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date: Sun, 4 Jan 2009 23:15:42 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Another fun openbsd warning fix.  On ioerror's computer at least, they redefined... 
X-Git-Tag: tor-0.2.1.10-alpha~20
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=765bb14f69e1d8a7998025a690ef4ca3dc56d756;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git

Another fun openbsd warning fix.  On ioerror's computer at least, they redefined an unsigned field in zlib.h to be signed.  I am quite sure this makes me more secure somehow.

svn:r17892
---

diff --git a/src/common/torgzip.c b/src/common/torgzip.c
index 0347d59eb4..180c1e6dfd 100644
--- a/src/common/torgzip.c
+++ b/src/common/torgzip.c
@@ -140,7 +140,16 @@ tor_gzip_compress(char **out, size_t *out_len,
   }
  done:
   *out_len = stream->total_out;
-  if (stream->total_out > out_size + 4097) {
+#ifdef OPENBSD
+  /* "Hey Rocky!  Watch me change an unsigned field to a signed field in a
+   *    third-party API!"
+   * "Oh, that trick will just make people do unsafe casts to the unsigned
+   *    type in their cross-platform code!"
+   * "Don't be foolish.  I'm _sure_ they'll have the good sense to make sure
+   *    the newly unsigned field isn't negative." */
+  tor_assert(stream->total_out >= 0);
+#endif
+  if (((size_t)stream->total_out) > out_size + 4097) {
     /* If we're wasting more than 4k, don't. */
     *out = tor_realloc(*out, stream->total_out + 1);
   }