From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:57:43 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: 3.15-stable patches
X-Git-Tag: v3.4.94~9
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b60f9da6932ea7524ceecbb1a92a2389fa7b1a7e;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git

3.15-stable patches

added patches:
	auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch
---

diff --git a/queue-3.15/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch b/queue-3.15/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1081c919ea6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-3.15/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400
+Subject: auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
+
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+
+commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.
+
+Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
+
+This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
+
+eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
+audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
+
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/auditsc.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
++++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
+@@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_tas
+ 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+ }
+ 
++static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
++{
++	int word, bit;
++
++	if (val > 0xffffffff)
++		return false;
++
++	word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
++	if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
++		return false;
++
++	bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
++
++	return rule->mask[word] & bit;
++}
++
+ /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
+  * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
+  * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
+@@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
+ 
+ 	rcu_read_lock();
+ 	if (!list_empty(list)) {
+-		int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+-		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+-
+ 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+-			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
++			if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
+ 			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+ 					       &state, false)) {
+ 				rcu_read_unlock();
+@@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
+ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ 				   struct audit_names *n,
+ 				   struct audit_context *ctx) {
+-	int word, bit;
+ 	int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
+ 	struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
+ 	struct audit_entry *e;
+ 	enum audit_state state;
+ 
+-	word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+-	bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+-
+ 	if (list_empty(list))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+-		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
++		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
+ 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
+ 			ctx->current_state = state;
+ 			return 1;
diff --git a/queue-3.15/series b/queue-3.15/series
index f82ec47cda3..11772d1f66d 100644
--- a/queue-3.15/series
+++ b/queue-3.15/series
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 fs-userns-change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_uidgid.patch
 lock_parent-don-t-step-on-stale-d_parent-of-all-but-freed-one.patch
+auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch