From: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2003 07:35:58 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Fixes to last checkin
X-Git-Tag: tor-0.0.2pre14~100
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=c72d57c92e3fecd1ede89c76cdac7e3dfec0b977;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git

Fixes to last checkin


svn:r750
---

diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex
index 67be8bffba..b2dcd28e49 100644
--- a/doc/tor-design.tex
+++ b/doc/tor-design.tex
@@ -1135,8 +1135,8 @@ We also worry about attacks to deceive a
 client about the router membership list, topology, or current network
 state. Such \emph{partitioning attacks} on client knowledge help an
 adversary to efficiently deploy resources
-when attacking a target.
-% XXX Cite for partitioning attacks?
+when attacking a target \cite{minion-design}.
+
 
 Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known onion routers to
 track changes in network topology and node state, including keys and
@@ -1896,8 +1896,7 @@ retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently
 download a description of the entire network state every 15
 minutes.  As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we
 may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive
-incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are
-cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
+incremental updates to directory state.
 
 \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
 Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous