From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2003 11:45:09 +0000 (+0000) Subject: new srp draft. X-Git-Tag: gnutls_0_9_6~33 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=78c73f40ea50be1d652ab30b29aba09629fcc4d5;p=thirdparty%2Fgnutls.git new srp draft. --- diff --git a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-04.txt b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-04.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 093f9ec87f..0000000000 --- a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-04.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,730 +0,0 @@ - - - -Transport Layer Security Working D. Taylor -Group Forge Research Pty Ltd -Internet-Draft November 29, 2002 -Expires: May 30, 2003 - - - Using SRP for TLS Authentication - draft-ietf-tls-srp-04 - -Status of this Memo - - This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with - all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. - - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that - other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- - Drafts. - - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months - and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any - time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference - material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// - www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - - This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2003. - -Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. - -Abstract - - This memo presents a technique for using the SRP [2] (Secure Remote - Password) protocol as an authentication method for the TLS - [1](Transport Layer Security) protocol. - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 1] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -Table of Contents - - 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. SRP Authentication in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.1 Modifications to the TLS Handshake Sequence . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.1.1 Message Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.1.2 Session Re-use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.2 SRP Verifier Message Digest Selection . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3.1 Client hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3.2 Server certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3.3 Server key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3.4 Client key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 2.4 Calculating the Pre-master Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 2.5 Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 2.6 New Message Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2.6.1 ExtensionType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2.6.2 Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2.6.3 Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2.6.4 Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 2] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -1. Introduction - - At the time of writing, TLS uses public key certificiates with RSA/ - DSA digital signatures, or Kerberos, for authentication. - - These authentication methods do not seem well suited to the - applications now being adapted to use TLS (IMAP [4], FTP [6], or - TELNET [7], for example). Given these protocols (and others like - them) are designed to use the user name and password method of - authentication, being able to safely use user names and passwords to - authenticate the TLS connection provides a much easier route to - additional security than implementing a public key infrastructure in - certain situations. - - SRP is an authentication method that allows the use of user names and - passwords over unencrypted channels without revealing the password to - an eavesdropper. SRP also supplies a shared secret at the end of the - authetication sequence that can be used to generate encryption keys. - - This document describes the use of the SRP authentication method for - TLS. - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 3] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -2. SRP Authentication in TLS - -2.1 Modifications to the TLS Handshake Sequence - - The advent of SRP-6 [3] allows the SRP protocol to be implemented - using the standard sequence of handshake messages defined in [1]. - - The parameters to various messages are given in the following - diagram. - -2.1.1 Message Sequence - - Handshake Message Flow for SRP Authentication - - Client Server - | | - Client Hello (I) ------------------------> | - | <---------------------------- Server Hello - | <---------------------------- Certificate* - | <---------------------------- Server Key Exchange (N, g, s, B) - | <---------------------------- Server Hello Done - Client Key Exchange (A) -----------------> | - [Change cipher spec] | - Finished --------------------------------> | - | [Change cipher spec] - | <---------------------------- Finished - | | - Application Data <--------------> Application Data - - * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not - always sent. - - The identifiers given after each message name refer to the SRP - variables included in that message. The variables I, N, g, s, A, and - B are defined in [3]. - - An extended client hello message, as defined in [8], is used to send - the client identifier (the user name). - - Servers MAY add an SRP extension to the server hello message. For - the cipher suites defined in this document no information is carried - in the SRP extension in the server hello message. The option to add - an SRP extension to the server hello message is given in case it is - required in future. - -2.1.2 Session Re-use - - The short handshake mechanism for re-using sessions for new - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 4] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - - connections, and renegotiating keys for existing connections will - still work with the SRP authentication mechanism and handshake. - - When a client attemps to re-use a session that uses SRP - authentication, it MUST include the SRP extension carrying the user - name (I) in the client hello message, in case the server cannot or - will not allow re-use of the session, meaning a full handshake - sequence is required. - - If the server does agree to re-use an existing session the server - MUST ignore the information in the SRP extension of the client hello - message, except for its inclusion in the finished message hashes. - This is to ensure attackers cannot replace the authenticated identity - without supplying the proper authentication information. - -2.2 SRP Verifier Message Digest Selection - - Implementations conforming to this document MUST use the SHA-1 - message digest with the SRP algorithm. - -2.3 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents - - This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message - contents when SRP is being used for authentication. The definitions - of the new message contents and the on-the-wire changes are given in - Section 2.6. - -2.3.1 Client hello - - The user name is appended to the standard client hello message using - the hello message extension mechanism defined in [8]. - -2.3.2 Server certificate - - The server MUST send a certificate if it agrees to an SRP cipher - suite that requires the server to provide additional authentication - in the form of a digital signature. See Section 2.5 for details of - which ciphersuites defined in this document require a server - certificate to be sent. - - Because the server's certificate is only used for generating a - digital signature in SRP cipher suites, the certificate sent MUST - contain a public key that can be used for generating digital - signatures. - -2.3.3 Server key exchange - - The server key exchange message contains the prime (N), the generator - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 5] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - - (g), and the salt value (s) read from the SRP password file based on - the value of (I) received in the client hello extension. The server - key exchange message also contains the server's public key (B). - - If the server has sent a certificate message, the server key exchange - message MUST be signed. - -2.3.4 Client key exchange - - The client key exchange message carries the client's public key (A). - -2.4 Calculating the Pre-master Secret - - The shared secret resulting from the SRP calculations (S) (defined in - [2]) is used as the pre-master secret. - - The finished messages perform the same function as the client and - server evidence messages (M1 and M2) specified in [2]. If either the - client or the server calculate an incorrect value, the finished - messages will not be understood, and the connection will be dropped - as specified in [1]. - -2.5 Cipher Suite Definitions - - The following cipher suites are added by this draft. The usage of - AES ciphersuites is as defined in [5]. - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x50 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x51 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x52 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x53 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x54 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x55 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x56 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x57 }; - - CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x58 }; - - Cipher suites that do not include a digitial signature algorithm - identifier assume the server is authenticated by its possesion of the - SRP database. - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 6] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - - Cipher suites that begin with TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA or TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS - require the server to send a certificate message containing a - certificate with the specified type of public key, and to sign the - server key exchange message using a matching private key. - - Implementations conforming to this specification MUST implement the - TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite, SHOULD implement the - TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - ciphersuites, and MAY implement the remaining ciphersuites. - -2.6 New Message Structures - - This section shows the structure of the messages passed during a - handshake that uses SRP for authentication. The representation - language used is the same as that used in [1]. - -2.6.1 ExtensionType - - A new value, "srp(6)", has been added to the enumerated - ExtensionType, defined in [8]. This value MUST be used as the - extension number for the SRP extension. - -2.6.2 Client Hello - - The user name (I) is encoded in an SRPExtension structure, and sent - in an extended client hello message, using an extension of type - "srp". - - - enum { client, server } ClientOrServerExtension; - - struct { - select(ClientOrServerExtension) { - case client: - opaque srp_I<1..2^8-1>; - case server: - /* empty struct */ - } - } SRPExtension; - - -2.6.3 Server Key Exchange - - When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the server's - SRP parameters are sent in the server key exchange message, encoded - in a ServerSRPParams structure. - - If a certificate is sent to the client the server key exchange - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 7] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - - message must be signed. The following table gives the - SignatureAlgorithm value to be used for each ciphersuite. - - Ciphersuite SignatureAlgorithm - - TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA anonymous - - TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA rsa - - TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA dsa - - TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA anonymous - - TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA rsa - - TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA dsa - - TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA anonymous - - TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA rsa - - TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA dsa - - - struct { - select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { - case diffie_hellman: - ServerDHParams params; - Signature signed_params; - case rsa: - ServerRSAParams params; - Signature signed_params; - case srp: /* new entry */ - ServerSRPParams params; - Signature signed_params; - }; - } ServerKeyExchange; - - struct { - opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1>; - opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1>; - opaque srp_s<1..2^8-1> - opaque srp_B<1..2^16-1>; - } ServerSRPParams; /* SRP parameters */ - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 8] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -2.6.4 Client Key Exchange - - When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the client's - ephemeral public key (A) is sent in the client key exchange message, - encoded in an ClientSRPPublic structure. - - An extra value, srp, has been added to the enumerated - KeyExchangeAlgorithm, originally defined in TLS [1]. - - struct { - select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { - case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret; - case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic; - case srp: ClientSRPPublic; /* new entry */ - } exchange_keys; - } ClientKeyExchange; - - enum { rsa, diffie_hellman, srp } KeyExchangeAlgorithm; - - struct { - opaque srp_A<1..2^16-1>; - } ClientSRPPublic; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 9] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -3. Security Considerations - - If an attacker is able to steal the SRP verifier file, the attacker - can masquerade as the real host. Filesystem based X.509 certificate - installations are vulnerable to a similar attack unless the server's - certificate is issued from a PKI that maintains revocation lists, and - the client TLS code can both contact the PKI and make use of the - revocation list. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 10] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -References - - [1] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol", RFC 2246, January - 1999. - - [2] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System", RFC - 2945, September 2000. - - [3] Wu, T., "SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure - Remote Password Protocol", October 2002. - - [4] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595, June - 1999. - - [5] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for - Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 3268, June 2002. - - [6] Ford-Hutchinson, P., Carpenter, M., Hudson, T., Murray, E. and - V. Wiegand, "Securing FTP with TLS", draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl- - 09 (work in progress), April 2002. - - [7] Boe, M. and J. Altman, "TLS-based Telnet Security", draft-ietf- - tn3270e-telnet-tls-06 (work in progress), April 2002. - - [8] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J. and T. - Wright, "TLS Extensions", draft-ietf-tls-extensions-05 (work in - progress), July 2002. - - -Author's Address - - David Taylor - Forge Research Pty Ltd - - EMail: DavidTaylor@forge.com.au - URI: http://www.forge.com.au/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 11] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -Appendix A. Acknowledgements - - Thanks to all on the IETF tls mailing list for ideas and analysis. - - Thanks to Tom Wu for adapting the SRP protocol so it fits the - standard TLS handshake message sequence. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 12] - -Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2002 - - -Full Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. - - This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to - others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it - or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published - and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any - kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this - document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing - the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other - Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of - developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for - copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be - followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than - English. - - The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be - revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. - - This document and the information contained herein is provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING - TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING - BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION - HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - -Acknowledgement - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the - Internet Society. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Taylor Expires May 30, 2003 [Page 13] - - diff --git a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-05.txt b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-05.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a90491d6d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-05.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1122 @@ + + + +TLS Working Group D. Taylor +Internet-Draft Forge Research Pty Ltd +Expires: December 16, 2003 T. Wu + Arcot Systems + N. Mavroyanopoulos + T. Perrin + June 17, 2003 + + + Using SRP for TLS Authentication + draft-ietf-tls-srp-05 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other + groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// + www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This Internet-Draft will expire on December 16, 2003. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This memo presents a technique for using the SRP [2] (Secure Remote + Password) protocol as an authentication method for the TLS + [1](Transport Layer Security) protocol. + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. SRP Authentication in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.1 Modifications to the TLS Handshake Sequence . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.1.1 Message Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.1.2 Session Re-use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.2 Text Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.3 SRP Verifier Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.4 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.4.1 Client hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.4.2 Server certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 2.4.3 Server key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 2.4.4 Client key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.5 Calculating the Pre-master Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.6 Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.7 New Message Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.7.1 ExtensionType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.7.2 Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.7.3 Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.7.4 Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 2.8 Error Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + A. SRP Group Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 19 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +1. Introduction + + At the time of writing TLS uses public key certificates, or Kerberos, + for authentication. + + These authentication methods do not seem well suited to the + applications now being adapted to use TLS (IMAP [4], FTP [8], or + TELNET [9], for example). Given that these protocols (and others like + them) are designed to use the user name and password method of + authentication, being able to safely use user names and passwords to + authenticate the TLS connection provides a much easier route to + additional security than implementing a public key infrastructure in + certain situations. + + SRP is an authentication method that allows the use of user names and + passwords over unencrypted channels without revealing the password to + an eavesdropper. SRP also supplies a shared secret at the end of the + authentication sequence that can be used to generate encryption keys. + + This document describes the use of the SRP authentication method for + TLS. + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +2. SRP Authentication in TLS + +2.1 Modifications to the TLS Handshake Sequence + + The advent of SRP-6 [3] allows the SRP protocol to be implemented + using the standard sequence of handshake messages defined in [1]. + + The parameters to various messages are given in the following + diagram. + +2.1.1 Message Sequence + + Handshake Message Flow for SRP Authentication + + Client Server + | | + Client Hello (I) ------------------------> | + | <---------------------------- Server Hello + | <---------------------------- Certificate* + | <---------------------------- Server Key Exchange (N, g, s, B) + | <---------------------------- Server Hello Done + Client Key Exchange (A) -----------------> | + [Change cipher spec] | + Finished --------------------------------> | + | [Change cipher spec] + | <---------------------------- Finished + | | + Application Data <--------------> Application Data + + * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not + always sent. + + Figure 1 + + The identifiers given after each message name refer to the SRP + variables included in that message. The variables I, N, g, s, A, and + B are defined in [3]. + + An extended client hello message, as defined in [10], is used to send + the client identifier (the user name). + +2.1.2 Session Re-use + + The short handshake mechanism for re-using sessions for new + connections, and renegotiating keys for existing connections will + still work with the SRP authentication mechanism and handshake. + + When a client attemps to re-use a session that uses SRP + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + authentication, it MUST include the SRP extension carrying the user + name (I) in the client hello message, in case the server cannot or + will not allow re-use of the session, meaning a full handshake + sequence is required. + + If the server does agree to re-use an existing session the server + MUST ignore the information in the SRP extension of the client hello + message, except for its inclusion in the finished message hashes. + This is to ensure attackers cannot replace the authenticated identity + without supplying the proper authentication information. + +2.2 Text Preparation + + The user name and password strings shall be UTF-8 encoded Unicode, + prepared using the "SASLprep" [7] profile of "stringprep" [6]. + +2.3 SRP Verifier Creation + + The verifier is created by applying the SRP-SHA1 mechanism as + described in RFC 2945 [2] to the user name and password. + +2.4 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents + + This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message + contents when SRP is being used for authentication. The definitions + of the new message contents and the on-the-wire changes are given in + Section 2.7. + +2.4.1 Client hello + + The user name is appended to the standard client hello message using + the hello message extension mechanism defined in [10]. + + The client may offer SRP ciphersuites in the hello message but omit + the SRP extension. If the server would like to select an SRP + ciphersuite in this case, the server will return a + missing_srp_username alert (see Section 2.8) immediately after + processing the client hello message. This alert signals the client + to resend the hello message, this time with the SRP extension. + Through this idiom, the client can advertise that it supports SRP, + but not have to prompt the user for his user name and password, nor + expose the user name in the clear, unless necessary. + + If the server doesn't have a verifier for the given user name, the + server MAY abort the handshake with an unknown_srp_username alert + (see Section 2.8). Alternatively, if the server wishes to hide the + fact that this user name doesn't have a verifier, the server MAY + simulate the protocol as if a verifier existed, but then reject the + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + client's finished message as if the password was incorrect. + + To simulate the existence of an entry for each user name, the server + must consistently return the same salt (s) and group (g, N) values + for the same user name. For example, the server could store a secret + "seed key" and then use hmac-sha1(seed_key, "salt" || user_name) to + generate the salts. For B, the server can return a random value + between 2 and N-2 inclusive. However, the server should take care to + simulate computation delays. One way to do this is to generate a + fake verifier using the "seed key" approach, and then proceed with + the protocol as usual. + +2.4.2 Server certificate + + The server MUST send a certificate if it agrees to an SRP cipher + suite that requires the server to provide additional authentication + in the form of a digital signature. See Section 2.6 for details of + which ciphersuites defined in this document require a server + certificate to be sent. + + Because the server's certificate is only used for generating a + digital signature in SRP cipher suites, the certificate sent MUST + contain a public key that can be used for verifying digital + signatures. + +2.4.3 Server key exchange + + The server key exchange message contains the prime (N), the generator + (g), and the salt value (s) read from the SRP password file based on + the value of (I) received in the client hello extension. The server + key exchange message also contains the server's public value (B). + + If the server has sent a certificate message, the server key exchange + message MUST be signed. + + The group parameters (g, N) sent in this message MUST have N as a + safe prime (a prime of the form N=2q+1, where q is also prime), and g + as a generator % N. The SRP group parameters in Appendix A are + proven to have these properties, so the client SHOULD accept any + parameters from this Appendix which have large enough moduli to meet + his security requirements. The client MAY accept other group + parameters from the server, either by prior arrangement, or by + checking the parameters himself. + + To check that N is a safe prime, the client should use some method + such as performing 64 iterations of the Miller-Rabin test with random + bases (selected from 2 to N-2) on both N and q (by performing 64 + iterations, the probability of a false positive is no more than + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + 2^-128). To check that g is a generator % N, the client can check + that g^q equals -1 % N. Performing these checks may be + time-consuming: after checking new parameters, the client may want to + add them to a known-good list. + + Group parameters that are not accepted via one of the above methods + MUST be rejected with an illegal_parameter alert. + + The client MUST abort the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert + if B % N is equal to zero. + +2.4.4 Client key exchange + + The client key exchange message carries the client's public value + (A). + + The server MUST abort the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert + if A % N is equal to zero, 1, or -1. + +2.5 Calculating the Pre-master Secret + + The shared secret resulting from the SRP calculations (S) (defined in + [2]) is used as the pre-master secret. + + The finished messages perform the same function as the client and + server evidence messages (M1 and M2) specified in [2]. If either the + client or the server calculate an incorrect value, the finished + messages will not be understood, and the connection will be dropped + as specified in [1]. + +2.6 Cipher Suite Definitions + + The following cipher suites are added by this draft. The usage of AES + ciphersuites is as defined in [5]. + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x50 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x51 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x52 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x53 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x54 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x55 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x56 }; + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x57 }; + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x58 }; + + Cipher suites that do not include a digital signature algorithm + identifier assume the server is authenticated by its possesion of the + SRP verifier. + + Cipher suites that begin with TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA or TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS + require the server to send a certificate message containing a + certificate with the specified type of public key, and to sign the + server key exchange message using a matching private key. + + Implementations conforming to this specification MUST implement the + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite, SHOULD implement the + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + ciphersuites, and MAY implement the remaining ciphersuites. + +2.7 New Message Structures + + This section shows the structure of the messages passed during a + handshake that uses SRP for authentication. The representation + language used is the same as that used in [1]. + +2.7.1 ExtensionType + + A new value, "srp(6)", has been added to the enumerated + ExtensionType, defined in [10]. This value MUST be used as the + extension number for the SRP extension. + +2.7.2 Client Hello + + The "extension_data" field of the srp extension SHALL contain: opaque + srp_I<1..2^8-1> where srp_I is the user name. + +2.7.3 Server Key Exchange + + When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the server's + SRP parameters are sent in the server key exchange message, encoded + in a ServerSRPParams structure. + + If a certificate is sent to the client the server key exchange + message must be signed. The following table gives the + SignatureAlgorithm value to be used for each ciphersuite. + + Ciphersuite SignatureAlgorithm + + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA anonymous + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA rsa + + TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA dsa + + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA anonymous + + TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA rsa + + TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA dsa + + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA anonymous + + TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA rsa + + TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA dsa + + + struct { + select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + case diffie_hellman: + ServerDHParams params; + Signature signed_params; + case rsa: + ServerRSAParams params; + Signature signed_params; + case srp: /* new entry */ + ServerSRPParams params; + Signature signed_params; + }; + } ServerKeyExchange; + + struct { + opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1>; + opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1>; + opaque srp_s<1..2^8-1> + opaque srp_B<1..2^16-1>; + } ServerSRPParams; /* SRP parameters */ + + +2.7.4 Client Key Exchange + + When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the client's + public value (A) is sent in the client key exchange message, encoded + in an ClientSRPPublic structure. + + An extra value, srp, has been added to the enumerated + KeyExchangeAlgorithm, originally defined in TLS [1]. + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + struct { + select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret; + case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic; + case srp: ClientSRPPublic; /* new entry */ + } exchange_keys; + } ClientKeyExchange; + + enum { rsa, diffie_hellman, srp } KeyExchangeAlgorithm; + + struct { + opaque srp_A<1..2^16-1>; + } ClientSRPPublic; + + +2.8 Error Alerts + + Two new error alerts are defined: + + o "unknown_srp_username" (120) - this alert MAY be sent by a server + that receives an unknown user name. This message is always fatal. + + o "missing_srp_username" (121) - this alert MUST be sent by a server + which would like to select an offered SRP ciphersuite, if the SRP + extension is absent from the client's hello message. This alert + may be fatal or a warning. If it is a warning, the server MUST + restart its handshake protocol without closing the TLS session, + and the client MAY either treat the warning as fatal and close the + session, or send the server a new hello message on the same + session. By sending a new hello on the same session, the client + can use the idiom described in 2.3.1 without terminating a current + TLS session which might be protecting the handshake (and thus the + user name). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +3. Security Considerations + + If an attacker is able to steal the SRP verifier file, the attacker + can masquerade as the real server, and can also use dictionary + attacks to recover client passwords. Filesystem based X.509 + certificate installations are vulnerable to a similar attack unless + the server's certificate is issued from a PKI that maintains + revocation lists, and the client TLS code can both contact the PKI + and make use of the revocation list. + + The client's user name is sent in the clear in the Client Hello + message. To avoid sending the user name in the clear, the client + could first open a conventional anonymous, or server-authenticated + session, then renegotiate an SRP-authenticated session with the + handshake protected by the first session. + + The checks described in Section 2.4.3 and Section 2.4.4 on the + received values for A and B are crucial for security and MUST be + performed. + + The private exponentials (a and b in [2]) SHOULD be at least 256 bit + random numbers, to give approximately 128 bits of security against + certain methods of calculating discrete logarithms [12]. Increasing + the length of these exponentials may increase security, but it also + increases the computation cost." + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +References + + [1] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol", RFC 2246, January + 1999. + + [2] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System", RFC + 2945, September 2000. + + [3] Wu, T., "SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure + Remote Password Protocol", October 2002. + + [4] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595, + June 1999. + + [5] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for + Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 3268, June 2002. + + [6] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized + Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002. + + [7] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and + passwords", draft-ietf-tn3270e-telnet-tls-06 (work in + progress), February 2003. + + [8] Ford-Hutchinson, P., Carpenter, M., Hudson, T., Murray, E. and + V. Wiegand, "Securing FTP with TLS", + draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-09 (work in progress), April 2002. + + [9] Boe, M. and J. Altman, "TLS-based Telnet Security", + draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-00 (work in progress), April 2002. + + [10] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J. and + T. Wright, "TLS Extensions", draft-ietf-tls-extensions-06 (work + in progress), February 2003. + + [11] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) + Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC + 3526, May 2003. + + [12] van Oorschot, P. and M. Wiener, "On Diffie-Hellman Key + Agreement with Short Exponents", 1996. + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +Authors' Addresses + + David Taylor + Forge Research Pty Ltd + + EMail: DavidTaylor@forge.com.au + URI: http://www.forge.com.au/ + + + Tom Wu + Arcot Systems + + EMail: tom@arcot.com + URI: http://www.arcot.com/ + + + Nikos Mavroyanopoulos + + EMail: nmav@gnutls.org + URI: http://www.gnutls.org/ + + + Trevor Perrin + + EMail: trevp@trevp.net + URI: http://trevp.net/ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +Appendix A. SRP Group Parameters + + The 1024, 1536, and 2048-bit groups are taken from software developed + by Tom Wu and Eugene Jhong for the Stanford SRP distribution, and + subsequently proven to be prime. The larger primes are taken from + [11], but generators have been calculated that are primitive roots of + N, unlike the generators in [11]. + + The 1024, 1536, and 2048-bit groups MUST be supported. + + 1. 1024-bit Group + + The hexadecimal value is: + + EEAF0AB9 ADB38DD6 9C33F80A FA8FC5E8 60726187 75FF3C0B 9EA2314C + 9C256576 D674DF74 96EA81D3 383B4813 D692C6E0 E0D5D8E2 50B98BE4 + 8E495C1D 6089DAD1 5DC7D7B4 6154D6B6 CE8EF4AD 69B15D49 82559B29 + 7BCF1885 C529F566 660E57EC 68EDBC3C 05726CC0 2FD4CBF4 976EAA9A + FD5138FE 8376435B 9FC61D2F C0EB06E3 + + The generator is: 2. + + 2. 1536-bit Group + + The hexadecimal value is: + + 9DEF3CAF B939277A B1F12A86 17A47BBB DBA51DF4 99AC4C80 BEEEA961 + 4B19CC4D 5F4F5F55 6E27CBDE 51C6A94B E4607A29 1558903B A0D0F843 + 80B655BB 9A22E8DC DF028A7C EC67F0D0 8134B1C8 B9798914 9B609E0B + E3BAB63D 47548381 DBC5B1FC 764E3F4B 53DD9DA1 158BFD3E 2B9C8CF5 + 6EDF0195 39349627 DB2FD53D 24B7C486 65772E43 7D6C7F8C E442734A + F7CCB7AE 837C264A E3A9BEB8 7F8A2FE9 B8B5292E 5A021FFF 5E91479E + 8CE7A28C 2442C6F3 15180F93 499A234D CF76E3FE D135F9BB + + The generator is: 2. + + 3. 2048-bit Group + + The hexadecimal value is: + + AC6BDB41 324A9A9B F166DE5E 1389582F AF72B665 1987EE07 FC319294 + 3DB56050 A37329CB B4A099ED 8193E075 7767A13D D52312AB 4B03310D + CD7F48A9 DA04FD50 E8083969 EDB767B0 CF609517 9A163AB3 661A05FB + D5FAAAE8 2918A996 2F0B93B8 55F97993 EC975EEA A80D740A DBF4FF74 + 7359D041 D5C33EA7 1D281E44 6B14773B CA97B43A 23FB8016 76BD207A + 436C6481 F1D2B907 8717461A 5B9D32E6 88F87748 544523B5 24B0D57D + 5EA77A27 75D2ECFA 032CFBDB F52FB378 61602790 04E57AE6 AF874E73 + 03CE5329 9CCC041C 7BC308D8 2A5698F3 A8D0C382 71AE35F8 E9DBFBB6 + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 14] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + 94B5C803 D89F7AE4 35DE236D 525F5475 9B65E372 FCD68EF2 0FA7111F + 9E4AFF73 + + The generator is: 2. + + 4. 3072-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^3072 - 2^3008 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^2942 pi] + + 1690314 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A93AD2CA FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + + The generator is: 5. + + 5. 4096-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^4096 - 2^4032 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^3966 pi] + + 240904 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 15] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 + 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB + 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 + 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 + D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34063199 + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + + The generator is: 5. + + 6. 6144-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^6144 - 2^6080 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^6014 pi] + + 929484 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 + 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB + 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 + 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 + D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492 + 36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406 + AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918 + DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 + 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 + F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F + BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA + CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B + B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632 + 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E + 6DCC4024 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + + The generator is: 5. + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + 7. 8192-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^8192 - 2^8128 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^8062 pi] + + 4743158 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 + 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB + 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 + 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 + D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492 + 36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406 + AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918 + DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 + 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 + F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F + BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA + CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B + B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632 + 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E + 6DBE1159 74A3926F 12FEE5E4 38777CB6 A932DF8C D8BEC4D0 73B931BA + 3BC832B6 8D9DD300 741FA7BF 8AFC47ED 2576F693 6BA42466 3AAB639C + 5AE4F568 3423B474 2BF1C978 238F16CB E39D652D E3FDB8BE FC848AD9 + 22222E04 A4037C07 13EB57A8 1A23F0C7 3473FC64 6CEA306B 4BCBC886 + 2F8385DD FA9D4B7F A2C087E8 79683303 ED5BDD3A 062B3CF5 B3A278A6 + 6D2A13F8 3F44F82D DF310EE0 74AB6A36 4597E899 A0255DC1 64F31CC5 + 0846851D F9AB4819 5DED7EA1 B1D510BD 7EE74D73 FAF36BC3 1ECFA268 + 359046F4 EB879F92 4009438B 481C6CD7 889A002E D5EE382B C9190DA6 + FC026E47 9558E447 5677E9AA 9E3050E2 765694DF C81F56E8 80B96E71 + 60C980DD 98EDD3DF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + + The generator is: 19 (decimal). + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +Appendix B. Acknowledgements + + Thanks to all on the IETF tls mailing list for ideas and analysis. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + +Intellectual Property Statement + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it + has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the + IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and + standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of + claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of + licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to + obtain a general license or permission for the use of such + proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can + be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive + Director. + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2003 + + + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + +Acknowledgment + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 16, 2003 [Page 20] + + diff --git a/doc/tex/gnutls.bib b/doc/tex/gnutls.bib index be8299d972..f28a2db842 100644 --- a/doc/tex/gnutls.bib +++ b/doc/tex/gnutls.bib @@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ @Misc{TLSSRP, author = "Taylor, D.", title = "Using SRP for TLS Authentication", - month = "September", - year = {2002}, - note = "Internet draft, work in progress. Available from http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-tls-srp-04.txt", - url = "http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-tls-srp-04.txt" + month = "June", + year = {2003}, + note = "Internet draft, work in progress. Available from http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-tls-srp-05.txt", + url = "http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-tls-srp-05.txt" } @Misc{TLSPGP, @@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ @Misc{TLSCOMP, author = "Hollenbeck, S.", title = "Transport Layer Security Protocol Compression Methods", - month = "October", - year = {2002}, + month = "May", + year = {2003}, note = "Internet draft, work in progress. Available from http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-tls-compression-05.txt", url = "http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-tls-compression-05.txt" }