From: Roger Dingledine Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2007 05:54:34 +0000 (+0000) Subject: point out a problem from r9576 X-Git-Tag: tor-0.1.2.8-beta~24 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a5af49afc39fef581a79ca6d30aa64ba38858557;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git point out a problem from r9576 svn:r9631 --- diff --git a/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt b/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt index 55e3ce03d7..c3aba0fd8d 100644 --- a/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt +++ b/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt @@ -175,8 +175,12 @@ see tor-design.pdf. the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection. All parties SHOULD reject connections to or from ORs that have malformed - or missing certificates. ORs SHOULD NOT reject incoming connections from - OPs with malformed or missing certificates. + or missing certificates. + [XXX How can we recognize that it's an OR if it's an incoming connection + with malformed/missing certs? Should we change the above to just "to + ORs"? -RD] + ORs SHOULD NOT reject incoming connections from OPs with malformed + or missing certificates. [Before version 0.1.2.8-rc, ORs rejected incoming connections from ORs and OPs alike if their certificates were missing or malformed.]