From: Affan Shaikhsurab <51104750+AffanShaikhsurab@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2025 21:37:05 +0000 (+0530)
Subject: gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name sanitization (#130537)
X-Git-Tag: v3.14.0a6~114
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a3990df6121880e8c67824a101bb1316de232898;p=thirdparty%2FPython%2Fcpython.git

gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name sanitization (#130537)

Add a note to the `zipfile.Path` class documentation clarifying that it does not sanitize filenames. This emphasizes the caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize inputs, especially when handling untrusted ZIP archives, to prevent path traversal vulnerabilities. The note also references the `extract` and `extractall` methods for comparison and suggests using `os.path.abspath` and `os.path.commonpath` for safe filename resolution.
---

diff --git a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
index afe1cd5c75fc..0e6439f75334 100644
--- a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
@@ -554,6 +554,14 @@ Path Objects
    e.g. 'dir/file.txt', 'dir/', or ''. Defaults to the empty string,
    indicating the root.
 
+   .. note::
+      The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike
+      the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the
+      caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
+      vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling
+      untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath`
+      and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.
+
 Path objects expose the following features of :mod:`pathlib.Path`
 objects: