From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 07:48:07 +0000 (+0200)
Subject: BUG: hlua: fix stack overflow in httpclient headers conversion
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a03120e228abc654d1f0d5bcb0240c6972721735;p=thirdparty%2Fhaproxy.git

BUG: hlua: fix stack overflow in httpclient headers conversion

hlua_httpclient_table_to_hdrs() declares a VLA of size
global.tune.max_http_hdr (default 101) on the stack but never checks
hdr_num against that bound. A Lua script that supplies a header table
with more than 101 values writes struct http_hdr entries (two ist =
two heap pointers + two lengths) past the end of the VLA, smashing
the stack frame.

Trigger from any Lua action/task/service:

    local hc = core.httpclient()
    local v = {}
    for i = 1, 300 do v[i] = "x" end
    hc:get{ url = "http://127.0.0.1/", headers = { ["X"] = v } }

Each out-of-bounds entry writes a heap pointer (controllable
allocation contents via istdup) plus an attacker-chosen length onto
the stack, overwriting the saved return address. With no stack
canary, this is direct RCE; with a canary, it requires a leak first.

Reachable from any deployment that loads Lua scripts. While Lua
scripts are nominally trusted, this turns "can edit Lua" into "can
execute arbitrary native code", which is a meaningful boundary in
many setups (Lua sandbox escape).

This must be backported as far as the httpclient Lua API exists.
---

diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c
index 6e56583df..c66849c48 100644
--- a/src/hlua.c
+++ b/src/hlua.c
@@ -8069,6 +8069,11 @@ struct http_hdr *hlua_httpclient_table_to_hdrs(lua_State *L)
 				goto next_value;
 			}
 
+			if (hdr_num >= global.tune.max_http_hdr) {
+				lua_pop(L, 2);
+				goto skip_headers;
+			}
+
 			v = lua_tolstring(L, -1, &vlen);
 			value = ist2(v, vlen);
 			name = ist2(n, nlen);